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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The large share of employment in the service sector and growing services trade present the 
potential for trade in services to have a significant impact on the U.S. economy and highlight the 
importance of being able to analyze the impact.  
 
International trade theory and previous empirical work on the manufacturing sector stress several 
key considerations for understanding the impact of globalization: 
 
1) The prevalence (how many activities?), scale (how much is being traded?), and direction 
(who is trading with whom?)of trade in services. 
2) How trade in services evolves over time. 
3) The factor intensities used in services provision. 
4) The factor intensities across locations.  
5) Firm-level heterogeneity (in size, factor intensities, productivity, trade activity) within 
and across industries and countries. 
 
Currently available data on the service sector do not support these data needs. Two broad areas 
require improvement: 
 
1) Increased industry and geographic detail in trade in services statistics. Current trade in 
services statistics are not detailed enough to support robust empirical analysis. Increasing 
the detail will require increased resources to collect information from larger sample of 
firms, improved access to an adequate sampling frame to support representative 
sampling, and lower reporting thresholds.  
2) More detailed information on inputs used services production in the United States. 
Current data on service sector production within the United States do not provide enough 
information on the factor inputs used in production. More information should be 
collected on skill intensity, capital intensity, and purchased services. These data should 
be collected at the establishment level to the extent possible to increase the industry and 
geographic detail available.  
 
Improving our ability to analyze the impact of trade in services will require 
 
1) more funding for service sector data collection, and an 
2) improved sampling frame for the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ data collection.  
 
The need for an improved sampling frame and potential efficiencies in data collection suggest 
the costs and benefits of moving data collection activities currently performed by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis to the Census Bureau should be investigated. 
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MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TRADE IN SERVICES: 
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 
 
 
The service sector accounts for a large share of employment in the United States. Trade in 
services is growing rapidly. The large share of employment in the service sector and growing 
services trade present the potential for trade in services to have a significant impact on U.S. firms 
and workers.  
 
Despite the potential importance of trade in services, the amount of empirical research on the 
impact of trade in services relative to empirical research of the impact of trade in goods is quite 
small. An important source of the relative scarcity of work on the service sector in general and 
trade in services in particular is the fact that the service sector is not measured as well as the 
goods producing sector.  
 
The organizers of this conference asked me to 1) provide my perspective on whether measuring 
the impact of trade in services is potentially important, 2) assess the prospects for measuring the 
impact of trade in services, and 3) identify any data needs, provide priorities for the data needs, 
and (somewhat provocatively) suggest organizational changes that might improve the statistical 
system.  
 
This is not new ground. Other organizations have produced reports on varying aspects of the 
impact of outsourcing, offshoring, services trade, and data availability.1 I will not report on all 
previous efforts, but will draw on the MIT/Sloan Offshoring Working Group report (Sturgeon 
and Levy 2006), as I was a contributor and I think it still accurately reflects needs and priorities.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to take stock of the current prospects for measuring the impact of 
trade in services on the U.S. economy. I will describe progress economists have made over the 
past 10–15 years using detailed, establishment-level microdata to examine the impact of trade in 
goods on the manufacturing sector. I will argue that to investigate the impact (or potential 
impact) of trade in services on the United States, one (or at least I) would want to use similar 
methods.2 I will then describe what data would be needed to conduct this research and how much 
of that data is currently available.  
 
I then propose priorities for improving the ability of researchers to examine the impact of trade in 
services on the U.S. economy. First, I provide a brief overview of developments in the U.S. 
service sector.  
 
                                                 
1 Other organizations that have produced reports on this or related topics include the National Academy of Public 
Administration, National Academy of Sciences, and Government Accountability Office.  
2 This would be a good place to put my perspective in context. I am someone who has done microdata research 
examining the impact of trade on the U.S.` manufacturing sector and tried to do the same for the service sector; not a 
necessarily representative perspective but one that should support other types of analysis (aggregate data is only as 
good as the microdata). So, while not everyone prefers to use microdata to examine these types of issues, conducting 
similar studies on more aggregated data would require collecting the same information.  
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THE SERVICE SECTOR 
 
Service Sector Employment  
 
The service sector accounts for the lion’s share of employment in the United States (and most 
other advanced economies). While services have traditionally been viewed as nontradable, 
services trade is growing and there is an increasing sense that technological change is making it 
easier and less expensive to provide services from a distance.  
 
Table 1 
 
NAICS Code Sector
Employment 
2007
Share of Total 
Employment 
2007
Employment 
Growth          
1997-2007
21 Mining 703,129 0.5% 38%
22 Utilities 632,432 0.5% -10%
23 Construction 7,399,047 5.5% 31%
31-33 Manufacturing 13,333,390 9.9% -21%
42 Wholesale trade 6,295,109 4.7% 9%
44-45 Retail trade 15,610,710 11.5% 12%
48-49 Transportation and warehousing 4,435,760 3.3% 52%
51-56 Business Services 33,430,809 24.7% 29%
51 Information 3,428,262 2.5% 12%
52 Finance and insurance 6,562,546 4.9% 12%
53 Real estate and rental and leasing 2,249,353 1.7% 32%
54 Professional, scientific, and technical services 8,121,171 6.0% 51%
55 Management of companies and enterprises 2,915,644 2.2% 11%
56 Administrative and support and waste remediation services 10,153,833 7.5% 38%
61-81 Personal Services 34,595,857 25.6% 23%
61 Educational services 562,210 0.4% 75%
62 Health care and social assistance 16,859,513 12.5% 24%
71 Arts, entertainment, and recreation 2,070,524 1.5% 30%
72 Accommodation and food services 11,587,814 8.6% 23%
81 Other services (except public administration) 3,515,796 2.6% 8%
Federal Government 2,462,000 1.8% --
State and Local Government 16,400,000 12.1% --  
 
 
Table 1 presents information on employment and employment growth from the 1997 and 2007 
economic censuses. Depending on the definition one uses, the service sector accounts for 
between more than 60 percent to more than 80 percent of employment. Further, employment in 
the service sector is growing, in contrast to the manufacturing sector. Services are a large and 
growing part of the U.S. labor market.  
 
Just because services are a large and growing portion of the U.S. economy does not necessarily 
imply that trade in services is likely to affect the U.S. economy in a significant way. But the 
confluence of a variety of changes (e.g., decreasing travel and telecommunication costs, 
decreasing IT hardware costs, increasing Internet availability worldwide) seem to have 
significantly increased the ease with which services are traded and expanded the scope of service 
activities that can be provided at a distance. As a result, trade in services is growing.  
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Trade in Services: Official Statistics 
 
Figure 1 shows the steady increase in U.S. service imports and exports. Both U.S. services 
exports and imports about doubled between 1997 and 2007. Services now account for 30 percent 
of U.S. exports and about 17 percent of U.S. imports. 
 
Figure 1 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the composition of U.S. service exports and imports over the period 1992–
2007. While all of the categories exhibit growth, the “Other private services” category is growing 
the fastest (both imports and exports more than doubling over the period) and contributes the 
most to overall services import and export growth—Other private services account for more than 
half of the overall increase in services exports and accounts for half of the increase in services 
imports. 
 
Other private services are comprised of the following activities: Education, Financial services, 
Insurance services, Telecommunications, and Business, professional, and technical services. 
Import and export data for these components of Other private services are only available starting 
in 1997. For both imports and exports, the Business, professional, and technical services 
category is the largest at the end of the period and contributes the most to Other private services 
growth over the period. A long time series of the BPTS category is not available, so it is not 
possible to decompose its growth into more detailed components. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Composition of US Service Imports
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Business, professional, and technical services; Financial services; and Insurance services account 
for a significant share of service sector growth over the past 15 years. We would like to 
understand better how trade in these types of services is affecting the United States. As discussed 
in this section, the availability of detailed data going back in time poses a significant impediment 
to researchers. And while the level of detail for trade in services data is improving, the level of 
detail is still far more aggregated than in the manufacturing sector. The lack of historical data 
and the ongoing lack of detailed industry-level data are two examples of the challenges in 
measuring and analyzing trade in services. In the next section, I describe an alternative 
methodology for assessing the potential scope of trade in services.  
 
Tradable Services: A Different Perspective 
 
Another less conventional (but more detailed) perspective on the potential for service trade to 
affect the U.S. labor market is from work that Lori Kletzer and I (Jensen and Kletzer 2006) did 
examining the tradability of service activities. We use the geographic concentration of service 
employment across metropolitan areas within the United States to identify service activities that 
are tradable. The intuition is that if services production is geographically concentrated (more 
than demand for the service), it is probably being traded. As an example of this intuition, think of 
personal services like haircuts or divorce lawyers. These service activities tend to be distributed 
in proportion to the population in a region (and thus we don't see big concentrations of these 
types of service activities in one place). But increasingly, there are services that don't seem to 
require face-to-face interaction and thus might be tradable—think software development or 
securities and commodities trading. We used this feature to distinguish between service activities 
that are tradable and those that require face-to-face interaction (and thus are far less likely to be 
traded). 
 
We find that many service activities—such as movie and music recording production, securities 
and commodities trading, software, and engineering services—appear to be traded within the 
United States and thus are at least potentially tradable internationally. Approximately 14 percent 
of the workforce is in service industries classified as tradable. By comparison, about 12 percent 
of the workforce is in manufacturing industries classified as tradable. When workers in tradable 
occupations (such as computer programmers in the banking industry or medical transcriptionists 
in the health care industry) in nontradable industries are included, the share of the workforce in 
tradable service activities is even higher. 
 
While many service activities appear tradable, in related work (Jensen and Kletzer 2008), we 
argue that only about one-third of the jobs in these activities will face meaningful competition 
from low-wage countries (or risk being offshored) in the medium term. Tradable service jobs, 
such as those at engineering or research and development firms, are good jobs. Workers in 
tradable service activities have higher than average earnings. Part of this premium is due to 
workers in these activities having higher educational attainment than other workers, but even 
controlling for educational and other personal characteristics differences, workers in tradable 
service activities have 10 percent higher earnings. Within the set of professional service 
industries, a worker in a tradable industry and a tradable occupation has almost 20 percent higher 
earnings than a similar professional service worker in a nontradable industry and occupation.  
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High earnings in tradable service activities do not mean that these jobs will be “lost” to low-
wage countries. High-wage, high-skill activities are consistent with U.S. comparative advantage. 
In the manufacturing sector, it is low-wage, labor-intensive industries like apparel that are most 
vulnerable to low-wage import competition. The United States continues to have strong export 
performance in high-wage, skill-intensive manufacturing industries.  
 
The United States currently exports high-wage, high-skill services like computer software and 
satellite telecommunications services. Most commentators on the offshoring issue focus on the 
jobs that will be lost to offshoring but neglect that the United States has comparative advantage 
in many service activities. Increased exports of services (and “inshoring”) are likely to benefit 
many U.S. firms and workers. 
 
About two-thirds of tradable business service jobs are skilled enough to be consistent with U.S. 
comparative advantage. U.S. service workers and firms are likely to be beneficiaries of increased 
trade in services through increased export opportunities.   
The relationship between skills, wages, and trade highlights the need to have detailed data 
covering the service sector.  
 
 
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
How would researchers analyze the impact of trade in services on the U.S. economy? The 
literature, both classical trade theory and more recent empirical and theoretical work, give us a 
good idea of where to start. Traditional trade theory and more recent theoretical and empirical 
advances suggest several important considerations: factor intensities and factor abundance, 
productivity differences across countries, industries and within industries, and producer 
heterogeneity within and across industries.  
 
Lessons from Trade Theory 
 
International trade theory emphasizes a number of features that help explain the sources and 
implications of international trade. Traditional trade theory emphasizes that countries will trade 
goods in which they have a comparative advantage—either through relative productivity 
differences or through differences in relative factor endowments. Countries will tend to export 
goods that they are relatively efficient at producing, either because they have a technological 
advantage or because they are relatively abundant in the factor important to a good’s production. 
Thus, capital-intensive countries like the United States tend to export capital-intensive products 
and import labor-intensive products from countries where labor is abundant and wages are 
relatively low. 
 
These traditional trade theories also described the mechanism through which trade can affect 
relative factor returns (i.e., wages and the returns to capital)—when countries specialize across 
industries that differ in their use of different inputs, the relative returns to the inputs may change. 
When industries that make relatively intensive use of unskilled labor (e.g., apparel production) 
shrink, employment prospects and wages for unskilled workers are likely to suffer.  
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This traditional trade theory emphasized how differences across countries will influence the 
patterns of trade. Yet, a large share of international trade takes place between relatively similar 
trading partners, apparently within industries (see Grubel and Lloyd [1975]). Germany and the 
United States, for example, exchange automobiles. This fact and others led to the creation of 
“new” trade models that emphasize economies of scale in production and consumer preferences 
for different varieties. In these models, otherwise similar firms (operating in countries with 
similar factor endowments) specialize in different varieties, spurring two-way or “intra-industry” 
trade between countries (see Ethier [1982], Helpman [1981], and Krugman [1980]).  
 
Recent Lessons from Empirical Research in Manufacturing 
 
One feature of both old and new trade theory is that the theories typically assume a 
representative firm—that is, they assume all firms within an industry are the same. There is a 
growing body of empirical research using plant- and firm-level microdata for the manufacturing 
sector that demonstrates that the traditional assumption of a “representative” firm in an industry 
is not appropriate for many research questions,  including understanding the impact of 
globalization.3 Plants, even within narrowly defined industries, exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity both in their cross-sectional characteristics and in their behavior over time. The 
heterogeneity of plants and firms and the variation in their responses to globalization have clear 
implications for the impacts of trade in services. 
 
Within Industry heterogeneity in manufacturing 
 
Bernard and Jensen (1995) provide some of the first plant-level results on U.S. exporters and 
find that exporters are relatively rare. Even in industries in which the United States has a 
comparative advantage, the majority of plants do not export, while even in import-competing 
sectors like textiles and apparel some firms export. In addition to being relatively rare, exporters 
are strikingly different from plants in the same industry. Exporters are significantly larger than 
nonexporters in the same industry. Exporters are also more capital intensive, more skilled-worker 
intensive, and pay higher wages than plants of similar size, in the same industry, in the same 
state. Exporters are also more productive than nonexporters in the same industry and region. 
 
Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2006) also show that exporters are more likely to survive and have 
higher employment growth than nonexporters of similar size, in the same industry, in the same 
region. Because exporters have different characteristics than nonexporters, and because they 
have differential growth and survival rates, the potential exists for the behavior of exporters to be 
associated with 1) a reallocation of economic activity that affects aggregate measures like 
industry and aggregate productivity and 2) the demand for and returns to different factors of 
production (e.g., skilled workers).4 
                                                 
3 This section is not meant to be exhaustive or representative. For more comprehensive reviews see Bernard et al. 
(2007), Helpman (2006), and Roberts and Tybout (1996), which focus on developing market contexts. Here, I draw 
mostly on work I have been involved in to demonstrate how one might go about this type of research.  
4 These relationships are not restricted to export participation. Researchers have also examined the characteristics 
and behavior of multinational corporations using plant- and firm-level microdata. Doms and Jensen (1998) find that 
U.S. manufacturing plants owned by MNCs—either foreign MNCs or U.S.-based MNCs—have superior operating 
characteristics relative to domestic-owned plants. Bernard and Jensen (2007) explore the behavior of MNCs over 
time and show that plants owned by U.S. MNCs are unconditionally more likely to survive, though controlling for 
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Economists are now incorporating these empirical regularities into models of international trade 
and investment (for example, see Bernard et al. [2003]; Bernard, Redding, and Schott [2006]; 
and Melitz [2003]). While differing in their details, these models have several shared 
implications. As trade costs fall, low productivity nonexporters are more likely to fail, high-
productivity nonexporters are more likely to start exporting, and existing exporters should 
increase their exports. 
 
These models have direct implications for how increased trade will affect firms and workers. If 
trade costs are reduced differentially across industries (either because of policy or technology), 
industries with larger reductions in trade costs are likely to see more churning within the 
industry. Because low-productivity plants tend to use low-skill and low-wage workers more 
intensively, the increased likelihood of plant failure has implications for the demand for low-skill 
workers. To the extent that particular industries or low-productivity producers are concentrated 
in particular geographic areas, this will also affect distributional outcomes. In this section we 
review results that examine the impact of international trade on U.S. manufacturers explicitly. 
 
Competition from low-wage countries 
 
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a) examine the role of import-competition from low-wage 
countries on the reallocation of U.S. manufacturing within and across industries from 1977 to 
1997. They focus on where imports originate (rather than their overall level), motivated by the 
factor proportions framework and the significant increases in import shares from low-wage 
countries like China. Their use of plant-level data provides a richer examination of U.S. producer 
responses to international trade, including plant exit and product switching, than is possible with 
more aggregate data. Specifically, their analysis identifies whether reallocation within industries 
is consistent with U.S. comparative advantage. 
 
They show that low-wage country import shares and overall penetration vary substantially across 
both industries and time. Both components tend to be higher and to increase more rapidly among 
labor-intensive industries such as Apparel and leather. Other industries such as Textiles see only 
modest rises in both series. Finally, more capital- and skill-intensive sectors such as 
Transportation and industrial machinery experience rapid growth of import penetration but little 
or no increase in the share of imports from low-wage countries. They find that plant survival and 
employment growth are negatively associated with industry exposure to low-wage country 
imports. Within industries, they show that manufacturing activity is disproportionately 
reallocated toward capital-intensive plants. Because there is an observed empirical regularity that 
capital-intensive plants also tend to be more skill (nonproduction worker) intensive, the 
reallocation to more capital-intensive plants will likely have implications for the relative demand 
for skilled and unskilled workers.5  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the superior operating characteristics of MNCs, MNC-owned plants are actually more likely to close. Firm 
participation in international markets is significantly correlated with both plant characteristics and behavior over 
time. 
5 Bernard and Jensen (1997) examine the impact of reallocation to exporters on the relative demand for and wages 
paid to skilled workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector. 
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Falling trade costs 
 
In separate but related work, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006b) examine the impact of falling 
trade costs (both tariffs and transportation costs) on U.S. manufacturers. They find that when 
trade costs in an industry fall, plants are more likely to close. This is one channel by which 
international trade can affect the distribution of economic activity, aggregate productivity 
growth, and the demand for labor. Falling trade costs tend to reduce the amount of economic 
activity at the low end of the productivity distribution. This tends to raise aggregate productivity 
(even without any technological change at the plant level) by truncating the low end of the 
productivity distribution. Because low productivity plants also tend to be production-worker 
intensive, this change is likely to affect the relative demand for unskilled workers. 
 
They find that relatively high-productivity nonexporters in industries with falling trade costs are 
more likely to start exporting. They also find that existing exporters increase their shipments 
abroad as trade costs fall. Exporters are relatively high-productivity plants, and the expansion of 
the high end of the productivity distribution will tend to raise aggregate productivity (even if no 
plant changes its productivity). Because exporters are skill and capital intensive, this will also 
tend to increase relative demand for these factor inputs. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott also find 
that decreases in trade costs, and the increased competitive pressure associated with it, are 
associated with increased productivity at the plant level. Not surprisingly, given the number of 
channels by which falling trade costs shift the distribution of economic activity toward more 
productive plants, they find that industries experiencing relatively large declines in trade costs 
exhibit relatively strong productivity growth. 
 
U.S. multinationals and outsourcing 
 
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) examine multinational behavior with regard to the 
choice of the location of production using confidential data from surveys conducted of all U.S. 
multinationals. They use a direct measure of input flows associated with vertical production 
networks: foreign affiliates’ imports from U.S. parent firms (and other U.S. entities) of 
intermediate inputs for further processing. They estimate the sensitivity of demand for imported 
intermediates for additional processing to host-country and industry trade costs, factor prices, 
taxes, and other variables suggested by theory.  
 
Manson, Mataloni, and Slaughter find that imports of intermediate inputs are strongly negatively 
correlated with trade costs facing affiliates. They find that vertical production networks are 
sensitive to labor costs—imported-input demand is decreasing in host-country wages for less-
skilled workers and increasing in host-country wages for more-skilled workers. They find that 
foreign affiliates do more processing of imports in countries with relatively cheap, less-skilled 
labor. A third finding is that vertical production networks also depend on other host-country 
policies and characteristics. Imported-input demand is higher in host countries with export-
processing zones, and is decreasing in host-country market size and corporate tax rates.  
 
The examples of research described in this section demonstrate the usefulness of detailed, 
comprehensive microdata in analyzing the impact of globalization. In the next section I describe 
data needs to produce similar analyses for the service sector.  
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DATA NEED TO ANALYZE GLOBALIZATION IN THE SERVICE SECTOR 
 
We know a considerable amount about the reaction of firms to changes in the global trading 
environment in the manufacturing sector. If a researcher were interested in conducting similar 
research on the service sector, what are the prospects? 
 
To understand how increased trade in services might affect the U.S. economy, both theory and 
previous empirical work stress some key considerations for understanding the impact: 
 
1) The prevalence (how many activities?), scale (how much is being traded?), and direction 
(who is trading with whom?)of trade in services. 
2) How trade in services has evolved over time. 
3) The factor intensities used in services provision. 
4) The factor intensities across locations.  
5) Firm-level heterogeneity (in size, factor intensities, productivity, trade activity) within 
and across industries and countries.6 
 
Measuring Trade in Services 
 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) collects information on trade in services and presents 
aggregate data on international services transactions through three publication programs: 1) 
cross-border trade in services data in the international transactions accounts; 2) sales of services 
through affiliates of multinationals, some portion of which represent cross-border trade; and 3) 
benchmark input-output tables.  
 
The cross-border trade in services publication program provides the basis for all of the BEA’s 
services trade data. As a result, this publication program provides the best sense of the trade data 
the BEA collects: 
 
The estimates of cross-border transactions cover both affiliated and unaffiliated transactions 
between U.S. residents and foreign residents. Affiliated transactions consist of intra-firm 
trade within multinational companies—specifically, the trade between U.S. parent companies 
and their foreign affiliates and between U.S. affiliates and their foreign parent groups. 
Unaffiliated transactions are with foreigners that neither own, nor are owned by, the U.S. 
party to the transaction. 
  
Cross-border trade in private services is classified into the same five, broad categories that 
are used in the U.S. international transactions accounts—travel, passenger fares, 
“other transportation,” royalties and license fees, and “other private services.”  
(Survey of Current Business, November 2001) 
                                                 
6 While not exactly a data need, if researchers are to use information on producer heterogeneity, they need access to 
producer-level information, i.e., microdata, which is often collected under a pledge of confidentiality. Thus, access 
to producer-level microdata is an additional dimension of data needs.  
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Affiliated transactions are collected through the BEA’s U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and 
Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. programs. Comprehensive benchmark surveys are 
collected every five years, and less comprehensive collections are conducted annually.  
 
The BEA collects data on U.S. international transactions in private services with unaffiliated 
foreigners through 11 surveys. These surveys fall into three broad categories: 1) the surveys of 
“selected” services, which cover mainly business, professional, and technical services; 2) the 
specialized surveys of services, which cover construction, engineering, architectural, and mining 
services, insurance services, financial services, and royalties and license fees; and 3) the surveys 
of transportation services. These collection programs are the principal source of the BEA’s 
estimates of trade in services, but the estimates of some services are based on data from a variety 
of other sources, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection and surveys conducted by other 
Federal Government agencies, private sources, and partner countries.  
 
Need: Increased detail—industry and country 
 
Detailed data on international services transactions for cross border trade are currently available 
from 1986 through 2006. Service imports and exports are reported for approximately 30 (1986–
1991) to 35 (1992–2006) service types (with additional detail on whether the transactions are 
between affiliated or unaffiliated parties available for some categories). These data are available 
by country for approximately 35 countries and country groupings for 1986–2006.  
 
Figure 4 exhibits the detail on trade in services (both affiliated and unaffiliated) published by the 
BEA over time. It shows the significant increase in detail over the past decade. The figure also 
shows how large the gap is between the detail available for the manufacturing sector (where 
information is available for over 8,000 export categories and over 10,000 import categories) and 
the service sector. The published aggregates are moving in the right direction, but we clearly 
have a ways to go.  
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Figure 4 – Categories reported in the BEA Table 1b 1992–2006 
 
1992 1997 2001 2006
Travel 2 …………………………………… Travel 2 ……………………………………………………………………... Travel 2 ……………………………………………………………………... Travel 2 ……………………………………………………………………...
Passenger fares 3 ……………………… Passenger fares 3 …………………………………………………………. Passenger fares 3 …………………………………………………………. Passenger fares 3 ………………………………………………………….
Other transportation…………………… Other transportation…………………………………………………….. Other transportation…………………………………………………….. Other transportation……………………………………………………..
Royalties and license fees……………… Royalties and license fees……………………………………………… Royalties and license fees……………………………………………… Royalties and license fees………………………………………………
Other private services 4  15……………… Other private services 4  15………………………………………………….. Other private services 4  15………………………………………………….. Other private services 4  15…………………………………………………..
Education 5…………………………… Education 5……………………………………………………………….. Education 5……………………………………………………………….. Education 5………………………………………………………………..
Financial services 16………………………………………………………. Financial services 16………………………………………………………. Financial services 16……………………………………………………….
Insurance services 6 ………………… Insurance services 6 …………………………………………………… Insurance services 6 …………………………………………………… Insurance services 6 ……………………………………………………
Telecommunications 7………………… Telecommunications 7…………………………………………………. Telecommunications 7…………………………………………………. Telecommunications 7………………………………………………….
Business, professional, and technical services 16………………… Business, professional, and technical services 16………………… Business, professional, and technical services 16…………………
Computer and information services 8 16………………………………. Computer and information services 8 16………………………………. Computer and information services 8 16……………………………….
Management and consulting services 9……………………………… Management and consulting services 9………………………………
Research and development and testing services 9……………….. Research and development and testing services 9………………..
Operational leasing 16……………………………………………………… Operational leasing 16……………………………………………………… Operational leasing 16………………………………………………………
Other business, professional, and technical services 10 16………….. Other business, professional, and technical services 10 16………….. Other business, professional, and technical services 10 16…………..
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services………………..
Advertising……………………………………………………………
Architectural, engineering, and other technical services………..
Construction ………………………………………………………….
Industrial engineering……………………………………………………
Installation, maintenance, and repair of equipment…………………
Legal services……………………………………………………………
Medical services 11………………… Medical services 11………………………………………………………… Medical services 11………………………………………………………… Medical services 11…………………………………………………………
Mining 12……………………………………………………………………
Sports and performing arts……………………………………………..
Trade-related services 13………………………………………………..
Training services…………………………………………………………
Other 14…………...
Other services………………………… Other services…………………………………………………………... Other services…………………………………………………………... Other services…………………………………………………………...
Film and television tape rentals… Film and television tape rentals………………………………………. Film and television tape rentals………………………………………. Film and television tape rentals……………………………………….
       Other…………………………………        Other…………………………………………………………………………       Other…………………………………………………………………………       Other………………………………………………………………………… 
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“What is most troubling for us is that the seventeen industry categories listed in the first 
column of Table 4 exhaust the detail on services trade collected by United States 
government statistical agencies. What is going on in the other service product categories 
that have been mentioned as moving offshore, such as the wide variety of back-office 
functions like accounting, customer support, and software programming? What about the 
interpretation of radiology images, market and legal research, and research to support 
financial services? Are customized software services staying onshore while only basic 
software coding is moving offshore, or is higher-skilled work and work related to 
innovation and new product creation also being imported? Because very few questions 
are asked, very little detail is collected, leaving us with extremely thin data on services 
trade, even if steps are taken to improve data quality. Contrast the seventeen descriptive 
categories for traded services products in Table 4 with the more than 16,000 detailed 
product codes for goods collected by the United States Department of Commerce and the 
magnitude of the data gap becomes clear. It is clearly infeasible to collect as much 
product detail on services trade as is generated by the customs forms filled out when 
goods are shipped across borders. But much more detail could and should be collected.” 
 (Sturgeon and Levy 2006) 
 
Progress is being made. The BEA has resolved the inconsistency between the survey formats for 
affiliated and unaffiliated trade. This now permits greater detail in reporting the types of services 
traded. While this represents progress, it does not resolve the issue of the need for greater detail.  
 
Need: Lower reporting thresholds 
 
“While the BEA surveys that ask firms to quantify their trade in services are mandatory, 
firms are exempted from reporting categories of services in which they have import 
transactions of less than $6M per year and export transactions of less than $8M per year. 
In the case of services, in particular, because firms tend to be smaller than firms engaged 
in goods trade, the current thresholds very likely exclude many transactions. Because of 
this, we believe that the thresholds for mandatory reporting of international services 
transactions should be lowered.” 
 (Sturgeon and Levy 2006) 
 
Need: Increased sample/improved sampling frame 
 
Related to the issue of lowering reporting thresholds, the BEA needs to improve its capacity to 
develop survey frames.  
 
“Another explanation for the apparent undercounting of services trade is that the BEA is 
not collecting data from the right companies, or is sending inappropriate surveys to the 
companies on its mailing lists. To test for potential undercounting of U.S. services 
imports, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided the BEA with a list of 
104 firms identified from press and company reports as likely to be importing services 
from India. The BEA was asked to compare this list with the survey responses it had 
received from firms on its mailing lists. The BEA had 87 (84 percent) of the firms 
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identified by the GAO on its mailing lists. The BEA stated that it had dropped some of 
the missing companies from its mailing lists because they had not previously met the 
reporting thresholds for services trade.”  
 
“Furthermore, only 54 (52 percent) of the firms identified by the GAO had received 
appropriate surveys from the BEA (e.g., firms with offshore affiliates were not sent the 
survey on affiliated trade). Finally, only 15 (14 percent) of the 104 firms identified by the 
GAO as likely to be importing services from India reported such imports (GAO 2005b, p 
19). One explanation for the low level of reporting of services trade with India is that 
firms that had transactions valued beneath the thresholds mentioned above, while not 
required to do so, nevertheless filled out the BEA surveys but did not provide detail on 
the source or destination countries associated with their international transactions because 
they were not required to do so.” 
 
“Still, the BEA believes that its data on services trade is of good quality. When the BEA 
contacted the companies on the GAO list that were missing from its mailing lists, it did 
not identify any company with substantial imports of services that were not already being 
reported. Nevertheless, the BEA recognizes that more resources need to be allocated 
toward maintaining lists of survey respondents since the identity of transactors may 
change from year to year. The BEA has a variety of initiatives underway to improve its 
mailing lists and improve survey compliance (GAO 2005b, p. 20). The BEA also plans to 
merge the collection of its data on affiliated international services transactions with its 
data on unaffiliated international services transactions, so that a given type of service is 
covered in exactly the same detail, whether it is imported or exported, and whether it is 
with an affiliated or an unaffiliated foreign party. We believe that these efforts are 
significant and very helpful, especially if combined with lower thresholds for mandatory 
survey compliance.” 
(Sturgeon and Levy 2006) 
 
The BEA is now collecting information from on unaffiliated and affiliated international service 
transactions using the same collection form. This resolves the issue of the information being 
collected at different levels of detail.  
  
The BEA has undertaken efforts to improve its sampling frame. It commissioned the Census 
Bureau to add a question to the 2006 Company Organization Survey to ask whether firms 
imported services. The purpose of this additional question is to improve the sampling frame for 
the BEA’s data collection programs.  
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Measuring the Impact of Services Trade on the U.S. Economy 
 
To understand how increased trade in services is likely to affect the U.S. economy, requires the 
detailed information on trade flows described above and the ability to link it to detailed 
information on domestic producers. Specifically, I would want detailed information on the inputs 
service firms use (labor, capital, land, buildings, accounting services, intellectual property, etc.) 
and the outputs they produce (computer programs, lawsuits, ad campaigns, medical operations, 
etc.). These data would help me understand the relationship between growth in demand for 
particular services and the demand for inputs to those services. These data would also help me 
understand whether productivity within the service sector is increasing over time (and whether 
this growth is in response to particular changes in the environment). To understand how the 
service sector affects employment outcomes across regions within the United States, I would 
want these data on a (hopefully detailed) geographic basis. I would also need to be able to link 
these data to detailed information on international trade in services (the type of information 
discussed above).7  
 
Need: More detailed industry classification 
 
The data covering the service sector within the United States are not as robust as the data for the 
manufacturing sector in a number of dimensions. The information collected from the service 
sector—for both inputs and outputs—is less detailed. A simplistic example of how output in the 
service sector is not collected at as detailed a level as the manufacturing sector is looking at 
NAICS codes per worker across sectors in the economy.8 NAICS contains about 470 industrial 
codes for the manufacturing sector (NAICS 31–33). For the service sector (NAICS 51–81), 
NAICS contains about 325 industry codes. The manufacturing sector employed about 13 million 
people and the service sector employed about 68 million workers in 2007. In terms of workers 
per industry code, there were about 28,000 workers per NAICS code in manufacturing in 2007 
and about 208,000 workers per NAICS code in the service sector. By this crude metric, the 
service sector is substantially underclassified (almost 10 times so).  
 
While the number of industries in the service sector relative to the manufacturing sector is low, 
the implementation of NAPCS is improving the level of detail for the output of establishments in 
the service sector. The 2007 economic census forms for the service sector have considerable 
detail for output product categories within service industries.9  
                                                 
7 As described above, this type of data is available for the manufacturing sector. The Census Bureau and made 
available publicly in aggregated form and made available in disaggregated form to approved researchers at the 
Center for Economic Studies. The research community has learned a great deal about the manufacturing sector 
across a wide range of topics—productivity dynamics, job creation and destruction, impact of environmental 
regulation, and impact of trade, just to name a few—through access to producer level information at the Census 
Bureau.  
8 While this is not necessarily the only (or best) way to think about classification, if one is interested in labor market 
impacts it is instructive to note the significant difference in the industry detail available across sectors.  
9 While this is helpful, an issue with classifying establishments into broad industries and collecting detailed product 
information is that it is difficult to allocate inputs across outputs. Additional refinement of the service sector industry 
codes would improve the ability to measure things like productivity. 
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Need: More detailed information on inputs to the production process 
 
Another way in which the service sector data are less robust than the manufacturing sector is 
with regard to the collection of data on inputs into the production process.  
 
“The Census Bureau has developed detailed classification schemes for material inputs 
and manufactured products that it uses to collect information on what individual 
manufacturing establishments buy and sell. These product categories have been 
developed with a great deal of care, and government surveys have been tuned to specific 
sectors. For example, establishments in the plastics industry are required to provide 
detailed information about the consumption of chemical feedstock and the production of 
various kinds of plastics while establishments producing furniture are required to provide 
detail about the consumption of wood, metal, hardware, glue, and fabric and the 
production of various kinds of furniture. This pattern holds true across the manufacturing 
sector. The U.S. Census Bureau’s Numerical List of Manufactured and Mineral Products 
contains hierarchically organized descriptions of the principal products and services of 
the manufacturing and mining industries in the United States. These codes are used to 
collect data for the Economic Census and are used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
for the input-output matrix that underlies the national accounts. But as in international 
trade in services, far less detail is collected on the services products that are consumed 
and produced domestically. Again, there are more than 6,000 codes for physical products 
but fewer than 100 for services. 
 
The lack of detail on domestic trade in services means that the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis largely estimates the contribution of services to the national accounts. While 
resulting estimation cannot claim precision, BEA analysts believe that their techniques 
capture the magnitude and direction of change in services accurately enough to support 
policy. While this may be true today, we think the view of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
quoted in full in the previous section, bears repeating, “If [the information gap between 
manufacturing and services goes] unaddressed, economic policymakers will be 
increasingly misinformed and misdirected about changes in the real economy, related to 
rates and sources of growth in output, prices, productivity, and trade.” Clearly, an 
accelerated and sustained effort to collect more detail on domestic trade in services is 
required. Our second recommendation, therefore, is for the U.S. Census Bureau to 
accelerate the completion the North American Product Classification System (NAPCS), 
and fully and rapidly deploy it in the Economic Census, at the establishment level, for 
both inputs and outputs.” (Sturgeon and Levy 2006) 
 
The recommendation above is with regard to purchased inputs used to produce services. I think 
this is an important improvement that would be beneficial to helping to understand how the 
service sector functions. 
 
In addition to increased information on purchased services, I would like to suggest two other 
improvements. We learned from the literature on the impact of trade on the manufacturing sector 
that factor intensities (both capital intensity and skill intensity) are important determinants of 
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how establishments behave in response to international competition. It would be useful if the 
Census Bureau would collect information on the skill intensity of the workers that are employed 
in the service sector. Currently, the economic censuses do not consistently collect information on 
labor inputs other than total employment and salaries and wages.10 It would be beneficial if the 
Census Bureau collected more information than just total employment and wages. I recognize 
that detailed information on skills or educational attainment would be costly to collect and 
burdensome to provide. However, I think that the research in the manufacturing sector 
demonstrates that it is possible to collect very crude classifications (in the case of manufacturing 
production and nonproduction workers) that still provide important information regarding the 
skill intensity of firms’ production processes.  
 
For services, the production/nonproduction worker classification might not make sense, but an 
analogous classification might be exempt and nonexempt employees.11 While not an ideal 
measure of skill, this classification is likely to capture meaningful variation in skill intensity 
across producers and industries. It would be relatively easy to collect and probably relatively 
straightforward for firms to report.  
  
Another input that has proved to be an important determinant in plant survival in the 
manufacturing sector is capital intensity. Currently, the economic censuses do not consistently 
collect capital information. While it might not be particularly meaningful for some service 
industries, for others it is not difficult to imagine that capital intensity would have something to 
do with firm performance. (One can imagine that capital intensity of hospitals would be 
systematically related to outcomes and, perhaps, likelihood of participating in international 
trade.)  
 
Need: Information on a geographic basis 
 
The Census Bureau does collect information on capital expenditures in the Annual Capital 
Expenditure Survey (ACES); however, ACES is an enterprise-level survey. Because many large 
firms by employment and output operate in multiple industries and multiple geographic markets, 
enterprise-level information on capital expenditures makes allocating capital service inputs to 
locations and industries difficult. This highlights another desirable feature of information on the 
service sector—geographical information.  
 
To understand how international trade is affecting regions within the United States, it is 
important to be able to examine how producers in different regions may vary in factor intensity 
and productivity. This need highlights the importance of collecting as much information as 
possible at the establishment level.  
 
Collecting information at the establishment level enables researchers to place the economic 
phenomena in a region and also enables a much tighter alignment of inputs used and outputs 
(industries/products). Collecting information at the enterprise level seriously reduces the level of 
                                                 
10 For some industries, the censuses collect information on the type of worker (by training or activity, give examples 
from engineering, lawyers, doctors’ offices). 
11 Employees whose jobs are governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are either “exempt” or 
“nonexempt.” Nonexempt employees are entitled to overtime pay. 
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product and geographical specificity of the data. For some purchased inputs (e.g., advertising) it 
may be difficult to collect the information at the establishment level. Yet, for inputs like physical 
capital, it seems feasible to collect capital stock and flow data at the establishment level. (Capital 
stock information is collected in the census of manufactures.)  
 
Need: Researcher ability to access ad link microdata 
 
As I described above, research using microdata provides a better understanding of how 
globalization affects the U.S. economy. Researchers need access to microdata to conduct this 
type of research. 
 
“Steps should be taken to extract as much information as possible from the data that is 
currently collected by government programs. An inventory of current and potential 
microdata resources should be made, and as many “micro-data” sets as possible should be 
archived, maintained, and made available to both government and academic researchers. 
 
Micro-data are the data that supports government administrative programs and underlies 
published statistics. In general, quantitative research based on micro-data can provide a 
better and more detailed view of services offshoring and its effects than research based on 
published statistics.” 
 (Sturgeon and Levy 2006) 
 
A minor note related to microdata access is the desirability of permitting researchers to combine 
data that has already been collected in different agencies to answer important questions. This is a 
cost effective way of increasing the usefulness of data that has already been purchased.  
 
“Finally, it is important to encourage research that links various sets of micro-data. While 
there can be legislative and institutional barriers to sharing micro-data across agencies, 
reducing these barriers could enable some extremely powerful research. For example if 
the outbound foreign affiliate investment collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
in its surveys of multinational firms were to be combined with the firm, establishment, 
and trade data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, it would help researchers create a 
more comprehensive picture of the operations of U.S. firms—both at home and abroad. 
The combined data could reveal domestic activity at the establishment level (with product 
level information, geographic information, and export information), the relationship 
between the establishments within the firm, the amount of trading the firm does (using 
the matched transaction and firm data), and the nature of the firm's foreign affiliate 
operations (employment, wage bill, location, local sales, trade with parent, etc). This 
would allow researchers to examine the relationship between domestic activity, trade, and 
foreign direct investment.” 
 (Sturgeon and Levy 2006) 
 
I understand the need to protect the confidentiality (and the perception of confidentiality) of 
respondent level information. My strong sense is that the protocols and infrastructure necessary 
to protect the confidentiality and perception of confidentiality are in place to restrict access to 
approved uses within the Census Bureau, the BEA, and the BLS. It is my sense, however, that 
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bureaucratic impediments continue to impede researchers’ ability to combine and link datasets 
from different statistical agencies.  
 
 
IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPROVEMENT 
 
In this section I describe what I perceive as impediments to improving the quality of data needed 
to evaluate the impact of trade in services on the U.S. economy.  
 
Resource Issues 
 
As described in the first section of the paper, services are a large, important, and growing sector 
of the U.S. economy. Yet, the infrastructure for collecting information on the service sector is 
not as robust as that for other sectors like manufacturing. A primary reason for this disparity is 
that Congress does not allocate the same level of resources (proportional to the size of the service 
sector) as it does to the manufacturing or other sectors. Given this, it should not come as a 
surprise that one impediment to improving statistics on trade in services and domestic service 
activity is the need for additional resources.  
 
As a simple metric of the disparity in resources devoted to the various sectors, the table below 
shows the FY 2009 budget for the economic census by sector. I also show the number of 
employees and the number of establishments in each sector. I then calculate the budget dollars 
per employee and per establishment across sectors. The table shows that the resources devoted to 
the service sector on a per employee basis or per establishment basis are significantly lower than 
those devoted to manufacturing or mining.  
 
On a per establishment basis, Congress allocates more than six times more money for data 
collection in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector. On a per employee basis, the 
disparity is smaller, but still more than twice is much is spent per employee in manufacturing 
than in the service sector. If one compares mining, the disparities are even greater.  
 
Economic Census Program Components (dollars in millions) FY 2009:  
 
U.S. Census Bureau Data Collection FY 2009 2007 2007 Budget per Budget per
Budget Employment Establishments Employee Establishment
Sector (millions)
Services $39.9 68,026,666 4,382,720 0.59 9.10
Retail Trade $23.7 15,610,710 1,122,703 1.52 21.11
Manufactures $17.8 13,333,390 293,919 1.33 60.56
Wholesale Trade $12.6 6,295,109 432,094 2.00 29.16
Construction $6.8 7,399,047 725,101 0.92 9.38
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities $3.1 5,068,192 234,805 0.61 13.20
Minerals $1.7 703,129 21,169 2.42 80.31  
Note: These numbers represent the budget for FY 2009. Not all periodic census activity associated with the Economic Census 
occurs in FY 2009. However, because the timing of the processing for the various sectors within the Economic Census is similar, I 
am assuming that the relative size of the budgets is representative of the total costs associated with each sector. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Periodic Censuses and Programs Budget Amendment FY 2009, as presented to Congress June 
2008, Exhibit 12 
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This is a simple (maybe simplistic) metric, but it makes the point that service sector data 
collection is relatively resource poor. To bring the data available for the (domestic) service sector 
to a similar level as the data available for the manufacturing sector will require a commensurate 
investment of resources.  
 
To provide information on trade in services comparable to the information on trade in goods 
does not seem feasible because goods pass through ports and are required to file customs forms 
or shippers export declarations. These administrative systems provide a relatively inexpensive 
means for collecting very detailed information on trade in goods. Because traded services do not 
necessarily pass through ports, there is no obvious low-cost data collection system. It seems 
likely that collecting information on trade in services will require survey responses from firms. 
This is obviously more expensive than piggy-backing off administrative systems. To collect 
better information on services, trade will at a minimum require a significant investment of more 
resources. In the next sections, I describe what I perceive as additional prerequisites for 
collecting better trade in services data.  
 
Sampling Frame 
 
An issue identified in the MIT Offshoring Working Group report is that the BEA does not have 
access to an adequate sampling frame for conducting its surveys of international service 
transactions. The BEA recognizes the need to improve its sampling frame and is, as described 
above, taking steps to do so. Yet, I think it remains an open question of whether these modest 
steps to improve the sampling frame are sufficient. What the BEA needs is access to a sampling 
frame similar to that maintained by the Census Bureau.  
 
Data-sharing legislation provides authorization for the statistical agencies to share confidential 
data, but the situation is complicated by the fact that the Census Bureau’s business sampling 
frame contains federal tax information provided by the Internal Revenue Service. For the Census 
Bureau to share its sampling frame with the BEA or the BLS, companion legislation would have 
to be passed that would amend section 6103(j) of Title 26 (governing the use of federal tax 
information). This companion “j-bill” has not passed. If the Census Bureau could provide 
sampling frame information to the BEA, it would be a significant improvement in the BEA’s 
capacity to conduct surveys. I do not know what the current thinking is on the prospects for 
passage of the companion “j-bill,” but evidence to date leaves one less than optimistic about 
passage.  
 
As a result of the lack of an adequate sampling frame, resource constraints, and the fact that the 
principal mission of the BEA is to produce aggregate economic accounts, the BEA focuses its 
data collection efforts on large organizations that they deem to be likely to trade services. My 
impression is that the international transaction surveys are not statistically representative samples 
across service sector industries, firm size classes, or geography. To improve the level of detail 
available for trade in services statistics, the BEA will need to increase the number of 
organizations it surveys and, presumably, increase the statistical representativeness of the 
sample. These will require access to an adequate sampling frame.  
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Organization Structure  
 
The conference organizers asked that I give some thought to organizational changes that might 
facilitate improvements in service sector data. This is a potentially provocative topic, so I 
approach it with some trepidation. Yet, if one takes a step back and looks at the organizational 
structure for the collection of trade in services data, the choice of organization across agencies is 
striking. The BEA is a recipient of large amounts of data collected by other statistical agencies 
(including the BLS and the Census Bureau). It is also a data collection agency. In contemplating 
this, I was left with the question: Why does the BEA collect information on multinational 
enterprises and international service transactions?  
 
While not based on much historical research, it is my impression that trade in services statistics 
have historically been collected largely to fulfill the needs of national income and product 
account (NIPA) construction. Other types of production and international trade data are collected 
for a broad range of uses (including and importantly for the NIPAs). Historically, there has not 
been large demand for detailed trade in service statistics beyond the need to complete the NIPAs. 
I imagine that as a result of this feature of the data need, it made sense for the BEA to collect the 
trade in services data.  
 
Yet, I think this is beginning to change. As services share of the U.S. economy increases and 
trade in services grows, there will be an increasing need to analyze the impact of a broader range 
of phenomena associated with increased trade in services (e.g., the regional implications within 
the United States, the impact of the service components of trade agreements). 
 
As I argue in this paper, the need to understand the impact of trade in services—from a variety of 
perspectives, e.g., impact of trade agreements, exchange rate impact, impact on local and 
regional economies—require much more detailed data regarding trade in services. Researchers 
and policymakers need comprehensive data across detailed industry classifications and 
geographical regions within the United States—ideally not only which firms participate in global 
services trade, but also which firms don’t. The data should be consistent with other production-
related data and easily linked to other production data.  
 
Collecting detailed, statistically representative information on trade in services across detailed 
industries, countries, and regions within the United States is a major undertaking. An open 
question is whether the BEA is the most appropriate agency to conduct the data collection.  
 
There may be reasons why it makes sense to have a dedicated statistical agency within the BEA 
for collecting this type of information. However, I see some significant drawbacks for this type 
of fragmented collection system.  
 
The first drawback is that data collection has fairly significant fixed costs—especially with 
regard to developing and maintaining a sampling frame. As described above, the BEA’s inability 
to access an adequate sampling frame is a significant impediment to improved trade in services 
data collection. While I would not present myself as an expert in data collection methods, I can 
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imagine other examples of fixed costs in data collection (e.g., forms design expertise, survey 
processing and follow-up capacity).  
 
So, I think the big institutional question is why does the BEA collect these data? As identified 
above, the lack of a proper sampling frame poses a significant impediment to the BEA’s ability 
to carry out a statistically representative sampling of trade in service activity.  
 
Another drawback is data consistency and potential problems with data integration. As an 
example, when the BEA and the Census Bureau were directed to produce statistics at the 
establishment level on foreign direct investment in the United States, the data comparability and 
matching issues were not insignificant. If the foreign direct investment surveys and international 
service transactions surveys were collected by the Census Bureau using the bureau’s sampling 
frame and industrial and geographic coding systems, it would significantly increase the ease with 
which the data could be used in conjunction with other production data.  
 
There may be advantages to having the BEA conduct the survey that I am not aware of. The 
BEA and the Census Bureau work closely on other aspects of data collection for the NIPAs. The 
bureau has the infrastructure to collect detailed, statistically representative statistics on trade in 
services. For example, it has arguably the best sampling frame for this type of application within 
the statistical system. The Census Bureau already surveys all the relevant firms and 
establishments. It appears to me that the efficiencies in data collection and improvements in 
comparability from having these data collection activities within the bureau are potentially 
significant. The costs and benefits of moving the foreign direct investment and international 
service transactions data collection programs to the Census Bureau should be investigated.  
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APPENDIX A 
SLOAN OFFSHORING WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Our working group had two purposes: 1) to evaluate the data available for characterizing and 
measuring services offshoring and its effects on the United States economy, and 2) to make 
recommendations for improvements in data collection, dissemination, and analysis. 
 
We see three broad solutions to this problem, each of which should be aggressively pursued: 1) 
more and better data on services trade should be collected, 2) more information should be 
extracted and published from existing data resources, and 3) quantitative research methods 
should be combined with qualitative methods to provide a better view of the context and 
character of services offshoring. 
 
Our five recommendations are as follows: 
 
1) Collect more detail on international trade in services. 
 
The BEA should collect more detail on services products that are traded internationally 
(affiliated and unaffiliated services imports and exports). It currently collects data on only 
17 categories of traded services products. In contrast, import and export statistics for the 
United States are currently available for more than 16,000 categories of goods. Without a 
more detailed view of which services are traded internationally, it will remain impossible 
to determine which sectors experience pressure from import competition. As a result, we 
cannot know where in the economy to look for the effects of services offshoring with any 
precision. This in turn renders other data on services less useful. 
 
2) Collect more detail on domestic trade in services. 
 
The U.S. Census Bureau should accelerate its efforts to collect more detailed statistics on 
services traded within the United States (services inputs and outputs). These more 
detailed statistics will help to provide a better view of the role that services play in the 
economy of the United States. Services account for more than 85 percent of U.S. private 
sector GDP, but we have very little information on the services that are bought and sold 
by companies. 
 
3) Collect more detail and publish time series data on employment by occupation. 
 
Because service work plays a role in all industries, adequate data on employment by 
occupation is necessary to determine the employment and wage effects of services 
offshoring. Data should be collected at the establishment level to enable links to data on 
domestic and international trade. We recommend two concrete steps in this regard: 
 
1) The BLS should publish consistent time series on employment by occupation 
from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program. If possible these 
data should be published by industry at the national, state, and metropolitan 
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levels. Time-series data will allow policymakers to track employment trends in 
the occupations most vulnerable to job loss from services offshoring. 
 
2) The BEA should collect data on more occupational categories in its surveys on 
the activities of U.S.-based multinational firms. More detail on the occupations 
created by multinational firms, at home and abroad, will provide a clearer picture 
of the employment effects of services offshoring. 
 
4) Archive and provide access to more microdata resources. 
 
Steps should be taken to extract as much information as possible from the data that is 
currently collected by government programs. An inventory of current and potential 
microdata resources should be made, and as many microdata sets as possible should be 
archived, maintained, and made available to both government and academic researchers. 
Microdata are the data that supports government administrative programs and underlies 
published statistics. In general, quantitative research based on microdata can provide a 
better and more detailed view of services offshoring and its effects than research based on 
published statistics. 
 
5) Accelerate research that combines quantitative and qualitative research methods.  
 
No single approach or dataset can hope to bring the complex and dynamic phenomena of 
services offshoring into complete focus. An interdisciplinary, collaborative approach is 
needed to combine insights from data collected by government programs with insights 
from researcher-generated surveys and field interviews. Quantitative methods allow 
researchers to estimate the magnitude and speed of economic change and to implement 
causality tests, while qualitative methods can provide a rich and nuanced picture of the 
complexity, context, and dynamics of services offshoring. 
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This article contributes to an assessment of the scholarly work of Sanjaya Lall, especially as it 
relates to improved measures of industrial upgrading and technological learning. We argue for 
the collection of new statistics, in addition to reworking and linking existing datasets. Changes in 
the global economy, especially the rise of global value chains (GVCs), have created 
measurement problems that require not only continued innovation in the use of existing data 
sources, but also the development and deployment of new measures that analyze GVCs more 
directly. Specifically, we advocate for the collection of establishment-level economic data 
according to business functions. Data collected according to a standardized set of generic 
business functions can provide researchers and policy-makers with a better map of the value 
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This article contributes to an assessment and celebration of the scholarly and policy work of the 
late Sanjaya Lall. As Rasiah (2009) highlights, Lall’s work was at once broad, deep, and 
intensely focused. Over his long career, Lall and his many collaborators used the lenses of the 
transnational corporation (TNC), competitiveness, globalization, and technological learning to 
uncover the determinants of economic change—or lack thereof—in the developing world. There 
is a clear continuity to this intellectual path, one that reveals Lall’s commitment to empirical 
investigation, his skepticism of conventional wisdom, his openmindedness, and his sustained 
focus on improving the lot of those in the world who have less.  
 
During his early career, a time when TNCs were driving rapid economic development in pockets 
of the developing world, he did not simply celebrate or demonize their presence in host 
economies; he explored both their positive impact (such as local linkages and technology 
transfer) and their negative effects (such as crowding out of domestic firms and international 
transfer pricing). With the organizational fragmentation that came with global outsourcing and 
the rise of more advanced capabilities in the developing world, Lall added questions related to 
globalization and technological learning. What is most admirable is that Lall adapted his research 
and shifted his policy targets as the world economy evolved, while retaining his central focus on 
the key agents of change and their implications for developing countries. This is the path of a 
pragmatic, observant and curious mind, guided by a strong moral compass.  
 
The focus of this article is narrower. We assess a single aspect of Lall’s work, his technological 
classification of exports, and related research utilizing international trade statistics, from the 
point of view of global value chains (GVCs). We see this work on international trade as useful 
but ultimately limiting. While the techniques for estimating the technological content of trade 
can certainly be further refined by constructing more sophisticated and detailed product-based 
analyses of trade flows within or across industries, there is an urgent need to enrich existing 
metrics with additional data resources and measures that allow us to investigate GVCs more 
directly. In our view, changes in the global economy, and especially the rise of GVCs, have 
created measurement problems that require new information and new methods. In an effort to be 
constructive as well as critical, we propose one possible approach: the collection of economic 
data according to a generic and parsimonious list of business functions. 
 
 
TRACKING GLOBAL SHIFTS: CONCEPTUAL AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES  
 
Among the enduring mysteries of political economy is why some places surge ahead in the 
global economy while others grow more slowly or fall behind in relative or even absolute terms. 
Is it sound macroeconomic policy, the development of human capital, protection under the 
geopolitical umbrella of a superpower, sector-specific industrial development policies, natural 
resource endowments, or some combination that have led to the success of certain countries, 
especially in East Asia (Deyo 1987; World Bank 1993)? There are also debates about the optimal 
industry structures for technological learning and industrial upgrading. Is a concentrated 
industrial structure best because large firms can afford to invest in major research and 
development (R&D) efforts, or are open, flexible networks of small and medium-sized firms 
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better able to identify and fit into ephemeral niches of a fast changing global economy (Piore and 
Sabel 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990)? The institutional basis for development has also been a 
topic of much debate (Evans 1995; Berger and Dore 1996; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
 
For Sanjaya Lall and many others (e.g., Kimura 2007), learning is the key to industrial 
upgrading. For places that are behind, learning must, at least in part, come from absorbing 
knowledge created elsewhere. Many mechanisms for this have been examined, from arms-length 
technological “borrowing” (Amsden 1989) through a range of practices that encompass 
technology licensing, reverse engineering, the injection of equipment and know-how through 
foreign direct investment, and firm-level adaptation to demands made by both foreign affiliates 
and overseas buyers (Gereffi 1994; Feenstra and Hamilton 2006).  
 
Answers to these questions are complex, and debates about what shapes economic development 
outcomes will certainly continue. However, we are now at a critical juncture where rising 
complexity in the global economy has begun to overwhelm the slow and partial analytical 
progress that has been made in the past 25 years. Recent examples, such as how firms based in 
the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of China interact with 
each other and with local firms to produce Apple iPods in southern China for export to world 
markets (Linden et al. 2007), illustrate both the intricacies of economic globalization and the 
limits of existing data. In this setting some of the core assumptions of mainstream economics—
that demand begets supply, that nations draw mainly on their own knowledge and physical 
resources to compete with other nations, that exports reflect the industrial capabilities of the 
exporter, that firms and individuals act independently, rationally and at arms-length, and so on—
appear, if not as gross distortions, then as quaint reminders of simpler times. But if the tools of 
mainstream economics are being blunted by global integration, so too are those offered by other 
social science disciplines, which typically assume levels of institutional and cultural 
cohesiveness and economic autarky that no longer exist.  
 
For us, the GVC framework provides a useful guide as we seek answers to questions about the 
dynamic political economy of industries.12 GVC analysis highlights three basic characteristics of 
any industry: 1) the geography and character of linkages between tasks, or stages, in the chain of 
value added activities; 2) how power is distributed and exerted among firms and other actors in 
the chain; and 3) the role that institutions play in structuring business relationships and industrial 
location. These elements help explain how industries and places evolve, and offer clues about 
possible changes in the future. The chain metaphor is purposely simplistic. It focuses on the 
location of work and the linkages between tasks as a single product or service makes its way 
from conception to end use. 
 
The analysis of GVCs identifies new actors in the global economy (e.g., global buyers and global 
suppliers) and shows how their emergence alters the ways that industries are organized and 
governed across borders (Gereffi 2005). Recent theorizing about the governance of GVCs 
highlights three key determinants that affect the organization and power dynamics within GVCs 
(complexity, codifiability, and supplier competence), and characterizes three distinct business 
network forms (modular, relational and captive) that lie between the classic duality of arms-
                                                 
12 See www.globalvaluechains.org for more detail on this approach and a list of publications and researchers that 
directly engage with it. 
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length markets and hierarchies (i.e., vertically integrated firms) (Gereffi et al. 2005). The GVC 
governance types were derived from direct field observation in a variety of global industries, 
including footwear and apparel (Bair and Gereffi 2001, Gereffi 1999; Schmitz 1999), 
horticulture (Dolan and Humphrey 2000), bicycles (Galvin and Morkel 2001), electronics 
(Borrus et al. 2000; Lee and Chen 2000; Sturgeon 2002), and motor vehicles (Humphrey 2003; 
Sturgeon and Florida 2004).  
 
Qualitative industry research and conceptual theory building of this sort have been extremely 
helpful in developing the framework, in identifying emerging trends in GVCs, and in providing 
researchers and policymakers with a vocabulary to discuss some of their key features without 
getting bogged down in industry-specific nomenclature. The framework has been used, 
challenged and extended in recent research on industries such as tourism (Barham et al. 2007), 
electronics (Vind and Fold 2007), textiles and apparel (Evgeniev 2008), motor vehicles 
(Sturgeon et al. 2008), and coffee and tea (Neilson and Pritchard 2009), and in regions such as 
Latin America (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2007) and East Asia (Kawakami and Sturgeon 
forthcoming). 
 
A major impediment to using qualitative research and conceptual theories to support specific 
policy interventions is the lack of comparable and detailed data on the industrial capabilities of 
firms, industries, and countries and the roles that they play in the global economy. The GVC 
framework provides a conceptual toolbox, but quantitative measures are lacking. While the 
development of objective, industry-neutral measures of GVC governance is a laudable goal, and 
survey questions are currently being fielded to collect data on the governance character of 
interfirm linkages in both cross-border and domestics sourcing relationships, better information 
to characterize the roles of firms, regions, and countries in GVCs is urgently needed. 13 
 
In this article, we examine the state of the art in GVC metrics and chart a way forward. First, we 
summarize some of the best recent academic research that has used official statistics to examine 
issues related to GVCs and industrial upgrading, including Lall’s (2000) technological 
classification of exports, Feenstra and Hamilton’s (2007) trade-data archeology, research on 
intermediate goods trade, and efforts to enrich trade data by linking it to “microdata” underlying 
national statistics and policy programs. We then point to what is perhaps the most glaring data 
gap of all: the appallingly poor level of product detail in international services trade.  
 
While the research we review provides useful insights into the dynamics of GVCs and helps to 
identify some of the key drivers of industrial upgrading, we are left with a dilemma. The rise in 
intermediate goods trade strongly suggests that countries no longer rely only or even primarily 
on domestic resources to develop and export products to the rest of the world. Countries and 
regions do not make products and deliver services in their entirety, but they have come to 
specialize in specific functions within larger regional and GVCs. Surging trade in services 
complicates the picture. As a result, industrial output and trade statistics provide a very partial 
and even misleading view of where value is created and captured in the global economy.  
 
                                                 
13 Specifically, Statistics Canada, in an international sourcing survey currently being tested, asks firms if 
relationships with important suppliers are simple market relationships or something more complex, and if 
transactions involve the exchange of codified or tacit information.  
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Even the best trade statistics, as they currently exist, can only hint at what is happening in GVCs 
and how this sort of “integrative trade” (Maule 2006) is shaping development outcomes. If key 
GVC-related questions are not asked on any official survey and do not exist on any 
administrative form, then existing data resources can never yield adequate results. Thus, there is 
an urgent need to collect new information. To illustrate, we present a new business function 
classification scheme that is currently being developed and deployed by statistical agencies and 
academic researchers in North America and Europe in the hope that it will soon be standardized 
and adopted more broadly.14 
 
 
WHAT TRADE STATISTICS CAN REVEAL ABOUT GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
Data on international trade in physical goods and commodities are available in considerable 
detail online in the United Nations Statistical Division’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(known as UN COMTRADE). The database contains import and export statistics reported by the 
statistical authorities of nearly 200 countries, from 1962 to the most recent year, currently 2006 
to 2008, depending on the country.15 Because these data are collected from many different 
national statistical agencies, they vary in quality and coverage. Nevertheless, the UN 
COMTRADE database provides information on imports and exports by value and in some cases 
by the number of units or volume shipped, according to seven different product (commodity) 
lists, the most detailed being the 2002 Harmonized Tariffs Code list, which at the 6-digit level 
includes more than 8,000 product descriptions.16 
 
The fine-grained product detail and the ease of access to COMTRADE data have allowed 
researchers to create alternatives to the industry classification schemes that its commodity lists 
are based on. While industries are an important and often relevant category, they typically 
contain products that are very heterogeneous in terms of labor or capital intensity, technological 
content, and so on. This section examines three distinct approaches to analyzing trade data that 
shed light distinct aspects of GVC development and industrial upgrading. The first is Sanjaya 
Lall’s (2000) classification of technological sophistication, which groups products based on their 
technological requirements. Increases in “high technology” exports suggest that learning and 
industrial upgrading is taking place in the exporting country. Second is the trade-data 
archaeology approach developed by Feenstra and Hamilton (2006), which tracks highly detailed 
export flows from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China to the United States over 
long periods of time. This approach reveals that specific products, rather than broad industries, 
have been key to upgrading in these countries (e.g., microwave ovens from the Republic of 
Korea, not white goods in general; computer monitors from Taiwan Province of China, not 
electronics in general). Feenstra and Hamilton also tie these exports of narrow product categories 
to the strategies of United States retailers and marketers to show how buyer-driven GVCs have 
influenced development outcomes in East Asia. The third is work on the relationship between 
                                                 
14 See, for example, the National Science Foundation–funded Project, “A National Survey of Organizations to Study 
Globalization, Innovation and Employment.” 
http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward.do?AwardNumber=0926746&version=noscript. 
15 See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/. 
16 The United States data, published by the Department of Commerce, is available at the 10-digit HTC level and 
includes more than 16,000 product descriptions. 
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GVCs and intermediate goods trade. Increases in intermediate goods trade signals the geographic 
fragmentation of the production process driven, we argue, by the increasing importance of GVCs 
in international trade.  
 
Upgrading As Learning: Sanjaya Lall’s Technological Classification of Exports 
 
Gereffi (2005, p. 171) defines industrial upgrading as “the process by which economic actors—
nations, firms and workers—move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global 
production networks.” Lall et al. (2005) share this view and start with a reasonable assumption, 
that the learning required to export high value-added, technology-intensive products will be 
greater than for simpler products. Even if the knowledge embedded in imported intermediate 
inputs and machinery and know-how from foreign affiliates and global buyers is invisible in 
export statistics, as they typically are, we can at least assume that technology-intensive exports 
heighten the potential for rapid learning by local actors.  
 
To examine the path of technological learning in the global economy using export statistics, Lall 
(2000) devised a technological classification of goods exports. To provide an example of how we 
can assess industrial upgrading for export-oriented economies, we examine shifts in the 
technology content of China’s and Mexico’s exports over time. Following Lall (2000), we divide 
each country’s exports into five product groupings, which are listed in ascending levels of 
technological content: primary products; resource-based manufactures; and low-, medium-, and 
high-technology manufactures (see Table 1).17 The main contributing industries to each category 
(agroforest products, textile and apparel, automotive, and electronics) are broken out to simplify 
the analysis. 
                                                 
17 Lall (2000) developed this technological classification of exports based on 3-digit Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) categories. His article provides the detailed list of products under each category. 
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Table 1.  Lall’s Technological Classification of Exports 
Classification Examples 
Primary products (PP) Fresh fruit, meat, rice, cocoa, tea, coffee, wood, coal, crude petroleum, gas 
Manufactured products  
RB: Resource based manufactures  
           RB1: Agro/forest based 
products 
Prepared meats/fruits, beverages, wood products, 
vegetable oils 
            RB2: Other resource based 
products 
Ore concentrates, petroleum/rubber products, 
cement, cut gems, glass 
LT: Low technology manufactures  
 LT1: Textile/fashion cluster Textile fabrics, clothing, headgear, footwear, leather 
manufactures, travel goods 
Simple 
Manufac
t-ures 
 LT2: Other low technology  Pottery, simple metal parts/structures, furniture, 
jewellery, toys, plastic products 
MT: Medium technology manufactures  
 MT1: Automotive products 
MT2: Medium technology 
process industries  
Passenger vehicles and parts, commercial vehicles, 
motorcycles and parts 
Synthetic fibres, chemicals and paints, fertilizers, 
plastics, iron, pipes/tubes 
 MT3: Medium technology 
engineering industries  
Engines, motors, industrial machinery, pumps, 
switchgear, ships, watches 
HT: High technology manufactures   
 HT1: Electronics and electrical 
products  
Office/data processing/telecom equip, TVs, 
transistors, turbines, power gen. eqp. 
Complex 
Manufac
t-ures 
 HT2: Other high technology Pharmaceuticals, aircraft, optical/measuring 
instruments, cameras 
Other transactions Electric current, cinema film, printed matter, special 
transactions, gold, works of art, coins, pets 
Source: Lall (2000, p. 341). 
 
In Figure 1, panel 1, we see that in 1988, 45 percent of Mexico’s total exports to the United 
States market were primary products, the most important of which was oil. In 1993, one year 
prior to the establishment of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), medium-
technology manufactures (mainly automotive products) and high-tech manufactures (largely 
electronics items) moved ahead of raw materials in Mexico’s export mix. By 2008, over 60 
percent of Mexico’s exports of $234 billion to the United States market were in the medium- and 
high-technology product categories, followed by primary products with 20 percent of all exports 
(which rebounded from their nadir of 10 percent of total exports in 2001) and low-technology 
manufactures (such as textiles, apparel, and footwear). Thus, in just two decades, Mexico’s 
export structure was transformed from one based on raw materials to one dominated by medium- 
and high-technology manufactured items. 
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Figure 1. Technological Composition of Mexico’s and China’s Exports  
to the United States,  1988 – 2008 
Panel 1: Technological Composition of Mexico’s Exports to the United States 
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Panel 2: Technological Composition of China’s Exports to the United States 
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Source: UN Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQuery.aspx).  
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In Figure 1, panel 2, we see the composition of China’s exports to the United States market 
during the 1988–2008 period. Unlike Mexico, the leading product category in China’s exports to 
the United States market in 1988 was low-technology manufactured goods. These were primarily 
made up of a wide variety of light consumer goods, such as apparel, footwear, toys, sporting 
goods, housewares. These products accounted for about two-thirds of China’s overall exports to 
the United States in the early 1990s. By 2008, however, high-technology exports had increased 
to 35 percent of China’s total exports to the United States market, and were virtually tied with 
low-technology exports for the top spot in China’s export mix.  
 
Thus, Mexico and China have a number of commonalities in their export trajectories to the 
United States market during the past two decades. Both are diversified economies, with a range 
of export product types. In both cases, manufactured exports are more important than primary 
product or resource-based exports; within manufacturing, high- and medium-technology exports 
are displacing low-technology goods. While these export data have limitations as indicators of 
industrial upgrading, as we will discuss below, both economies appear to be increasing the 
technological sophistication of their exports. 
 
Trade-Data Archaeology 
 
Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) utilize highly disaggregated international trade statistics to shed 
new light on the debate surrounding the origins of the “East Asian miracle.” Conventional 
explanations of East Asia’s economic success—beginning with Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and including the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong (China), and 
Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s—revolve around the role of markets and states in promoting 
export-oriented industrialization in this region. The World Bank and neoclassical economists 
have favoured the market-friendly explanation, which focuses on the solid macroeconomic 
fundamentals in the early East Asian industrializers (World Bank 1993), while other scholars 
have highlighted the directive role of the state in promoting this transition (Amsden 1989, Wade 
1990, Evans 1995). Feenstra and Hamilton offer a contending demand-side perspective to 
account for the sustained export success of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, 
which ties their performance to the retail revolution and the rise of “big buyers” in the United 
States (see also Gereffi [1999]). 
 
Using what they call “trade-data archaeology,” Feenstra and Hamilton recreate the export 
trajectories of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, not merely at the level of 
industries, but by tracing the flow of very specific products over several decades from the early 
1970s to the present. This approach reveals that the Republic of Korea’s and Taiwan Province of 
China’s dramatic export success was actually concentrated in a handful of product categories, 
such as garments, footwear, bicycles, toys, televisions, microwave ovens, computers and office 
products. The analysis shows that although exports from Taiwan Province of China and the 
Republic of Korea were in the same industries, they specialized in different kinds of products 
within these industries: the Republic of Korea’s large vertically integrated chaebol firms 
emphasized mass-produced, standardized items, while Taiwan Province of China excelled in 
making a wide variety of more specialized products that fit the capabilities of the smaller firms 
that dominate the island’s diversified economy.  
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The authors go beyond standard supply-side accounts of East Asia’s export success by showing 
precisely how these exports were linked to the “retail revolution” in the United States, where 
retailers (such as Sears, JC Penney, Kmart, and Wal-Mart) and companies with global brands 
(such as Nike, Liz Claiborne, Disney, and many others) set up international sourcing networks to 
tap and expand the global supply base. It was the dynamics within GVCs, as much as any 
supply-side market or state-society characteristics, that fuelled the export-oriented development 
model that has been promoted by the World Bank and a variety of international development 
agencies since the 1980s. The fact that both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of 
China developed these “demand-responsive” economies has important theoretical implications 
for economic sociology and international trade theories alike (Hamilton and Gereffi 2008).  
 
Examining Intermediate Goods Trade 
 
Merchandise trade has increased dramatically since the 1970s, far surpassing pre-World War I 
peaks in most OECD countries. Feenstra (1998) notes a sectoral shift in U.S. imports away from 
agricultural products and raw materials and towards capital and technology-intensive goods. 
Explanations include trade liberalization, falling transportation costs, and equalization of gross 
domestic products (GDPs) among trading countries, given the tendency for countries of similar 
size trade more than countries of disproportionate size. Of course, there are many other possible 
explanations for these shifts, including rising production skills and better capital stock in poor 
countries and speedier transportation, which opens up trade for perishable goods such as fresh 
vegetables as well as for goods with very volatile prices, such as computer memory.  
 
The rise of GVCs is not only enabled by these factors, but is itself a cause of trade increases. As 
Feenstra (1998, p. 36) argues, the geographic fragmentation of production causes increases in the 
volume of total trade because intermediate inputs may cross borders several times before final 
products are delivered to end users. Thus, the trade content of an average product rises when it is 
made in the context of GVCs.  
 
The fact that intermediate goods trade is rising much faster than overall trade has stimulated a 
vast body of research and multiple labels, including a new international division of labor (Fröbel 
et al. 1980), multistage production (Dixit and Grossman 1982), slicing up the value chain 
(Krugman 1995), the disintegration of production (Feenstra 1998), fragmentation (Arndt and 
Kierzkowski 2001), vertical specialization (Hummels et al. 2001), global production sharing 
(Yeats 2001), offshore outsourcing (Doh 2005), and integrative trade (Maule 2006). Sturgeon 
and Memedovic (forthcoming), using the UN’s broad economic categories of consumption, 
capital, and intermediate goods, calculate that global trade in intermediate goods has far 
outpaced these other categories (Figure 2). This rise is most dramatic after 1992, when the 
developing world was linked more systematically in GVCs. The share of worldwide imports of 
intermediate goods by developing countries increased from only 25.5 percent in 1992 to 35.2 
percent in 2006. During this period total trade in intermediate goods grew 2.2 times in 
industrialized countries and 3.4 times in developing countries. 
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Figure 2. Intermediate, capital, and final goods trade, 1962–2006  
(millions of constant U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Sturgeon and Memedovic (forthcoming). 
 
While soaring intermediate goods trade is a strong indicator of the rise of GVCs, their growing 
dominance of world trade can lead to odd and confusing metrics. For example, because Malaysia 
imported so many intermediate goods for inclusion in exports, its ratio of exported goods and 
services to GDP in 2005 reached 123.4 percent (World Development Indicators 2007). Such 
ratios are not uncommon in classic entrepôt economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong 
(China), and as a comparative measure of trade integration this is fine, but upon seeing such 
statistics without reference to GVCs, one has to wonder how a country can export more than it 
produces. 
 
Clearly, the global economy is changing. Rising intermediate goods trade means that goods are 
flowing, increasingly, within the same industry. Research on intraindustry trade (Grubel and 
Lloyd 1975; Lloyd and Lee 2002) has shown steady increases of about 4–5 percent per year in 
countries trading the same or seemingly similar products. This challenged the central tenet of 
Ricardian trade theory: country specialization according to factor-based comparative advantage 
that would lead only to interindustry trade. Finger (1975) claims that coarse industry 
classifications disguised vast heterogeneity within industries; in other words, countries could 
specialize within the same industry, especially in intermediate inputs versus final goods.  
 
For Krugman (1991), intraindustry trade is driven by firms seeking increasing returns from large-
scale production, thereby generating exports, while consumer demand for product variety 
stimulates imports of very similar products. Although this work was based on horizontal 
differentiation (of similar products), the quality ladder-growth models from Grossman-Helpman 
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(1991), which are formally very similar to Krugman’s model, have a vertical dimension that 
includes intermediate goods. Others have tested and refined these theories in the context of East 
Asia’s economic rise (Ng and Yeats 1999) and provided evidence of increasing “vertical” 
specialization in intermediate inputs (Hummels et al. 2001). Using updated statistics, Brülhart 
argues that “. . . since the 1990s, [the increase in intraindustry trade] appears to be driven to a 
significant extent by the international fragmentation of vertical production chains” (Brülhart 
2008, abstract). 
 
Our argument is that trade statistics can only hint at the changes occurring in the global 
economy. Trade statistics alone contain very partial information about the location of value 
added, and no information about ownership of productive assets and output, where profits are 
reaped, or how these increasingly complex systems are coordinated. Certainly, work will 
continue on the causes and meaning of interindustry trade. But there are limits to what can be 
learned from trade statistics alone. 
 
 
USING ADMINISTRATIVE AND MICRODATA RESOURCES TO UNDERSTAND 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS  
 
Linking trade statistics to other datasets can enhance their usefulness. Through careful matching, 
or by taking advantage of especially rich administrative data,18 researchers can sometimes push 
beyond the limitations of published statistics. A host of government programs collect detailed 
economic data. Typically more detailed microdata underlie what is ultimately made available to 
the public. While these data are usually confidential, researchers who gain security clearance and 
have their proposals accepted by data collection agencies can gain access, as along as 
government personnel screen the results before the research is published. Some microdata sets 
have also been assembled by data agencies and released, with confidential information removed, 
as public-use files. Over the past decade, a burgeoning body of research has relied on 
government-collected microdata. In this section, we provide a few examples. 
 
Feenstra and Hanson (2004, 2005) take advantage of administrative data from Mainland China 
and Hong Kong (China) to reveal new information about the workings of GVCs. Specifically, 
the data contain reexport values for Hong Kong and information about factory and input 
ownership in China. These data allow the authors to estimate the mark-up charged by Hong 
Kong–based GVC “intermediaries” such as Li and Fung, a trading company. The authors also 
use these data to calculate the share of China’s exports to Hong Kong that are reexported (45.4 
percent in 1998), an indicator of the important coordination role that companies like Li and Fung 
play in GVCs, especially in apparel and other consumer-goods industries. By taking advantage 
of data that describe the ownership of factories exporting from China, the authors are able to 
show that independent suppliers working under “export processing” arrangements (i.e., suppliers 
that are provided with inputs by intermediaries and their customers) are much more likely to 
send goods through Hong Kong for reexport than exporting factories that are wholly owned by 
non-Chinese firms.  
                                                 
18 Governments collect data for the purpose of administering their programs such as tax collection, compliance with 
environmental protection laws, and the like. For this reason, such data are typically referred to as “administrative 
data.” 
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Feenstra and Spencer (2005) use the same Chinese data, from 1998 through 2000, to explore the 
relationship between outsourcing arrangements (arms-length vs. contractual) and the proximity 
of suppliers (on-shore vs. offshore). They find that relationships vary according to the 
technological sophistication of the product being outsourced. The more technologically 
sophisticated the product, the more likely it is that firms will source from affiliates or outsource 
to suppliers located nearby. Dani Rodrick and his collaborators (Haussman et al. 2006) use these 
data to show that the basket of goods exported by China is of higher technological content than 
would be predicted by its GDP per capita (using averages for all other countries’ export mixes).  
 
By linking these same data to Chinese input-output data, Dean, Fung, and Wang (2007) estimate 
that China’s “vertical specialization,” that is, the use of imported intermediate inputs in exported 
goods, increased between 1997 and 2002 in most industries. This is the opposite of what one 
would expect. Instead of engaging in progressive import substitution as domestic capabilities 
rise, as most theories of development predict, China increased its reliance on imported 
intermediates as exports increased. Here we see that, because of the intricacies of production and 
trade networks within GVCs, we cannot assume deterministic causal linkages between export-led 
industrialization, the technological content of exports, and industrial upgrading. 
 
Researchers have creatively used microdata to explore specific questions related to GVCs. For 
example, Bernard et al. (2005) link administrative data from U.S. census mailing lists to the universe 
of import and export transactions for 1993–2000, revealing a detailed picture of the characteristics of 
firms that do and do not trade. 19 Harrison and McMillan (2006) and others have used the parent and 
foreign affiliate microdata from the Bureau of Economic Analysis surveys on TNCs to examine the 
relationship between affiliate activity and United States employment. Swenson (2005) has examined 
the permanency of offshore assembly arrangements using extremely detailed data from United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) reports. Kletzer (2002) has used microdata from the 
Displaced Worker Survey to explore the experiences of workers displaced from manufacturing 
industries associated with increased foreign competition, and has made policy recommendations 
based on her findings. 
 
Administrative microdata from public surveys and linked datasets can enrich our view of how 
domestic firms engage with the global economy. Microdata collected from TNCs, for example, 
when combined with data on international trade, can provide new information about the cross-
border activities of TNCs and how they use local resources in offshore locations. Such 
approaches can be difficult to replicate and extend, however, because not all researchers can 
access confidential microdata, and because the painstaking work of cleaning and matching raw 
microdata files can be very difficult for other researchers to understand and replicate. 
Furthermore, unique administrative datasets tend to be available only for individual countries, 
and data collected in support of specific policy initiatives are commonly phased out after the 
                                                 
19 We are referring here to the United States Census Bureau’s Business Register, which is the sampling frame used 
for the Economic Census. Data included are business name, address, a unique establishment-level identifier, 
industry, employment, and the identity of the firm that owns the enterprise. Data about ownership allows the 
enterprises in the Business Register to be aggregated to the firm level. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) have assembled 
the Business Register into a time-series for 1976-2002, referred to as the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). 
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programmes they were intended to support come to an end. As a result, studies based on 
microdata can have limited scope with regard to multiple countries and longer-term trends.  
 
 
WHAT TRADE STATISTICS HIDE 
 
The easy availability and richness of UN COMTRADE data has led to their wide use among 
researchers and policymakers. However, we need to keep in mind what trade statistics do not tell 
us, and even what they might obscure. First, trade data contain no actual information about the 
process by which products are made. Certain production processes, such as semiconductor wafer 
fabrication, involve the manipulation of items so small, or require tolerances so exact, that they 
have moved beyond the limits of human dexterity and must always be carried out by machines. 
Other processes, such as sewing, have so far resisted automation and can only be done by hand. 
But for a very wide range of products and processes, the labor content of production is variable. 
The degree of labor or capital intensity used in production is, in many instances, a strategic 
managerial choice rather than an intrinsic characteristic of the product. Thus, we cannot rigidly 
associate technological content or capital requirements with most specific categories or classes of 
products. Industries are even poorer indicators of technological sophistication. 
 
Furthermore, the technological content of high-technology exports may be embodied in imported 
components, subsystems, or production equipment. The highest value-added elements of high-
technology exports from developing countries are often produced in a third country. Even if 
these “high-tech” inputs are produced locally, and final assembly processes are truly technology 
intensive, they may be carried out by foreign-owned and operated firms with few meaningful 
linkages to the local economy. With rising wages, worker militancy, political friction, or even a 
prolonged natural disaster, such footloose firms might easily pack up and move elsewhere. Thus, 
trade statistics run a real risk of overstating the technological competence of exporters, and 
especially of local firms.  
 
Even when production is carried out by local firms and is truly technology intensive, the reality 
of GVCs is that the innovative work of product conception, design, marketing and supply-chain 
management may well continue to be conducted outside of the exporting country. These 
“intangible assets” cannot be measured by current international trade statistics. The value of 
imports plus the intangible assets held by the most powerful firms in GVCs, such as lead firms 
with global brands, suppliers with platform leadership (Gawer and Cusumano 2002), and large 
retailers, can be extremely high.  
 
For example, Linden et al. (2007) estimate that only $4 of the $299 retail price of an Apple 30 
gigabyte video iPod MP3 player is captured in China, where they are assembled and tested by 
the contract manufacturers based in Taiwan Province of China, Hon Hai (also known as 
Foxconn), Asustek, and Inventec. This is in part because iPods are assembled from components 
made mostly in other countries, such as the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. But 
more importantly, it is because Apple, which conducts high-level design work and software 
development in house and orchestrates the product’s development, production, marketing, and 
distribution, is estimated to capture $80 of the sale price. This study also estimates that $83 is 
captured in the United States by Apple’s technology suppliers and by retailers. Clearly, assigning 
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the $183 per unit wholesale price of exported iPods (as would be reported in trade statistics) to 
the Chinese economy misrepresents where value is created in the global economy. It also would 
be a mistake to conclude that Chinese firms have the capability to develop and market products 
such as the iPod simply because the country is the source of exports. 
 
A Glaring Data Gap: Services Trade 
 
The easy availability and richness of UN COMTRADE data has tilted research on international 
trade toward the goods sector. While this work has contributed greatly to our understanding of 
international trade and its impacts on various national economies and industries, the lack of 
similar detail or global coverage on international trade in services has created a significant 
knowledge gap. In the case of the United States, the Bureau of Economic Analysis collects 
import and export data for only 17 service product categories (see Table 2). Statistics Canada 
collects only 28, and the OECD, which relies on member countries for data, publishes only 11. 
Contrast the poor detail in traded services with detail on goods in the COMTRADE database 
(8,000 product codes) and the magnitude of the data gap becomes clear. 
 
Because of this data gap, we lack the basic knowledge about services trade needed to even 
glimpse trends in industrial upgrading driven by services. The paucity of detail in services means 
that we have no information about what is happening in the service product categories that have 
been mentioned as moving offshore from developed to developing countries, including back-
office functions such as accounting, customer support, R&D, and software programming.  
 
Why are the data resources related to services so poor? One reason is that the data are difficult to 
collect. While companies might track the source of every physical input to manufacturing, for 
warranty or quality control purposes, services expenditures are typically grouped into very 
coarse categories, such as “purchased services.” The absence of tariffs on services, and their 
nonphysical character, means that when service work moves across borders, no customs forms 
are filled out and no such data are generated. Another reason is that service work has historically 
been thought to consist of nonroutine activities that require face-to-face contact between 
producers and users. Services as different as haircuts and legal advice have traditionally been 
consumed, in place, as soon as they are produced. The customized and ephemeral nature of many 
services has led them to be considered “nontradable” by economists or at least very “sticky” in a 
geographic sense relative to the production of tangible goods. Finally, services have long been 
viewed as ancillary to manufacturing, either as direct inputs (e.g., transportation) or as services 
provided to people who worked in manufacturing (e.g., residential construction, retail sales, etc.). 
As such, services have been viewed as a by-product, not a source, of economic growth.  Thus, 
data collection on services has been given a low priority by statistical agencies. 
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Table 2. The 17 product categories collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
for traded services 
 
Travel, passenger fares, and 
other transportation services 
(1) 
Royalties and license fees (2) Education (3) 
Financial services (4) 
Insurance services (5) Telecommunications services 
(6) 
Business, professional, and technical services 
Computer and information 
services 
 Computer and data processing 
services (7) 
 Database and other information 
services (8) 
  
Management and consulting 
services (9) 
  
Research, development and 
testing services (10) 
Construction, architectural, 
engineering services (11) 
Industrial engineering services (12) Operational leasing services (13) 
Installation, maintenance, and 
equipment repair services (14) 
Advertising services (15) Legal services (16) 
Other business, professional, 
and technical services (17) 
  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
 
Nevertheless, services trade is burgeoning, both domestically and internationally. 
Computerization is allowing a growing range of service tasks to be standardized, fragmented, 
codified, modularized, and more readily and cheaply transported between producers and 
consumers who might be at great distance. As in goods production, the application of 
information technology to the provision of services allows some degree of customization within 
the rubric of high volume production, or what Pine and Davis (1999) call “mass customization.” 
With computerization and inexpensive data storage, the second defining feature of services, that 
they cannot be stored, has also become less true than in the past. With deregulation, business 
process outsoucing, and the rise of the Internet, services have become the focus of intense 
international competition and rampant innovation. Clearly, the assumptions behind current data 
regimes have changed and statistical systems must catch up. 
 
Recent progress has been made in the context of NAFTA. In the spring of 2006, the U.S. Census 
Bureau, in collaboration with its counterpart agencies in Canada and Mexico, completed the 
development of 99 detailed product lists that identify and define the significant products of about 
370 service industries. Work to date on the North American Product Code System (NAPCS) has 
focused on the products made by service industries in 12 two-digit industry sectors (48–49 
through 81). In all, more than 3,500 individual service products have been defined. The NAPCS 
product definitions are extremely detailed in terms of what they do, and in many cases do not, 
include. This level of detail, if fully deployed, would go a long way toward filling the data gap in 
services trade.20  
 
                                                 
20 For more information on NAPCS, see http://www.census.gov/eos/www/napcs/napcs.htm. 
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To sum up, data resources are falling behind economic realities. Innovative work to create new 
classification schemes from disaggregated datasets, to mine microdata from government surveys 
and administrative records (as well as from private sources), and to combine and match data to 
create new data resources, is breaking new ground and providing important insights. A few of 
the most severe data gaps could eventually be filled. However, more needs to be done to collect 
data specifically designed to provide insights into the characteristics and effects of GVCs. Work 
of this sort is proceeding along multiple fronts, including the surveys that test the GVC 
governance framework developed by Gereffi et al. (2005) and the quantification of value capture 
in specific GVCs (Linden at al. 2007). Equally important is the ongoing stream of detailed field-
based research on the functioning of GVCs, in particular industries and places (e.g., Kawakami 
and Sturgeon forthcoming). In the next section, we propose another approach: the collection of a 
broad range of economic data, such as employment, sourcing locations, and job characteristics 
according to an exclusive, exhaustive, parsimonious, and generic list of business functions. 
 
 
COLLECTING NEW DATA ON BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 
 
Vertical fragmentation and the growth of integrative trade—the very stuff of GVCs—has served 
to expand the arena of competition beyond final products to the vertical business function slices 
that can be offered (horizontally, to diverse customers) as generic goods and services within and 
across industries. This dynamic has raised the performance requirements for firms and workers 
that may have been insulated from global competition in the past. Workers, almost regardless of 
their role, can suddenly find themselves in competition with a range of consultants, vendors, 
suppliers, contractors, and affiliates from places both far and near. Global value chains raise, 
among other things, the possibility that entire societies can become highly specialized in specific 
sets of business functions, while others fail to develop or atrophy. Development paths that 
include heavy GVC engagement can have positive or negative consequences for wealth creation, 
employment, innovation, firm autonomy, social welfare, and economic development (Whittaker 
et al. forthcoming). Despite their growing importance as discrete realms of value creation, 
competition and industry evolution, we currently have no standard method for collecting data 
about business functions. 
 
While there are a host of business functions that have long been disembodied from specific 
industries (e.g., from janitorial to IT to manufacturing services), qualitative research has shown 
that managers often experiment with a wide variety of “make” or “buy” choices and on- or 
offshore sourcing (Berger et al. 2005). Decisions about how to bundle and unbundle, combine 
and recombine, and locate and relocate business functions have become a central preoccupation 
of strategic decision-making. Because industry classification schemes typically describe only the 
main output or process of the firm, and input-output statistics refer only to those products the 
firm buys or sells, existing enterprise and establishment-level data resources are not well suited 
to capturing the dynamics of business function bundling or revealing the spatial and 
organizational patterns that result.  
 
In our view, this data gap will become more important over time as the capabilities that reside in 
the domestic and global supply-bases continue to rise, increasing the potential for fragmenting, 
outsourcing and relocating a wide variety of business functions. A standardized list of exclusive 
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and generic business functions is needed. An exclusive list will have no overlap between 
categories and will account for all of the functions of the firm. A generic list will be equally 
applicable to all firms and organizations, regardless of industry. The list should be extremely 
parsimonious at first, with detail collected only after the main categories have stabilized through 
field testing. While this is a difficult and time-consuming prospect, work to develop business 
function lists and deploy them in surveys is well under way. 
 
Developing, Deploying, and Refining Business Function Lists: A Brief History 
 
To our knowledge, the earliest use of a business function list to collect economic data was for the 
EMERGENCE Project (Huws and Dahlman 2004), funded by the European Commission. This 
research uses a less-than-generic list of seven business functions tailored to collect information 
about the outsourcing of information technology–related functions, such as software 
development and data processing. Industry-specific bias in business function lists can simplify 
data collection and focus research on specific questions, but the results cannot be easily 
compared to or aggregated with other data, and they increase the risk of creating nonexhaustive 
lists. When business function lists are nonexhaustive, they leave some functions unexamined and 
block our view of how specific business functions contribute to the total employment or output 
of a firm. Business function lists should seek to include the full range of activities that all 
establishments must either do in house or have done by others, regardless of industry. 
 
In his 1985 book, Competitive Advantage, Michael Porter publishes a list of nine generic 
business functions: R&D, design, production, marketing and sales, distribution, customer 
service, firm infrastructure, human resources, and technology development. A list similar to 
Porter’s was developed for the European Union (EU) Survey on International Sourcing (Neilsen 
2008) and adopted by Statistics Canada for the Survey of Changing Business Practices in the 
Global Economy. This list, while not industry-specific in any way, was not fully exhaustive 
because it included an “other functions” category. Such categories are useful as checks on the 
exhaustiveness of the list used, but researchers should then combine them with an existing 
category or, if needed, define a new, exclusive category, rather than accepting an undefined 
category of data. 
 
Firms, especially at the establishment level, typically have a main output, be it a product or 
service. The main operational function that produces this output is associated with the firm’s 
standardized industrial code. Instead of counting all output and employment under this 
classification, as business censuses typically do, business function lists can be used to measure 
economic activity (e.g., employment, occupational mix, wages paid, etc.) in other functions as 
well. In business function frameworks, this main productive function has been designated 
variously as “production” (Porter 1985), the “core function” (Neilsen 2008), and “operations” 
(Brown 2008). In contrast, the EMRGENCE project list (Huws and Dahlman 2004) and a more 
recent list developed by the Offshoring Research Network for the purpose of detecting R&D 
offshoring (Lewin et al. 2009) did not include a category for the firm’s main operational 
function. Instead it used a list of commonly outsourced functions (product development, IT 
services, back office functions, call centers, etc.). A business function list cannot be considered 
exhaustive unless it includes a category that captures the main productive function of the firm, a 
function that can be partially or even completely outsourced.  
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The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Mass Layoff Statistics (MLS) program has developed a 
list to collect data on business functions fulfilled by workers who have been separated in large-
scale layoffs in the United States (Brown 2008). In the 2007 MLS survey of establishments, 
respondents were asked a question about the primary and secondary roles, or “business 
functions,” performed by laid-off workers. According to Brown (2008, p. 56), “ ‘Do not know’ 
responses to the business function question remained low [less than 6 percent], indicating that 
the correct person is being reached for the interview and that most respondents in fact think in 
terms of business functions.” In other words, the BLS found business function data to be highly 
collectable because company officials appear to recognize the business function concept.  A 
tabulation of respondents’ literal responses generated a very long, nonexclusive list of business 
functions that were then coded by BLS personnel to create detailed, mutually exclusive 
categories. This list was further coded to nine higher-level business functions (named “business 
processes” in the MLS) similar to the Porter list. It is the bottom up methodology used by the 
BLS—beginning with literal responses rather than using a list that researchers develop 
subjectively or iteratively with industry informants—along with its exhaustive, exclusive, and 
generic character, which gives us a high level of confidence in the BLS list.  
 
A Proposed List of Business Functions 
 
The growing use of business function lists in survey research suggests a need to delve within the 
firm to observe the details of organizational design, organizational change, outsourcing and 
industrial location. Clearly, new realities are spurring researchers to develop these new metrics. 
In our view, the sooner a business function classification scheme can be standardized and 
broadly deployed the better. 
 
Table 3 presents a proposed list of 12 business functions, along with their definitions. The list 
adds four business functions to the 2007 BLS MLS list. First, there is a function called “strategic 
management.” This reflects the common separation of the command, control, and strategy-
setting activities of top management from more mundane managerial functions that can 
sometimes be located offshore and/or carried out in supplier firms. The most recent BLS MLS 
surveys distinguish strategic management from a set of “general management” functions. 
Second, because they typically occur at nearly opposite ends of the value chain, procurement has 
been separated from distribution, transportation, and logistics. Third, our list breaks out 
“intermediate input and materials production” from operations. This is meant to capture the very 
common practice of externally sourcing physical parts or blocks of services for inclusion in 
larger products and systems. In the BLS MLS list intermediate input production is considered 
part of operations. Fourth, because they contain very different activities, firm infrastructure has 
been broken out from general management (and corporate governance). Despite these 
differences, the lists are compatible since the functions in Table 3 can be combined to match the 
BLS MLS list. 
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Table 3. Twelve generic business functions and their definitions 
 
Business function Definitions 
1) Strategic management 
Activities that support the setting of product strategy (i.e., deciding what "new 
product development" works on), choosing when and where to make new 
investments and acquisitions, or sales of parts of the business, and choosing 
key business partners (e.g., suppliers and service providers). 
2) Product or service 
development  
Activities associated with bringing a new product or service to market, 
including research, marketing analysis, design, and engineering. 
3) Marketing, sales, and 
account management 
Activities to inform buyers including promotion, advertising, telemarketing, 
selling, retail management. 
4) Intermediate input and 
materials production 
The fabrication or transformation of materials and codification of information 
to render them suitable for use in operations. 
5) Procurement Activities associated with choosing and acquiring purchased inputs. 
6) Operations (industry code) 
Activities that transform inputs into final outputs, either goods or services. 
This includes the detailed management of such operations. (In most cases, 
operations will equate with the industry code of the establishment or the 
activity most directly associated with the industry code.) 
7) Transportation, logistics, 
and distribution 
Activities associated with transporting and storing inputs, and storing and 
transporting finished products to customers. 
8) General management and 
corporate governance 
Activities associated with the administration of the organization, including 
legal, finance, public affairs, government relations, accounting, and general 
management. 
9) Human resource 
management 
Activities associated with the recruiting, hiring, training, compensating, and 
dismissing personnel. 
 
10) Technology and process 
development 
Activities related to maintenance, automation, design/redesign of equipment, 
hardware, software, procedures, and technical knowledge. 
11) Firm infrastructure (e.g., 
building maintenance. and 
IT systems) 
Activities related to building maintenance, and ITC systems. 
12) Customer and after-sales 
service 
Support services to customers after purchase of good or service, including 
training, help desks, customer support for guarantees, and warranties. 
Source: Adapted by the authors from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Mass Layoff Statistics Program. 
 
Collecting Data on the Geography of Business Functions 
 
Although business function data can be used to inform other research questions, as the BLS’ 
MLS program does in identifying the functional role of laid-off workers, our main interest in 
using it to identify patterns of business function bundling (i.e., organizational design), and the 
locational characteristics of outsourcing and offshoring. Because business functions can be 
bundled and located differently, we can identify four nonexclusive quadrants for any given 
function: 1) domestic in house, 2) domestic outsourced, 3) offshore in house (i.e., the MNC 
affiliate), and 4) offshore outsourced. However, it is important that business function surveys that 
seek to capture data on global engagement are designed, not only to capture all four, but also the 
ways that firms combine them. Firms can, and typically do, combine internal and external 
sourcing of specific business functions. For example, some intermediate inputs may be produced 
in house while others are outsourced. Operations may be outsourced, but only when internal 
capacity is fully utilized. Firms might combine internal and external sourcing for strategic 
reasons (Bradach and Eccles 1989). 
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The same can be said of location. Managers can decide to locate business functions in proximate 
or distant locations, in high- or low-cost locations, near customers, suppliers, specialized labor 
markets, and so on, but most typically they combine these approaches and motives. This is why 
detailed information about the location of business functions is of great interest. Surveys that 
identify sourcing locations and either domestic or international are not very helpful. Outsourcing 
from the United States to Germany, for example, will likely involve different functions and have 
very different and motivations and implications than outsourcing from the United States to 
China. But even on the domestic front, outsourcing to a vendor in the same city is very different 
from outsourcing to a supplier located in a distant, rural location.  
 
The surveys on international sourcing fielded by Eurostat, Statistics Canada, and the Offshoring 
Research Network collect no data on domestic locations and use predetermined lists of 
geographic locations to identify countries of great interest (e.g., India and China), but combine 
others into vast, amorphous groupings (e.g., “other Asia”). It is better, in our view, to ask 
respondents to provide geographic information according to city and country. In this way, a 
single question can begin to identify, with great precision, both domestic and international 
patterns of outsourcing and offshoring. Geographic aggregations can be made after the fact, and 
detailed locational coordinates can allow the use of geographic information system software to 
create and examine a host of potentially important variables (e.g., clustering, distances, travel 
times, prevailing labor market conditions).  
 
Data collected according to business function can provide researchers and policymakers with a 
rough map of the value chain; reveal the roles that domestic establishments, firms, and industries 
play within GVCs; and offer a unique view of the competitive pressures facing domestic firms 
and industries. Over time, it will be possible to develop a hierarchy of business functions to 
provide information about business functions in greater detail, but in the shorter term a 
parsimonious, high-level list can provide important information, such as an at-a-glance 
perspective on how enterprises bundle value chain functions and a benchmark for how this is 
changing. As metrics for the key variables of GVC governance and the five GVC governance 
modes described earlier are developed, they can be used to characterize the internal and external 
linkages between specific business functions, testing our assumptions about the relationships 
between GVC governance and the “offshorability” and location of work. Nationally 
representative surveys can begin to characterize business function gaps and specializations in 
specific countries, while international surveys can develop comparisons between trading 
partners. When combined with existing data on employment, occupations, wages, worker career 
paths, firm performance, E-commerce, trade, etc., new data on business functions will open up 
important new avenues for research and policy analysis.  
 
A New European Survey on Business Functions 
 
To provide an example of the usefulness of business function data, we present some preliminary 
data from the EU Survey on International Sourcing. So far, the survey has been administered in 
14 out of 27 EU member states, and 60,000 responses have been collected, but only the data 
from four Nordic countries have been tabulated (see Nielsen [2008] for details). Figure 3 and 
Table 4 and Table 5 show the results from Denmark, where the survey was carried out as a 
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census for all 3,170 private sector nonagricultural enterprises with 50 or more employees.21 
Because a few of the core questions were mandatory, the response rate for this group of 
establishments was 97 percent. The questions about business functions on this survey were 
straightforward: Were business functions outsourced domestically or internationally in the 2001–
2006 period (Table 4), and if so, what kind of business partner was used (Table 5), and (from a 
predetermined list) where were internationally sourced functions located (Figure 3)? 
 
The data in Table 4 show that Danish firms sourced the majority of business functions in house. 
About 88 percent were not engaged in international sourcing of any kind. Facilities management 
was the most commonly outsourced function (37 percent), but because vendors provide these 
services on site, the source was invariably domestic. The business function that was sourced 
internationally the most frequently was the “core” function (10 percent of all firms), analogous to 
“operations” in Table 3, followed by information technology and communications (ITC) 
services. Twenty-nine percent of the 1,567 functions reported as internationally sourced were 
core functions, followed by ITC services (16 percent), distribution and logistics functions (13 
percent), engineering functions (11 percent), administrative functions (10 percent), marketing 
and sales functions (10 percent), and research and development functions (9 percent).  
 
These data support anecdotal evidence that international sourcing is most advanced in 
manufacturing (a “core” function for goods producing firms). This assumption gains further 
support when firms reporting their core function as manufacturing are compared to service-
producing firms. Only 28 percent of service producing firms in Denmark reported international 
sourcing of their core function, while 70 percent of manufacturing firms did so (Nielsen 2008, p. 
24). Table 5 shows that less than half of the reported international sourcing by Danish firms in 
the 2001–2006 period was to independent firms. The bulk of in-house international sourcing 
went to existing affiliates, as opposed to recently acquired or newly established “greenfield” 
affiliates.  
 
Table 4. External and international sourcing of business functions by Danish firms, 2001–2006 
 
Business Function Not outsourced Domestically outsourced 
Internationally 
sourced 
Core function 88% 4% 10% 
ICT services 71% 24% 6% 
Distribution and logistics 82% 15% 4% 
Administrative functions 90% 7% 4% 
Engineering 88% 9% 4% 
Marketing, sales etc. 91% 6% 3% 
R&D 94% 3% 3% 
Other functions 96% 4% 1% 
Facility management 63% 37% 0% 
 
Source: Eurostat International Sourcing Survey, courtesy of Statistics Denmark (Nielsen 2008). 
Notes: n=3,170 Danish enterprises with more than 50 employees. Rows may not add to 100 percent because a few 
firms reported more than one source for a given business function. 
                                                 
21 The survey was also administered to 1,968 smaller Danish manufacturing and business services firms. For 
simplicity’s sake, these data are not presented in this paper. In general, they show similar patterns but slightly less 
domestic and international outsourcing across business functions than the sample of larger firms. 
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Table 5. Internationally sourced business functions by Danish firms, by supplier type, 2001–2006 
 
 
Source: Eurostat International Sourcing Survey, courtesy of Statistics Denmark (Nielsen 2008). 
Notes: n= 611 Danish enterprises engaged international sourcing. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the geography of international sourcing by Danish firms. It shows that new 
European Union (EU) member states (mostly in Eastern Europe) account for 31 percent of the 
cases of international sourcing of core functions during the 2001–2006 period, followed by 
China (22 percent) and old EU member states (19 percent). When the focus is shifted to ITC 
services, the importance of the new member states falls to only 8 percent, while old member 
states account for 57 percent of the cases of international sourcing. India, a country typically 
identified as a destination for ITC outsourcing in the popular press and in qualitative research, is 
identified as a source country in 12 percent of the cases of ITC sourcing, in comparison with 
only 5 percent of the international sourcing cases for core functions. International outsourcing of 
R&D and engineering functions is also concentrated in Western Europe (42 percent), with China 
(9 percent) and “other Asian” countries (8 percent) playing a larger role than in ITC services. 
Interestingly, the role of India in R&D outsourcing is very small. The combined shares of 
marketing, distribution, and administrative functions show a more balanced pattern across 
locations.  
 
The results presented here are largely unsurprising. They confirm both qualitative GVC research, 
and to some extent popular perceptions. Of the business functions that are sourced outside of 
Denmark, 30–50 percent are outsourced to independent suppliers, a substantial but not dominant 
share. Existing affiliates provide most of the in-house international sourcing, but international 
acquisitions and the establishment of new “greenfield” facilities are not unheard of. Core 
functions, mostly manufacturing, are most commonly outsourced and offshored, followed by 
ITC services. Functions based on tacit and local knowledge, such as marketing and sales, 
engineering, and R&D are less likely to be internationally outsourced or offshored. Most 
international sourcing by Danish firms is within Europe, but China is a popular location for 
sourcing core functions (mainly manufacturing). While India is more likely to be a source 
location for ITC service functions (12 percent of cases) than for core functions (5 percent of 
cases), it is notable that the majority (57 percent) of instances of international ITC services 
sourcing are to the original 12 member states of the European Union.  
 
Business Function 
Existing 
affiliate 
Recently 
acquired 
affiliate 
Recent 
greenfield 
affiliate 
Independent 
firm (< than 
50% owned) 
Core function 29% 8% 18% 46% 
Distribution and logistics 43% 5% 15% 37% 
Marketing, sales etc. 48% 8% 14% 30% 
ICT services 46% 3% 6% 44% 
Administrative functions 50% 3% 13% 34% 
Engineering 33% 6% 16% 45% 
R&D 34% 8% 9% 49% 
Facility management NA NA NA NA 
Other functions 9% 9% 0% 81% 
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While it is important to have our impressions confirmed, the greater value of these data is that 
they establish a baseline for future research. Is the practice of outsourcing to independent 
suppliers becoming more prevalent? Will India grow as a location for ITC sourcing at the 
expense of old European Union member states? Will the outsourcing of engineering and R&D 
functions grow, and if so, where? Will service-producing firms increase the outsourcing and 
offshoring of core functions [operations]? If these are trends, then how quickly will they 
progress? Will Eastern Europe lose out to East Asia? Such questions comprise some of the most 
pressing policy questions of the day. When and if new rounds of business function data are 
collected, we will be in a much better position to provide answers. 
 
What the Eurostat international sourcing survey did not collect was employment and wage data 
according to business function. Such data would begin to quantify the importance of specific 
business functions within firms, industries, and countries, and provide a benchmark for 
comparison with other countries that could reveal patterns of organizational design and national 
specialization within GVCs. It is our hope that future surveys will collect these data. One way 
could be to code census data that reveals performance metrics such as sales, employment and 
payroll according to a business function framework.  
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Figure 3. International sourcing of business function by Danish firms, 2001–2006  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat International Sourcing Survey, courtesy of Statistics Denmark (Nielson 2008). 
Notes: Other is Latin and South America plus Africa. Other Europe is Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Russia, Belo 
Russia, Ukraine, and the Balkan states. n=611 Danish enterprises engaged international sourcing. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
In the mosaic of value chain specialization and intermediate goods flows that underlie the most 
recent trends in global integration, ownership and capability development cannot be so easily be 
linked to the domestic context, even if we allow that it is based in part on “borrowed” 
technology. The implications for policy are far reaching. How can workers, firms, and industries 
be provided with the best environment for engaging with the global economy? How can we be 
sure that enough wealth, employment, and innovative capacity are generated at home as global 
integration proceeds? How much national specialization—and by extension, interdependence 
with other societies—is too much? These are open questions. Even if policymakers seek few 
direct interventions in the areas of trade, industrial, or innovation policy, global integration can 
make the process of economic adjustment more difficult because it accelerates the pace of 
change.  
 
Because the picture of global integration provided by current official statistics is incomplete, the 
causal links to economic welfare indicators such as employment and wages tend be weak and 
unconvincing. New thinking is required to develop useful insights into the character and 
implications of our increasingly globally integrated national economies. Perhaps the most 
pressing need is for new kinds of data to be collected, data that shed light on the position of 
domestic firms, establishments, and workers in GVCs. As a partial solution to this data gap, we 
advocate the collection of establishment-level economic data according to a standardized set of 
generic business functions. We share with Lall the desire to move beyond given industry and 
product classifications, and to create broad analytical frameworks and data collection tools to 
examine aspects of global integration that cut across specific industries and countries. The GVC 
framework, the business function scheme, and Lall’s technological classification of exports are 
all attempts to create intellectual tools and data classification schemes of exactly this sort.  
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Among the important potential effects of increased offshoring are changes in the occupational 
composition of U.S. employment.  To the extent that firms choose to shift particular tasks to 
workers located overseas, domestic employment in the occupations that perform those tasks can 
be expected to decline or to grow less rapidly than would otherwise have been the case.  It has 
been suggested that time-series data on occupational employment by industry could be useful for 
studying these effects in the aggregate.  Similarly, longitudinal data on the mix of jobs at 
individual enterprises could be useful for better understanding the dynamics of outsourcing and 
offshoring at the level of the individual firm.  The development of this sort of information has 
been recommended as part of a broader set of needed improvements in the data available for the 
study of off-shoring (see, for example, Sturgeon [2006] and National Academy for Public 
Administration [2006]).   
Concerns about sample size and the accuracy with which household respondents report their 
occupations and industries, together with the fact that household survey data generally cannot be 
used to study the evolution of employment at individual firms, have led analysts interested in the 
effects of offshoring on domestic employment to focus on employer-provided employment data.  
The Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) is a large employer survey that, each year since 1988, has collected detailed 
information on employment by occupation.   
The OES is designed to produce detailed point-in-time estimates of staffing patterns and wages, 
not to produce occupational employment time series or to support the analysis of changes in the 
occupational composition of employment at individual workplaces.  For some applications, such 
as the use of OES employment data to determine weights in the BLS National Compensation 
Survey program or the use of OES wage data by the Employment and Training Administration to 
administer the H-1B visa program, having data that could be compared over time would not be 
especially valuable.  Many users of OES survey data, however, clearly would benefit from data 
designed to support cross-year comparisons.  For example, annual data designed to track 
trajectories in staffing patterns would be of great value to the BLS Occupational Employment 
Projections (OEP) program.  Similarly, access to information on trends in occupational staffing 
patterns and wages would help those who use the data for workforce development, career 
counseling, and career planning purposes.  Researchers studying organizational behavior, the 
sources of productivity growth, and other topics could benefit from data that allowed them to 
track staffing patterns at the level of the individual establishment or individual enterprise.  
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the OES survey as a source of time-series and/or 
longitudinal data on employment by occupation.  This sort of information would be useful not 
only for identifying offshoring activity and study its impacts—topics that are the focus of the 
present conference—but for a variety of other purposes as well.  In the next section we briefly 
describe the OES survey.  We then discuss the feasibility of using the historical OES data to 
construct occupational employment time series or for longitudinal analysis at either the 
establishment or the enterprise level.  Unfortunately, the existing survey design and the 
management approach dictated by current program objectives make the data poorly suited for the 
analysis of trends, especially over short time intervals.  The fourth section considers how the 
OES survey might be reconfigured to produce reliable annual time-series data and support 
analysis at the individual establishment or enterprise level.  A necessary step would be to collect 
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data from some subset of establishments every year, rather than only once every three years as is 
the current practice, but other changes in the survey also would be required.  Some concluding 
thoughts and observations are offered in the final section. 
 
 
THE OES SURVEY 
 
The OES survey is an ongoing mail survey conducted by the BLS in collaboration with its state 
partners. It covers all industries exclusive of agriculture.  Prior to 1996, industries were surveyed 
on a three-year rotating cycle.  Since 1996, each year’s sample has covered establishments across 
all industries, but except for an annual enumeration of federal and state government 
establishments, it is still the case that even very large establishments are surveyed only once 
every three years.   
The OES sample is designed to support cross-sectional estimates of staffing patterns developed 
from data collected over a three-year period.  Through 2001, estimates were based on three 
annual panels, each consisting of approximately 400,000 establishments; within each panel, 
establishments were assigned an October, November, or December reference date.  In 2002, the 
survey transitioned to a design in which estimates are based on six semiannual panels, with each 
panel consisting of approximately 200,000 establishments assigned either a May or a November 
reference date.  The May 2008 published estimates, for example, rest on data collected for 
November 2005, May 2006, November 2006, May 2007, November 2007, and May 2008.  
Estimates are benchmarked to the average of the most recent May and November employment 
levels. 
Since 1996, the OES has collected information on occupational wages in addition to 
occupational employment.  Establishments selected for the OES are asked to report employment 
in each cell of a matrix in which the rows refer to different occupations and the columns to wage 
intervals.  Generally, for firms with 20 or more employees, the survey forms contain between 50 
and 225 occupations, depending on the industry of the establishment completing the form.   Prior 
to 2000, employers receiving these forms were asked to list numerically significant or new 
occupations that could not be reported in a detailed occupation and therefore were reported in an 
“all other” residual category.  This information was used in revising the survey forms for later 
years.  Beginning in 2000, employers have been asked to provide detailed occupational 
information for workers who cannot be placed in one of the listed occupations.   
Since 1999, small employers have received a shorter unstructured form that contains no list of 
likely occupation titles; rather, the employer is asked to provide a brief description of each 
occupation represented in the establishment’s workforce.  The information on these forms is 
coded into occupational categories by survey staff in the state agencies.22  Multiestablishment 
firms may request that their data be collected through the firm’s corporate headquarters rather 
than directly from individual establishments. This is referred to as central office collection 
(COC).  COC reporters provide the OES program with electronic records containing job title and 
                                                 
22Prior to 1999, several states developed their own unstructured short forms that were used to collect data from some 
small employers, but this was not a part of the formal survey protocol.  Beginning in 2004, states were given the 
discretion to send unstructured forms to establishments with up to 49 employees.  
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wage information for their employees.  The OES staff then builds crosswalks for coding these 
firms’ data into Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) occupations and OES wage 
intervals. 
Approximately 80 percent of establishments sampled for the OES survey provide usable 
responses; on an employment-weighted basis, the survey response rate is approximately 75 
percent.  Nearest neighbor hot-deck procedures, which take data from another similar 
establishment, are used to impute missing employment information for establishments that do 
not respond.  Missing wage distributions also are imputed using distributions for similar 
establishments. 
OES survey data are published by occupation, industry, and area.  Employment and wage 
estimates are produced for as many as about 800 occupations, both nationally and for states, 
metropolitan areas and other geographic areas.  In addition, national occupational employment 
and wage estimates are available for specific industries.  BLS does not publish occupation by 
industry data below the national level, and suppression of sparsely populated cells is common in 
both the national by-industry tables and the cross-industry tables for subnational areas.  The OES 
program switched from its own survey-specific occupation coding system to the SOC system in 
1999 and from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) in 2002.  
 
 
CAN EXISTING OES DATA BE USED TO CONSTRUCT ANNUAL TIME SERIES?  
 
Several features of the current OES design make it difficult to use the existing data to construct 
single-year estimates of employment by detailed occupation, even at the national level.  The 
current design calls for estimates to be produced using three years of data, and the existing 
survey weights are not suitable for the production of annual estimates.  It is possible to construct 
annual estimation weights, but because (except in federal government) even very large units are 
surveyed only once every three years, annual estimates tend to be quite variable, especially for 
smaller employment cells.  The significant breaks in both occupation and industry classification 
caused by the adoption of the SOC and the NAICS are another problem.  Finally, other changes 
in survey operations associated with the adoption of the SOC have affected the comparability of 
the OES estimates over time.  To preview our conclusions, we believe that it is possible to use 
existing OES survey data to construct national occupational time series that are suitable for some 
analytic purposes, but that these estimates have serious limitations for studying offshoring and its 
effects.   
Lack of Weights for Annual Estimates  
The weights used to produce official OES estimates are constructed at the level of cells defined 
on the basis of industry, establishment size, and geography.  As noted above, the sample units 
used to produce each set of estimates are divided into panels spread across three years of data 
collection.  Each sampled establishment is assigned a current weight that reflects its probability 
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of selection into a particular panel.23  If every cell in a panel contained at least one establishment, 
the weighted sum of employment calculated for an industry using the current weights would be 
approximately equal to total national employment in the industry as of the panel reference 
date(s).  There are, however, a very large number of OES sampling cells—as of 2004, the survey 
was stratified by 343 industries, seven establishment size classes, and 686 metropolitan or 
balance-of-state geographic areas—and individual panels contain a significant number of empty 
cells.  Because employment in the cells that happen to be empty is not represented, using the 
current weights to estimate employment in an industry based on the responses to any single panel 
yields an estimate that lies significantly below the industry’s true employment level.24   
 Working with OES data for the private sector over the period 1996–2004, Abraham and 
Spletzer (forthcoming) developed weight adjustment factors to be applied to the OES current 
weights that are calculated as follows:   
(1) 1
CES
jt
jt OES OES
ijt ijt
i
E
ADJFACTOR
CURRWT E
=? ,     
where ADJFACTOR1 is the industry weight adjustment factor, E is employment from either the 
monthly Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey or the OES survey,  CURRWT is the 
current weight from the OES data file, i indexes individual establishments, j indexes detailed 
industries, and t indexes years.  Estimates produced from the OES microdata using weights equal 
to the product of ADJFACTOR1, and CURRWT reproduce CES national industry employment 
trends.   
In all years, industry weight adjustment factors were calculated at the most detailed industry 
level for which sample data were available.  The SIC classification structure in use through 2001 
included 934 detailed industries.  In 1996, taking that year as an example, weight adjustment 
factors were calculated at the four-digit (most detailed) level for 310 industries, representing 34.0 
percent of employment; at the three-digit level for 383 industries, representing 37.6 percent of 
employment; at the two-digit level for 225 industries, representing 27.8 percent of employment; 
and at the one-digit level for 16 industries, representing 0.6 percent of employment.  The NAICS 
structure adopted in 2002 includes 1,171 detailed industries.  In 2004, weight adjustment factors 
were calculated at the five-digit (most detailed) level for 424 industries, representing 36.1 
percent of employment; at the four-digit level for 520 industries, representing 47.1 percent of 
employment; at the three-digit level for 172 industries, representing 9.8 percent of employment; 
and at the two-digit level for 55 industries, representing 7.0 percent of employment.    
A further weighting concern is that, although the true distribution of employment by size of 
establishment appears to have been very stable from 1996 through 2004, the distributions in the 
data collected for the OES vary considerably from year to year.  Factors that appear to have 
contributed to this variability include the uneven distribution of the largest (certainty) units 
across panels; the effects of a 1999 experiment carried out in selected states to determine the 
                                                 
23 The current weights also incorporate adjustments for differences between the way a unit was sampled and the way 
it was reported (e.g., one establishment at a company sampled but data reported for several establishments together).   
24In the official estimates, which are based on three years of data, this is not generally a problem because data at the 
detailed cell level are reweighted to account for the number of panels in which each cell is represented. 
 74
feasibility of collecting data from all certainty establishments every year; and the introduction of 
establishments with 1–4 employees into the survey sample in 1998 (these very small 
establishments previously had been represented by establishments with 5–9 employees).  A 
second weight adjustment factor was developed to calibrate the share of employment in broad 
industries accounted for by each of nine establishment size classes to the average share for that 
size class across the OES benchmark data files for 1998, 2001, and 2004.25 
(2) 2
BMK
ks
kst OES
kst
AVESHAREADJFACTOR
SHARE
= , 
where ADJFACTOR2 is the size class weight adjustment factor, AVESHARE is the average share 
of employment accounted for by the designated size class in the benchmark data, SHARE is the 
current year share in the OES data, k indexes broad industry, s indexes establishment size class, 
and t indexes year.  Applying both the industry and the size class adjustment factors yields 
(3) 1 2 OESijkst jt kst ijkstFINALWT ADJFACTOR x ADJFACTOR xCURRWT= . 
Anyone interested in using the historical OES data to construct an annual time series would need 
to apply some similar procedure to produce weights suitable for annual estimates. 
Variability in Annual Estimates  
In cells defined at the national level using broad industries and occupations, employment 
estimates calculated using the adjusted weights just described seem generally to behave very 
sensibly (see Appendices C and D in Abraham and Spletzer forthcoming).  Because even very 
large units in the private sector are surveyed only once every three years, however, annual 
estimates of employment for detailed occupations, estimates for subnational areas and/or 
estimates for occupation by industry are likely to behave more erratically.  To illustrate the 
potential instability in estimates for small domains, we used the adjusted weights just described 
to construct annual time series for the 10 occupations identified by Jensen and Kletzer 
(forthcoming) as most offshorable.  These are shown in Figure 1.  Each of the 10 panels in the 
figure contains two employment series—one created from year-specific OES microdata with 
weights adjusted using the method just described, and one created from the November OES press 
releases posted to the BLS Web site.26  We should note that using the published OES estimates in 
this way is not recommended by the BLS, which states on its Web site that it “does not use or 
encourage the use of OES data for time series analysis” 
(http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm#Ques29).  Still, we believe that the comparisons shown in 
the figure are informative.   
                                                 
25 The OES survey data are benchmarked to the quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.  Our analysis rests on 
OES benchmark data files for the years 1998, 2001, and 2004.  The size class distributions observed across these 
three years are very similar. 
26Through 2001, all OES data were collected with a reference date in October, November or December.  In 2002, the 
OES switched to May and November reference dates.  For these later years, in an effort to avoid problems of 
comparability associated with seasonal differences in staffing patterns at different times of the year, we used only 
the data from the November panel. The 2003 and 2004 press releases report statistics benchmarked to average 
employment by industry for the most recent May and November and there may be an issue of comparability 
between the published estimates for these years as compared to earlier years. 
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The estimates in Figure 1 cover the years from 1999, the year that the SOC was adopted in the 
OES program, through 2004.   One difference between the two series is that the microdata 
estimates cover only employment in the private sector, while the published estimates cover 
employment in federal, state, and local government, as well as the private sector.  While this 
difference in coverage has a noticeable effect on the level of some of the series—most obviously, 
the series for statisticians and medical transcriptionists—it should not much affect their year-to-
year variability.  More importantly for the series’ variability, the microdata estimates are based 
on establishments that, from 1999 through 2001, represented only about one-third of the full 
private sector OES sample and, from 2002 through 2004, only about one-sixth of the full private 
sector sample.  The time series created with annual microdata are considerably more volatile 
than the time series created from the published data.  Several of the occupational time series 
based on annual microdata—those for mathematical technicians; credit authorizers, checkers and 
clerks;  biochemists and biophysicists; title examiners; weighers; and actuaries—show sharp 
changes from one year to the next that are not apparent in the published estimates based on 
multiple years of data.  For 9 of the 10 occupations in Figure 1—excluding only statisticians—
the variance of the series created from the annual microdata is higher than that for the published 
estimates.  Figure 1 suggests that employment time series for detailed occupations that are 
created from single-year OES microdata are likely to be highly volatile, making them 
problematic for policy analysis of the effects of offshoring.   Increases in the size of the OES 
sample would be needed to reduce the variance of annual employment estimates. 
Breaks in Occupation and Industry Classification Systems 
Breaks in both the occupation and industry classification structures are an additional barrier to 
using the historical OES data to produce detailed annual time series.  As already noted, prior to 
1999, the OES used its own classification structure; the Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) was introduced in 1999.  The NAICS replaced the older SIC system in 2002.  In both 
cases, the new classification structure was very different from the old.  Of the 769 detailed 
occupations included in the SOC when it was introduced in 1999, only 374 could be cross-
walked directly to occupations that previously existed in the old OES classification structure 
(BLS 2001a, pp. 24 and 175).  During the transition to NAICS at the BLS, only about half of 
establishments could be assigned NAICS codes based on their SIC classification (Mikkelson, 
Morisi, and Stamas 2000).    
Comparisons at an aggregated level seem more feasible across the classification structure breaks 
than do more disaggregated comparisons.  Matthew Dey of the BLS, for example, has developed 
a concordance that links cells defined using 19 aggregated occupations and 13 aggregated 
industries that appear to be reasonably consistent across the breaks in classification system, and 
Abraham and Spletzer (forthcoming) use a modified version of the Dey concordance.  There are 
detailed occupations within these larger groupings that are defined in the same way in the SOC 
as in the older OES classification structure, but as already noted there are also many detailed 
occupations for which no direct linkage is possible.  The OES data were never dual coded using 
the SOC and OES occupational classification structures, so in cases where occupations are not 
comparable it is difficult to relate the new SOC occupations to the older OES occupations.   
The best option for extending the OES annual estimates for detailed occupations back through 
time likely would be to plot the employment series for each of the occupations and retain those 
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occupations for which there is no evidence of a discontinuity between 1998 and 1999 that might 
indicate a lack of comparability in how the occupation was defined.  Where no direct match at 
the detailed occupation level exists, occupations formed by combining detailed occupations in an 
appropriate fashion could be evaluated similarly.  Drawing clear conclusions could be difficult, 
however, because of the substantial underlying variability in annual estimates based on the OES 
microdata that has already been discussed.  Moreover, since industries were surveyed on a three-
year rotating cycle prior to 1996, even under the best-case scenario, it would be possible to 
extend true annual series by only three years, back to 1996.   
Other Comparability Issues  
In addition to a new coding structure, the SOC also introduced a set of principles intended to 
guide the classification of workers (OMB 2000).  An important principle is that only individuals 
who devote at least 80 percent of their time to management activities are to be classified as 
managers.  To implement this SOC guidance, the OES introduced new edit checks to flag 
establishments that reported employment in a management occupation (e.g., financial manager) 
without reporting employment in any of the expected subordinate occupations (e.g., financial 
specialists or clerks).  A second set of edit checks was developed to flag establishments with an 
excessive number of managers.  Both sets of edit checks were applied in a limited fashion in 
1999 and phased in more fully over the following years.   
Implementation of the SOC also included new training designed to explain its structure and 
coding principles to program staff.  Staff who attended SOC training courses in 1999 and 
subsequent years were instructed that management jobs reported on establishment schedules that 
did not include an intervening layer of supervision generally would need to be recoded as 
something else.  Management jobs recoded in accord with this advice typically were shifted 
either to one of the professional occupations or to a first-level supervisor occupation.  Because 
survey program staff code all of the occupations reported on unstructured survey forms 
submitted by small establishments, the introduction of the unstructured forms as an option in 
1999 may have amplified the effects of the SOC training on the OES management employment 
series.  The “rule” that no job should be coded as a management position unless the schedule also 
includes a first-level supervisor position is easy to apply and seems to have been embraced as a 
guide to coding the unstructured schedules.   
Our best assessment is that the combined effect of these changes was to reduce management 
employment by very roughly 2 million jobs between 1998 and 2001, with these jobs then 
assigned instead to other job categories.  Although perhaps less important for the analysis of 
offshoring than for some other purposes, this is nonetheless an additional barrier to comparing 
OES estimates over time.  In our earlier work (Abraham and Spletzer forthcoming), we 
developed a procedure for “reverse-engineering” the new coding rules that involved reclassifying 
a sufficient number of nonmanagement jobs in 1999 and later years as management positions to 
offset the sharp decline in management employment that is evident in the unadjusted data 
between 1999 and 2001.  This effort was unavoidably crude.  Further, going forward, insofar as 
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it involves putting new OES data onto the old basis rather than putting old data on the new basis, 
the application of this procedure would inevitably become less and less appealing.27  
New SOC training introduced in 2007 makes clear that someone might legitimately be 
performing management duties without there being an intervening layer of supervision between 
them and their subordinates.  While this change was made to improve coding accuracy, going 
forward, it too may adversely affect the comparability of the OES data over time.   
Problems with Coverage of Units Surveyed 
A further limitation of the historical OES data is that the survey sample is not designed to 
support longitudinal analysis.  As has been noted, establishments are asked to report on a three-
year cycle.  Large establishments responding to the survey in year t are likely also to have 
responded in year t-3.  Because even large establishments are observed only once every three 
years, there may be a long lag before important changes in staffing patterns are captured.  
Further, the establishment is not the obvious unit of analysis for identifying and tracing the 
effects of offshoring.  In a large corporation, sourcing decisions are likely to be made at the 
corporate level rather than the establishment level, and a decision to offshore work could take the 
form of shuttering an entire establishment, rather than transferring portions of the work 
performed at an individual establishment to another company.  In this case, offshoring could not 
be identified through an establishment-level analysis, but only through an examination of 
changes in staffing patterns for the company as a whole.   
To the extent that the appropriate level of analysis is the company rather than the establishment, 
the OES survey suffers from the further limitation that data generally are not collected for all of 
the establishments at a firm (National Academy of Public Administration 2006).  Over the course 
of a three-year period, all establishments large enough to belong to the survey’s certainty strata 
are asked to complete an OES questionnaire, but large firms include many small establishments, 
and only a fraction of these small establishments would be surveyed even once in a three-year 
cycle.  Among firms in the United States with more than 10,000 employees, for example, in May 
2006 there were 377,484 establishments with fewer than 250 employees, accounting for 53.6 
percent of these firms’ employment; 7,369 establishments with 250–499 employees, accounting 
for an additional 13.9 percent of the firms’ employment; and 2,727 establishments with 500–999 
employees, representing a further 10.1 percent of the very large firms’ employment.28   
 
                                                 
27 The specific jobs that formerly might have been categorized as management jobs were identified by looking for 
the highest-paid nonmanagement jobs in establishments with too few managers, based on historical patterns.  This 
procedure took jobs from many different occupations and reclassified them as management positions (many to one).  
We were not able to devise a methodology for putting the old data on the new basis.  That would have involved 
reassigning management positions to many different possible alternate occupations (one to many), and we did not 
believe we had a sound basis for making such assignments. 
28 These figures and others cited in the text are based on tabulations of the Business Employment Dynamics 
database, which is based on the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data file and are designed 
only to be illustrative.  
 78
REDESIGNING THE OES FOR TIME SERIES AND LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS 
 
To produce reliable annual time series, the OES sample would need to be augmented with units 
that are surveyed every year rather than only once every three years.  Being able to track changes 
in staffing patterns at the establishment level might be of some interest, though as just discussed, 
important developments could be missed with an establishment-level focus.  To the extent that 
analysts are interested in using enterprise-level data to study the effects of offshoring, it would be 
desirable for at least some firms to provide comprehensive data for all of their establishments.  In 
addition to changes in the design of the survey sample to support time series and/or longitudinal 
analysis, other changes in the survey’s focus also would be necessary.   
Sample Redesign Options 
We consider three possible options for augmenting the OES sample.  The first is intended to be 
responsive to the demand for a sample that could support annual OES time series; the second 
suggests an approach to collecting data suitable for longitudinal analysis; and the third is a 
hybrid of the first two approaches.  Many variations on these approaches can be imagined, and 
we do not mean to suggest that the specific options we describe are the only ones that are 
possible.  Further, because it is the information we were able to access given our time 
constraints, we use data on number of firms and number of establishments from 2006 in our 
rough cost calculations, though since the size distribution of establishments is very stable over 
time and total employment has changed little on net between 2006 and the present, we do not 
believe our answers would have been much different had we been able to use 2009 data for these 
calculations. Our intent in any case is to stimulate thinking about sample design alternatives and 
the rough magnitude of the costs that might be associated with different choices, rather than to 
recommend a specific plan and attach a specific dollar cost figure to that plan.  The rough dollar 
cost figures we present refer only to the direct costs of additional data collection and do not 
include the costs of other staffing necessary to edit and process the additional data collected.  All 
of the options considered focus on increases in the size of the sample for the private sector, as 
that is where we would expect the effects of offshoring to be manifested. 
Option 1:  Survey all large private sector establishments every year.  One way to increase 
the stability of annual OES estimates over time would be to survey all establishments with more 
than some threshold level of employment every year.  Suppose, for example, that the survey 
were redesigned to collect data from all establishments with 250 or more employees every year.  
As of May 2006, the universe of private sector establishments eligible for inclusion in the OES 
included 30,639 establishments with 250–499 employees, 10,894 establishments with 500–999 
employees, and 5,470 establishments with 1,000 or more employees.  Since even units included 
in the current certainty strata are surveyed only once every three years, surveying all units with 
250 or more employees every year would represent a significant increase in the annual survey 
sample. 
Most of the work of collecting OES data is done by the states.  Payments to the states for their 
work on the OES program totaled $21.5 million in FY2009 (the fiscal year in which the 2008 
estimates were published). This figure includes some state overhead expenses and excludes some 
modest expenses for data collection work performed by the BLS national office staff, but for 
present purposes, we treat the payments made to the states as the cost of OES data collection.  
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The money awarded to states is allocated using a formula that takes into account the number of 
establishments surveyed in the state, the size distribution of those establishments, the number of 
publication areas in the state, and the average wages of state employees.  In this allocation 
formula, establishments with 250–499 employees are treated as equivalent to two units, 
establishments with 500–999 employees as equivalent to three units and establishments with 
1,000 or more employees as equivalent to four units.29  By our calculations, as a very rough 
approximation, the current allocation formula implies a cost of $50 per establishment of size up 
to 249 employees, $100 per establishment of size 250–499 employees, $150 per establishment of 
size 500–999 employees, and $200 per establishment of size 1,000 or more employees.  
Applying these cost estimates, to survey all private sector establishments with 250 or more 
employees every year would have added roughly $3.9 million dollars to the cost of data 
collection for the OES program.30 
Without a more detailed analysis that would be beyond the scope of the present exercise, we 
cannot say precisely how collecting data from all private sector establishments with 250 or more 
employees every year would affect the variance of annual estimates, but the number of 
employees for whom data were collected each year clearly would increase significantly.  The 
current sample includes establishments with total employment of approximately 20.0 million per 
year over the three years of the survey cycle; the sample augmentation just described would add 
establishments with employment of approximately 19.6 million each year, close to doubling the 
employment covered. 
Option 2:  Survey all private sector establishments in large firms every year.  Adoption of 
the preceding option for redesign of the OES sample would reduce the variance of annual OES 
estimates.  Under this plan, however, only large establishments could be followed over time and, 
in most cases, data collected in a particular year still would cover only a portion of a firm’s 
establishments, making it difficult to use the data for firm-level analysis.  If longitudinal analysis 
at the firm level is a priority, surveying all of the establishments in firms with more than a 
threshold level of employment every year might be an appealing strategy.  To the extent that 
large firms were willing to provide electronic data files containing information on the job 
classifications of all of their employees, collecting data in this way also could yield significant 
economies of scale.  Indeed, without such economies, this data collection strategy would be 
prohibitively expensive. 
Turning again to the May 2006 universe listing, using EIN as the firm identifier, we found 
322,525 establishments that belonged to the 8,295 firms with 1,000–4,999 employees, 148,211 
establishments that belonged to the 964 firms with 5,000–9,999 employees, and 429,140 
establishments that belonged to the 677 firms with 10,000 or more employees.  Using the per-
establishment cost figures cited above, even restricting attention to establishments belonging to 
firms with 10,000 or more employees, the costs of data collection would be projected to rise by 
                                                 
29 This information was provided in a personal communication from OES program staff member Laurie Salmon on 
September 9, 2009.  
30 We should emphasize that the program does not receive a budget based on the number of units included in the 
survey sample.  Rather, the program receives a total dollar amount of funding that then must be allocated to cover 
the various costs of program operation.  Similar to other surveys, however, the amount of money needed to maintain 
program operations can be expected to grow over time because of growth in wages, salaries and other expenses and 
growth in the number of certainty units.   
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$18.7 million dollars per year, an amount that comes close to equaling the program’s entire 
current data collection budget. 
It seems likely, however, that economies of scale could be realized if data were collected for 
entire companies rather than separately for each establishment in the sample.  So-called central 
office collection (COC) is already in place for some companies who prefer to submit their data in 
this way.  Estimates of the staffing required to complete the current COC workload compiled by 
BLS national and regional office staff (NCS-OES Data Collection and Processing Cost Team 
2008) suggest that a reasonable estimate might be that it costs approximately $6,000 per firm to 
process these submissions.  If COC collection were mandated for all large firms, the per-firm 
cost likely would be higher.  One reason is that firms for which this is not necessarily the 
preferred reporting method would have to be convinced to report in this way.  The need to 
process all of the firms’ establishments, rather than only selected establishments as at present, 
also would raise per-firm costs.  To the extent that firms use common job classification systems 
across all of their establishments, the effort to assign SOC codes to job titles might not vary a 
great deal with the number of included establishments, but there could be other complications.  
For example, past experience suggests that there can be problems with matching establishments 
listed in the firm records to establishments on the BLS business list and with assigning 
appropriate industry and geographic identifiers.  
For the purpose of producing a rough data collection budget estimate, suppose that it would cost 
$8,000 per COC firm to process electronically submitted data.  If the COC universe were 
restricted to firms with 10,000 or more employees, this per-firm cost figure implies that total data 
collection costs would rise by $3.5 million per year, rather than the $18.7 million implied by the 
establishment-by-establishment collection cost model.  If we instead assumed a higher figure of 
$10,000 per firm, the projected budget increment for added data collection work would be $4.8 
million.   
Compared to the previous sample redesign option, this option likely would do less to reduce the 
variance of annual OES estimates.  As of May 2006, 14.0 million people were employed by 
establishments that would have been added under this strategy, compared to the 19.6 million 
employed by the establishments added under the previous strategy.  In addition, to the extent that 
establishments of a given firm tend to be similar with respect to their staffing patterns, their 
addition to the sample will do less to improve the precision of the aggregate estimates than 
would the addition of a similar number of unaffiliated establishments.  A major advantage of this 
approach is that, because information for all of the establishments at the identified firms would 
be collected, the data would be well suited for studying occupational employment trends at the 
firm level for the covered firms.   
Option 3:  Survey all private sector establishments in large firms and all other large private 
sector establishments every year.  If a larger amount of money were available, a third option 
for augmenting the OES sample would be to combine the first two options.  Under this option, 
data would be collected annually for all establishments that belong to firms with 10,000 or more 
employees and for all other establishments with 250 or more employees.  To estimate the cost of 
this option, we assume that the incremental costs of data collection for establishments belonging 
to large firms would be $8,000–$10,000 per firm and that collecting data for any remaining 
establishments with 250 or more employees would cost $100–$200 per establishment, depending 
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on establishment size, the same assumptions used to estimate the costs of option 1 and option 2.  
At $8,000 per firm for COC collections, this option would raise the cost of the OES program by 
$6.4 million dollars per year; if we instead assume a cost of $10,000 per firm for COC 
collections, the cost increment would be $7.7 million.  These figures are about $1.0 million less 
than the sum of the incremental costs for option 1 and option 2, due to the overlap between the 
two covered groups, consisting of large establishments that belong to large firms.  
Option 3 would reduce the variance of annual OES estimates by a larger amount than either 
option 1 or option 2.  In total, it would add establishments with 27.8 million jobs to the sample 
each year.  Firm-level analysis also would be supported under this sample design option, at least 
for the set of large firms for which comprehensive data were collected. 
Other options.  The options outlined above are of course not an exhaustive set of possibilities.  
One might, for example, want to modify option 1 by collecting data each year not only for large 
establishments but also for a subsample of smaller establishments.  Option 2 might be modified 
by focusing collection efforts on firms doing business primarily in sectors that, according to 
some yet-to-be specified criterion, are likely to be affected by offshoring activity.  Even 
assuming a cost of no more than $8,000–$10,000 per firm, reductions in the firm size threshold 
for data collection that were applied economy-wide would be very expensive.  For example, 
lowering the firm size threshold to include all firms with employment of 5,000 or more would 
raise the cost of option 2 to between $10.5 million and $13.8 million.  A lower firm size 
threshold might be more feasible, however, if its application were restricted to certain sectors.  
Other variants of the sampling options we have outlined also could be devised, but all would 
have in common the designation of some significant sample of establishments for annual 
collection.   
One question that needs to be asked about the survey redesign options we have suggested is 
whether businesses would in fact be willing to respond to the survey every year.  The results of a 
test conducted in 2000 are at least somewhat encouraging.  In this test, staff in 25 states 
attempted to collect data from all of the certainty units in their states, and 12 states provided data 
on their collection experience that could be analyzed.  These data show roughly comparable 
response rates for the certainty units originally scheduled to participate in the OES in 2000 and 
the added units originally scheduled to report only in another year of the three-year collection 
cycle.  On the negative side, collecting data from both groups was difficult and the combined 
response rate was lower than would be hoped.  An important factor in the response rate obtained 
appears to have been the amount of staff time available for follow-up with the surveyed units 
(BLS 2001b). 
Another question is whether large companies would be willing to submit electronic records for 
all of their establishments centrally, as is assumed in our cost estimates for option 2 and option 3.  
Some large companies already do this and, depending on how their records are kept, others 
might be willing to do so.  But if a significant number of large companies cannot or will not 
agree to central office collection, response rates for options that envision such collection could 
be adversely affected and the data collection costs for these options could be substantially higher 
than our rough figures suggest.   
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Other Changes in Survey Management Practices and Philosophy 
In addition to the changes in sample design discussed above, converting the OES from a survey 
designed only to produce detailed cross-sectional estimates to a survey that also produced usable 
time series would require a number of other changes to the way in which the survey was 
managed.  These would include changes in editing and imputation procedures, plans for dealing 
with future changes in the industry and occupation classification structures, and overarching 
changes in the philosophy governing other management decisions.  Making these changes almost 
certainly would require additional staffing, and it should be emphasized that the costs of this 
added staffing are not reflected in the data collection cost estimates cited above. 
Consider the process for editing the survey responses that are submitted.  Under the current 
program structure, responses submitted by establishments are reviewed in isolation.  Edit checks 
examine whether the combination of occupations reported seems sensible according to a 
specified set of criteria, but there are no edit checks that examine whether the information 
reported by an establishment in the current year is consistent with that reported by the same 
establishment in previous years.  Checking the consistency of establishment reports across years 
would be more important in a program designed to produce time-series data.  For example, 
inconsistencies in occupational coding across years might be identified through edit checks that 
flagged shifts of large blocks of employment from one occupation to another.   
Similarly, under the current survey design, data for establishments that do not respond are 
imputed using information for other establishments that are deemed to be similar.  In a program 
designed to produce time-series data, however, given idiosyncratic variation in staffing patterns 
across establishments, it would be desirable to develop an imputation methodology that relied 
more heavily on data reported by the missing establishments in previous time periods.   
A recurring issue for a program designed to produce time-series estimates of employment by 
occupation would be dealing with future changes to the SOC and NAICS.  The next scheduled 
NAICS revision is set for 2017, and the next scheduled SOC revision for 2018.  From that point 
forward, current plans call for NAICS revisions approximately once every 5 years and SOC 
revisions approximately once every 10 years.  It seems likely that SOC revisions will pose the 
most serious challenges for the OES program.  Having a set of dual-coded records containing 
both the old and the new SOC code could allow the OES staff to reconstruct historical 
occupational employment series on the new SOC basis, but dual coding is expensive and would 
need to be built in to the OES budget plans.   
Less tangible, OES management and staff would need to reorient themselves toward a new set of 
survey objectives, which in turn would drive subsequent decisions.  There is always a tension 
between making changes designed to improve survey estimates and preserving the continuity of 
historical series.  In the current OES program, the program’s stated objectives have dictated that, 
when data improvements are possible, they should be introduced, even when that makes the data 
less comparable over time.  In a program that had as one of its stated objectives the production of 
annual time series, this balance would need to be set differently.   
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CONCLUSION 
Because the annual sample for the OES survey is large, it is reasonable to think about using the 
historical OES data to produce annual time-series estimates.  In practice, however, while useful 
for certain purposes, the annual times series that the historical data will support have significant 
limitations for studying the effects of offshoring.  Reflecting the fact that certainty units are 
surveyed only once every three years, annual estimates for detailed occupations can be expected 
to have high variance.  Breaks in occupation and industry classification systems and other 
changes in survey practices further complicate any trend analysis based on the OES data.  
Further, the existing data are not well suited to support longitudinal analysis.     
Any redesign of the OES program to produce reliable annual estimates and/or support 
longitudinal analysis should address each of these factors.  We have suggested several options 
for redesigning the survey sample that would involve the collection of data from all large private 
sector establishments each year and/or the collection of data from all of the establishments at 
selected large firms each year.  Ballpark cost estimates for the sample expansions associated with 
these options range from $3.5 to $7.7 million per year, though we should emphasize both that 
these estimates are very rough and that they cover only the direct costs of data collection. If the 
OES survey were to be redesigned along the lines we have suggested, funding also would be 
required to support new data editing procedures, dual coding of survey records at the time of 
future changes to the SOC, and other survey management activities, though data collection likely 
would account for the largest share of the total new funding that would be needed. 
A significant complication we have not addressed is whether and how annual published 
estimates would be reconciled with more detailed cross-sectional estimates produced using data 
from multiple waves of data collection.  The existing OES customer base cares a great deal about 
geographically disaggregated estimates and our guess is that, even with an expanded sample, the 
needs of this customer base could not be satisfied by purely annual data.  This is, however, at 
least partly an empirical matter that remains to be addressed.  Even with the full sample of 
approximately 1,200,000 establishments currently collected over three years, the BLS does not 
publish occupational data for industries disaggregated by geographic area, and, if we have 
understood correctly what is being recommended, it seems unrealistic to call for “. . . the BLS to 
make the changes to the OES methodology necessary to create time series data on all 820 
occupations in the SOC by industry and geographic areas” (Sturgeon 2006).  Further work would 
be required to determine the level of detail in occupational employment estimates—whether by 
industry or by geographic area, but almost certainly not by both simultaneously—that could be 
supported by different sample redesign options. 
Finally, in thinking about a possible OES redesign, it will be important to consider carefully the 
value of data to support firm-level longitudinal analysis as compared to the value of improved 
annual time series.  Without a doubt, a longitudinal occupational employment database could 
support interesting research, including useful research on the effects of offshoring.  Further, there 
may be significant economies associated with the collection of data from all establishments of 
large firms.  On the other hand, adding establishments from a small number of firms can be 
expected to do less to reduce the variability of annual time-series estimates than adding a similar 
number of establishments representing a larger number of firms.  In addition, unless new 
modalities for researcher access to confidential microdata are developed, the number of 
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researchers who would in practice end up working with firm-level data from the OES seems 
likely to be limited.  Those charged with making a decision about the survey’s future will need to 
be clear about the relative importance of different survey objectives as they choose among 
possible redesign options. 
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Figure 1:  OES Employment of Ten Occupations Identified  
by Jensen and Kletzer (forthcoming) 
 
As Most Off-Shorable, 1999-2004 
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Over a remarkably short time frame, thinking about the production of services and services 
employment has changed dramatically. For a sector once considerable “nontradable,” measuring 
services trade is now a task of considerable energy and importance. The possible domestic 
employment implications of rising services trade—that is, services offshoring—attract 
significant attention and political interest.31  The literature on services offshoring is expanding, 
although the activity remains “an elusive phenomenon.”32 Much of that elusiveness springs from 
data limitations and measurement concerns, the subject of this conference. The increasing role of 
multinational corporations (MNCs), technology transfer, and increasing trade in services are just 
three activities associated with globalization where statistical and measurement limitations are 
widely acknowledged. Scholars interested in the labor market implications of increasing trade in 
services add one more area to this (partial) list: detailed time-series occupational data. 
Understanding the relocation of work, but not the workers doing the work, and more broadly, 
understanding the nature of work that is potentially offshorable, requires consistent detailed 
occupational data. 
 
Before turning to the current data limitations and ongoing efforts to address the limitations, it is 
useful to establish definitions and provide context. For the vein of research focusing on domestic 
employment, one research goal is to understand and measure the magnitude and significance of 
shifting of business operations to offshore (foreign) locations and impact on American workforce 
(employment and earnings). The labor market impact questions include estimates of jobs moved 
offshore; estimates of lost potential job growth (because jobs moved offshore); jobs added due to 
foreign work located in the United States; jobs added due to efficiency gains; shifts in 
occupations; changes in earnings and the distribution of earnings; job displacement (numbers, 
worker characteristics, unemployment durations, UI receipt, reemployment).  
 
Stated this way, it becomes clearer that the offshoring questions are not new, in that similar 
questions have been asked about and for the manufacturing sector for decades. These questions 
have, however, taken on heightened awareness with growth of services trade. This heightened 
awareness arises in part from the manufacturing/production worker focus becoming business and 
professional services/“white-collar” and professionals. This does not imply that everything is the 
same and nothing is new. Rather, the potential for services offshoring highlights tasks and 
occupations in a way that manufacturing import competition did not (and does not). Also, the 
implications for educational attainment may be different, as a result of the different impact on 
occupations.  
 
One focused avenue in the literature on services offshoring attempts to address directly the 
occupational or task nature of the activity. Papers by Jensen and Kletzer (2006, 2008); Blinder 
(2006, 2007); van Welsum and Reif (2009); and Moncarz, Wolf, and Wright (2008) share a 
general approach to measuring potential offshorability by looking at the task and activity content 
of jobs. Although these papers differ in methodology and details, they share a common starting 
                                                 
31 Services offshoring refers to the (potential) migration of jobs (but not the people performing them) across national 
borders, mostly from rich countries to poor ones, with imported products and activities flowing back to the United 
States. 
32 See Jensen and Kletzer (2008) for citations to the literature. The phrase “elusive phenomenon” appears in NAPA 
(2006a). Interested readers are directed to the set of three NAPA publications on offshoring (2006a,b; 2007).  
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point that movable jobs are those with little face-to-face customer contact; high information 
content, work process is Internet enabled and/or telecommutable (see Bardhan and Kroll [2003]; 
Dossani and Kenney [2003], and Blinder [2006]). More informally, it is commonly believed that 
if “it can be sent down a wire (or wireless),” it is offshorable. These papers have all yielded sets 
of occupations varying in their “potential offshorability.” One possible next step, as noted in 
Chapter 4 of NAPA (2006b), is to consider that the offshoring of services should produce 
changes in the occupational structure of firms and establishments. In other words, shifts in 
certain (potentially “movable”) occupations may be consistent with offshoring. Shifts in these 
occupations, within industries with (intermediate) services trade, may be more compelling 
evidence. 
This paper proceeds with some thoughts on possible enhanced links between studies of 
(domestic) outsourcing and (international) offshore outsourcing. After that I describe the basic 
principles of offshorability and the data on the content and context of jobs (O*Net), together with 
occupational employment and earnings (Occupational Employment Statistics [OES]). The next 
section considers the preliminary evidence of shifts of the occupational employment distribution, 
followed by a concluding section.  
 
 
HOW STUDIES OF OFFSHORING MAY BENEFIT FROM LITERATURE ON 
OUTSOURCING 
 
Over the past five years, the potential for services offshoring has generated remarkable attention 
for an internal-to-the-firm economic activity, and area of research, historically undertaken 
behind-the-scenes and not in the spotlight. These behind-the-scenes activities are the “make-or-
buy” points—the decisions to use in-house (own) employees versus purchasing completed tasks 
from other establishments.  
 
Interest in domestic contracting out surged in the 1990s, with attention paid to temporary help 
agencies. Katharine Abraham’s research led the way, with her 1988 and 1990 papers on market-
mediated work arrangements. Then, as now, research progress was slowed by data limitations. 
The still-small literature on domestic outsourcing now reveals significant growth in the activity 
over the past 25 years (see papers by Segal and Sullivan [1997], Houseman [2001], and Dey, 
Houseman, and Polivka [forthcoming]). 
 
To date, research on offshore outsourcing has proceeded without much of a link to the domestic 
outsourcing literature. Interestingly, perspectives from international trade have dominated the 
offshore outsourcing literature, in a services version of “does trade cost jobs?” Yet the domestic 
outsourcing literature has implications for offshore outsourcing research. Domestic outsourcing 
can produce shifts in the industry structure of employment. Contractual production workers are 
employees of temporary help agencies (or more broadly, firms in the business services sector). 
In-house production workers are (usually) employed by manufacturing firms. Simply put, as 
stated by Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (forthcoming), “. . . the number and occupational 
distribution of workers classified in the manufacturing sector changes, even if the number and 
occupational distribution of workers performing the tasks does not” (p. 2). Thus, the domestic 
outsourcing literature looks at shifts in the pattern of occupational employment across 
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industries.33  Following the logic that offshore outsourcing involves the reallocation of 
production tasks within establishments, firms, and industries, we might expect to see shifts in the 
pattern of occupations within industries, and most specifically for “potentially movable” 
occupations within industries where business and professional services imports have increased. 
Investigating this (weakly formed) hypothesis involves bringing together data on (potentially 
movable) occupations, occupational employment, and services trade. 
 
 
MEASURING TASK CONTENT OF POTENTIALLY MOVABLE SERVICES 
OCCUPATIONS34  
 
The literature on offshoring posits that movable jobs are those with little face-to-face customer 
contact, those with high information content, and those whose work processes are Internet 
enabled and/or telecommutable.35 A great deal of attention is paid to Internet-enabled: the 
expansion of broadband and wireless (and the broad use of “off the shelf” software programs) 
having greatly reduced the “transportation costs” of information. Having developed a set of 
tradable services occupations, the next step is to consider the detailed characteristics of these 
jobs and whether the characteristics fit a description of offshorability.  
 
The use here of Occupational Information Network (O*Net) is in the spirit of Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane (2003), who explore the spread of computerization, using the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT) to measure the routine vs. nonroutine, and cognitive vs. noncognitive 
aspects of occupations. The O*Net was developed by the U.S. Department of Labor as a 
replacement for the DOT.36 Similar in theme to the DOT as a source of occupational information, 
O*Net reflects the expanded possibilities of contemporary information technology in that it is a 
database, with information on job characteristics and worker attributes. Unlike the vast job-
specific detail provided on 12,000+ occupations in the DOT, O*Net provides information on 
1100+ occupations, using language and assessment common across jobs. Unlike DOT, where 
professional analysts are the primary source of information, job incumbents provide the 
information, which is gathered by survey questionnaire. Occupations are organized at the 
Standard Occupational Classification level.37 O*Net is used in a variety of fields studying work 
and occupations, such as organizational behavior, applied psychology, career assessment, human 
resource management, and occupational psychology.38 O*Net is relatively foreign to research in 
economics. Blinder (2007) takes an approach similar in spirit to our discussion here.  
 
                                                 
33 In fairness to the domestic outsourcing literature, it considers a broader range of questions from industrial 
relations to labor demand, including job security, wages, compensation and benefits costs, job training, hiring, 
firing, and search costs. 
34 This section borrows heavily from Jensen and Kletzer (2008). 
35 See Bardhan and Kroll (2003) for a list of attributes. 
36 See Peterson and Mumford et al. (1999) for a history of the development of O*Net. 
37 Importantly, the level of SOC detail used in O*Net (6-digit plus) is deeper than the 6-digit SOC codes used in 
OES.  
38 See http://online.onetcenter.org/ for information on acquiring the data.  
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The O*Net Content model identifies the most important types of information about work, jobs, 
and workers, and integrates the information into a structured system of six major categories:39 
 
1) Worker characteristics (abilities, occupational interests, work values, work styles); 
2) Worker requirements (skills and knowledge, education); 
3) Experience requirements (experience and training, skills and entry requirements, 
licensing); 
4) Occupational requirements (generalized and detailed work activities, organizational 
context, work context) 
5) Labor market characteristics (labor market information, occupational outlook); and  
6) Occupation-specific information (tasks, tools and technology). 
 
The first three categories (Worker characteristics, Worker requirements, Experience 
requirements) are worker oriented. The second three are work- (or job-) oriented categories, with 
Occupational requirements as the focus of interest here. Occupational requirements are meant to 
identify requisite tasks, and are designed to cross occupations, at both a general and detailed 
level, while Occupation-specific information is meant to be quite detailed and literally 
occupation specific.  
 
The domain/category Occupational requirements is designed to provide “. . . a comprehensive set 
of variables or detailed elements that describe what various occupations require” (National 
Center for O*Net Development 2006, p. 20). The focus is on typical activities required across 
occupations. Within the Generalized and detailed work activities subdomain, 11 measures to 
construct an index of offshorability/potential tradability. The sign in parentheses [(+) or (-)] 
denotes a prior on whether the characteristic is positively related to offshorability or negatively 
related.  
 
On information content: 
 
 Getting information (+) 
 Processing information (+) 
 Analyzing data or information (+) 
 Documenting/recording information (+) 
 
On Internet-enabled: 
 
 Interacting with computers (+) 
 
On face-to-face contact: 
                                                 
39 The idea behind the six content areas is to provide “multiple windows” on the world of work.  Information on the 
O*Net Context Model comes from National Center for O*Net Development (2006). For a comprehensive discussion 
of O*Net from the practical and research perspectives, see Peterson and Mumford et, al. (2001). 
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 Assisting or caring for others (-) 
 Performing or working directly with the public (-) 
 Establishing or maintaining interpersonal relationships (-) 
 
On working together or supervising the work of others: 
 
 Communicating with supervisors, peers, subordinates (-) 
Training and teaching others (-) 
Performing administrative duties (-) 
Coordinating work and activities of others (-) 
 
On the “on-site” nature of work: 
 
Inspecting equipment, structures, or material (-) 
Monitoring processes, materials, and/or surroundings (-) 
 
Rating scales are used to quantify these characteristics. Multiple scales are provided, with 
“importance” and “level” as the predominant pair. “Importance” is the rating of answers to the 
question, “How important is this skill to performance on the job?” Answers vary from “not 
important” to “extremely important,” on a scale of 1 to 5. “Level” is the rating of “What level of 
this skill is needed to perform this job?” ranging from low (level) to high (level), on a scale of 1 
to 7.40 An illustration might be useful, normalizing the two different scale ranges to 0 to 100. For 
the attribute “Performing or working directly with the public,” data entry keyers are assigned 
importance (I) =43, and level (L) = 33. For Security Guards, I=74 and L=62.  Compared to data 
entry keyers, working with the public is more important to performance on the job for security 
guards, along with a higher level of the “skill” of working with the public. See Jensen and 
Kletzer (2008) for a more complete description of the rating scheme and a presentation of 
summary statistics on the work activities.  
 
The composite index of offshorability is the weighted sum of the 14 components, using priors on 
the sign of the attribute in regard to offshoring potential. Higher values of the index indicate 
more offshorability potential, yielding a ranking of all occupations for which the attributes are 
available.41 The usefulness of the index is ordinal, not cardinal. Occupations are judged on their 
offshorability relative to each other, not compared to some absolute standard. Tables 1 and 2 
report the top-30 and bottom-30 occupations.42 Occupations at the top of the list seem 
unsurprising: credit authorizers, data entry keyers, accountants, medical transcriptionists, market 
research analysts, bookkeeping, and account clerks.  
                                                 
40 See Peterson and Mumford et al. (1999, 2001). Level allows a “not relevant to performance” rating, coded as 0. 
41 In constructing an index, it is not obvious how to weight importance and level. Starting from the observation that 
importance varies more than level across occupations, an index was created using a weight of three-quarters to 
importance and one-quarter to level. The ranking is robust to different weights.  
42 The full listing of 799 occupations, ranked by job-task content, takes up 28 printed pages, and is available upon 
request. 
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Tables 1 and 2 list employment and median annual earnings for each occupation, for May 2003 
and May 2008, obtained from the OES program. The OES program, operated by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS), generates employment and earnings estimates for over 800 detailed 
occupations, derived from a semiannual mail survey of establishments. Although the OES survey 
methodology is designed to create detailed cross-sectional employment and wage estimates for 
the U.S. and smaller geographic units, across and by industry, it is less useful for comparisons of 
two or more points in time. Changes in the procedures for collecting data, along with changes in 
occupational and industry codes may it complicated to create a time series. A great deal of detail 
must be suppressed to create a consistent time series, as noted by Abraham and Spletzer (2009). 
Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (forthcoming) create a time series for 15–18 broad occupational 
aggregates (at the major occupation level) and 6 narrow occupational groups. This level of 
aggregation loses the movability characteristics available from O*Net. For this paper’s 
preliminary analysis, changes in employment and earnings are considered at just two data points, 
May 2003 and May 2008. 
 
To date, I have located three other analyses that order occupations by an assessment of 
offshorability. Consistent with its organizational interest in occupational growth projections, the 
BLS has developed a list of 40 detailed occupations deemed “susceptible to a significant risk of 
offshoring” (BLS 2006, p. 12). Of these 40 occupations, 39 are services occupations (the 
exception is aircraft mechanics and service technicians). With varying degrees of “fit,” 38 of 
these 39 occupations are noted for their offshorability by the index reported here. Graphic 
designers and switchboard operators are included in the BLS list, with my index ranking these 
two occupations close to the middle of the 457. All the rest of the BLS occupations are fairly 
highly ranked by my index. The BLS list is not ranked; it is simply offered as a list of susceptible 
occupations, presumably with some more susceptible than others.43  
 
Moncarz, Wolf, and Wright (2008) present a more comprehensive analysis of offshoring and 
occupations, from work performed for the BLS Employment Projections Program. Starting with 
515 service-providing occupations, BLS economists who study occupations identified those 
occupations “that had insurmountable barriers to offshoring” (p. 73).44 After eliminating 
occupations “considered not at all susceptible to offshoring” (p. 73), the analysis was confined to 
160 occupations. The analysts considered four characteristics: 1) inputs and outputs that can 
travel easily across long distances (such as electronically), 2) work that requires little interaction 
with other types of workers, 3) work that requires little knowledge of the social or cultural 
idiosyncrasies of the target market, and 4) work that is routine in nature (p. 73). Occupations 
were scored on this characteristics (very low to very high, a four-point scale), and assigned a 
susceptibility score. A preliminary comparison of the resulting ranking suggests considerable 
difference between the BLS analysis and the analysis reported here.  
 
                                                 
43 The BLS methodology is similar in spirit to ours, considering characteristics of digital transmission, repetitive 
tasks, little face-to-face interaction. Occupational analysts provided judgments on these characteristics. Further 
refinements included excluding occupations where technology or automation could account for a dampening of 
employment growth. See BLS (2006). 
44 Examples include physical therapists and barbers, security guards, correctional officers. 
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Blinder (2007) explores a subjective index based on two characteristics: 1) can the work be 
delivered to a remote location, and 2) must the job be performed at a specific (U.S.) location? In 
his subjective measure, Blinder concentrates on one characteristic of the delivery of services, the 
separation of customer and supplier that he labels “impersonally delivered services.” Basically, 
impersonally delivered services can be delivered electronically, incorporating the vast 
improvement in ICT. His measure does not incorporate any attributes related to the kind of work 
sent down the wire, such as information context or internet enabling. Most importantly, in terms 
of the area of traditional US comparative advantage, Blinder does not consider the creativity or 
routineness of work.45 In an area that needs more exploration, there are many high-skill and high-
value (creative) services, that while transmittable electronically, pose opportunities for American 
workers and firms to penetrate foreign markets.  
 
Using both production and nonproduction occupations, Blinder estimates that 30–40 million 
workers are currently in potentially tradable jobs, based on May 2005 employment levels. 
Objective measures may well be preferred, given the number of occupations (less than 450) and 
desire for replication. 
 
 
RISING SERVICES TRADE AND SHIFTS IN THE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF EMPLOYMENT  
 
Taking up the approach followed in National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA 2006b), 
this section examines shifts in the occupational distribution of employment within service sector 
industries where imports (trade) have expanded. The idea is to look for evidence consistent with 
offshoring, within industries where services trade has expanded: Do high potential movability 
occupations decline (relative to national trends) in industries coincident with rising imports? 46 
How does the occupational employment share within a “rising import” industry relate to 
potential movability?  
 
NAPA (2006b) examines a limited set of industries that were “significant in size, potentially 
vulnerable to off-shoring, sufficiently diverse, well integrated into the overall economy, and 
likely to continue expanding.” Four industries were selected:  
 
  1)?pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing [3254]; 
2)?architectural, engineering, and related services [5413]; 
3)?computer systems design and related services [5415]; and 
4)?business support services [5614]. 
 
The NAPA analysis developed additional and more extensive measures of offshoring than 
tackled here (to date). The approach here is in the spirit of NAPA’s analysis, of considering 
service industries with a high-tech component with increasing trade flows, yet with a 
considerably larger set of detailed industries. Appendix Table A.1 reports changes in 
                                                 
45 The routineness of work, or the codification of tasks, is a characteristic emphasized by Autor, Levy, and Murnane 
(2003). 
46 This framing ignores the question of whether the appropriate “trade” measure is the level of trade or the change. 
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occupational employment, within 6-digit NAICS industries and across industries, for NAICS 
sectors 51 (Information), 54 (Professional, scientific, and technical services) and 56 
(Administrative and support services).47  
 
Before turning to the occupational employment data, Figure 1 shows the rise in trade in the 
overall category of Other private services, where these NAICS sectors reside. There is a trade 
surplus in this category that has grown since the early 2000s. Table 3 presents more detailed 
trade data, for the period 2002–2007, for a subset of Other private services that includes a 
number of the industries examined here. The services trade surplus is broadly in evidence, 
although it is also clear that imports have increased substantially. 
 
Returning to Appendix Table A.1, for each industry, the subset of occupations charted starts with 
the “Ten largest occupations for each industry” featured on the BLS Web site, drawn from the 
May 2008 OES (BLS 2009). Given the difficulties of using the OES data as a time series, and the 
desire to examine very detailed occupations, the analysis to date compares just two points in 
time, May 2003 and May 2008. 
 
Table 1.1 is sufficiently detailed to make summary statistics complicated. Offering the most 
summary of summary statistics, the movability index is negatively correlated with changes in the 
share of industry employment accounted for by an occupation (if an occupation’s share of 
industry employment rose from 2003 to 2008, that occupation was lower ranked in terms of 
potential movability).48 A general observation from the table: the majority of the most populous 
occupations in these industries grew faster than the corresponding national occupational average 
(that is, a comparison of Columns 2 and 4). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper offers a measure of potential movability of occupations, built from common notions 
of job characteristics related to “offshorability.” The calculated index of offshorability offers 
strong potential for understanding jobs (tasks) at risk. Preliminary analysis of how these 
occupations have changed in importance, measured as by employment share and earnings 
change, is ongoing. A natural question arises as to whether business, professional, and technical 
services industries with rising imports show evidence of shifts in occupational employment that 
are consistent with offshoring.  
 
                                                 
47 NAICS sector 56 also includes Waste management and Remediation services, but those detailed industries are not 
included here. 
48 Correlation = –0.25 for sectors 54 and 56.  
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Table 1: Top 30 Occupations for Potential Movability 
              May 2008         May 2003  Change, 2003–2008 
SOC code Occupation title 
Movability 
index Rank Employment
Median 
annual 
earnings Employment 
Median 
annual 
earnings Employment
Real 
median 
earnings
15-2091 Mathematical technicians 1.274 1 1,100 $38,400 2,180 $36,540 -0.495 -0.102 
15-2021 Mathematicians 0.118 2 2,770 $95,150 2,470 $78,290 0.121 0.039 
17-3013 Mechanical drafters -0.171 3 77,070 $46,640 74,010 $41,520 0.041 -0.040 
13-2041 Credit analysts -0.173 4 74,400 $55,250 68,910 $45,020 0.080 0.049 
15-2031 Operations research 
analysts 
-0.289 5 60,860 $69,000 58,080 $58,300 0.048 0.012 
19-2011 Astronomers -0.358 6 1,280 $101,300 770 $88,310 0.662 -0.020 
15-2041 Statisticians -0.391 7 20,680 $72,610 18,370 $59,560 0.126 0.042 
17-3012 Electrical and electronics 
drafters 
-0.395 8 32,710 $51,320 33,720 $41,730 -0.030 0.051 
15-1051 Computer systems analysts -0.443 9 489,890 $75,500 474,780 $64,160 0.032 0.006 
19-3011 Economists -0.454 10 12,600 $83,590 12,300 $70,250 0.024 0.017 
19-3021 Market research analysts -0.457 11 230,070 $61,070 142,190 $54,670 0.618 -0.045 
15-2011 Actuaries -0.486 13 18,220 $84,810 14,680 $72,520 0.241 0.000 
15-1031 Computer software 
engineers, applications 
-0.506 14 494,160 $85,430 392,140 $72,530 0.260 0.007 
17-2072 Electronics engineers, 
except computer 
-0.539 15 139,930 $86,370 137,320 $71,370 0.019 0.034 
13-2031 Budget analysts -0.564 16 62,630 $65,320 55,560 $54,520 0.127 0.024 
15-1061 Database administrators -0.571 17 115,770 $69,740 100,890 $58,200 0.147 0.024 
13-2011 Accountants and auditors -0.577 18 1,133,580 $59,430 924,640 $49,060 0.226 0.035 
43-9021 Data entry keyers -0.644 19 272,810 $26,120 339,010 $22,600 -0.195 -0.012 
13-2052 Personal financial advisors -0.668 20 146,690 $69,050 85,670 $58,700 0.712 0.005 
23-2093 Title examiners, 
abstractors, and searchers 
-0.669 21 59,390 $38,300 47,840 $34,080 0.241 -0.039 
17-2071 Electrical engineers -0.671 22 154,670 $82,160 146,150 $69,640 0.058 0.008 
31-9094 Medical transcriptionists -0.677 23 86,200 $32,060 97,810 $27,590 -0.119 -0.007 
17-2011 Aerospace engineers -0.679 24 67,800 $92,520 70,740 $74,520 -0.042 0.061 
17-1021 Cartographers and 
photogrammetrists 
-0.741 25 11,690 $51,180 8,940 $44,170 0.308 -0.010 
19-3041 Sociologists -0.754 26 4,390 $68,570 3,060 $54,410 0.435 0.077 
43-9111 Statistical assistants -0.760 27 16,900 $34,850 20,970 $29,890 -0.194 -0.003 
43-3031 Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
-0.763 28 1,855,010 $32,510 1,750,680 $27,760 0.060 0.001 
15-1011 Computer and informa-tion 
scientists, research 
-0.785 29 26,610 $97,970 23,210 $81,600 0.146 0.026 
13-2051 Financial analysts -0.833 30 236,720 $73,150 165,420 $60,050 0.431 0.041 
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Table 2: Bottom 30 Occupations for Potential Movability 
              May 2008         May 2003   Change, 2003 -2008 
SOC 
code Occupation title 
Movability 
Index Rank Employment
Median 
annual 
earnings Employment 
Median 
annual 
earnings Employment
Real 
median 
earnings
31-9091 Dental assistants -3.228 768 293,090 $32,380 272,030 $27,700 0.077 -0.001 
53-6021 Parking lot attendants -3.241 769 136,470 $18,790 113,490 $16,630 0.202 -0.034 
29-1061 Anesthesiologists -3.247 770 34,230 # 23,790 # 0.439  
39-5093 Shampooers -3.257 771 15,570 $17,300 15,300 $14,360 0.018 0.030 
29-1081 Podiatrists -3.272 772 9,670 $113,560 7,800 $94,060 0.240 0.032 
47-5061 Roof bolters, mining -3.284 773 4,950 $45,210 3,980 $38,550 0.244 0.002 
25-2011 Preschool teachers, except special 
education 
-3.288 774 392,170 $23,870 368,870 $19,820 0.063 0.029 
27-2032 Choreographers -3.301 775 13,860 $38,520 14,810 $31,030 -0.064 0.061 
29-9091 Athletic trainers -3.316 777 15,070 $39,640 11,750 $32,850 0.283 0.031 
29-2055 Surgical technologists -3.317 778 89,600 $38,740 73,250 $32,130 0.223 0.031 
53-3011 Ambulance drivers and attendants, 
except emergency medical technicians 
-3.324 779 21,790 $22,410 17,650 $19,000 0.235 0.008 
33-9032 Security guards -3.334 780 1,046,760 $23,460 964,260 $19,660 0.086 0.020 
39-1021 First-line supervisors/managers of 
personal service workers 
-3.340 781 129,070 $34,910 110,630 $29,500 0.167 0.011 
21-2011 Clergy -3.351 782 42,040 $41,730 38,170 $33,800 0.101 0.055 
27-2021 Athletes and sports competitors -3.362 783 13,960 $40,480 11,840 $45,780 0.179 -0.244 
39-3091 Amusement and recreation attendants -3.366 784 258,820 $17,470 236,070 $15,030 0.096 -0.007 
31-9011 Massage therapists -3.379 785 51,250 $34,900 29,940 $28,670 0.712 0.040 
39-3011 Gaming dealers -3.381 786 91,130 $16,310 76,120 $14,200 0.197 -0.018 
49-9051 Electrical power-line installers and 
repairers 
-3.427 787 111,580 $55,100 95,190 $48,960 0.172 -0.038 
47-2022 Stonemasons -3.446 788 18,910 $37,800 13,710 $34,000 0.379 -0.050 
47-4091 Segmental pavers -3.480 789 1,170 $27,400 1,710 $26,530 -0.316 -0.117 
27-2041 Music directors and composers -3.488 790 9,120 $41,270 9,000 $32,530 0.013 0.084 
37-3013 Tree trimmers and pruners -3.497 791 35,420 $29,970 40,710 $25,630 -0.130 -0.001 
11-9031 Education administrators, preschool and 
child care center/program 
-3.528 792 49,630 $39,940 56,030 $34,500 -0.114 -0.011 
29-2054 Respiratory therapy technicians -3.533 793 16,210 $42,430 25,470 $34,850 -0.364 0.041 
39-6031 Flight attendants -3.609 794 99,480 $35,930 107,100 *** -0.071  
39-9031 Fitness trainers and aerobics instructors -3.623 796 229,030 $29,210 177,790 $24,510 0.288 0.019 
33-1021 First-line supervisors/managers of fire 
fighting and prevention workers 
-3.680 797 53,300 $67,440 59,000 $57,000 -0.097 0.011 
27-2022 Coaches and scouts -3.844 798 175,720 $28,340 105,070 $26,950 0.672 -0.101 
49-9095 Manufactured building and mobile 
home installers 
-4.131 799 8,290 $28,250 13,160 $23,360 -0.370 0.034 
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Table 3: International Trade in Business, Professional and Technical Services (millions of dollars)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  
Total        
  Imports 34185 37458 40992 46924 61068 68763  
  Exports 60177 62958 69568 76487 89692 107675  
Advertising        
  Imports 786 864 931 876 1845 1977  
  Exports 466 517 581 896 3163 4030  
Computer and Information Services        
  Imports 6495 7617 8639 10596 13085 14815  
  Exports 7079 8213 8693 9434 10341 12798  
Research, Development and Testing Services        
  Imports 4063 5071 5778 7239 9429 11437  
  Exports 8678 9467 9563 10431 12821 14698  
Management Consulting and Public Relations 
Services 
       
  Imports 11028 10770 12076 14905 19361 20475  
  Exports 14339 14309 16372 19242 22058 24699  
Legal Services        
  Imports 820 874 899 894 1222 1561  
  Exports 3099 3377 3997 4225 5294 6424  
Construction, Architectural and Engineering 
Services 
       
  Imports 316 303 580 434 1751 1851  
  Exports 2247 2564 3294 3791 5369 6469  
Industrial Engineering         
  Imports 183 176 164 169 1035 1504  
  Exports 806 877 828 2303 3836 3872  
Installation, Maintenance and Repair of Equipment        
  Imports 668 670 720 956 3780 4180  
  Exports 5287 4995 4948 6494 7667 8966  
Operational Leasing        
  Imports 1060 841 1142 1316 1161 1046  
  Exports 7552 8062 8634 9555 10389 11664  
Other (1)        
  Imports 8768 10267 9994 9538 7880 9917  
  Exports 10622 10575 12656 10116 8754 14124  
(1) Other includes accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services; medical services; mining services; sports, and performing 
arts; trade-related services; training services.    
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Services Cross-Border Trade   
Accessed at: http://www.bea.gov/international/intlserv.htm 
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Table A.1 Top 10 Occupations (by employment), by Industry, 2003 and 2008 
Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Legal Services 541100 All 00-0000 0.032  0.060  
  Lawyers 23-1011 0.046 0.004 0.073 180 
  Paralegals and legal 
assistants 
23-2011 0.226 0.025 0.224 41 
  Title examiners, abstractors, 
and searchers 
23-2093 0.580 0.008 0.241 21 
  Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
43-3031 -0.015 -0.001 0.060 28 
  File clerks 43-4071 0.099 0.001 -0.179 186 
  Receptionists and 
information clerks 
43-4171 0.077 0.001 0.037 208 
  Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 -0.264 -0.007 0.051 293 
  Legal Secretaries 43-6012 -0.023 -0.011 -0.024 148 
  Secretaries, except legal, 
medical, and executive 
43-6014 -0.290 -0.017 0.014 273 
  Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.031 0.000 -0.007 209 
Accounting & 
Bookkeeping Services 
541200 All 00-0000 0.113  0.060  
 541200 Accountants and auditors 13-2011 0.279 0.042 0.226 40 
 541200 Tax preparers 13-2082 0.279 0.009 0.250 70 
 541200 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
office and administrative 
support workers 
43-1011 -0.063 -0.004 -0.006 556 
 541200 Bill and account collectors 43-3011 1.114 0.010 -0.020 118 
 541200 Billing and posting clerks 
and machine operators 
43-3021 0.486 0.011 0.051 45 
 541200 Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
43-3031 0.154 0.004 0.060 28 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 541200 Payroll and timekeeping 
clerks 
43-3051 2.208 0.018 0.046 34 
 541200 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.164 0.001 0.051 293 
 541200 Secretaries, except legal, 
medical, and executive 
43-6014 -0.001 -0.004 0.014 273 
 541200 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.029 -0.004 -0.007 209 
Architectural & 
Engineering Services 
541300 All 00-0000 0.172  0.060  
 541300 Engineering managers 11-9041 0.100 -0.002 -0.065 228 
 541300 Architects, except landscape 
and naval 
17-1011 0.267 0.005 0.220 258 
 541300 Surveyors 17-1022 0.091 -0.002 0.083 261 
 541300 Civil engineers 17-2051 0.356 0.013 0.267 363 
 541300 Mechanical engineers 17-2141 0.371 0.005 0.124 93 
 541300 Architectural and civil 
drafters 
17-3011 0.276 0.005 0.175 104 
 541300 Civil engineering 
technicians 
17-3022 0.124 -0.001 -0.021 55 
 541300 Surveying and mapping 
technicians 
17-3031 0.337 0.004 0.246 67 
 541300 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.350 0.004 0.051 293 
 541300 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.208 0.001 -0.007 209 
Specialized Design 
Services 
541400 All 00-0000 0.195 . 0.060 . 
 541400 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 -0.081 -0.007 -0.103 650 
 541400 Art directors 27-1011 0.178 0.000 0.403 131 
 541400 Commercial and industrial 
designers 
27-1021 0.394 0.003 -0.013 125 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 541400 Graphic designers 27-1024 0.273 0.013 0.377 103 
 541400 Interior designers 27-1025 0.541 0.034 0.152 326 
 541400 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.507 0.006 0.617 150 
 541400 Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
43-3031 0.077 -0.003 0.060 28 
 541400 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.251 0.001 0.051 293 
 541400 Secretaries, except legal, 
medical and executive 
43-6014 0.384 0.003 0.014 273 
 541400 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.216 0.001 -0.007 209 
Computer Systems 
Design & Related 
Services 
541500 All 00-0000 0.284  0.060 . 
 541500 Computer and information 
systems managers 
11-3021 0.355 0.002 0.041 301 
 541500 Management analysts 13-1111 0.404 0.002 0.264 223 
 541500 Computer programmers 15-1021 0.268 -0.001 -0.087 59 
 541500 Computer software 
engineers, applications 
15-1031 0.325 0.004 0.260 14 
 541500 Computer software 
engineers, systems software 
15-1032 0.321 0.002 0.336 64 
 541500 Computer support 
specialists 
15-1041 0.212 -0.004 0.129 157 
 541500 Computer systems analysts 15-1051 0.462 0.011 0.032 9 
 541500 Network and computer 
systems administrators 
15-1071 0.280 0.000 0.378 87 
 541500 Network systems and data 
communications analysts 
15-1081 0.461 0.003 0.557 348 
 541500 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 -0.016 -0.007 0.174 161 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Management & 
Technical Consulting 
Services 
541600 All 00-0000 0.292 . 0.060 . 
 541600 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 0.119 -0.005 -0.103 650 
 541600 Management analysts 13-1111 0.534 -0.001 0.264 223 
 541600 Business operations 
specialists, all other 
13-1199 0.897 0.011 0.216 225 
 541600 Market research analysts 19-3021 0.791 0.008 0.618 11 
 541600 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.929 0.008 0.617 150 
 541600 Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
43-3031 0.184 -0.003 0.060 28 
 541600 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.041 -0.001 0.174 161 
 541600 Executive secretaries and 
admin. Assistants 
43-6011 0.334 -0.001 0.051 293 
 541600 Secretaries, except legal, 
medical, and executive 
43-6014 0.281 -0.006 0.014 273 
 541600 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.142 -0.015 -0.007 209 
Office administrative 
services 
561100 All 00-0000 0.338 0.000 . . 
 561100 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 0.446 0.004 -0.103 650 
 561100 Management analysts 13-1111 0.195 -0.004 0.264 223 
 561100 Accountants and auditors 13-2011 0.855 0.011 0.226 40 
 561100 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
office and administrative 
support workers 
43-1011 0.551 0.005 -0.006 556 
 561100 Billing and posting clerks 
and machine operators 
43-3021 0.529 0.003 0.051 37 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 561100 Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
43-3031 0.652 0.010 0.060 28 
 561100 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.950 0.022 0.174 161 
 561100 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.350 0.000 0.051 293 
 561100 Secretaries, except legal, 
medical, and executive 
43-6014 0.753 0.007 0.014 273 
 561100 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.317 -0.001 -0.007 209 
Employment Services 561300 All 00-0000 0.033 0.000 0.060  
 561300 Employment, recruitment, 
and placement specialists 
13-1071 1.110 0.013 0.255 440 
 561300 Registered nurses 29-1111 0.307 0.006 0.132 741 
 561300 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.471 0.009 0.174 161 
 561300 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.109 0.001 0.051 293 
 561300 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.033 0.000 -0.007 209 
 561300 Construction laborers 47-2061 0.687 0.012 0.218 567 
 561300 Team assemblers 51-2092 1.613 0.031 -0.006 405 
 561300 Helpers-production workers 51-9198 0.531 0.012 0.104 249 
 561300 Laborers and freight, stock, 
and material movers, hand 
53-7062 -0.189 -0.031 0.035 575 
 561300 Packers and packagers, hand 53-7064 -0.048 -0.003 -0.138 585 
Business Support 
Services 
561400 All 00-0000 0.113 0.000 0.060  
 561400 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 -0.030 -0.003 -0.103 650 
 561400 Medical transcriptionists 31-9094 0.094 0.000 -0.119 23 
 561400 Telemarketers 41-9041 0.101 -0.002 -0.146 42 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 561400 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
office and administrative 
support workers 
43-1011 0.206 0.003 -0.006 556 
 561400 Switchboard operators, 
including answering service 
43-2011 -0.221 -0.010 -0.293 233 
 561400 Bill and account collectors 43-3011 0.316 0.020 -0.020 118 
 561400 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.517 0.055 0.174 161 
 561400 Mail clerks and mail 
machine operators, except 
postal service 
43-9051 0.244 0.002 -0.099 213 
 561400 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.011 -0.003 -0.007 209 
 561400 Office machine operators, 
except computer 
43-9071 0.088 -0.001 -0.122 537 
Newspaper, book & 
directory publishers 
511100 All 00-0000 -0.092 0.000 0.060 . 
 511100 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 -0.103 0.000 -0.103 650 
 511100 Graphic designers 27-1021 0.408 0.016 -0.013 125 
 511100 Reporters and 
correspondents 
27-3022 -0.036 0.003 -0.035 40 
 511100 Editors 27-3041 0.051 0.014 0.009 147 
 511100 Advertising sales agents 41-3011 0.137 0.017 0.143 251 
 511100 Sales representatives, 
wholesale and 
manufacturing, except 
technical and scientific 
products 
41-4012 -0.170 -0.002 0.051 231 
 511100 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 -0.143 -0.002 0.174 161 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 511100 Mail clerks and mail 
machine operators, except 
postal service 
43-9051 0.239 0.006 -0.099 213 
 511100 Office clerks, general 43-9061 -0.112 -0.001 -0.007 209 
 511100 Printing machine operators 51-5023 0.016 0.003 0.019 145 
Software Publishers 511200 All 00-0000 0.074 0.000 0.060 . 
 511200 Computer and information 
systems managers 
11-3021 0.095 0.001 0.041 301 
 511200 Computer programmers 15-1021 -0.015 -0.006 -0.087 59 
 511200 Computer software 
engineers, applications 
15-1031 -0.067 -0.022 0.160 14 
 511200 Computer software 
engineers, systems software 
15-1032 0.343 0.020 0.336 64 
 511200 Computer support 
specialists 
15-1041 -0.100 -0.014 0.129 157 
 511200 Computer systems analysts 15-1051 0.342 0.009 0.032 9 
 511200 Network and computer 
systems administrators 
15-1071 0.493 0.007 0.378 65 
 511200 Computer specialists, all 
other 
15-1099 . 0.026 0.470 40 
 511200 Sales representatives, 
wholesale and 
manufacturing, technical 
and scientific products 
41-4011 0.386 0.009 0.064 149 
 511200 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.312 0.005 0.174 161 
Motion picture & video 
industries 
512100 All 00-0000 0.019 0.000 0.060 . 
 512100 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 -0.161 -0.005 -0.103 650 
 512100 Multi-media artists and 
animators 
27-1014 0.574 0.009 -0.043 122 
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Industry NAICS Occupation SOC Within NAICS 
employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 512100 Actors 27-2011 -0.622 -0.051 -0.144 640 
 512100 Producers and directors 27-2012 1.005 0.032 0.436 415 
 512100 Film and video editors 27-4032 0.245 0.006 0.240 257 
 512100 Counter attendants, 
cafeteria, food concession, 
and coffee shop 
35-3022 0.017 0.000 0.143 521 
 512100 Motion picture 
projectionists 
39-3021 0.165 0.003 -0.024 518 
 512100 Ushers, lobby attendants, 
and ticket takers 
39-3031 -0.066 -0.009 -0.025 451 
 512100 Cashiers 41-2011 0.001 -0.001 0.024 396 
 512100 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 -0.022 -0.001 0.051 293 
Sound recording 
industries 
512200 All 00-0000 -0.229 0.000 0.060 . 
 512200 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 -0.081 0.006 -0.103 650 
 512200 Producers and directors 27-2012 0.622 0.019 0.436 415 
 512200 Audio and video equipment 
technicians 
27-4011 -0.017 0.006 0.210 420 
 512200 Sound engineering 
technicians 
27-4014 1.238 0.116 0.402 252 
 512200 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.645 0.013 0.617 175 
 512200 Sales representatives, 
wholesale and 
manufacturing, except 
technical and scientific 
products 
41-4012 -0.273 -0.002 0.051 231 
 512200 Bookkeeping, accounting, 
and auditing clerks 
43-3031 1.000 0.028 0.060 28 
 512200 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.000 0.008 0.051 293 
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employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 512200 Secretaries, except legal, 
medical and executive 
43-6014 0.000 0.008 0.014 273 
 512200 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.000 0.012 -0.007 209 
Radio & Television 
Broadcasting 
515100 All 00-0000 -0.016 0.000 0.060 . 
 515100 General and operations 
managers 
11-1021 -0.125 -0.003 -0.103 650 
 515100 Producers and directors 27-2012 0.285 0.021 0.436 415 
 515100 Radio and television 
announcers 
27-3011 -0.105 -0.014 -0.100 204 
 515100 Broadcast news analysts 27-3021 -0.014 0.000 -0.089 163 
 515100 Reporters and 
correspondents 
27-3022 -0.046 -0.001 -0.035 40 
 515100 Broadcast technicians 27-4012 0.066 0.008 0.024 214 
 515100 Camera operators, 
television, video, and 
motion picture 
27-4031 -0.215 -0.008 -0.101 439 
 515100 Advertising sales agents 41-3011 0.023 0.005 0.143 251 
 515100 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.071 0.001 0.051 293 
 515100 Office clerks, general 43-9061 0.151 0.004 -0.007 209 
        
Cable & Other 
subscription 
programming 
515200 All 00-0000 -0.074 0.000 0.060 . 
 515200 Producers and directors 27-2012 0.275 0.021 0.436 415 
 515200 Audio and video equipment 
technicians 
27-4011 0.860 0.010 0.210 420 
 515200 Broadcast technicians 27-4012 0.635 0.013 0.024 214 
 515200 Advertising sales agents 41-3011 0.429 0.008 0.143 251 
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employment change, 
2003-2008 
Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 515200 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.206 0.009 0.617 175 
 515200 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 -0.443 -0.060 0.174 161 
 515200 Executive secretaries and 
administrative assistants 
43-6011 0.207 0.005 0.051 293 
 515200 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
mechanics, installers, and 
repairers 
49-1011 -0.126 -0.001 -0.004 760 
 515200 Telecommunications 
equipment installers and 
repairers, except line 
installers 
49-2022 0.546 0.032 -0.002 359 
 515200 Telecommunications line 
installers and repairers 
49-9052 -0.016 0.008 0.135 523 
Wired 
telecommunications 
carriers 
517100 All 00-0000 0.133 0.000 0.060 . 
 517100 Business operations 
specialists, all other 
13-1199 0.259 0.002 0.216 225 
 517100 Network and computer 
system administrators 
15-1071 0.981 0.010 0.378 65 
 517100 Network systems and data 
communications analysts 
15-1081 4.900 0.028 0.557 348 
 517100 Electronics engineers, 
except computer 
17-2072 -0.038 -0.004 0.019 15 
 517100 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.471 0.014 0.617 175 
 517100 Telephone operators 43-2021 -0.331 -0.014 -0.496 108 
 517100 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.260 0.010 0.174 161 
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employment change, 
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Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 517100 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
mechanics, installers, and 
repairers 
49-1011 0.038 -0.002 -0.004 760 
 517100 Telecommunications 
equipment installers and 
repairers, except line 
installers 
49-2022 0.097 -0.005 -0.002 359 
 517100 Telecommunications line 
installers and repairers 
49-9052 1.118 0.062 0.135 523 
Wireless 
telecommunications 
carriers 
517200 All 00-0000 0.029 0.000 0.060 . 
 517200 Business operations 
specialists, all other 
13-1199 0.799 0.008 0.216 225 
 517200 Computer support 
specialists 
15-1041 0.700 0.007 0.129 157 
 517200 Network systems and data 
communications analysts 
15-1081 -0.049 -0.001 0.557 348 
 517200 Electronics engineers, 
except computer 
17-2072 0.340 0.006 0.019 15 
 517200 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
retail sales workers 
41-1011 0.451 0.011 0.009 739 
 517200 Retail salespersons 41-2031 1.138 0.088 0.109 460 
 517200 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.235 0.012 0.617 175 
 517200 First-line 
supervisors/managers of 
office and administrative 
support workers 
43-1011 -0.224 -0.007 -0.006 556 
 517200 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 0.387 0.066 0.174 161 
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Change in share of 
NAICS employment 
National-level 
employment change 
Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 517200 Telecommunications 
equipment installers and 
repairers, except line 
installers 
49-2022 -0.022 -0.002 -0.002 359 
Satellite 
telecommunications 
517400 All 00-0000 -0.259 0.000 0.060 . 
 517400 Business operations 
specialists, all other 
13-1199 1.071 0.015 0.216 225 
 517400 Network systems and data 
communications analysts 
15-1081 9.750 0.033 0.557 348 
 517400 Electronics engineers, 
except computer 
17-2072 0.933 0.015 0.019 15 
 517400 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 0.061 0.025 0.617 175 
 517400 Telemarketers 41-9041 0.144 0.029 -0.146 42 
 517400 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 -0.356 -0.016 0.174 161 
 517400 Order clerks 43-4151 -0.500 -0.019 -0.182 80 
 517400 Telecommunications 
equipment installers and 
repairers, except line 
installers 
49-2022 -0.663 -0.033 -0.002 359 
 517400 Electrical and electronics 
repairers, commercial and 
industrial equipment 
49-2094 1.583 0.018 -0.078 325 
 517400 Telecommunications line 
installers and repairers 
49-9052 -0.229 0.002 0.135 523 
Other 
telecommunications 
517900 All 00-0000 18.831 0.000 0.060 . 
 517900 Business operations 
specialists, all other 
13-1199 93.500 0.021 0.216 225 
 517900 Computer support 
specialists 
15-1041 80.250 0.017 0.129 157 
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Movability index 
ranking 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 517900 Network systems and data 
communications analysts 
15-1081 58.333 0.017 0.557 348 
 517900 Electronics engineers, 
except computer 
17-2072 9.364 -0.022 0.019 15 
 517900 Retail salespersons 41-2031 . . 0.109 460 
 517900 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 78.400 0.063 0.617 175 
 517900 Sales representatives, 
wholesale and 
manufacturing, technical 
and scientific products 
41-4011 95.000 0.021 0.064 149 
 517900 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 70.529 0.062 0.174 161 
 517900 Telecommunications 
equipment installers and 
repairers, except line 
installers 
49-2022 51.974 0.091 -0.002 359 
 517900 Telecommunications line 
installers and repairers 
49-9052 25.500 0.013 0.135 523 
Data processing & 
related services 
518200 All 00-0000 -0.081 0.000 0.060  
 518200 Computer and information 
systems managers 
11-3021 0.108 0.006 0.041 301 
 518200 Computer programmers 15-1021 -0.471 -0.028 -0.087 59 
 518200 Computer software 
engineers, applications 
15-1031 0.084 0.007 0.160 14 
 518200 Computer software 
engineers, systems software 
15-1032 0.539 0.022 0.336 64 
 518200 Computer support 
specialists 
15-1041 -0.076 0.000 0.129 157 
 518200 Computer systems analysts 15-1051 0.008 0.006 0.032 9 
 518200 Network and computer 
systems administrators 
15-1071 0.062 0.005 0.378 65 
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   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 518200 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 -0.168 -0.006 0.174 161 
 518200 Computer operators 43-9011 -0.088 0.000 -0.329 170 
 518200 Data entry keyers 43-9021 -0.167 -0.007 -0.195 19 
Other information 
services 
519100 All 00-0000 1.730 0.900 0.060  
 519100 Computer programmers 15-1021 16.714 0.028 -0.087 59 
 519100 Computer software 
engineers, applications 
15-1031 18.227 0.031 0.160 14 
 519100 Computer software 
engineers, systems software 
15-1032 21.290 0.051 0.336 64 
 519100 Network systems and data 
communications analysts 
15-1081 16.381 0.027 0.557 348 
 519100 Librarians 25-4021 0.178 0.041 -0.014 453 
 519100 Library technicians 25-4031 -0.029 0.031 0.042 242 
 519100 Editors 27-3041 2.712 0.036 0.009 147 
 519100 Sales representatives, 
services, all other 
41-3099 10.561 0.048 0.617 175 
 519100 Customer service 
representatives 
43-4051 1.958 0.039 0.174 161 
 519100 Library assistants, clerical 43-4121 0.660 0.067 0.044 352 
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Abstract 
The 2007 Economic Census asked establishments to identify if they engaged in domestic 
outsourcing or foreign offshoring for manufacturing and wholesaling.  These novel data can be 
linked to existing longitudinal business microdata that include information on such variables as 
employment, firm structure, and revenue.  In this paper, we describe the collected responses, 
their distribution across sectors, and some business activity patterns with reference to the U.S. 
economy as a whole.  We find that the majority of establishments do not offshore but those that 
do are likely to belong to larger firms; furthermore, most offshorers can be linked to at least one 
import transaction.  Interestingly, less than a third of manufacturing activity occurs among 
“traditional manufacturers”—firms that design and produce their own good and whose primary 
activity is the production of their own goods.  We observe additional differences in employment 
shares and growth between offshorers and own producers.  Finally, we find the special inquiry 
data are a valuable complement to other Census Bureau microdata on trade transactions and firm 
dynamics.  While there is still more work needed to develop a fully integrated data infrastructure, 
this paper demonstrates that analytic utility of that infrastructure will likely be very high. 
 
                                                 
* Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau, 4600 Silver Hill Road, Washington, DC 20233.  Any opinions 
and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. 
Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.  We would 
like to thank Susan Houseman, Ken Ryder, Dennis Shoemaker, John Murphy, and participants in the National 
Academy of Public Administration preconference workshop on measurement and globalization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Generally speaking, the practice by which firms transfer all or part their production to another 
company is called “outsourcing” if the partner business is domestic and “offshoring” if 
foreign.49  While offshoring and outsourcing have been controversial topics in the public 
discourse, some have noted that these practices can impact many of the key measures we use to 
track the health of our economy.  Houseman (2007, 2008) notes in particular that increased 
sourcing of imports, whose prices are poorly measured and biased upwards, is leading to 
mismeasurement of industry productivity statistics.  In addition, the growing ease with which 
production activities can be moved around the globe to take advantage of factor price 
differentials has made the classification and measurement of activity at domestic business 
establishments and firms more difficult. 
 
 Our ability to quantify and examine how outsourcing and offshoring affect our statistics and 
economy has been severely limited by a lack of appropriate data.50  This paper is an exploratory 
study that utilizes a unique new dataset linking survey based offshoring data from the 2007 
Economic Census with administrative import and export transactions files.  With these data, we 
are able to conduct a number of exercises aimed at assessing our ability to identify firms 
engaging in these practices and to appropriately classify their activities in official statistics.  
Moreover, the data we use are part of a broader effort under way at the Center for Economic 
Studies (CES) to link import, export, outsourcing, and longitudinal firm data.  The CES 
maintains and updates an innovative dataset of the universe of transaction-level foreign trade 
data linked to firm-level data from the longitudinal business database (LBD), the economic 
censuses and other data sources.  The new file is called the longitudinal firm trade transactions 
database or (LFTTD). 51   
 
In this paper, we describe and evaluate the new census 2007 questions on outsourcing.  For 
example, we break down the responses by industry sector and firm size and identify some 
intuitively appealing stylized facts.  We observe, for example, that although most offshoring 
firms are small, offshoring firms are overrepresented among the largest firms, i.e., those that 
employ more than 500 workers.  To gauge the reliability of the offshoring responses, we match 
them to international trade data and find that, as expected, a disproportionate share of the firms 
that report outsourcing activities also can be linked to an import transaction.   Finally, we more 
closely scrutinize differences in employment shares and growth among the three different types 
of manufacturing sourcing firms. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next two sections describe the new data we use and provide 
some basic statistics and various exercises that include data quality checks; disaggregation by 
major sector, size, and activity; linkage to trade data; comparisons at the establishment- and firm-
                                                 
49 Technically, this usage is imprecise as outsourcing can refer to both domestic and foreign, so offshoring is more 
accurately defined as foreign outsourcing.  For ease of reference, this paper will follow the less precise, conventional 
usage. 
50 Helpman (2006) notes that while theoretical work on why firms outsource production or invest abroad for vertical 
integration is inconclusive, very few studies empirically test some model implications due to a lack of appropriate 
data.  
51 The LFFTD was developed primarily through the efforts of J. Bradford Jensen, an RDC researcher.  See the data 
appendix in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for details. 
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levels; and preliminary analyses of employment differences.  The last section summarizes our 
findings. 
 
 
DATA 
 
Among other business microdata, the CES maintains and updates a novel dataset of the universe 
of transaction-level foreign trade data linked to firm-level data from the LBD, the business 
register, economic censuses, and other data sources.  The transaction-level international trade 
files, also known as the foreign merchandise trade (FMT) data, underlie the census bureau’s 
published foreign trade statistics, which are the official source of data on U.S. international 
trade.52  The export data come from exporters’ electronic filings on the census bureau’s 
automated export system and also through a data-sharing arrangement with the Canadian 
government.  Each filing represents a shipment of one or more kinds of merchandise from one 
exporter to one importer on a single carrier.  Similarly, the import data come from the U.S. 
Customs’ Automated Commercial System, which collects information on imports from import 
entry forms, warehouse withdrawal forms, and foreign trade zone documents.   
 
These data contain information for each transaction, including the 10-digit harmonized schedule 
code, value, quantity, entry or exit port, date of transaction, mode of transportation, and related-
party status.  Data are collected for every import transaction with a value greater than $2,000 and 
every export transaction with a value greater than $2,500.  In addition, the employer 
identification number of the importer or exporter is collected.  This is the primary variable used 
to link the records to other census data products like the business register.53   
 
The business register is the primary file used to assign firm identifications to transaction-level 
trade data.   In particular, it contains establishment-level data including employer identification 
number, firm name, firm identification, address and industry affiliation.  Matching transaction-
level import data to firm identifications is relatively straightforward.  Because most export and 
all import transaction data contain a field for the employer identification number, observations 
can be linked directly to the business register. The match rates of import transactions to the 
business registerare typically in the 80 percent range and the share of matched import value is 
typically above 80 percent.  The linked trade transaction data with firm identifiers are the key 
components of the LFTTD.54 
 
For this exercise, we link the LFFTD files to the special inquiries data on offshoring and 
outsourcing in the 2007 economic census.  The questions were originally designed to help census 
more accurately describe firms’ supply chains and to aide in the classification of the increasingly 
                                                 
52 Tang (2009) describes the FMT in detail and provides useful information including variable definitions, 
codebooks, and variable coverage over time.  The data cleaning performed to construct the FMT include, for 
example, assigning time-consistent variable names. 
53 The EIN variable is not present on records of exports to Canada due to a bilateral data exchange program; instead, 
name and address are used.  Because of differences in matching methodologies as well as the sheer number of 
records (20 million per year), it has taken several years for researchers to develop matching algorithms that can be 
rapidly and reliably applied to new years of data.     
54 The description of the matching procedure for imports and exports draws heavily on the data appendix in Bernard, 
Jensen, and Schott (2009). 
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complex web of manufacturing activities.  In particular, they ask manufacturing and wholesaling 
plants whether they designed the goods they sell, their primary activity was manufacturing (for 
themselves or others) or re-sales, and if they purchased contract-manufacturing services from 
either foreign or domestic companies.55  For all establishments that received a form, about 72 
percent of wholesale establishments and 66 percent of manufacturing plants responded to the 
questions, which is roughly comparable to the 72 percent and 73 percent response rates for 
employment. 56  Although the questions were not officially pretested, our results indicate that the 
responses make intuitive sense. 
 
 
EXPLORATORY EXERCISES 
 
Special Inquiry Cross-Tabulations, by Activity, Count, and Size 
 
We begin our analysis with a few basic tabulations.  Table 1 presents establishment-level 
breakdowns for each part of the special inquiry, while Table 2 contains analogous figures for 
employment.57  From these basic summary statistics, a number of interesting patterns quickly 
emerge.  Almost 60 percent of establishments responding to this part of the manufacturing form 
indicate that they design their own goods (row 2, column 1), while only 15 percent of responding 
wholesale establishments state the same.  For part 2 of the special inquiry, the majority of 
responses to both forms are consistent with the expected industry definition of the 
establishments.  For example, roughly 81 percent of the manufacturing establishments (and about 
86 percent of their employment) is accounted for by establishments that reported their major 
activity as either “production” or “contracting.”  Similarly, about 68 percent of establishments 
(and 66 percent by employment) that answered the wholesale forms reported their major activity 
as “resales.”58  Note that although the first row indicates the total number of establishments or 
their associated employment, not all establishments necessarily answered each part of the 
inquiry, which is why the subtotals for each part may sum to less than the total responses. 
 
Interestingly, 5 percent of tabbed manufacturing establishments report that their primary activity 
is resales and 7 percent of tabbed wholesale establishments report their major activity is 
production.  While the special inquiry data were not used for classification purposes, the 
Economic Census is the most reliable source of industry codes available to the Census Bureau 
and quinquennial collection results in a substantial number of corrections to establishment 
                                                 
55 2007 Economic Census, Forms MC-313XX through 315XX, Question 26.  Although the question was asked in 
the Census of Manufacturers, respondents included both manufacturers and wholesalers.  See Appendix A at the end 
of this paper for the specific questions (under “Special Inquiries”).  Note that the language used in these questions 
was not pretested. 
56 These include all long-form manufacturing cases and all wholesale establishments except for Miscellaneous 
wholesale and Agents and brokers.  Furthermore, note that establishments receiving forms represent less than half of 
the universe of establishments.  We thank Dennis Shoemaker in the Census Bureau’s Economic Planning and 
Coordination Division for providing the background information. 
57 Since this categorization is based on which forms the establishments responded to and not on a comprehensive 
measurement of the overall firms’ activities, one should interpret the table accordingly.   That is, it may be that the 
establishment is classified as “wholesale” but report doing their own production because they are part of a larger 
firm that has manufacturing activities. 
58 We should note that this sample conditions on the establishments answering all three questions and also excludes 
wholesale establishments that are known to act primarily as manufacturers’ sales offices.  
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industry codes.  In fact, about 5 percent of the manufacturing establishments (nonbank) were 
classified in different (nonmanufacturing) sectors after the 2007 Economic Census form was 
received and the share of wholesalers that switched sectors was roughly twice that.  These 
numbers are typical during Economic Census operations.  Thus, the findings from the special 
inquiries are in line with typical reclassification rates.   
 
In light of recent research on the effects of professional employer organizations on industry 
statistics, it is worthwhile to note that in separate calculations, we found these shares to have 
been relatively stable since at least 1997.59  That is, it seems unlikely that the share of 
manufacturers reporting that they engage in other activities is due to them reclassifying 
themselves because they use professional employer organizations.  Instead, it seems like a 
normal part of the classification process.  Furthermore, most establishments indicated that they 
neither outsource nor offshore any activity.  For manufacturing, the offshorer, outsourcer, and 
own-producer shares were roughly 2, 26, and 69 percent, respectively.  For wholesale 
establishments, the analogous shares were 4, 11, and 82 percent.  
 
The employment breakdowns in Table 2 are qualitatively similar to the figures in Table 1, with 
employees concentrated in each sector’s primary functions (manufacturing and reselling).  
However, note that establishments that offshore production—bidparticularly manufacturers—
represent twice their share of manufacturing employment (4 percent) than they do of 
establishments (2 percent).  Thus, establishments reporting offshoring activity are larger, on 
average, than nonoffshorers.60 
 
The decision to outsource or offshore production activities is better thought of as a firm-level 
rather than establishment-level choice.  For the exercises that follow, we will shift our unit of 
analysis to the firm-level.  In order to do this we need a protocol for aggregating the 
establishment-based questions from the Economic Census.  Our approach is to classify a firm as 
an offshorer if it operates at least one establishment that reports offshoring activity, and as an 
outsourcer if it has no offshoring establishments and at least one outsourcing establishment.  
Firms with no contracts make up the balance. 
 
One important firm characteristic that is likely related to the propensity to engage in outsourcing 
and offshoring activity is size.  Table 3 shows the number of firms grouped by size and primary 
sourcing activity.  While small firms (those with 50 or fewer employees) dominate each category 
of firm, a greater proportion of offshoring firms (8 percent) employ more than 500 employees 
compared to firms with no contracts (1 percent) or those using domestic suppliers (5 percent).  
That is, while most offshoring firms are small, the greatest share of offshoring activity can be 
found among large firms. 
                                                 
59 Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2009). 
60 The relative share of domestically outsourced employment in manufacturing (35.0 percent) reported here is 
comparable to that found using the 2005 Contingent Worker Supplement (CWS) collected by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (38.7 percent) (Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2009, Table 3). 
126 
 
 
Matching to the Trade Transactions Files 
 
A natural quality control check on the validity of the offshoring responses was to look at 
differences in observed importing activities among the three firm production types.  As shown in 
Table 4, the overwhelming majority (78 percent) of firms that reported offshoring activity on the 
2007 Economic Census form can be matched to at least one import transaction in 2007.  We 
cannot conclude that most of the remaining firms that responded that they are offshorers but 
were not matched to an import transaction answered the form incorrectly because 1) our 
matching methodology between firms and import transactions is still under development, and 2) 
not all firms that outsource their production will necessarily reimport the good.  Clearly many of 
these firms are multinational corporations that sell goods and services in many different 
countries, and it may be that the majority of their offshore production is aimed at foreign 
markets.  Finally, 3) many firms use third-party wholesale firms to handle their foreign trade 
activity.   
 
Interestingly, Table 4 also shows that while the shares of total import value are fairly similar 
across the production categories, if one considers the much smaller number of offshoring firms it 
is clear that offshorers import far more than other types of producers.  We also corroborated this 
hierarchy of import activity by firm production type by focusing on two specific industries: 
vehicle manufacturing and electronics, where we found even stronger results.61  Additional 
breakdowns by each census form type are presented in Tables 5 and 6, which also present the 
number of firms and their employment associated with the responding establishments.  We in 
turn identify the number of manufacturing and wholesaling establishments owned by these firms, 
which may or may not have responded to the census forms, as well as how many of these firms 
can be identified in the import transaction data and what share of total U.S. imports those 
transactions represent.  It is interesting to note the employment discrepancy among respondents 
to the wholesaling forms (Table 6), with both own producers and outsourcers having a larger 
share of their workers in wholesaling establishments (column 4) than in manufacturing, as one 
would expect; yet among offshorers this is not the case.  These statistics hint at the complex 
structure of larger multinational companies.  We’re hopeful that the integrated data infrastructure 
discussed here and still under development will help researchers to get a better handle on how 
firms and value chain evolve and the role outsourcing and offshoring play in this evolution. 
 
Comparing Manufacturing Types 
 
In a recent federal register notice the Organization of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) 
Economic Classification Policy Committee (ECPC) pointed out some of the difficulties involved 
in defining what a manufacturing establishment is in the presence of outsourcing and offshoring 
(OMB 2009).  They define three general types of manufacturing units: 1) traditional or integrated 
manufacturing, 2) manufacturing service providers, and 3) factoryless goods providers.  They 
define the major characteristics of each as follows: 
                                                 
61 Results are withheld due to potential disclosure of confidential information. 
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1) Traditional manufacturers    
 
• Perform transformation activities 
• Own the rights to the product they manufacture  
• Control and facilitate the production process 
• Sell the final good 
 
2) Manufacturing service providers  
 
• Performs transformation activities 
• Receives contracts to perform transformation activities 
• Does not own intellectual property or design of the final product 
• Does not own the final product 
• Controls the production facility but not the production process 
• Does not sell the final product 
 
3) Factoryless goods providers  
 
• Does not perform transformation activities 
• Contracts with manufacturing service providers 
• Owns the intellectual rights to the final product 
• Owns the final product 
• Sells the final product 
 
We make use of the new questions on the 2007 Economic Census to approximate these 
categories using the following definitions: 
 
1) Traditional manufacturers 
 
• Establishment does not contract out for manufacturing services from other 
companies or other establishments of its company 
• Establishment’s primary activity is manufacturing 
• Establishment designs, engineers, or formulates the manufactured products it sold, 
produced or shipped 
 
2) Manufacturing service providers 
 
• Establishment does not contract out for manufacturing services from other 
companies or other establishments of it’s company 
• Establishment’s primary activity is providing contract services for others 
• Establishment does not design, engineer, or formulate the manufactured products 
it produced or shipped 
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3) Factoryless goods provider 
 
• Establishment contracts out for manufacturing services from other companies or 
other establishments of its company (both in and outside of the United States 
• Establishment’s primary activity is resales 
• Establishment designs, engineers, or formulates the manufactured products it sold, 
produced or shipped 
 
Table 7 displays the shares of activity accounted for by each establishment type.  The 
denominator is the sample of total activity accounted for by the establishments that answered all 
three questions. While traditional manufacturers dominate the three categories of producer types, 
they represent less than a third of total manufacturing activity by establishment count and 
employment. 
 
Of course, it may be that traditional manufacturers are more (or less) common in certain 
industries.  We investigate this possibility by calculating the employment shares accounted for 
by these producers for a subset of NAICS industries.  Due to disclosure concerns, we limit the 
analysis to only those industries with a relatively large number of firms; results are displayed in 
Figure 1.62   
 
Clearly, there is wide variability in the shares of activity accounted for by traditional 
manufacturers across industry subgroups.  The range of activity starts at about 8 percent for 
printing and ranges to almost half for textile mills.  Interestingly, computer manufacturing, an 
industry one would normally associate with outsourcing, is only slightly above the average share 
of employment at traditional manufacturers.  This unexpected finding for computer 
manufacturing suggests that as outsourcing and offshoring become more common, firms may 
become less manufacturing intensive over time.  That is, firms that previously had a large share 
of manufacturing employment may begin to specialize more heavily in other activities and it may 
affect their manufacturing employment, overall employment or both. 
 
To explore this issue further, we identified firms that existed in both 1990 and 2007 and 
categorized them according to whether or not they outsourced, offshored, or did not contract out 
for manufacturing services.  Next we calculated the firms’ shares of manufacturing employment 
in both years as well as the changes in total employment for each group; these are shown in 
Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
Both figures show an ordering to the changes in employment.  The firms without contracts 
decline less or grow more than either outsourcers or offshorers.  In Figure 2 noncontracting 
firms’ manufacturing shares (weighted means) declined about 13 percent, similar to outsourcers 
(14 percent) but visibly less than offshorers (18 percent).  Similarly, in Figure 3 we see that own 
producers had much stronger growth than did either outsourcing or offshoring firms.  In fact, 
employment actually declined at offshoring firms. 
                                                 
62 We find similar results for establishment shares but omit them here for brevity. 
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Multivariate Analysis of Employment Trends 
 
The above findings do not control for any of the many other factors that are known to affect firm 
growth rates, such as age, size, and geography.   While a rigorous treatment of these factors is 
beyond the scope of this exploratory paper, we begin by running linear regressions of changes in 
manufacturing shares and total employment on a set of basic firm controls, as well as firm type.  
The results are reported in Table 8. 
 
In both specifications, the omitted firm type is non-contractors so the results should be 
interpreted accordingly.  Interestingly, the regression results do not completely support our 
preliminary observations from the earlier figures.  Controlling for other major factors, both 
outsourcers and offshorers are associated with a more negative change in their shares of 
manufacturing employment (column 1, rows 5 and 6) relative to own producers.  On the other 
hand, with growth in total manufacturing employment as the dependent variable (column 2), it 
appears that outsourcers may have had more employment growth than own producers, and 
substantially more than offshorers. These discrepant findings suggest that substantial care must 
be taken in any interpretation and that much more work is necessary before we are fully 
confident in the results.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper takes advantage of a unique new dataset linking offshoring data from the 2007 
Economic Census with import and export transactions files to examine the prevalence of 
outsourcing and offshoring and how these activities are correlated with firm productivity.  We 
performed a number of preliminary quality control and exploratory exercises and obtained the 
following six results: 
 
1) The majority of establishments do not report either outsourcing or offshoring activity. 
 
2) Most establishments’ activity is consistent with their industry definitions.  That is, most 
wholesalers report resales as their primary activity and most manufacturers report either 
manufacturing or contracting as their primary activity.  Differences from these norms are 
in-line with historical industry changes that normally occur during economic censuses. 
 
3) The majority of offshoring firms are small but large firms are more likely to engage in 
offshoring. 
 
4) We are able to match 78 percent of the firms that reported engaging in offshoring activity 
to at least one import transaction.  This is encouraging given that there is some noise in 
our linking variable and that a firm that offshores does not necessarily need to reimport 
the good. 
 
5) Less than a third of manufacturing activity occurs at traditional manufacturing plants that 
design and produce their own goods and whose primary activity is manufacturing for 
themselves. 
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a. A further 11 percent occurs at manufacturing service providers. 
b. Less than 1 percent is accounted for by factoryless goods providers 
c. There are substantial differences in these shares across industries. 
 
6) As a group, noncontractors grew more and stayed more manufacturing intensive than 
both outsourcers and offshorers, but when we controlled for key firm characteristics we 
found that outsourcing firms grew more than noncontractors. 
 
Additional areas for study that can usefully exploit these data include examining the role of 
outsourcing and offshoring in firm and productivity dynamics.  Combing the data infrastructure 
described in this paper with Bureau of Economic Analysis data on trade in services and foreign 
direct investment would greatly enhance the analytic capability of both permitting the analysis 
of, for example, changes in the distribution of manufacturing and wholesaling activities across 
establishments within domestic-only and multinational firms, and investment patterns by sector 
and firm type.63 Discussions about bringing these rich data sources together are ongoing. 
 
Table 1: Special Inquiry Response Breakdown, by Form Type: Establishment 
 
 Manufacturing Wholesaling 
Total establishment counta 106,550 153,147 
Own design   
   Yes 63,017 22,554 
   No 41,266 127,942 
Primary function   
   Production 57,371 10,061 
   Contracting 28,725 4,169 
   Reselling 5,326 104,900 
   Other 10,725 20,627 
Primary sourcing   
   No contracts 74,030 126,100 
   Domestic outsourcing 28,173 16,762 
   Foreign offshoring 2,269 5,397 
*Includes all establishments that answered any part to special inquiry. 
 
                                                 
63 Data on foreign direct investment are collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis; see Mataloni (1995), 
Quijano (1990), and.Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004, 2006). 
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Table 3: Special Inquiry Response Breakdown, by Form Type: Employment 
 
 Manufacturing Wholesaling 
Total employee count 9,215,356 2,805,397 
Own design   
   Yes 6,129,012 547,211 
   No 2,937,883 2,209,371 
Primary function   
   Production 6,211,181 291,188 
   Contracting 1,790,786 63,166 
   Reselling 198,641 1,847,761 
   Other 603,521 422,633 
Primary sourcing   
   No contracts 5,486,210 2,195,630 
   Domestic outsourcing 3,161,254 380,445 
   Foreign offshoring 361,009 143,767 
 
 
Table 4: Number of Firms by Employment Size 
 
 ?50 51-500 >500 
No contracts 122,139 21,401 2,007 
Domestic outsourcing 23,899 7,699 1,551 
Foreign offshoring 4,402 1,122 506 
 
 
Table 2: Importing, Offshoring, and Outsourcing 
 
 2007 EC 
respondent firms 
2007 import data 
matches 
% Total value of 
imports (2007) 
No contracts 154,961 40,827 19% 
Domestic outsourcing 33,313 10,250 16% 
Foreign offshoring 6,055 4,750 14% 
132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Special Inquiry Part 3 Breakdown: Primary Sourcing in Manufacturing Responses
 
 Estab. Firms     
   Affiliated 
mfg. estab. 
Affiliated 
wholesale 
estab. 
Matched 
to import 
data 
Import 
value* 
($ bil) 
 
Total 
      
   Count 104,472 75,677 113,084 39,442 20,738 $855.7 
   Employees 9,008,473 19,575,864 10,472,662 1,371,578 16,070,271  
 
No contracts 
      
   Count 74,030 52,629 65,520 13,306 11,932 $205.9 
   Employees 5,486,210 7,602,322 3,872,270 479,717 5,135,543  
 
Outsourcing 
      
   Count 28,173 20,991 37,021 14,806 7,088 $356.3 
   Employees 3,161,254 7,579,528 4,276,430 499,135 6,588,885  
 
Offshoring 
      
   Count 2,269 2,057 10,543 11,330 1,718 $293.5 
   employees 361,009 4,394,014 2,323,962 392,726 4,345,843  
 
*Note: total U.S. import value in 2007 = $2,344.6 billion 
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Table 6: Special Inquiry Part 3 Breakdown: Primary Sourcing in Wholesaling Responses 
 
 Estab. Firms     
   Affiliated 
mfg. estab. 
Affiliated 
wholesale 
estab. 
Matched to 
import data 
Import 
valuea 
($ bil) 
 
Total 
      
   Count 148,259 122,227 24,966 194,312 37,586 $987.3 
   Employees 2,719,842 16,431,116 4,746,349 3,839,155 14,316,785  
 
No contracts 
      
   Count 126,100 104,087 6,631 148,036 29,910 $387.9 
   Employees 2,195,630 7,527,531 779,450 1,604,389 5,775,482  
 
Outsourcing 
      
   Count 16,762 13,700 10,634 29,948 4,223 $298.5 
   Employees 380,445 4,728,984 2,015,647 749,150 4,413,939  
 
Offshoring 
      
   Count 5,397 4,440 7,701 16,328 3,453 $300.9 
   Employees 143,767 4,174,601 1,951,252 485,616 4,127,364  
 
*Note: Total U.S. import value in 2007 = $2,344.6 billion 
 
 
 
Table 7: Activity Shares of Manufacturing Types 
 
  Establishment share (%) Employment share (%) 
Traditional manufacturers 28.1 30.3 
Manufacturing service providers 11.0 6.0 
Factoryless manufacturers 0.9 0.5 
All other manufacturing types 60.0 63.2 
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results 
 
DV: 
(1) 
? share of mfg. employment
(2) 
% ? in total mfg. 
employment 
 
Firm age -0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.044*** 
(0.001) 
# States -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
1990 Firm employees (1,000) -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
1990 Estab. count (1,000) 0.065*** 
(0.022) 
0.072* 
(0.042) 
Outsourcer -0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
Offshorer -0.049*** 
(0.011) 
-0.075*** 
(0.022) 
Intercept 0.287*** 
(0.004) 
0.684*** 
(0.008) 
 
Observations 34,667 34,667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.055 0.110 
 
Significance levels: *10 percent   **5 percent   ***1 percent 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Changes in Manufacturing Shares
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Figure 3 
% Change in Total Employment
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There is significant interest in determining the effects of offshoring on U.S. economic 
performance. Offshoring, or offshore outsourcing, is the substitution of imported intermediate 
inputs for domestic labor or domestically produced intermediate inputs. To assess the effects of 
imported intermediate inputs on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) productivity statistics, it is 
essential to understand how imports enter into the measurement framework. The BLS Major 
Sector Productivity program develops measures of labor productivity for broad sectors of the 
economy: business, nonfarm business, manufacturing, and nonfinancial corporations. In addition, 
this program develops annual indexes of multifactor productivity (MFP) for the private business 
sector, the manufacturing sector, and for most manufacturing groups. This paper focuses on the 
BLS productivity measures for the private business sector, as well as the manufacturing sector. 
Productivity measures for these two sectors are constructed using different methodologies; the 
private business sector productivity measures use a value-added output concept, while the 
manufacturing sector measures use a sectoral output approach. This difference in methodology 
influences the effects of imported intermediates on the measures of productivity.   
 
In this paper, we develop a framework for estimating the effects of imported intermediate inputs 
on U.S. major sector labor productivity. The production model used to calculate the BLS private 
business sector MFP measures is expanded to treat imported intermediate inputs as an input, 
rather than as a subtraction from output. The BLS framework for constructing manufacturing 
MFP is decomposed in order to isolate imported intermediate inputs. For both sectors, we use the 
Solow MFP equation to estimate the effects on labor productivity of substitution between 
imported intermediate inputs and U.S. hours worked (Solow 1957). The data reveal that the 
growth in imported intermediate inputs contributed 14 percent to the average annual growth of 
labor productivity for the private business sector from 1997 to 2006, and contributed 23 percent 
to the average annual growth in labor productivity in the manufacturing sector.64   
 
The study also addresses the difficulties surrounding the deflation of the imported intermediate 
inputs, since the coverage of import price indexes is sparse. We show that any mismeasurement 
of import prices will impact measured productivity growth. However, the size of the effect will 
depend upon the share of imports relative to aggregate output, which range from 8–12 percent 
for the private business sector and 12–18 percent for the manufacturing sector.  
 
 
DATA SOURCES 
 
Output 
 
Real output measures used by the BLS to construct major sector productivity statistics are 
produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce.  
The most widely known measure of aggregate output for the U.S. economy is gross domestic 
product (GDP). GDP is the sum of 1) personal consumption expenditures, 2) gross private 
domestic investment, 3) government consumption expenditures and gross investment, 4) exports 
of goods and services, less 5) imports of goods and services. The BEA constructs nominal output 
                                                 
64 We implement the analysis using BEA annual input-output tables, as well as data on imported intermediate inputs 
provided by the BEA. See Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008).  
 144
for detailed components of GDP from various data sources, converts them to real measures, and 
then aggregates them to calculate GDP.  
 
As a fundamental part of the national accounts, the BEA also distinguishes three primary sectors 
of GDP: business, household, and government (Young and Tice 1985). The business sector 
accounts for the bulk of national output. The BEA calculates the measure of business sector 
output by removing from GDP the gross product of general government, private households, and 
nonprofit institutions.65  
 
Ideally, BLS productivity statistics would measure productivity for the U.S. economy at the most 
aggregate level of domestic output, GDP. However, the BLS must exclude several activities from 
aggregate output in order to remove potential sources of bias specific to productivity 
measurement. The real gross products of general government, of private households, and of 
nonprofit institutions are estimated primarily using data on labor compensation. The trends in 
such output measures will, by definition, move with measures of input data and will tend to 
imply little or no labor productivity growth. Although these measures are the best available 
estimates of nonmarket components of GDP, including them in measures of aggregate 
productivity for the economy would bias labor productivity trends toward zero.  
 
The BLS private business sector also excludes the gross product of owner-occupied housing and 
the rental value of buildings and equipment owned and used by nonprofit institutions serving 
individuals.66 These components are excluded because no adequate corresponding labor input 
measures have been developed. To measure MFP, the BLS must further restrict output to the 
U.S. private business sector, excluding the output of government enterprises. Estimates of the 
appropriate weights for labor and capital in government enterprises are not made because 
subsidies account for a substantial portion of capital income; therefore, there is no adequate 
measure of government enterprise capital income in GDP. In 2006, the BLS measure of the U.S. 
private business sector output accounted for approximately 76 percent of the value of GDP.67  
 
In the manufacturing sector, BLS measures output for productivity statistics differently. Output 
in the manufacturing sector is the deflated value of production shipped to purchasers outside of 
the domestic industry, not just production for final users as is used for the major sector MFP 
indexes. This is a sectoral output concept, defining output as gross output excluding intrasectoral 
transactions (sales or transfers between establishments within the sector)—sales to final demand 
plus the intermediate goods sent to other industries. The manufacturing MFP indexes are based 
on sectoral output in an effort to avoid the problem of double-counting that occurs when one 
establishment provides materials used by other establishments in the same industry. 
                                                 
65 The gross product of general government is the sum of government expenditures on compensation of general 
government employees and the general government consumption of fixed capital, which measures the services of 
general government fixed assets. Government expenditures on goods and services purchased from the private sector 
are not excluded from private business sector output. The gross product of private households is the compensation of 
paid employees of private households; the gross product of nonprofit institutions serving individuals is the 
compensation paid to employees of these institutions. 
66 This value is measured as the sum of consumption of fixed capital, indirect business taxes, and interest paid. 
67 Data in this paper originate in the MFP program and coverage differs from BLS quarterly labor productivity 
measures for business sector. MFP measures are available only on an annual basis and exclude government 
enterprises from sectoral coverage.  
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Labor Input 
 
Labor input for the U.S. private business sector is measured as total hours actually worked by all 
persons multiplied by a labor composition index. The hours actually worked measure is based on 
the sources and methods used to measure quarterly business sector labor productivity. The BLS 
labor composition index estimates the effects that shifts in age, education, and gender have on labor 
input growth and MFP growth. 
 
Labor input is based on a jobs concept. The Current Employment Statistics program (CES) is the 
primary source of data used to construct hours for the BLS productivity measures.68  The CES 
average weekly hours paid data are adjusted to an hours-at-work concept using a ratio of hours-
worked to hours-paid.69 Current Population Survey (CPS) data on average weekly hours of 
nonproduction and supervisory workers are incorporated into the methodology to expand 
coverage to all employees.70 To expand sectoral coverage, hours actually worked for employees 
of farms, proprietors, and unpaid family workers reported in the CPS are incorporated into the 
labor input measure; remaining data are obtained from various sources.71   
 
Construction of the MFP labor composition measure begins with estimates of the number of 
hours worked by each type of worker based on CPS data. The assembles data on workers’ hours 
classified by their educational attainment, age, and gender using actual wage averages for 
weights.  The sum over all groups of the hour’s growth rates multiplied by the labor cost shares 
gives the growth in adjusted labor input. Subtracting this from the growth in total (unweighted) 
hours yields the growth in labor composition.72 
 
Labor input for the U.S. manufacturing sector is constructed using the same methods, except that 
no adjustment is made for labor composition (age, education, and gender of the work force). The 
labor composition adjustment is currently not included in manufacturing hours data due to 
limitations in the data available from the CPS at the industry detail.73 
 
 
                                                 
68 The CES, an establishment survey, sample is benchmarked annually to levels based on administrative records of 
employees covered by state unemployment insurance tax records.  Hours data from establishments provide 
consistency with output data in the reporting and coding on industries and thus are well suited for producing 
industry-level measures. CES data on employment and average weekly hours paid for production workers in goods-
producing industries and nonsupervisory workers in service-producing industries are the building blocks of labor 
input. 
69 The hours worked to hours paid ratio is constructed using information from the National Compensation Survey 
program; prior to 2000, the annual Hours at Work Survey was used. 
70 In August 2004, BLS introduced this new method of constructing estimates of hours for nonproduction and 
supervisory workers; see Eldridge, Manser, and Otto. (2004).  
71 Employment counts for employees in agricultural services, forestry, and fishing are reported from the BLS’s 202 
program, based on administrative records from the unemployment insurance system.  
72 Additional information concerning data sources and methods of measuring labor composition can be found at 
www.bls.gov/mfp/mprlabor.pdf and in BLS Bulletin 2426 Labor Composition and U.S. Productivity Growth, 1948-
90 (December 1993). 
73 The BLS is currently investigating the possibility of constructing labor composition estimates for the 
manufacturing sector productivity measures. 
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Capital Inputs 
 
Capital inputs for private business and manufacturing MFP measures are similar. The BLS 
capital input measures include assets that are owned and operated by a business within the 
sector; rented capital services are included in intermediate inputs. Capital input measures the 
services derived from the stock of physical assets and software. The assets included are fixed 
business equipment, structures, inventories, and land. Financial assets are excluded from capital input 
measures, as are owner-occupied residential structures. The aggregate capital input measures are 
obtained by Tornqvist aggregation of the capital stocks for each asset type within each of 60 NAICS 
industry groupings using estimated rental prices for each asset type. Rental prices reflect the 
nominal rates of return and rates of economic depreciation and revaluation for the specific asset 
types. Rental prices are adjusted for the effects of taxes; rental prices of capital are computed for 
18 3-digit NAICS industries within manufacturing. Data on investments in physical assets are 
obtained from the BEA (see BLS [2009]). 
 
Energy, Materials and Purchased Business Services 
 
In the manufacturing sector, inputs include intermediate inputs, as well as capital and labor 
inputs. Intermediate inputs (energy, materials, and purchased business services) are obtained 
from BEA’s annual input-output tables. Tornqvist indexes of each of these three input classes are 
derived at the 3-digit NAICS level and then aggregated to total manufacturing. For 
manufacturing, materials inputs are adjusted to exclude transactions between manufacturing 
establishments to maintain consistency with the sectoral output concept. 74 
 
Nominal values of materials, fuels, and electricity and quantities of electricity consumed are 
obtained from economic censuses and annual surveys of the Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Purchased business services are estimated using benchmark input-
output tables and other annual industry data from the BEA. Prices of many service inputs are 
based on the BLS price programs and are obtained from the national income and product 
accounts. 
 
Imported Intermediate Inputs 
 
The BEA produces import matrices as supplementary tables to the annual input-output (I-O) 
accounts. For each commodity, the import-matrix table shows the value of imports of that same 
commodity used by each industry. Because such information is not available from most 
businesses, the estimates must be imputed from data available in the annual I-O accounts. The 
imputed-import values are based on the assumption that each industry uses imports of a 
commodity in the same proportion as imports-to-domestic supply of the same commodity. 
(Domestic supply represents the total amount of a commodity available for consumption within 
the United States; it equals domestic output plus imports less exports.) The implication of using 
this assumption to calculate the estimates is that all variability of import usage across industries 
                                                 
74 A nonprofit adjustment is made to intermediate inputs, but not to imported intermediates because it is doubtful 
that nonprofits are using a significant amount of imported intermediates. By not making a nonprofit adjustment to 
imported intermediates, we may overstate the importance of imports slightly. 
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reflects the assumption and is not based on industry-specific information (Strassner, Yuskavage, 
and Lee 2009).75  
 
The BEA provided these detailed statistics to the BLS for this research study. These data are not 
included in the published tables because their quality is significantly less than that of the higher 
level aggregates in which they are included. Compared to these aggregates, the more detailed 
statistics are more likely to be either based on judgmental trends, on trends in the higher level 
aggregate, or on less reliable source data.76  
 
Using this dataset we can observe trends in the shares of imported intermediate inputs. The share 
of intermediate inputs, used by all private industries, that is accounted for by imports grew from 
7.6 percent in 1998 to almost 10 percent in 2006. Notice in Figure 1 that there was a decline in 
the share of imports used by private industries around the 2001 recession; however, beginning in 
2002, they increased steadily. Purchased materials account for the majority of imported 
intermediates, and grew steadily, again with a slight dip around the 2001 recession. Imported 
material inputs accounted for 15 percent of total materials used by private industries in 1998 and 
grew to 21 percent by 2006.77  
 
Although it was once thought that services were not off-shorable, we see evidence that service 
inputs are also being imported. Imported service inputs accounted for 1.4 percent of total 
intermediates used by private industries in 1998 and 1.7 percent in 2006. However, imported 
services inputs account for roughly 3 percent of all service inputs used by private industries, and 
this stayed relatively steady from 1998 to 2006. Interestingly, we observe growth in the share of 
energy inputs that are imported; 4 percent of all energy inputs used by private industries were 
imported in 1998, and we see 12 percent imported by 2006.78 However, imported energy inputs 
are less than 0.4 percent of total intermediates used by the private industries. 
 
 
                                                 
75 This study uses BEA international transaction account data to assess the import comparability assumption. They 
find that real imported materials may be understated in the annual I-O accounts. However, they indicate that the 
comparability assumption provides reasonable results at the aggregate level. Feenstra and Jensen(2009) prepare 
alternative imported intermediates using an alternative method for allocating imported input across industries and 
compare the results with the BEA import matrix that uses the comparability assumption. They find that there are 
differences between the two approaches, and identify cells in the I-O table where the differences are greatest. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent them from resolving the differences 
76 Notes about the imported intermediate input data are from BEA documentation that accompanied the data. 
77 Imported materials inputs include crude petroleum as a raw material for the refining and coal products industry. 
The increase in crude petroleum prices over this time period could be responsible for the increase in imported 
materials share of intermediate inputs used by private industries, and more significantly the increase in imported 
materials share of intermediate inputs in the manufacturing sector.  
78 Crude oil is classified as a nonenergy material input to U.S. refineries, rather than an energy input. 
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Figure 1. Imported Intermediate Inputs Share of Total Intermediates, 
by type of input, private industries, 1998-2006 
 
 
 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Looking at the imported intermediate data by industry, we see that the manufacturing sector 
consumes over 60 percent of all imported intermediate used by private industries. For the 
manufacturing sector, we observe that the share of intermediate inputs that is accounted for by 
imports is significantly larger than it is for all private industries and grew at a faster rate. Figure 
2 shows imported intermediates share of “sectoral” intermediate inputs (total intermediates less 
domestically manufactured inputs), as well as the imports’ share of total intermediates.  The 
“sectoral” intermediate inputs for the BLS manufacturing sector are less than the total 
intermediates in the BEA annual I-O accounts because intermediates that are purchased from 
other firms within the U.S. manufacturing sector have been removed. Therefore, the imports’ 
share of “sectoral” intermediates is greater than the imports’ share of total intermediate inputs. 
The “sectoral” intermediate inputs for the manufacturing sector are 57 percent of the BEA total 
intermediates. 
 
We observe that 24 percent of “sectoral” intermediates were imported in 1997; this grew to 
almost 35 percent in 2006. Notice in Figure 2 that beginning in 2002, there has been a steady 
increase in the share of imported intermediates used by U.S. manufacturing firms relative to 
“sectoral” and total intermediates.79  As we observed for the private business sector, imported 
materials account for the majority of imported intermediate inputs.  However, service inputs 
were also imported by the manufacturing sector. Imported services’ share of “sectoral” 
intermediates in the manufacturing sector grew from 1.3 percent in 1997 to 2.1 percent in 2006, 
while imported energy’s share grew from 0.1 percent in 1997 to 0.3 percent in 2006. 
                                                 
79 In 2006, total materials imported by the petroleum industry accounted for 34 percent of material imports by the 
manufacturing sector. Over the 1997–2006 period, the price of imported intermediates for the petroleum industry 
grew 14 percent as compared to average growth of prices in the manufacturing sector as a whole of 4 percent.  
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Figure 2. Imports Share of Sectoral Intermediate Inputs, 
by type of input, U.S. Manufacturing, 1997–2006 
(imports’ share of total intermediates also shown) 
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BLS MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Solow Model of Productivity 
 
It is generally acknowledged that technical progress can best be captured using a total factor 
productivity concept. The most common model of total factor productivity is credited to Solow 
(1957). The Solow residual model evaluates technical progress as the difference between the 
time derivative of production and the weighted aggregate of the time derivatives for all factors of 
production. This measure of disembodied technological change evaluates the ability to expand 
the production possibilities frontier without the addition of resources. Given a production 
function )t,X(fY = , the growth rate of total factor productivity, A, can be written as 
 
(1) ? ???
?
???
?
−=
•••
i i
i
i
X
X
Y
Y
A
A ω   
 
where ? represents a time derivative , Y denotes real aggregate output, Xi denotes the ith factor 
of production, and βi represents the corresponding output elasticity. This productivity growth 
model requires well-defined concepts of output and inputs that correspond to a specified 
production process. To construct measures of productivity, we must make a discrete 
approximation for the time derivatives (Diewert 1976), and we must assume cost-minimizing 
behavior in order to measure the βi with cost shares. 
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BLS Multifactor Productivity for the Private Business Sector 
 
The BLS labor productivity measures for the private business sector compare output, measured 
as the real gross domestic product of U.S. businesses, to hours worked by all U.S. workers who 
contribute to the production of this output. Real GDP is measured by adding all exports and 
subtracting all imports from domestic final demand. Thus, imported intermediate inputs are 
excluded from the scope of the output measures, and as a result, the contribution of the labor 
hours worked overseas that produce the imported intermediate inputs are also absent from the 
analysis of U.S. productivity.  The output measure used to construct the productivity measure for 
the private business sector removes the output of intermediate inputs produced and used within a 
sector, as well as all imported intermediate inputs and other domestic intermediate inputs 
produced outside the sector. Thus, BLS MFP, ABLS, contains only two factor inputs, labor (L) 
and capital services (K), and can be written as 
(2) 
K
Kw
L
Lw
Y
Y
A
A
KL
BLS
BLS
BLS
BLS ΔΔΔΔ
−−=  
Or 
 
(3)
 
KdwLdwYdAd KLBLSBLS lnlnlnln −−=  
 
where the YBLS is the BLS real private business sector output, dlnABLS denotes the difference in 
logarithms of ABLS for successive years (lnA(BLS,t) – lnA(BLS,t-1) ) , and the weights for labor and 
capital, wi, are the averages of each factor’s nominal cost (Ci) relative to nominal output, YNBLS, 
in two successive years: 
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Because of this design it is impossible to observe the impact of offshoring intermediate inputs on 
production. To incorporate intermediate inputs into the model, we need to use a sectoral output 
concept.  
 
Private Business Sector Multifactor Productivity Adjusted to Include Imports 
 
Sectoral output removes from the value of output only those intermediate inputs that are 
produced elsewhere within the sector to eliminate double counting. Intermediate inputs, which 
are produced outside of the sector, (i.e., imported intermediates) remain in output (Domar 1961). 
To bring imported intermediate inputs inside the major sector model framework, we must not 
exclude them as a component of output, and they must be included as a factor input to 
production. Denoting the imported intermediate inputs as II, the production function becomes  
YS = f ( L, K, II, t). Using this output concept, we can write MFP as:  
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where the factor weights for imported intermediate inputs of energy (IE), materials (IM), and 
services (IS) are defined as 
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and an output adjustment ratio, ?, used to correct the weights on labor and capital, is written as a 
two-period average 
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Algebraically working through the model, we derive an adjusted MFP measure that encompasses 
imported intermediate inputs in both the output and input indexes. Assuming that growth in 
sectoral output is a weighted average of growth in the BLS output measure and intermediate 
imports, the resulting MFP growth rate is a scalar of the existing BLS MFP growth: 
 
(8) BLSS AlndAlnd θ=  
 
Table 1. Growth of Components of Private Business Sector Multifactor Productivity, 
Alternative Output Concepts, 1997–2006 
 
 
Original 
Output 
Sectoral 
Output Labor Capital 
Imported 
Intermediates
Imported 
Energy 
Imported 
Materials 
Imported 
Services 
annual growth from previous year 
1998 4.9% 5.3% 2.3% 6.3% 10.7% 3.8% 10.9% 10.3% 
1999 5.2% 5.4% 2.7% 6.5% 8.5% 9.2% 8.3% 9.3% 
2000 3.9% 4.4% 1.0% 6.3% 9.6% 11.2% 9.5% 9.7% 
2001 0.5% 0.1% -1.4% 4.6% -3.8% -1.9% -5.4% 3.8% 
2002 1.5% 1.4% -1.4% 2.9% -0.1% -6.5% -1.3% 5.5% 
2003 3.1% 3.1% -0.3% 2.3% 3.1% 3.4% 4.4% -2.4% 
2004 4.3% 4.9% 1.5% 2.3% 11.8% 27.3% 10.3% 16.4% 
2005 3.7% 3.9% 1.8% 2.5% 5.7% 13.9% 5.6% 4.7% 
2006 3.2% 3.4% 2.6% 2.7% 4.9% 2.8% 4.7% 6.8% 
average annual growth 
1997-
2006 3.4% 3.5% 1.0% 4.0% 5.5% 6.6% 5.1% 7.0% 
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Table 1 presents growth rates for the components of the MFP model for the private business 
sector.80 Notice that the imported intermediates grow faster than labor and capital in most years, 
except around the 2001 recession. The growth of imported intermediate inputs has an impact on 
the growth of sectoral output trends as well, which grew somewhat faster than the published 
value-added output measure for all years except 2001 and 2002.  The year-to-year growth rates 
of the imported intermediates fluctuate quite a bit. Over the 1997–2006 period, energy and 
service imports grew faster than imported materials. However due to their small size, imported 
materials growth is driving the growth in total imported intermediate inputs.  
 
Using BEA estimates of imported intermediate inputs, we derived the adjustment scalar for the 
private business sector MFP measures. Table 2 shows the results of adjusting the published BLS 
MFP data. Notice that by incorporating the imported intermediate inputs into the MFP 
framework, the annual growth in private business sector MFP is reduced by 0.1–0.2 percentage 
points. 
 
Table 2.  Multifactor Productivity Growth for the Private Business Sector, 
by alternative treatment of imports, 1997–2006 
 
  
Excluding Imported 
Intermediate Inputs: 
BLS published data 
Including Imported 
Intermediate Inputs  Difference 
annual growth from previous year 
1998 1.30% 1.20% -0.10% 
1999 1.29% 1.19% -0.10% 
2000 1.28% 1.18% -0.10% 
2001 0.11% 0.10% -0.01% 
2002 1.65% 1.53% -0.13% 
2003 2.63% 2.43% -0.20% 
2004 2.49% 2.28% -0.20% 
2005 1.63% 1.48% -0.15% 
2006 0.54% 0.49% -0.05% 
annual average growth 
1997-2006 1.43% 1.32% -0.12% 
 
Substitution of Imported Intermediates for U.S. Labor in the Private Business Sector 
 
Using the Solow MFP equation, we estimated the effects of substitution between imported 
intermediate inputs and U.S. hours worked on labor productivity. The growth in imported 
intermediate inputs, combined with growth in capital inputs and technical change, directly 
                                                 
80 The time series does not cover the business cycles sufficiently to divide that data into subperiods that would allow 
a meaningful analysis of the data. We constructed subperiods of 1997–2000 and 2001–2006, as well as 1997–2002 
and 2003–2006. The comparison of results between period 1 and period 2 was very sensitive to the year that the data 
was divided. Therefore, we will not present subperiod analysis in this paper. 
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influence labor productivity. Thus, labor productivity can be written as the sum the intensity of 
each of the other input factors (increases in the factor’s quantities relative to domestically 
employed labor): 
 
(9) ??
???
?
−++=− ????????? − LdIIdwLdKdwAdLdYd jjjKSS lnlnlnlnlnlnln θ   
 
Figure 3 shows the contributions to private business sector labor productivity of the remaining 
nonlabor factor inputs. From 1997 through 2002, growth in capital services contributed to the 
majority of labor productivity growth. Beginning in 2003, capital’s contribution to labor 
productivity declined and was outpaced by MFP growth. Also, beginning in 2004 the 
contribution of imported intermediate inputs contributed more to labor productivity growth than 
capital growth. Again, we note that the influence of imported material inputs dominated the 
contribution of all imported intermediate inputs. 
 
Figure 3. Labor Productivity Growth by Contributing Input Factors, 
Private Business Sector, 1997–2006 
(annual growth rates from the previous year) 
 
 
 Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics (using BEA unpublished import data) 
 
Using the sectoral output approach, we observe (see Table 3) that for the 1997–2006 period, 
approximately 14 percent of labor productivity growth was attributed to growth in imported 
intermediate inputs (11 percent to materials, 3 percent to services, and less than 0.5 percent to 
energy).81  
 
                                                 
81 Note that because output has been expanded to include imports, the labor productivity growth is 2.6 percent per 
year, rather than 2.4 percent per year. 
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Table 3. Labor Productivity Growth and the Contribution of Non-labor Inputs and 
Multifactor Productivity, U.S. Private Business Sector 1997–2006 
 (average annual growth rates) 
 
Output per unit of labor (includes imports) 2.56% 
Multifactor Productivity (includes imports) 1.31% 
Contribution of capital intensity  0.88% 
Contribution of imported intermediates 0.37% 
Contribution of imported materials 0.27% 
Contribution of imported services 0.08% 
Contribution of imported energy 0.01% 
 
 
BLS MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY FOR THE U.S. MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 
As mentioned earlier, BLS productivity measures for the manufacturing sector are constructed 
using a sectoral output concept. Therefore, imported intermediates are within the productivity 
model framework. For the MFP measures, imported intermediate inputs are a component of 
measured output and intermediate inputs. To identify the impact of imported intermediates on 
manufacturing productivity, we do not need to adjust the measures to include imports, but rather 
separate the intermediates into domestic and imported components. This demarcation is achieved 
using the BEA estimates of imported intermediates, which were provided to the BLS at the 
industry level of detail.  
 
Table 4 presents the year-to-year growth rates and the average annual growth for the components 
of the manufacturing MFP model over the 1997–2006 period. Notice that in most years, labor 
inputs declined and imported intermediates grew faster than capital and domestic 
nonmanufactured intermediate inputs. Prior to the 2001 recession, there was strong growth in 
capital services, imported intermediates, and domestic nonmanufactured intermediates. However, 
note that domestic nonmanufactured intermediates were impacted by the recession sooner than 
the imported intermediates. Also notice that the imported intermediates were able to rebound 
after the recession, while domestic nonmanufactured inputs showed negative growth through 
2004. Over the entire 1997–2006 period, labor and domestic nonmanufactured intermediates 
inputs declined, while capital services and imported intermediates grew.82  
                                                 
82 Kurz and Lengermann (2008) construct a gross output productivity measure in order to keep U.S. manufactured 
intermediates in the model. This model allows an analysis of the shift from domestic to imported intermediate 
inputs.  
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Table 4. U.S. Manufacturing Sector Multifactor Productivity and Components, 1997–2006 
 
 
Sectoral 
Output Labor Capital 
Domestic 
Intermediates 
Imported 
Intermediates MFP 
Annual growth from previous year 
1998 5.2% -0.2% 5.0% 2.3% 9.6% 2.30% 
1999 3.8% -0.7% 4.1% 4.2% 7.1% 0.80% 
2000 2.7% -1.3% 3.1% -4.1% 5.5% 3.50% 
2001 -5.1% -6.5% 1.5% -3.0% -4.9% -1.30% 
2002 -0.7% -7.1% 0.6% -4.4% -2.1% 3.70% 
2003 1.0% -4.9% 0.0% -1.3% 2.6% 2.80% 
2004 1.7% -0.5% -0.6% -5.2% 8.7% 2.60% 
2005 3.7% -1.1% 0.0% 7.7% 4.9% 0.40% 
2006 1.8% 0.6% 0.5% -2.0% 4.3% 1.60% 
Annual average growth  
1997-
2006 1.53% -2.44% 1.57% -0.74% 3.88% 1.79% 
 
 * Combined intermediates constructed as a weighted aggregate of energy, materials, and purchased services. 
 
Table 5 compares the growth of domestic nonmanufactured intermediate inputs and imported 
intermediates by type of input. In general, we note that imported intermediates showed stronger 
growth than domestically nonmanufactured inputs. It is interesting to note that domestic material 
inputs (excluding materials purchased from other manufacturing industries) were declining in 
most years, while imported materials grew.  
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Table 5. Comparison of Imported and Domestic Intermediate Inputs by Type of Input, U.S. 
Manufacturing Sector, 1997–2006 
 Total Intermediates ENERGY MATERIALS SERVICES 
 Domestic Imported Domestic Imported Domestic Imported Domestic Imported 
Annual growth from previous year 
1998 2.25% 9.59% -2.49% -7.80% 1.94% 9.73% 3.02% 8.48%
1999 4.21% 7.12% 0.09% 0.39% 3.79% 6.57% 4.93% 15.76%
2000 -4.10% 5.52% -5.04% -11.12% -10.12% 5.85% -0.06% 1.54%
2001 -3.02% -4.86% -9.47% -6.99% -6.13% -7.29% -0.48% 28.48%
2002 -4.44% -2.11% -1.51% -1.17% -8.39% -2.14% -2.53% -1.82%
2003 -1.25% 2.64% -6.08% 12.96% -4.87% 3.17% 1.14% -4.19%
2004 -5.23% 8.71% -2.15% 35.05% -9.97% 8.12% -2.89% 13.88%
2005 7.74% 4.93% 8.05% 25.06% 7.44% 4.63% 7.87% 6.38%
2006 -2.02% 4.25% -6.81% 10.69% -7.40% 3.91% 1.67% 8.20%
Average annual growth 
1997-
2006 -0.74% 3.88% -2.94% 5.34% -3.93% 3.49% 1.36% 8.13%
*Combined intermediates constructed as a weighted aggregate of energy, materials, and purchased services 
 
Figure 4 presents the trends in constant-dollar factor input costs for the U.S. manufacturing 
sector. Notice that labor represents the highest cost and was constant prior to the 2001 recession, 
when it declined with falling employment in manufacturing. Energy and imported services 
represent a very small portion of the overall factor costs in manufacturing and were relatively 
constant over the 1997–2006 period. Interestingly, the cost of imported materials increased over 
the period, while the cost of domestic nonmanufactured materials declined. The factor costs of 
capital services and purchased domestic services increased somewhat. We next estimate the 
effects of imported intermediate inputs on labor productivity by using the Solow MFP model. 
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Figure 4: Input Costs for the Manufacturing Sector, by type 1998–2006 
Constant dollar, billions 
 
 
 Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics (using BEA unpublished import data) 
 
 
Substitution of Imported Intermediates for U.S. Labor in the Manufacturing Sector 
 
The model used by BLS to measure MFP for the U.S. manufacturing sector can be written as  
 
(10) KlndwLlndwYlndAlnd KLGG −−=  
 
 
SlndwMlndwElndw SME −−−
 
 
where YG is real sectoral output for the manufacturing sector, dlnAG denotes the difference in 
logarithms of AG for successive years (lnA(G,t) – lnA(G,t-1) ), and the weights for labor, capital, 
energy, materials, and purchased business services, wi, are the averages of each factor’s nominal 
cost relative to nominal output, YNG in two successive years: 
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The growth in imported intermediate inputs, combined with growth in capital inputs, domestic 
intermediate inputs, and technical change, directly influence labor productivity. Thus, labor 
productivity can be written as the sum the intensity of each of the other input factors (increases 
in the factor’s quantities relative to domestically employed labor): 
 
(12)  
++=− ??
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
− LlndKlndwAlndLlndYlnd KGG   
 
 
?? ?????? −+?????? − j jj j LlndIIlndwLlndDIlndw jIIjDI  
 
where wDIj denotes the weights on domestic intermediates j = E,M,S and wIIj denotes the 
weights on imported intermediates j = E,M,S.  
 
 
Figure 5. Labor Productivity Growth by Contributing Input Factors, 
Manufacturing Sector, 1998–2006 
 (annual growth rates from previous year) 
 
 Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics (using BEA unpublished import data) 
 
Figure 5 shows the contributions of nonlabor factor inputs to year-to-year growth of 
manufacturing sector labor productivity, and Table 6 presents the contributions of nonlabor 
factor inputs on the average annual growth over the entire period from 1997 to 2006. From 
Figure 5, notice that in most years, MFP contributed the most to labor productivity growth.  Also 
notice that growth in capital services contributed to labor productivity growth prior to 2004, but 
very little thereafter. Imported intermediate inputs made a relatively constant contribution to 
labor productivity growth in all years, with the exception of 2001. Over the period 1997–2006, 
MFP accounted for 45 percent of productivity growth and imported intermediate inputs 
accounted for 23 percent. 
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Table 6. Contributions to Labor Productivity in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector 1997–2006 
(average annual growth) 
 
Output per unit of labor  3.96% 
Multifactor Productivity  1.79% 
Contribution of capital intensity  0.64% 
Contribution of domestic intermediates 0.65% 
Contribution of imported intermediates 0.92% 
Contribution of imported materials 0.80% 
Contribution of imported services 0.10% 
Contribution of imported energy 0.01% 
 
 
INFLUENCE OF IMPORT PRICES 
 
To assess the impact of possible bias in the price change of imports on productivity, we consider 
the difference between the growth of the BLS productivity measure, dln ABLS, and the growth of 
a productivity measure that is constructed with more precise price indexes for imports, dln 
Aprice*. Prices of imports enter the BLS private business sector productivity model when imports 
are removed from final demand in the construction of real GDP (which is further reduced to 
arrive at private business sector output, YBLS). To assess the impact of possible import price bias, 
we assume that domestic inputs and all other components of output are measured precisely. 83 
Therefore, the possible bias in productivity growth equates to a difference in the growth of 
alternative output measures: 
 
(13) YdYdAdAd iceBLSiceBLS lnlnlnln *Pr*Pr −=−  
 
By assuming that all domestic components of output are measured precisely, the difference in the 
growth of measured output and an output measure that is constructed using alternate import 
prices becomes the difference in the growth of measured imports, IBEA, and the alternate, IPrice*, 
that is measured with alternative import prices. The growth of the differences in import measures 
must be weighted by imports’ share, sI, of output. Because the shares are calculated using 
nominal data, there is no difference in the weights. The difference in the growth of measured 
productivity relative to a productivity measures constructed with alternative prices of imports 
becomes 
 
                                                 
83 Diewert and Nakamura (2009) present a new measure for the bias in an import price index due to outsourcing and 
show how the price index bias problems attributable to input source substitution can be represented theoretically. 
The authors suggest that outsourcing and the inability of price indexes to capture the effect of new firm entry and 
input substitution, have led to an upward bias in intermediate input and import price indexes. 
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Real growth in imports can be calculated as the difference between nominal growth and price 
growth. As there is no difference in nominal growth between the two concepts, the difference 
between the growth of measured productivity and a productivity measure constructed with 
alternative import prices becomes the weighted difference between the measured price growth of 
imports, PIBEA, and an alternative measure of price growth, PIPrice* 
 
(16) 
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Note that the value of aggregate imports is based upon many individual commodities that may or 
may not suffer from biased import prices. An individual commodity’s impact on aggregate 
productivity growth will be determined by the bias in that commodity’s price, PIi, growth, 
weighted by the imported commodity’s share of output , ci: 
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An individual commodity’s impact on productivity growth can be estimated as 
 
(18) ??
???
?
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The size of the possible bias in aggregate productivity growth is 
 
(19)  ? ?????? −i i*,icePri,BEA
I
i PlndPlndc II  
 
When we modified the BLS private sector MFP model to include intermediate inputs in the 
model, we reduced the influence of possible price bias on the output component; however we 
introduced the possible price bias on the input side of the model. Again we consider the impact 
of import prices on productivity as the difference between the growth of the modified 
productivity measure, dln AS, and the growth of a productivity measure that is constructed with 
more precise price indexes for imports, dln Aprice*. Recalling the modified MFP Eq. (5), the 
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difference between the growth of modified productivity and a productivity measure constructed 
with alternative import prices is the difference in output growth and the weighted difference the 
growth of imported intermediate inputs with existing import price indexes, II BEA, and an 
alternative measure of price growth, IIPrice* 
 
(20)
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In the modified MFP model, only imports used as intermediate inputs in production are added 
back into the model. Assuming they can be added back in the same manner as they were 
originally removed, the growth of real output can only be biased to the extent that price measures 
for imports that are destined for final demand are biased. The possible impact on productivity 
growth is estimated as the weighted difference between the measured price growth of imports, 
PIBEA, and an alternative measure of price growth, PIPrice* over final demand products and 
intermediate inputs  
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Because the weights on the final demand components and the intermediate inputs are both that 
commodity’s share of nominal output, the influence of mismeasured import prices on aggregate 
productivity is 
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By construction, wj is less than sj for all commodities; recall that YS > YBLS . Therefore, the 
impact of import prices on MFP is smaller under the modified MFP framework than in the BLS 
published MFP model.  
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Table 7: Imported Intermediate Inputs Share of Private Business Sector Output, 
1998–2006 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BLS Output Share, sI 8.05% 8.07% 8.76% 8.84% 8.25% 8.25% 8.98% 10.03% 10.77% 
Sectoral Output Share, 
wI 7.45% 7.47% 8.05% 8.12% 7.62% 7.62% 8.23% 9.11% 9.72% 
 
Because import prices are not used to construct real output measures for the BLS manufacturing 
productivity statistics, any possible price mismeasurement of imports does not affect labor 
productivity statistics for the manufacturing sector. However, prices of imports enter the BLS 
manufacturing sector MFP model when imports are included in the construction of purchased 
intermediate inputs. To assess the impact of possible import price bias, we assume that output 
and all domestic inputs are measured precisely. Therefore, the possible bias in productivity 
growth equates to a difference in the weighted growth of imported intermediate inputs 
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Real growth in imports is calculated as the difference between nominal growth and price growth. 
As there is no difference in nominal growth between the two concepts, the difference between 
the growth of measured productivity and a productivity measure constructed with alternative 
import prices becomes the weighted difference between the measured price growth of imports, 
PIBEA, and an alternative measure of price growth, PIPrice* 
 
(26)  
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Table 8: Imported Intermediate Factor Cost Shares, Manufacturing Sector, 1998-2006 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BLS Output Share, 
wI 12.24% 12.39% 13.53% 13.97% 13.57% 13.86% 15.24% 16.94% 18.33% 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we develop a framework for estimating the effects of imported intermediate inputs 
on U.S. major sector labor productivity. The production model used to calculate the BLS private 
business sector MFP measures is expanded to treat imported intermediate inputs as an input 
rather than as a subtraction from output. Once the imported intermediate inputs are inside the 
framework, we use the Solow MFP equation to estimate the effects on labor productivity of 
substitution between imported intermediate inputs and U.S. hours worked. Separate effects are 
estimated for imported energy, materials, and services.  The data show that imports increased as 
a share of total intermediates used by private industries from 8 percent in 1997 to 10 percent in 
2006. By including imported intermediates in the MFP model, we find that private business 
sector MFP grew 0.1–0.2 percent per year slower than the BLS published series. Also, we 
estimated that the growth in imported intermediate inputs contributed 14 percent to the average 
annual growth of labor productivity for the private business sector from 1997 to 2006.  
 
We do not believe that it would be a good idea to alter the labor productivity model to 
incorporate imported intermediates, as then the trend could be considered “biased” to the extent 
that output would reflect the growth in imported intermediates, while the labor input would not 
include the corresponding hours worked overseas. However, the role of imported intermediates 
can be meaningfully assessed in the MFP model. From the exercise above (see Table 2), we find 
that including imported intermediates in a sector output concept and as a factor input in 
production, MFP grew 0.1–0.2 percent per year slower than the BLS published series.  
 
Because over 60 percent of imported intermediate inputs purchased by private industries are used 
by the manufacturing sector, we also evaluate the role of imported intermediates in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. The BLS methods for constructing manufacturing MFP include 
intermediates in the model framework. Therefore, we isolate the imported components to assess 
their impact on labor productivity. The data reveal that over the 1997–2006 period, imported 
intermediate inputs grew as a share of total intermediate inputs. We find that labor inputs and 
domestic nonmanufactured inputs declined over the entire period, while capital services and 
imported intermediates grew. In addition, we estimate that growth in imported intermediate 
inputs contributed 23 percent to the average annual growth in labor productivity in the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
Finally, we show that any mismeasurement of import prices impacts BLS productivity measures. 
However, the impact will be weighted by the share of imports relative to aggregate output, which 
ranged from 8–12 percent for the private business sector and 12–18 percent for the 
manufacturing sector.  
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Abstract 
 
The recent growth in offshore outsourcing of intermediate input production makes it especially critical 
that statistical agencies are able to accurately measure quality-adjusted trade flows. This paper 
examines the implications of global production sharing for measuring the price of semiconductors, a 
critical input to high-end domestic manufacturing and U.S. productivity growth.  We analyze new 
transaction-level data on semiconductor wafer fabrication around the world, including prices and 
detailed information on key physical attributes of semiconductor wafers.  Semiconductor wafers are a 
high-value intermediate good in the production of final products in the semiconductor industry.  Using 
this detailed information on wafer pricing and quantities by country, we study the price measurement 
implications of shifts in the pattern of international production sharing for this important stage in the 
value chain.  We estimate that, after adjusting for changes in product characteristics, the average 
annual price decline in processed wafers was roughly 12.5 percent during the last five years. Our 
analysis also finds that shifts in the location of production to lower-cost countries can contribute an 
additional price decline of up to 0.8 percent per year. 
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 170
 171
The recent growth in offshore outsourcing of intermediate input production has generated 
concern that standard government data collection methods are ill-suited to an increasingly 
international productive structure (Houseman 2007).  This paper focuses on the semiconductor 
industry to estimate the effects of offshore outsourcing on input price measurement.  We find 
that offshoring in this industry necessitates the collection of very detailed product data to 
adequately adjust prices for input quality, and that shifting sourcing patterns may cause standard 
price measures to understate price declines for processed semiconductor wafer inputs by as much 
as 0.8 percent per year.84 
 
We choose to examine wafer fabrication, an intermediate stage in semiconductor production, for 
a number of reasons.  First, semiconductor wafer production has moved offshore to a dramatic 
degree in the last forty years, with continual shifts in the geographic distribution of 
semiconductor manufacturing capacity.  Second, China’s entrance in the semiconductor 
manufacturing market in 2001 was much heralded in the media, and provides an interesting case 
study on the effects of growing Chinese economic strength on an important industry.  Third, the 
discrete nature of technological progress in semiconductor wafer fabrication techniques makes 
careful quality adjustment feasible, as we describe in detail below.  Finally, we have obtained a 
new dataset of semiconductor input prices with information on country of origin, making 
possible an empirical investigation of the effects of shifts in sourcing on input price 
measurement. 
 
Offshoring poses a number of challenges for price measurement in the semiconductor 
manufacturing sector in particular.  First, suppose a U.S.-based manufacturer contracts out all 
production to a firm overseas and that, prior to its decision to offshore, it had purchased final 
goods from an independent supplier here in the U.S. or had made the good itself.  The one-time 
decline in the price level associated with the decision to offshore is not captured by current data-
collection procedures.  The Producer Price Index’s universe does not include imports, so it does 
not reflect the price reduction. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) International Price Program 
(IPP) measures price changes beginning in the second month in which the imported good is 
observed, as it is not designed to measure the initial price decline that occurs when a domestic 
producer first off-shores a segment of production.  A similar problem can arise if the firm has 
already contracted out production overseas but now sources from a low-cost supplier in China 
rather than from a producer in Taiwan.85 
 
The problem posed by shifting sourcing arrangements is essentially equivalent to the problem of 
outlet substitution bias in the CPI, described in detail by the Boskin Commission Report (Boskin 
et al. 1996) and Diewert (1998).  While those studies were concerned with consumers shifting 
their consumption toward low-cost retail outlets, this paper confronts the problem of 
semiconductor producers shifting their intermediate input sourcing toward low-cost suppliers 
located abroad.  The bias is most acute whenever the inputs, as in our case, are approximately 
                                                 
84 Semiconductor wafers are described in detail in the next section. 
85 In principle, the IPP would measure this change if the manufacturer imported the good itself or if it continued to 
work through the same intermediary that is surveyed by IPP.  If, on the other hand, the manufacturer contracts with a 
different intermediary in order to access a new market overseas, the IPP will miss the price decline since it surveys 
the importer, which in this case was the original intermediary. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
little information on the relative importance of intermediaries in the IPP. 
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identical, which implies that the unmeasured price change when production is shifted to a new 
location does in fact represent a genuine price decline for the same good. 
 
The final significant challenge is quality adjustment.  As a greater share of production is shifted 
abroad, the composition of imports becomes increasingly sophisticated. This is particularly true 
within the semiconductor industry, which imports many complex intermediate inputs at various 
stages in the production process. This process places much greater demands on quality 
adjustment procedures for import prices, as semiconductor technology changes so quickly.  The 
challenge of quality adjustment in the semiconductor industry is well known and has been 
demonstrated in many previous studies.86 
 
We address these concerns using new transaction-level data on semiconductor wafer purchases, 
collected by the Global Semiconductor Alliance (GSA).  These data contain fine detail on 
product characteristics, allowing us to generate constant-quality price indexes.  They also report 
the source country for each transaction, making it possible to examine the effects of shifting 
geographic production on price measurement.  Our results demonstrate the importance of having 
such detailed data when constructing price indexes in industries with large amounts of 
offshoring.  This need is likely to increase as more countries move up the technical ladder and 
begin exporting ever more complex products. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section describes aspects of the semiconductor 
manufacturing process that are relevant to price measurement.  We then describe the data we 
utilize to build input price measures, followed by a section that presents our price index 
calculations.  We begin with a standard matched model index as a baseline and then follow 
Reinsdorf (1993) to bound the potential effect of outlet substitution bias due to shifting input 
sourcing across countries.  This section concludes with comparisons to a hedonic index and a 
publicly available official semiconductor price index.  The last section concludes. 
 
 
SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTION 
 
This section describes the semiconductor manufacturing process and recent changes in the 
business models employed by semiconductor firms, highlighting characteristics of the industry 
that are important for price measurement.  Semiconductor production technology progresses in 
distinct measurable steps, allowing us to account for technological improvement when 
constructing price indexes in spite of rapid changes over time.  The continuing movement to 
outsource semiconductor production to offshore firms raises the possibility of outlet-substitution 
bias in standard price indexes and motivates our choice to focus on foundry wafer fabrication. 
 
Semiconductor Production Technology 
 
Semiconductor fabrication involves creating networks of transistors on the surface of a thin piece 
of semiconducting material.87  The process begins with the design and layout of a new chip.  
Semiconductor designers use suites of complex software to specify the functionality of the chip, 
                                                 
86 See, among others, Flamm (1993), Grimm(1998), and Aizcorbe, Corrado, and Doms (2003). 
87 Turley (2003) provides an accessible overview of semiconductor technology, manufacturing, and business. 
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convert that logic into the corresponding network of transistors, determine the physical layout of 
those transistors, and simulate the behavior of the proposed design for debugging purposes. 
 
Semiconductors are manufactured in a facility called a fab.  Transistors are created on the surface 
of the wafer through a photolithography process, in which successive layers of conducting and 
insulating materials are deposited on the surface of the wafer and chemically etched away in the 
appropriate places to form the desired pattern of transistors and necessary interconnections.  The 
design layout software determines the etching pattern for each layer, which is projected onto the 
wafer through a mask containing the negative of the desired pattern, in a process similar to 
developing a photograph by projecting light through a negative.  Each step of the etching process 
is repeated multiple times across the wafer, resulting in a grid pattern of many copies of the chip.  
Once all transistors and connection layers are complete, the chips are tested in a process called 
“wafer probe,” and any faulty chips are marked to be discarded.  The wafer is then cut up, 
leaving individual chips, called die.  The die are then placed inside protective packages and 
connected to metal leads that allow the chip to be connected to other components. 
 
Semiconductor fabrication technology has advanced over time in discrete steps, defined by wafer 
size and line width (also called feature size).  Increases in wafer size allow larger numbers of 
chips to be produced on a wafer.  Most fabs currently produce 150mm (roughly 6 inches), 
200mm (8 inches), or 300mm (12 inches) diameter wafers.  Although larger wafers cost more to 
produce, the move to a larger wafer has generally reduced the cost per die by approximately 30 
percent per die (Kumar 2007). 
 
Line width is the size of the smallest feature that can be reliably created on the wafer. Decreased 
line width means that individual transistors are smaller, and more functionality can be integrated 
into a given area of silicon.  This makes chips of a given functionality smaller, lighter, and faster, 
and also makes it feasible to include more functions on a single chip.  The number of transistors 
that can be produced on a chip has grown exponentially over time, following Moore’s Law, the 
Intel cofounder’s famous observation that the number of transistors on a chip doubled every 
eighteen months (Moore 1965).88  Figure 1 shows the maximum number of transistors per chip 
and the minimum line width used to produce Intel processors over the last 40 years (both plotted 
on logarithmic scales). 
 
Current line widths are measured in microns (?m) or nanometers (nm).  The smallest line width 
currently being produced in volume is 25nm.  As a rule of thumb, Kumar (2007) estimates that 
moving a given chip design to a 30 percent smaller line width will result in cost savings of 
approximately 40 percent, assuming the same number of defects in both processes.  The primary 
drawback of smaller line widths is increased cost per wafer, particularly early in the technology’s 
life span.  Masks are much harder to produce when creating smaller features, and new process 
technologies often result in higher defect rates and lower yields, the fraction of chips on a wafer 
that function correctly.  In spite of these challenges, the benefits of increased die per wafer and 
better performance outweigh the problems of decreased yields, particularly as the fabrication 
technology matures and yields increase.  Given the benefits of smaller line widths, 
semiconductor manufacturers have steadily moved toward newer technology.  This is apparent in 
Figure 1 for Intel processors and can be seen even more clearly in Figure 2, which plots the 
                                                 
88 This regularity later slowed to doubling every two years. 
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technology composition of sales at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 
the largest semiconductor foundry. 
 
There are a number of options regarding the chemicals used to create the transistors themselves 
and how the transistors are arranged to implement logical functions.  The most common 
technology, called complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS), accounted for 97 
percent of worldwide semiconductor production in 2008.89 Other transistor arrangements, such as 
bipolar logic, and other chemical processes, such as Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) or Silicon 
Germanium (SiGe), generally focus on niche markets for high-frequency, high power, or 
aerospace devices, rather than the storage and computational logic products comprising the 
majority of the CMOS market.  In the following analysis, we will refer to each combination of 
wafer size, line width, and logic family as a “process technology” (e.g., 200mm, 180nm, CMOS 
constitutes one process technology). 
 
The price index calculations below require us to define the set of product characteristics that 
determine the performance, and hence the price, of a given wafer.  To guide this choice, we have 
consulted pricing models used by engineers at fabless firms to estimate production costs when 
developing business plans.  Kumar (2008) presents a wafer cost model based on wafer size, line 
width, and logic family.  A commercial cost estimation firm, IC Knowledge, distinguishes wafer 
cost estimates by wafer size, line width, logic family, number of polysilicon layers, and number 
of metal layers.  Given this potential importance of the number of layers in a given design, 
indicating the design’s complexity, we calculate price per layer rather than price per wafer.  
These pricing models support the use of process technology (wafer size, line width, and logic 
family) to distinguish between goods in our price indexes, calculated in the section “Price Index 
Results.” 
 
Changing Semiconductor Business Models 
 
In the early 1970s nearly all semiconductor producers were vertically integrated, with design, 
wafer fabrication, packaging, testing, and marketing performed within one company.  By the 
mid-1970s, firms began moving packaging and test operations to East Asia to take advantage of 
lower input costs (Scott and Angel 1988, Brown and Linden 2005).  In spite of outsourcing these 
relatively simple steps in the production process, firms maintained their complex wafer 
fabrication operations in house.  Firms that perform both design and wafer fabrication are 
referred to as integrated device manufacturers (IDM).  As wafer fabrication technology 
advanced, the cost of production facilities increased dramatically; the cost of a fabrication 
facility has risen from $6 million in 1970 (IC Knowledge 2000) to $4.2 billion in 2009 (Global 
Foundries 2009).  This sharp increase in cost has made it ever more difficult to stay at the 
leading edge of process technology.  In the mid 1980s, small semiconductor firms began 
producing some of their more advanced designs on the manufacturing lines of larger, more 
established semiconductor manufacturers that were better able to bear the capital costs of 
maintaining a state-of-the-art fab facility.  Many Japanese semiconductor firms had substantial 
excess manufacturing capacity during this time period, making such production partnerships 
particularly attractive (Hurtarte, Wolsheimer, and Tafoya 2007). 
 
                                                 
89 Share of actual wafer starts reported in SICAS Semiconductor International Capacity Statistics. 
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These production sharing arrangements led to the creation of a new business model through the 
emergence of wafer foundries that manufacture semiconductors designed by other firms.  At 
first, foundries were used by IDMs as an alternative source of capacity for older process 
technologies (Kumar 2008).  By the late 1980s a number of new semiconductor firms avoided 
wafer fabrication by doing all of their manufacturing through foundries.  Semiconductor 
companies with little or no in-house wafer manufacturing capability are called “fabless” firms.  
In general, fabless firms perform chip design and layout, and use foundries and other contractors 
for mask production, wafer fabrication, packaging, and testing.  The fabless business model has 
grown quickly over the last 30 years, accounting for 24 percent of total semiconductor industry 
revenue in 2009, as shown in Figure 3.90 Since the largest foundries are located in Asia, and the 
largest fabless semiconductor producers are located in North America and Europe, the growth of 
the fabless model has increased the internationalization of semiconductor production.91 Although 
the fabless share of the global semiconductor industry only edged up from 2006 to 2008, as new 
process technologies continue to raise the costs of fab facilities, the prominence of the fabless 
model may well increase even more.  Indeed, AMD, the second largest microprocessor producer, 
spun off its manufacturing division as an independent foundry company in 2009, boosting the 
fabless share of the industry (Clendenin and Yoshida 2002).92 
 
Implications for Price Measurement 
 
The extremely fast pace of technological change in semiconductor manufacturing poses a large 
challenge to quality-adjusted price measurement.  Aizcorbe (2002) demonstrates the difficulty 
government price indexes have had in tracking rapid price declines in finished semiconductors.  
However, as just described, technological advance in semiconductor production proceeds in 
discrete, measurable steps, in contrast to continuous and difficult to measure quality 
improvements seen in other industries (Flamm 1993).  This discrete nature of technological 
advance in the semiconductor industry makes it possible to control for quality changes, given 
detailed enough data on product characteristics.  In this study we construct constant-quality price 
indexes for wafer fabrication using quarterly pricing data that include the most relevant aspects 
of process technology: wafer size, line width, and logic family.  We also control for the number 
of layers used in constructing the chip, a proxy for design complexity. 
 
This section has also documented the increasing internationalization of the semiconductor supply 
chain coinciding with offshoring various steps in the production process and the growth of the 
fabless model of semiconductor production.  Houseman (2007) describes the challenges faced by 
statistical agencies attempting to measure price changes when producers switch suppliers, 
particularly when the suppliers are located abroad.  In particular, substitution toward low-cost 
suppliers is likely to be missed in standard price index calculations (see below for a more 
                                                 
90 Note that the shares in Figure 3 are likely to understate the extent of fabless production activity because 
companies must derive 75 percent or more of their semiconductor revenue from fabless production.  Many 
companies not counted as fabless nevertheless rely heavily on foundries. 
91 In 2008, the 5 largest foundries (accounting for 84 percent of foundry revenue) were all located in Asia.  Of the 25 
largest fabless semiconductor companies (accounting for 75 percent of fabless revenue), 19 were located in North 
America or Europe.  These figures were calculated from proprietary reports from iSuppli and GSA, respectively. 
92 A recent report (IC Insights) predicts that between 2008 and 2013, total foundry sales will grow at double the rate 
of the overall semiconductor industry. A recent report (IC Insights) predicts that between 2008 and 2013, total 
foundry sales will grow at double the rate of the overall semiconductor industry. 
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detailed discussion), understating the rate of input price decline.  As semiconductor production 
technology advances and the fabless business model becomes more prominent, it is likely that 
these price measurement challenges will remain relevant in the foreseeable future. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on foundry wafer production, leaving analysis of IDM 
production for future work.  We make this choice for practical reasons.  Our pricing data include 
only wafer purchases from foundries, though those purchases could have been made by fabless 
firms or IDMs choosing to use foundry suppliers.  Also, the issue of within-firm transfer pricing 
raises a number of complications that are beyond the scope of this study and makes data 
collection essentially impossible. 
 
 
DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
To construct the price indexes used in our analysis, we require information on prices paid and 
quantities purchased for foundry services, specified by the characteristics relevant for pricing.  
We obtain prices from a survey conducted by the Global Semiconductor Alliance (GSA) and we 
calculate quantities by merging several different sources.93 Observations are quarterly, and our 
data span the period 2004-2008.  Descriptive results demonstrate the importance of controlling 
for process technology.  They also reveal substantial shifting of production toward lower cost 
countries. 
 
Wafer Pricing Survey 
 
Our primary dataset consists of 7,455 individual responses to GSA’s Wafer Fabrication & Back-
End Pricing Survey, provided to us for 2004-2008.94 The survey has been conducted quarterly 
since 2004 and provides extensive detail on contracts for foundry services, including key 
technological features, foundry location, price paid, and volume for a diverse set of foundry 
customers.  The survey responses account for a representative sample of about 20 percent of the 
wafers processed by the foundry sector. 
 
As shown in Table 1, we drop observations missing key variables.  We also drop observations 
reporting prices for engineering runs, preliminary fabrication before volume production.  To 
focus on substitution between onshore and offshore production, and between offshore locations, 
we retain only contracts for production at the major offshore locations (Taiwan, Singapore, and 
China), U.S. foundry contracts, and European contracts for comparison.95 A small number of 
observations with internally inconsistent responses are dropped, as are the handful of 
observations on 100mm wafers–a very dated technology.  All told, we use 5,464 observations for 
index construction. 
                                                 
93 GSA is a semiconductor trade association whose membership includes fabless producers and IDMs.  Its survey is 
administered to members and nonmembers. 
94 Individual respondents are not identified in our data. 
95 Significant omissions from the global foundry industry are Japan and Korea.  Our approach to estimating capacity, 
described below, does not allow us to assign reasonable weights on technologies in Korea.  Our preliminary price 
index for Japan behaved erratically, and suggested that the product composition was changing in a way not captured 
by our data.  We have obtained more detailed data extracts that may assist in alleviating this problem in subsequent 
versions. 
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Descriptive Price Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for key variables in the resulting dataset are shown in Table 2.  We observe 
273 prices per quarter, on average.  Wafer prices average $1,575 over the period covered.  
Interestingly, no substantial time trend is evident before adjusting for composition.  The average 
contract was for 2,307 wafers, and the average contract size climbs over time.  The number of 
layers per wafer also rose significantly over the period studied, from 23 in 2004 to 28 in 2008, 
reflecting a trend toward foundries handling increasingly complex products. 
 
The changing technological characteristics of the fabrication process are evident in the statistics 
for wafer diameter and geometry.  Pilot lines for 300 mm wafers were first introduced in 2000 
and the share for this emerging technology rises from 3.5 percent of contracts to 20 percent of 
contracts over the survey.  Similarly, new generations of lithography increase in penetration over 
time: 90 nanometer technology reached volume production in the overall semiconductor industry 
in 2004 and slowly gained share in the foundry market, ending at 7 percent in 2008; 65 
nanometer contracts were just emerging in 2008.96  Meanwhile, older technologies, with 
processes above 250 nanometers, dwindle in prominence from 45 percent in 2004 to 28 percent 
in 2008.  92 percent of contracts reported in the survey are for CMOS technology, but prices are 
available for other processes as well. 
 
A challenge with the GSA pricing survey is sporadic reporting for some technologies in certain 
geographic regions, despite independent evidence that such production existed.  For such cells 
where we believe there was production (based on our capacity database described in the next 
subsection) we linearly interpolate prices using values from surrounding periods or extrapolated 
based on higher-level prices.97 
 
Quantities and the Shifting Geography of Production 
 
To construct a price index, we need to weight individual price observations by quantity.  
Although the GSA survey includes information on the size of each order, some gaps in reporting 
remain.  This makes weights based on the GSA data unstable at quarterly frequencies.  As an 
alternative, we construct weights based on global foundry capacity.  Although capacity is an 
imperfect proxy for actual production or purchases, we must choose between erratic sales 
measures and highly credible capacity estimates.  Our baseline index uses the latter. 
 
The Gartner Semiconductor Fab Database provided us with quarterly capacity data from 2004 to 
2007.  For specific fabs, key features are reported, including planned wafer start capacity, 
minimum line width, operating status, and whether the fab was operating as a foundry.  We 
                                                 
96 2004 and 2007 mark the years when volume production of DRAM began at 90nm and 65nm, respectively 
(International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 2007. 
97 Note that the alternative, dropping these periods for lack of directly observed prices, is not neutral, since it 
amounts to 1) assuming the product mix within the industry is different than we know it is, and 2) throwing out price 
information from this period for cells with similar technology or geography.  See discussion of this approach in 
Gordon (2006). 
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extended these data with GSA’s 2009 IC Foundry Almanac, which provides a snapshot of 
capacity and technology by fab as of 2009. 
 
Merging these datasets gives us a preliminary set of weights, but we address three remaining 
shortcomings.  First, Gartner only reports planned capacity by fab and ramp-up status, leaving 
the contours of the ramp-up process unknown.  Fortunately, many major foundries provide 
quarterly information on actual operational capacity, showing the actual path of capacity as 
equipment is added incrementally.  We employ these directly reported capacities, when 
available, and add a comparable ramp-up period to fabs for companies without direct reporting.98 
Second, the data do not distinguish CMOS production quantitatively, though GSA does indicate 
whether a fab uses CMOS and other processes.  Since CMOS prices behave rather differently 
than non-CMOS prices, we assigned a weighted average of the CMOS and non-CMOS prices to 
each fab for the technology in operation, using overall industry weights from the GSA.  Third, in 
the Gartner fab database, we only observe the minimum line width in use at a fab, but we know 
that fabs often operate multiple geometries one time.  This raises the possibility that we 
overweight leading edge technologies.   On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that we 
only observe capacity, not actual production.  Since capacity utilization is higher for leading 
edge geometries, the application of capacity weights generates a bias in the opposite direction–
toward underweighting these geometries.99 
 
Table 3 compares two aggregate measures of foundry capacity, constructed as just described, to 
industry estimates from other sources.  First, wafer fab capacity as reported to the SICAS survey 
suggests our wafer fab measure is not fully capturing the overall size of the sector.  However, the 
growth rate from 2004 to 2008 for the measure constructed from our bottom-up approach is very 
close to the SICAS measure, suggesting we are catching the overall trend in industry capacity.  
Our measure of revenue is also somewhat lower than the measure of foundry company revenue 
published by the consultancy iSuppli.  This may simply reflect that not all foundry revenues are 
for the services we are studying.  Table 4 shows shifting revenue weights among the largest 
offshore foundry suppliers.  While Taiwan’s share falls somewhat, China and Singapore both 
gain revenue share, representing movement toward lower-cost foundry locations. 
 
 
PRICE INDEX RESULTS 
 
This section presents our price index calculations using the database just described.  The level of 
detail in our data allows us to adjust for differences in physical product attributes. In addition, 
since our data also include foundry location, we are able to isolate the effect of shifting 
production across countries on the average wafer price. We find that substitution across countries 
may account for no more than a 0.8 percentage point per year decline in the average wafer price.  
Our findings also support the established importance of careful quality adjustment to capture the 
effects of rapid technological change on semiconductor prices. 
 
                                                 
98 Ramping new capacity to volume production typically takes 12 months (Semiconductor Industry Association 
2007). 
99 Utilization on fab lines using 90nm and smaller geometries was 94 percent in 2007, noticeably higher than the 86 
percent utilization for larger geometries (SICAS 2008). 
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Fisher Matched Model Index 
 
Our dataset includes price information by detailed semiconductor wafer type and source country 
at the quarterly frequency.  As discussed in the “Semiconductor Production” section, a wafer’s 
process technology (defined by wafer size, line width, and logic family) determines its 
performance, along with circuit design.  Process technologies proceed in discrete steps, so our 
detailed data on prices by process technology yield a time series of price observations for each 
wafer type, with attributes held constant over time.  This high level of detail allows us to 
construct a matched model price index tracking quarterly price changes for each wafer type. 
 
The matched model index is calculated as a Fisher index of price relatives for each process 
technology and country pair.  First we calculate Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, respectively, as 
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where i represents process technology, j represents source country, t is time (quarter), and p is 
the average price for a given process technology, country, and quarter in the GSA survey.100  s is 
the share of total output value in time t accounted for by wafers in the relevant process 
technology and country cell, calculated using our capacity database.  As the Laspeyres index 
overstates price changes and the Paasche understates them, it is advisable to construct the Fischer 
index, which is a geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes. 
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We normalize the index to 100 in the first quarter of 2004. 
 
The procedure just described treats observations from different source countries as separate 
“models” by calculating separate price relatives by country.  This parallels the treatment of 
prices across outlets in the U.S. CPI, and is subject to similar assumptions (Reinsdorf 1993).  
When a new process technology and country combination appears, it is assumed that any 
difference in the price level across countries for that process technology entirely reflects quality 
differences, where “quality” refers to any unmeasured attribute of the wafer or transaction that 
makes one production location more attractive than another.  This is the “link-to-show-no-price-
change” method in Triplett’s (2006) classification of linking methods for matched model 
indexes.  This linking strategy is based upon the assumption that the law-of-one-price holds for 
quality adjusted units across outlets.  As we argue below, there is reason to believe that this 
                                                 
100 Note that we use price per layer for the results presented here to account for the increased cost of producing more 
complex wafers containing more layers.  As we expect, an index based on price per wafer falls somewhat more 
slowly, but the qualitative conclusions using price per wafer are the same as those presented here. 
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assumption does not hold in the semiconductor wafer fabrication industry, potentially leading the 
standard matched model index to understate the true rate of price decline. 
 
As expected, entry and exit of products is a prominent feature of the data.  As shown in Table 5, 
27 cells are new entrants in the 2004–2008 period, and 23 cells are exits.  This raises the 
challenge of estimating price changes for the first and last periods in the series for a large share 
of the data.  However, because our data are high frequency (quarterly), the number of entrants or 
exits in any given quarter is small, at 2.5 on average.  In addition, the weights on these periods 
are small as new technologies ramp up gradually. 
 
Table 6 presents our price index calculations.  Column (1) contains the Fisher matched model 
index just described.  We present the quarterly index, yearly averages, and the average yearly 
change between 2004 and 2008.  The index falls by 12.6 percent per year.  As has been known 
since at least Flamm (1993), Grimm (1998), and more recently Aizcorbe (2002), quality 
adjustment of prices for semiconductors, and indeed for all high-tech products, is critical.  In 
particular, bear in mind (see Table 2) that the average price change before adjusting for product 
composition was slightly positive.  The substantial differences across countries points to the 
necessity of accurate weights by country. 
 
Relaxing the Location as Quality Assumption 
 
Our previous index maintained the assumption that price differences across countries for 
otherwise identical goods reflect unspecified differences in quality.  We now make the opposite 
assumption: price differences reflect genuine price dispersion across goods of identical quality.  
Formally, this means that we calculate unit values by technology, averaging across observations 
from different countries.  As a result, substitutions toward low-cost producers will be reflected in 
the average product price.  These two assumptions bracket the truth, which likely lies in between. 
 
We consider this alternative index because the location-as-quality assumption can lead to biased 
estimates of price changes under certain circumstances.  Consider the convenient example of a 
situation in which two countries exhibit similar price trends for a given wafer type, but one has a 
consistently lower price level.  Under the approach in the previous section, any shift toward the 
lower-cost country’s foundries will have no effect on the aggregate price index, since the prices 
decline at the same rate in both countries.  The linking procedure implicitly assumes that the 
savings accrued in shifting supplies are offset by lower quality of the goods being purchased.  If, 
however, the goods are actually identical, then the shift to the lower-cost country represents a 
genuine price drop for the relevant customer.  The standard matched model linking approach 
misses this price drop achieved in switching suppliers, and thus understates the true rate of price 
decline.  This is the so-called “outlet substitution bias” discussed in the Boskin Commission 
report (Boskin et al. 1996). 
 
To address this, we follow Reinsdorf (1993) and calculate an average price index across 
outlets.101  This index is motivated by the opposite quality assumption of the index presented 
above.  If models are very narrowly defined, one can assume that quality for a given model is 
                                                 
101 Ideally, one would be able to directly observe particular buyers substituting between different outlets.  Since our 
data do not include purchaser identifiers, directly observing substitution is not possible. 
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identical across outlets.  In our context, this amounts to assuming that a given process technology 
is identical across foundries in different countries.  If this assumption is correct, then there is no 
reason to distinguish price relatives by country.  Instead, we calculate average prices across 
countries for each process technology. 
 
(4) ?= j tijtijti pwP ,  
 
where w is country j’s fraction of the total number units of process technology i produced at time 
t.  We then generate price relatives of these average prices for each process technology and use 
them to generate a Fisher price index as described above.  This approach is able to capture the 
effect of substitution toward low-cost countries as the weights on the lower prices increase with 
substitution. 
 
If demand for wafers is shifting toward low-cost suppliers, and the matched model is missing this 
substitution effect, we expect to find that the average price index declines more quickly than the 
matched model index.  The results are presented in Column (7) of Table 6.  The index falls by 
13.4 percent per year, which is 0.8 percentage points faster than the matched model index in 
Column (1).  This result supports the notion that outlet substitution bias causes the standard 
measure to understate the price declines for wafer fabrication, suggesting an outlet substitution 
problem no bigger than 0.8 percentage points per year.  Note, however, that the scale of quality 
change over time is much larger, as indicated by the sharp overall price declines. 
 
This result should be interpreted with a number of caveats in mind.  Both the law-of-one-price 
assumption and the alternative assumption of uniform quality across countries are extreme.  The 
data likely reflect both quality differences across countries and some persistent quality-adjusted 
price differences.  Thus, the two approaches bound the true quality-adjusted price change, and 
the difference between them is an upper bound on the effect of outlet substitution.  This 
discussion raises the question of why quality-adjusted price differences should be able to occur 
in equilibrium.  In the semiconductor fabrication market, a number of observations support the 
idea that quality-adjusted price differences can persist over time.  There have been substantial 
shifts toward low-cost countries. This behavior suggests the presence of quality-adjusted 
discounts at the low-cost countries.  Why might that be?  Although Reinsdorf (1993) discusses 
the role of costly information gathering in generating real price dispersion, we think that this 
explanation is unlikely to hold in a market as concentrated as this one.  Rather, we propose an 
alternative reason for price dispersion based on the particular characteristics of the wafer 
fabrication industry. 
 
Very large fixed costs are incurred when getting a production line up to capacity with a given 
design.  Discussions with engineers at a large U.S. fabless firm indicate that it takes a large 
number of sensitive calibrations to fabricate a particular design on a particular production line.  
This creates substantial start-up cost, such that semiconductor firms are very reluctant even to 
switch production lines within the same foundry, much less to move a product to a different 
foundry.  This fact, coupled with the nature of new product introduction across countries leads us 
to a potential explanation for equilibrium price dispersion. 
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Consider the price plots presented in Figure 4.  The top panel plots prices by country for a 
leading edge technology.  Taiwan entered the market first, with a high price.  Singapore and 
China each entered later, each at a lower price level.  In spite of the increased competition from 
competitors entering the market, the Taiwanese price continued to decline at a steady rate, 
maintaining a roughly constant price differential relative to the others.  A similar pattern for a 
more mature process technology is apparent in the bottom panel of Figure 4, in which a roughly 
constant price differential is maintained between the U.S. and Taiwan relative to Singapore and 
China. 
 
To understand the implications of these observations, consider only Taiwanese and Chinese 
foundries for simplicity.  If a given design requires the newest technology, it will have to be 
produced in Taiwan.  In two years’ time, when the Chinese foundry brings the same process 
technology on line, they charge a lower price in order to win market share away from their 
Taiwanese competitors.  However, the lower wafer price in China does not outweigh the fixed 
cost of moving the existing products from Taiwan.  The Taiwanese foundry can maintain a 
discretely higher price without losing its existing business, and only new products using the now 
year-old technology will go to the lower priced Chinese foundry.  The Chinese foundry may 
adopt the new technology more slowly due to a relative lack of technical expertise or due to U.S. 
export license restraints on advanced semiconductor fabrication equipment going to China 
(Electrical Engineering Times 1998).  In any case, the presence of large fixed costs of switching 
foundries coupled with staggered entry into a given technology makes persistent quality-adjusted 
price differences across countries possible. 
 
Hedonic Price Index 
 
To check the robustness of our results, we next generate a hedonic price index.  Table 7 presents 
some information on the importance of the characteristics we observe.  We regress log price per 
wafer on indicators for foundry location, technological characteristics, contract size, and quarter 
indicators using the 5,000 observations on contracts for CMOS technology.102 All of these 
variables have a noticeable effect on prices and are estimated precisely.  Collectively, they 
account for 88 percent of the variation in wafer prices. 
 
The point estimates on foundry location and process technology appear to be reasonable.  
Controlling for technology, China has markedly lower prices than Taiwan, which serves as the 
baseline case in the regression.  Singapore’s prices are moderately lower than Taiwan’s, while 
U.S. and European prices are substantially higher.  Production using more advanced technologies 
clearly commands a higher price.  Compared to the baseline case of production on 200 mm 
wafers with 180 nm geometry, production on larger (300 mm) wafers and production with 
narrower line widths is significantly more expensive.  More overall layers per chip, and more 
metal layers in particular, both proxies for the complexity of the circuitry, also drive up the price.  
Finally, contracts involving a greater scale of production do appear to draw a volume discount; 
                                                 
102 As mentioned above, non-CMOS technology is generally used in specialized niche markets.  Although we do use 
non-CMOS prices when calculating industry price indexes, we omit them here for simplicity of exposition.  Results 
for non-CMOS prices, not shown, indicate that location explains little of the variation in pricing, but technological 
characteristics do play a role. 
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other things equal, doubling contract size would be expected to reduce wafer costs by 5.5 
percent. 
 
Like the matched-model index, the hedonic index also falls rapidly, though the 11 percent 
average yearly rate of decline is 2 percentage points short of the rate for the matched model.103  
From this we conclude that our baseline results are fairly robust to choice of price index 
construction methodology.  The hedonic specification also controls for characteristics not 
addressed in the matched model index, which suggest that contract size and the composition of 
layers contracted does affect pricing.  The regression statistics indicate that these features explain 
over 80 percent of the variation in prices. 
 
Official Indexes 
 
For completeness, this section compares our results to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 
price series for imported semiconductors. The BLS’ International Price Program (IPP) publishes 
a price index for Harmonized System code 8542, Electronic integrated circuits. These include 
microprocessors and memory, the final products of the semiconductor production chain. 
 
IPP draws its sample from Customs lists at the more detailed 10-digit Harmonized System 
level.104  For instance, until recently, IPP would draw a sample of establishments whose 
product(s) are recorded under the just phased-out HS classification 8542.21.80.05 for 
“unmounted chips, die, and wafers.” Price indexes are calculated at this more disaggregated level 
and IPP then aggregates across the price relatives to produce the published index.  Unfortunately, 
this more detailed data is sealed to outside researchers for confidentiality reasons. 
 
Perhaps the measurement challenge for IPP is to control for quality improvements in ICs. We do 
this via a matched model price index that controls for several important performance-related 
characteristics of wafers. IPP does not necessarily observe as many characteristics of each IC, 
but it does have a potentially promising way to identify quality improvements. At least some 
respondents provide BLS staff with their own internal product code assigned to the surveyed 
item. It is likely that new, higher quality products would receive a new product code.  If IPP 
observes that the product code attached to the surveyed item changes, it will follow up with the 
respondent to ask what the price of the new product would have been last month so that it can 
record the true price change for the quality-enhanced good. These follow-ups based on observed 
changes in firm product codes appear to be one of the principal ways by which IPP adjusts 
goods, at least in HS 8542, for quality improvements.105 
 
The ICs observed by IPP are not directly comparable to the wafers studied in this paper. To see 
this more clearly, it is useful to recall that we can break up the production of ICs into four 
stages—design, wafer fabrication, test, and assembly. Our data pertain to the input produced in 
                                                 
103 Aizcorbe et al. (2003) find a similar result for microprocessors. 
104 This discussion draws on a number of conversations with Sonya Wahi-Miller of the IPP. We are very grateful for 
the time she spent educating us on the IPP’s procedures. Any errors in our characterization of the IPP, however, are 
our own. 
105 Thus far, we have been unable to obtain information on how often this procedure is generally used in generating 
the HS 8542 index. 
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stage two whereas IPP measures the price of final output shipped at the conclusion of stage four. 
Nonetheless, it is instructive to ask how average price per wafer compares to the IPP estimate of 
the price of the finished product. 
 
Table 6 Column (9) presents the IPP index by quarter over the period 2004-2008.  Over this time 
period, the index falls on average 2.9 percent per year. Even though this is not directly 
comparable to our indexes, the discrepancy is quite large.  It would imply that the prices in the 
remainder of the production chain (development, wafer test, and assembly) fall implausibly 
slowly. Consider, for instance, that recent research has found price declines that approach 40–50 
percent per year for finished semiconductors sold in the United States (see, among others, 
Aizcorbe [2002, Table 1]). This work suggests that prices at other stages of the production chain, 
such as test and assembly, actually fall faster than the price of wafer fabrication, which contrasts 
starkly with the message sent by the IPP series. A critical task for future work is to dig deeper 
into the sources of these discrepancies. In particular, it seems worthwhile to investigate whether 
the IPP’s follow-up procedure for product code changes does in fact effectively capture key 
quality improvements. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis exploits a rich new dataset to calculate constant quality price indexes for processed 
semiconductor wafers.  We calculate a matched model price index, finding that wafer prices fall 
on average by 12.6 percent per year.  Given that average prices, unadjusted for quality, remain 
fairly constant over the time period, the sharp yearly price decline demonstrates the importance 
of careful quality adjustment in this industry.  Our results support the conclusion of numerous 
previous studies that official statistics substantially understate the rate of semiconductor price 
decline. 
 
Since our dataset includes information on the source country for wafer purchases, we can also 
measure how geographic changes in sourcing patterns affect price measurement.  Our approach 
is analogous to Reinsdorf’s (1993) measurement of retail outlet substitution bias in the CPI.  We 
calculate an average price index that captures the effects of shifting sourcing patterns toward 
wafer foundries in low-cost countries.  Our results imply that the baseline matched model 
approach understates the yearly price decline by at most 0.8 percentage points. 
 
Although this problem is not overwhelming, particularly in comparison to the much larger issue 
of quality adjustment in the semiconductor industry, it is suggestive that continued shifts in 
international sourcing patterns will cause the problem to persist and potentially grow.  Our 
findings here should motivate research into other industries that have seen large shifts in 
sourcing patterns across countries.  Since there are large fixed costs of shifting suppliers in 
semiconductor production, the finding here may be smaller than the bias in more footloose 
industries that can substitute quickly in response to smaller price differences.  Note however, that 
future analyses will need to motivate the assumption of persistent quality adjusted price 
differences across suppliers, as we do here. 
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Figure 1: Moore’s Law – Intel Processors 
 
 Sources: http://www.intel.com/technology/timeline.pdf 
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/kits/quickreffam.htm 
Figure 2: Technology Cycle – TSMC Sales by line width 
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Figure 3: Growth of the Fabless Business Model 
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Sources: Global Semiconductor Association (GSA) and Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) 
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Figure 4: Price Differences Across Locations 
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Table 1: Dropped Observations 
Total observations 7455
Used in analysis 5464
Dropped 1991
Missing:
foundry location 813
wafers purchased 19
price 19
Other reason:
engineering run 778
location 499
100mm wafer 3
inconsistent 3
Note: there may be multiple reasons to drop a particular observation
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Price Per Wafer ($) 1575.40 1145.54 1,576.58 1,609.53 1,502.86 1,545.03 1,655.18
Number of Wafers Contracted 2307 7514 1924 2357 1941 2710 2627
Number of Layers Per Wafer 25.74 7.57 23.25 24.64 25.79 26.64 27.93
Metal Layers 4.77 1.81 4.23 4.55 4.75 4.97 5.27
Wafer Size
   150 mm or less 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10
   200 mm 0.76 0.42 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.70
   300 mm 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.20
Line Width
   65 nm 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
   90 nm 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.07
   130 nm 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.32
   180 nm 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.22
   250 nm 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.09
   older vintage 0.36 0.48 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.28
CMOS process 0.92 0.28 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
5464 Observations
Source: Authors' calculations based on GSA Wafer Fabrication & Back-End Pricing Survey
Yearly Means
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Table 3: Coverage of Constructed Capacity and Revenue 
SICAS Constructed iSuppli Constructed
2004 194 123 16.6 9.1
2005 252 139 16.3 9.0
2006 285 151 19.5 9.6
2007 288 172 19.7 9.8
2008 297 188 20.1 9.9
Source: SICAS, iSuppli, and author's calculations from sources described in text
Wafer Start Capacity
(1,000 Wafers per Week)
Revenue
(US $ Billion)
 
 
Table 4: Foundry Revenue and Share for Major Offshore Locations 
 
Revenue ($million) Taiwan China Singapore
2004 7232 66.0% 19.7% 14.3%
2005 8517 61.7% 20.4% 17.8%
2006 8549 62.0% 20.1% 17.9%
2007 8668 60.3% 21.6% 18.1%
2008 8432 59.8% 21.7% 18.5%
Note: Includes pure-play foundries only.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from GSA, Gartner, and
company reports  
 
 
Table 5: Entry and Exit Statistics, CMOS Process 
country technology cells with data 74
ave. no. quarterly prices per cell 10.18
new entrants 27
exits 23
cells with entry or exit 38
ave. quarters with missing prices 5.375
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                    Table 6: Price Index Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Average Hedonic BLS IPP
Quarter Overall Taiwan China Singapore USA Europe Price Index Index HS 8542
2004Q1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2004Q2 101.5 101.7 99.9 102.7 97.5 108.5 100.7 99.5 98.3
2004Q3 99.6 103.2 90.1 101.7 97.2 94.6 98.4 97.7 97.1
2004Q4 93.5 95.1 84.3 102.1 95.5 89.1 89.5 91.3 95.9
2005Q1 91.3 86.9 100.5 101.5 93.0 89.5 87.7 87.4 95.5
2005Q2 83.5 76.9 95.2 94.1 95.2 85.1 79.1 87.3 95.1
2005Q3 81.7 79.5 85.5 88.7 80.0 86.8 79.5 83.8 93.9
2005Q4 82.0 79.2 90.6 85.8 79.3 92.1 77.8 82.7 93.5
2006Q1 76.4 73.6 83.5 82.0 69.4 87.2 72.8 78.4 94.0
2006Q2 74.4 71.6 77.8 84.2 70.8 82.0 70.4 74.1 93.8
2006Q3 72.4 69.4 78.0 80.8 66.4 82.0 68.7 73.6 94.6
2006Q4 69.6 65.9 78.6 76.4 64.1 82.1 66.3 71.0 95.3
2007Q1 70.3 67.1 77.7 75.7 65.6 87.6 66.9 69.2 93.3
2007Q2 67.9 63.3 77.4 77.1 59.1 90.0 64.8 67.6 88.8
2007Q3 62.8 58.7 67.2 74.8 56.0 88.4 59.7 65.3 90.0
2007Q4 59.6 55.5 65.3 70.1 52.2 84.1 56.5 64.5 90.3
2008Q1 60.4 55.7 66.3 71.7 58.2 83.7 57.3 65.0 88.5
2008Q2 57.1 51.9 63.9 68.2 57.1 83.3 54.3 61.9 87.5
2008Q3 58.2 52.5 68.2 65.0 69.2 85.3 55.3 59.6 85.8
2008Q4 54.2 49.2 63.1 59.7 63.4 82.9 51.4 59.7 85.6
Year
2004 98.6 100.0 93.6 101.6 97.6 98.1 97.2 97.1 97.8
2005 84.6 80.6 93.0 92.5 86.9 88.4 81.0 85.3 94.5
2006 73.2 70.1 79.5 80.9 67.7 83.3 69.5 74.3 94.4
2007 65.2 61.2 71.9 74.5 58.2 87.5 62.0 66.6 90.6
2008 57.5 52.3 65.4 66.2 62.0 83.8 54.6 61.6 86.9
Avg. Yearly
Change '04-'08 -12.6% -14.9% -8.6% -10.2% -10.7% -3.9% -13.4% -10.8% -2.9%
Fisher Matched-Model Indexes
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Table 7: Descriptive Wafer Price Regression Results 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Stat
Foundry Location
China -0.272 0.019 -14.59
United States 0.218 0.014 15.58
Europe 0.119 0.018 6.54
Singapore -0.062 0.012 -5.30
Wafer Size
150 mm -0.344 0.015 -22.20
300 mm 0.645 0.014 47.68
Line Width
? 1000 nm -0.696 0.038 -18.24
800 nm -0.353 0.027 -13.31
600 nm -0.358 0.022 -16.12
450 nm -0.355 0.019 -18.35
350 nm -0.194 0.013 -14.59
250 nm -0.092 0.012 -7.74
130 nm 0.306 0.012 26.31
90 nm 0.511 0.025 20.19
65 nm 0.737 0.050 14.63
layers per wafer 0.012 0.001 13.83
no. metal layers 0.057 0.004 14.30
log wafers contracted -0.055 0.002 -32.92
constant 6.743 0.030 223.47
R-squared 0.8773
Observations 5000
Specification also includes quarterly indicator variables
non-CMOS production not included
Baseline case (omitted category) is Taiwan, 200mm, 180nm
dependent variable: log of price per wafer
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Abstract  
 
Intermediate parts contribute roughly 70 percent of the value added in production of motor 
vehicles. Carmakers like Ford and General Motors once made many of these parts in house, but 
now procure most of them from independent producers. Outsourcing of parts extends globally, 
with more than one-fourth of the parts in vehicles assembled in the United States imported from 
other countries. This paper describes the growing role of motor vehicle parts imports for U.S.-
based light vehicle assembly. Imports of motor vehicle parts have increased to both substitute for 
U.S.-based parts production as well as to complement U.S.-based vehicle production of foreign 
producers. The paper assesses the effect of imports on production costs by distinguishing high- 
and low-cost source countries. This analysis is supplemented with anecdotal evidence on two key 
measurement issues: 1) the globalization of supply chains, as well as the relocation of production 
from a developed to a less-developed country; and 2) attendant changes in the structure of 
production costs. 
 
The authors thank Cole Bolton, Taft Foster, and Justin Hess for excellent research assistance. 
Thanks to Susan Houseman and Richard Lilley for helpful comments. 
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MOTIVATION 
 
The production of an automobile is complex, involving thousands of parts and hundreds of 
different companies.106 As many of the intermediate parts cross international borders (some 
multiple times, especially between Michigan and Ontario along the U.S. Canadian border), 
automobile production is of interest from the vantage point of properly measuring the extent of 
offshoring as well as the price of attendant imported intermediate goods. 
 
Intermediate parts contribute roughly 70 percent of the value added in production of motor 
vehicles. Carmakers like Ford and General Motors once made many of these parts in house, but 
now procure most of them from independent producers. Outsourcing of parts has also been 
globalized, with more than one-fourth of the parts in vehicles assembled in the United States 
imported from other countries. In the same vein, foreign-headquartered motor vehicle parts 
producers have established significant production operations in the United States.   
 
This paper describes the growing role of motor vehicle parts imports for U.S.-based light vehicle 
assembly. Imports of motor vehicle parts have increased to both substitute for U.S.-based parts 
production as well as to complement U.S.-based vehicle production of foreign producers. The 
paper serves as a case study in the context of this conference by focusing on two key 
measurement issues: 1) the globalization of supply chains, as well as the relocation of production 
from a developed to a less-developed country; and 2) attendant changes in the structure of 
production costs. Both examples will be discussed in the context of Mexico as a production 
location for motor vehicle parts. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section summarizes the relevant literature. We 
then discuss the source for our data on the auto supplier industry. The next section presents the 
trends in imports of motor vehicle parts to the United States. We then focus on Mexico as a 
source for U.S. motor vehicle parts imports and present two examples illustrating in some detail 
the challenges for proper measurement of the imports of intermediate inputs in the auto industry: 
the shift of production for a specific product, aluminum wheels, from the United States to 
Mexico, and the globalization of the supply chain for an intermediate part, the seat. 
 
 
LITERATURE 
 
The auto industry is often highlighted as an example of a global manufacturing industry (see, for 
example, work at the International Motor Vehicle Program, as well as Sturgeon, Van 
Biesebroeck, and Gereffi [2007]). In North America, automobile and parts production has long 
been integrated across the U.S. and Canadian border (Weintraub and Sands 1998). Mexico 
became an important location for parts production starting in the late 1970s. Montout, 
Mucchielli, and  Zignago (2007) suggest that the degree of intraindustry trade in the North 
American automobile industry increased at the beginning of the 1990s. 
                                                 
106 In this paper the term automobile is used synonymously with “light vehicle,” which is a term frequently used to 
summarize vehicles consumers tend to buy. Light vehicles are cars and light trucks, such as pick-ups, SUVs, and 
minivans.summarize vehicles consumers tend to buy. Light vehicles are cars and light trucks, such as pick-ups, 
SUVs, and minivans. 
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Most of the literature on the North American auto industry describes the evolution of especially 
Mexico as an important source of intermediate good production (see, for example, Gilmer and 
Canas [2008], Carillo and Contreras [2007], and earlier, Herzenberg [1991] and U.S. Congress, 
[1992]). In the last few years there have been a number of papers estimating the share of vertical 
and horizontal intraindustry trade in the auto industry (see Montout, Mucchielli, and  Zignago 
[2007] and Ito and Umemoto [2004]). Regarding the focus of this conference, there is very little 
information on the relative production costs of auto parts, including comparisons between 
production in the United States and Mexico. The few published examples tend to be dated and 
apply to large and complex components, such as engines (see U.S. Congress [1992]).107 Klier and 
Rubenstein (2008) provide a recent and comprehensive analysis of the trade flows in auto parts 
to and from the United States. 
 
 
DATA 
 
Detailed Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) code data are available from the U.S. International 
Trade Commission. That coding system was enabled by the 1988 Trade Act. It created the HTS 
system which authorized 8- and 10-digit codes for imports. This very detailed data source forms 
the basis for our analysis of changes in the nature and source of motor vehicle part imports to the 
United States. Many parts for motor vehicles are included in HTS code chapter 87, yet they are 
scattered throughout a number of other chapters as well. 
 
To generate a comprehensive list of motor vehicle parts based on HTS codes, we painstakingly 
combed through all relevant HTS chapters. Our goal was to identify parts intended for use in the 
assembly of new light vehicles (so-called light vehicle OEM parts). Therefore we excluded parts 
for use in motorcycles, buses, or commercial trucks whenever possible. Despite the incredible 
detail available in the 10-digit HTS-code system, there is one major drawback to the data 
classification: trade data, just like census-based data on U.S. production, cannot identify where 
the parts will be used. Ideally we would like to focus in our analysis exclusively on parts that are 
intended for the assembly of new vehicles as opposed to “aftermarket” parts, which are parts that 
end up in the retail or wholesale channel (for example, for installation at a car repair shop). For 
large and complex parts, such as engines and transmissions, the HTS codes distinguish new from 
“remanufactured” parts. While that distinction does not substitute as an identification of OEM 
and aftermarket parts—e.g., a new engine can be purchased through a parts dealer—we excluded 
all remanufactured parts, as those are not intended for use in the assembly of a new vehicle. Our 
list of motor vehicle parts consists of just over 200 individual 8- and 10-digit HTS codes, 
representing 10 different 2-digit chapters. 
 
We supplemented the trade data with a plant-level database that describes the geography of 
motor vehicle parts production by part in North America. The plant-level database covers 3,179 
parts plants in the United States, 416 in Canada, and 673 in Mexico. It represents information 
                                                 
107 The only exception we came across is a comparison of production costs of wiring harnesses for a U.S. and 
Mexico location (U.S. Congress 1992, p. 147).  Assembly costs of wiring harnesses, a very labor-intensive product, 
in the United States around 1990 ranged from $12 to $23. Assembly cost in Mexico varied between $1 and $2; 
shipping and inventory added $7.50. All costs are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
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from late 2006 to early 2007 and is the basis for our book on the North American auto supplier 
industry.108 
 
 
TRENDS IN MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS IMPORTS 
 
Figure 1 shows that the value of imports of motor vehicle parts imports (as defined above) more 
than doubled between 1996 and 2008. Yet the volume of U.S. light vehicle production between 
1996 and 2006 fluctuated in a rather narrow band, between 10 and 12 million units, before 
steadily declining to below 8 million units by the end of 2008. As a share of the material costs of 
light vehicle assembly (data available from the census of manufactures), imports have increased 
noticeably from 29 percent in 1997 to 36 percent in 2002. 
 
Figure 2 breaks out data on U.S. imports of motor vehicle parts by countries of origin. It 
identifies the five largest countries in year 2008. The remainder is aggregated into the “rest of the 
world” category. There has been a fair amount of movement among the largest source countries 
during the last decade and a half. Canada and Mexico, the two NAFTA partners, have 
traditionally represented the origin for more than half of all U.S. imports of motor vehicle parts. 
In 1996 the two counties represented nearly 60 percent of all U.S. parts imports, with Canada 
firmly holding the lead. By 2008 Canada was essentially tied with Japan for rank three among 
import source countries, having lost more than 10 percentage points in almost a decade and a 
half. Mexico’s share of U.S. motor vehicle parts imports held steady at just below 30 percent; by 
2004 it had taken over as the largest source of imports from Canada. China represents the fastest 
growing origin of motor vehicle parts imports. It had eclipsed Germany for rank four by 2006 
and represented 10 percent of U.S. imports in 2008. 
 
Figure 3 breaks out all motor vehicle parts imports by high- and low-wage countries.109 It 
demonstrates the steady growth of imports in motor vehicle parts from low-wage countries 
during the last decade and a half. Low-wage countries added about 25 percentage points of 
import share during that time. By 2007 the majority of all parts imports originated in low-wage 
countries. Stated differently, 69 percent of the growth in motor vehicle parts imports between 
1996 and 2008 had originated in low-wage countries. Figure 4 identifies the three largest source 
countries for both high- and low-wage countries. Among high-wage countries, Canada’s role has 
been shrinking, whereas China has been growing among low-wage countries. 
 
 
FOCUS: MEXICO  
 
We now look toward Mexico, the largest source of low-wage country imports of motor vehicle 
parts to the United States. After a brief recap of the history of the Mexican motor vehicle parts 
industry, we illustrate with two specific examples the growth in imports of motor vehicle parts: 
the shift of production from the United States to low-wage countries, and the complexity of the 
supply chain for intermediate parts. 
 
                                                 
108  See Klier and Rubenstein (2008, pp. 10–13) for a detailed description of the construction of the plant-level data. 
109 High-wage countries consist of Canada, Japan, and all of Western Europe. 
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Maquiladora Plants 
 
The leading suppliers of motor vehicle parts from Mexico have been foreign-owned maquiladora 
plants.110 Mexico’s Border Industrialization Program, established in 1965, permitted foreign 
companies to import materials from the United States, assemble them in so-called maquiladora 
plants, and export them back to the United States without having to pay duty on the raw 
materials brought into Mexico, the equipment in the maquiladora plants, or the subassemblies 
shipped back to the United States. 
 
U.S. auto parts makers started taking advantage of the maquiladora laws in the late 1970s. GM’s 
Packard Electric Division, now part of Delphi, established Conductores y Componentes 
Electricos to make wire harnesses, a very labor-intensive part, in Ciudad Juarez in 1978. 
Electrical components dominated Mexican early maquiladora production, accounting for twice 
as many imports as all other systems combined into the 1990s. 
 
GM’s Inland Division, now also part of Delphi, arrived in Ciudad Juarez in 1978 to make seat 
covers and interior trim. Production of seat components expanded rapidly into the twenty-first 
century as the three large assemblers of complete seats, Lear, JCI, and Magna, relocated 
production of some individual components to Mexico and purchased more individual seat parts 
from Mexico-based lower-tier suppliers. 
 
In terms of geography, maquiladora plants are strung out in Mexican cities along the U.S. border, 
especially (from east to west) in Matamoros (across the border from Brownsville, Texas), 
Reynosa (across from McAllen), Nuevo Laredo (across from Laredo), Ciudad Juarez (across 
from El Paso), and Tijuana (across from San Diego). The more easterly cities have attracted most 
of the auto parts maquiladoras because of their relative proximity to auto alley. Auto-related 
maquiladora production is also clustered in larger northern Mexican cities 100 miles or so south 
of the border, such as Nuevo Leon, Monterrey, Chihuahua, and Hermosillo. 
 
According to the Mexico Maquila Information Center, 24 of the 100 largest maquiladoras in 
2006 were motor vehicle parts suppliers. The three largest maquiladoras on the list were Delphi, 
Lear, and Yazaki, all motor vehicle parts producers. The 24 auto-related maquiladoras together 
employed 216,696 workers in Mexico in 2006, including 66,000 at Delphi, 34,000 at Lear, and 
33,400 at Yazaki. 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates the changing composition of motor vehicle parts imports from Mexico 
during the last decade and a half. The figure is based on HTS-code import data. We aggregated 
the individual parts into seven distinct subsystems, such as electrical and drivetrain (engine and 
transmission). The data illustrate the large share of electrical parts, even in 2008. To this day 
Mexico continues to be by far the largest source of automobile wiring harnesses imported into 
the United States (47 percent of all imported wiring harnesses came from Mexico in 2008, down 
slightly from 54 percent in 1996). Yet there is evidence that the composition of the types of auto 
parts produced in Mexico for U.S. consumption is changing. See, for example, Carillo and 
Contreras (2007), who point out that companies such as Delphi have upgraded their production 
operations in Mexico “from simple assembly to centralized coordination of functions including 
                                                 
110 This section draws heavily on Klier and Rubenstein (2008, pp. 318–320). 
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sophisticated product design, development, and research (p. 2).” As part of that transformation 
Delphi transferred a technical center and its research, design, and product development functions 
from Anderson, Indiana, to Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, in 1995 (p. 4). 
 
Shift of Production from the U.S. to Mexico: Aluminum Wheels 
 
We chose the aluminum wheel as an example of a component for which most production has 
relocated during the past decade from the United States to low-wage countries. The wheel 
represents a rather well-defined stand-alone part. Its production is quite simple. About 70 percent 
of production costs are represented by alumina, the raw material, and the processing of it, such as 
casting, heat-treating, machining, and painting.111 The aluminum wheel has its own 10-digit HTS 
code, although as noted already we are not able to distinguish between OEM and aftermarket 
imports. We were also able to obtain some detailed information about the cost structure of 
aluminum wheel production in the United States and Mexico from Richard M. Lilley of Lilley 
Associates, Inc., which publishes a biannual NAFTA Light Vehicle Road Wheel Survey. 
 
Aluminum is the main material for the construction of wheels, representing roughly two-thirds of 
the OEM market for wheels in the world and in North America. Although more expensive than 
steel, aluminum has replaced steel during the past quarter-century as the metal of choice for 
casting wheels, because it is much lighter and can be more easily shaped into designs that 
carmakers prefer. 
 
The mass-produced aluminum wheel is a commodity that is sourced by carmakers on the basis of 
price. Carmakers know to the fraction of a penny the cost of each component in the price of a 
wheel, especially standard wheels produced in high volumes. Profit margins on high-volume 
wheels are extremely small, according to Lilley Associates. Wheel suppliers make a profit 
primarily by producing low-volume niche and specialty wheels.  
 
The two leading U.S.-based suppliers of wheels are Hayes-Lemmerz and Superior Industries. 
Hayes, a venerable supplier founded in 1908, filed for Chapter 11 in May 2009. Hayes has been 
shedding other parts units to focus on wheels. Once the dominant supplier of steel wheels, the 
company was slow getting into aluminum. Superior Industries, the other leading U.S.-
headquartered producer, is the “upstart,” having been founded in 1973 in California. Superior 
specializes in the production of aluminum wheels. The company has about one-third of the U.S. 
market for aluminum wheels. Like Hayes, Superior has addressed the difficult economic climate 
by giving up production of parts other than wheels. 
 
Superior produces aluminum wheels at two factories in the United States, both in Arkansas, and 
three in Mexico, all in Chihuahua. Between 2007 and 2009, the company closed three of its 
aluminum wheel plants in the United States, one each in California, Kansas, and Tennessee. As a 
result, two-thirds of Superior’s North American OEM wheel production is in Mexico and one-
third in the United States, according to its 2008 annual report.  
                                                 
111 Once melted, the aluminum is fed to the wheel casting machines. After the aluminum has solidified, the blank 
casting is sent to trimming machines and to the heat treatment station. Each wheel is “baked” for several hours to 
give it the proper metallurgical structure and strength. Subsequently the wheel is sent to the machining stations for 
drilling. Afterward wheels are cleaned and painted. 
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All of Hayes’ North American aluminum wheels are produced in Mexico. Hayes closed its only 
U.S. aluminum wheel factory in Gainesville, Georgia, in 2008. The company started wheel 
production in Mexico as the minority partner in a joint venture. It has since taken over full 
control over that operation. 
 
Other North American producers of aluminum wheels include Alcoa Wheel Products, a division 
of Alcoa, which invented the forged aluminum wheel in 1948. It produces aluminum wheels in 
Cleveland, Ohio, and Lebanon, Virginia, but most of these wheels are destined for commercial 
vehicles and the aftermarket. The company closed an aluminum wheel plant in Beloit, 
Wisconsin, in 2008. Several Japanese-owned aluminum wheel suppliers have U.S. operations. 
Central Motor Wheels of America and Canadian Autoparts Toyota, both Toyota captives, 
produce aluminum wheels in Paris, Kentucky, and, Delta, British Columbia, respectively. These 
two companies are the principal supplier of aluminum wheels to Toyota’s North American 
assembly operations.112 AAP St. Mary’s, a subsidiary of Hitachi, produces aluminum wheels in 
St. Mary’s, Ohio, and primarily supplies Ford. Enkei America, located in Columbus, Indiana, 
mainly supplies Honda with aluminum wheels. 
 
Figure 1 compares the costs of producing aluminum wheels in the United States and in Mexico. 
It is based on estimates provided by Lilley Associates for total production costs, as well as the 
share accounted for by various costs for a typical high-volume 17-inch wheel sold to the Detroit 
3 carmakers. 
 
The largest single cost of producing the wheels is the aluminum. According to American Metal 
Market, a 17-inch aluminum wheel contains roughly 20 pounds of aluminum. Lilley Associates 
suggests that aluminum accounts for around one-fourth of wheel production costs. According to 
DataMonitor, the principal supplier of alumina for the aluminum wheels is Alcoa, with 58.6 
percent of the U.S. primary aluminum market in 2008.  
                                                 
112 Canadian Autoparts Toyota only produces cast aluminum wheels; Central Motor Wheels makes both cast and 
steel wheels. 
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Table 1: Comparing aluminum wheel production costs between Mexico and 
the United States 
 
 MEXICO  UNITED STATES 
 Percent $ Percent $
Materials 30 13 24
Processinga 41 18 52 28
Casting 16 7 20 11
Heat treatment 3 1 4 1
Machining 11 5 14 8
Painting 11 5 14 8
SG&Ab 4 2 4 2
Profit 9 4 7 4
Other 16 7 13 7
Total 100 44 100 54
 
a  All processing functions are assumed to be equally labor intensive. 
b  SG&A stands for selling as well as general and administrative expenses. 
 
Source: Lilley and Associates 
 
Alumina (also known as aluminum oxide) is sourced primarily within the United States for 
production of wheels in Mexico as well as in the United States. Alcoa’s long-standing North 
American alumina facility is at Massena, New York. A plant at Rockdale, Texas, may also be a 
source of primary metal for the Chihuahua plants. Thus, a “Mexican” wheel is likely to include 
some U.S. content. 
 
In our example, the $10 (or 22 percent) cost advantage to Mexico originates with the processing 
of the alumina, especially casting, machining, and painting as the processing operations are the 
most labor-intensive elements of the wheel production process. Yet Mexico no longer represents 
the largest source of aluminum wheel imports to the U.S.113 
 
China accounts for an increasing share of global wheel production (as well as U.S. 
consumption), according to the trade data. According to Research in China (2008), total 
production of aluminum wheels in China has increased from 3.5 million in 2001 to 35 million in 
2008. The 35 million figure includes an estimated 15–20 million for motorcycles, 1.5 million for 
the aftermarket, and 1.5 million in inventory, leaving 12–17 million for light and heavy motor 
vehicles. Per Richard Lilley, about half of the 12 million aluminum wheels imported by the 
United States from China in 2008 represent OEM wheels. In the same year, Mexico exported just 
under 4 million aluminum wheels to the U.S. Presumably most of these are OEM wheels. 
 
We do not have authoritative information on production costs in China. While manufacturing 
wage rates in China are substantially lower than in Mexico, we don’t have a basis for comparing 
productivity which would allow us to estimate processing costs in China. We assume them to be 
                                                 
113 See Watkins (2006) on the challenges China represents to manufacturing in Mexico. 
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lower in China than in Mexico because of China’s lower labor costs. China’s aluminum wheels 
producers obtain materials from Chinese alumina sources.114  
 
To reach the U.S. market, Chinese wheels incur additional shipping costs compared to 
production in Mexico. A standard 40-foot shipping container can hold around 1,000 17-inch 
wheels and costs around $1,100 to ship from China to the United States (Huber et al. 2009). 
Therefore the shipping cost from China amounts to just over $1 per wheel. While the additional 
shipping expense per wheel is likely much less than the labor cost savings on processing, 
production in China also triggers incremental inventory costs to make up for the greater distance 
to the customer. 
 
Role of Imports in Assembly of Intermediate Part: Seat Assembly 
 
This section demonstrates the complexity of supply chains in the motor vehicle industry and 
what this means for identifying the extent to which the import of intermediate goods is hidden. 
The seat provides a good example of the challenges in distinguishing between domestic and 
foreign sources for motor vehicle parts.  
 
Seats are produced at two types of plants:  
 
1) Plants that specialize in individual parts such as frames, cloth, and foam.  
2) Seat assembly plants that assemble seat parts into finished seats ready for installation in 
vehicles.  
 
Seat assembly plants are located extremely close to the carmakers’ final assembly plants, 
normally within one hour. Seats are delivered to carmakers’ final assembly plants on a just-in-
time and in-sequence basis, minutes before they are actually installed in the vehicles. Suppliers 
assemble seats in response to specific orders from the carmakers; the seats are placed in delivery 
trucks in such a manner as to facilitate unloading in the sequence needed on the final assembly 
line.  
 
A carmaker’s final assembly plant typically obtains all of its seats from a single seat assembly 
plant, and a seat supplier in turn typically dedicates a single facility to producing seats for only 
one final assembly plant. Because carmakers have clustered their final assembly plants in auto 
alley, so have seat assemblers. Therefore, one might conclude that a seat is a good example of a 
domestically produced intermediate part.  
 
However, a closer look at the supply chain reveals that many of the parts that go into making a 
seat are actually produced in other countries. A seat consists of several distinct pieces, including 
foam padding, leather or fabric, a metal frame, and controls for seat position and temperature. 
Most of the parts that go into seats involve straightforward labor-intensive tasks such as cutting 
and sewing. Plants producing seat parts do not have to be near seat assembly plants, and instead 
can locate in low-wage countries. 
 
                                                 
114 GM struck a deal to obtain Chinese alumina a few years ago at a favorable price, but assigning a market price to 
Chinese alumina is not easy. 
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Trade data illustrate the challenge in identifying the extent of intermediate goods imports (Figure 
6). The import of assembled seats is minimal, and is accounted for primarily by a Lear Corp. seat 
assembly plant in Windsor, Ontario, that delivers finished seats to a GM final assembly plant 
only 10 miles away, but on the other side of the Canada-U.S. border, in Hamtramck, Michigan. 
Other than Hamtramck, carmakers’ final assembly plants in the United States receive finished 
seats from seat assembly plants also in the United States; therefore, the finished seat is 
considered a U.S.-made component.115 
 
Meanwhile, between 1989 and 2007, import of seat parts increased from $621 million to nearly 
$5 billion. As U.S. motor vehicle production started to decline sharply toward the end of 2008, 
imports of seat parts fell to $4.1 billion in 2008. Imports of seat parts are destined for seat 
assembly plants. According to trade data, Mexico accounted for around $2.8 billion of the $4.1 
billion imports of seat parts in 2008, and Canada nearly $667 million (Figure 7).116 Thus, we can 
conclude that Mexico is a large producer of intermediate goods for U.S. seat assembly. 
The example of seat assembly demonstrates that an intermediate good itself consists of 
intermediate goods, many of which can be imported. Such supply chain relations may not be 
currently reflected in the way import price indices are calculated. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This paper tries to shed some light on the measurement issues related to growing globalization 
by illustrating the complexities of the supply chain of the automobile industry. The production of 
automobiles is a large and complex undertaking that involves nearly every manufacturing 
industry. Assembly of motor vehicles and production of parts represented 6.5 percent of all U.S. 
manufacturing jobs in 2008.  
Imports of motor vehicle parts to the United States have been rising as supply chains 
increasingly extend across borders. Rising imports of vehicle parts both substitute for U.S.-based 
parts production and complement U.S.-based vehicle production of foreign producers. During the 
last 15 years the mix of source countries has changed considerably. In particular the share of 
imports of intermediate parts from low-wage countries has increased. This paper provides some 
background on these trends. The shift of production of aluminum wheels to Mexico as well as 
the sourcing of seat parts represent two specific examples discussed in more detail. 
                                                 
115 Two companies dominate production of finished seats in the United States—Lear Corp. and Johnson Controls, 
Inc. (JCI). Each has roughly 40 percent of the North American market. Faurecia, Magna, and Trim Masters hold 
much of the remaining share. 
116 Mexico’s share of seat part imports has averaged 70 percent since 2000. 
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Figure 1: U.S. Light vehicle production (million units) and motor vehicle parts imports 
($ bn) 
 
 
 
Source: USITC Dataweb, Federal Reserve Board via Haver Analytics 
Note: trade data are of annual, light vehicle production data are of quarterly frequency. 
 
Figure 2: U.S. motor vehicle parts imports by major source countries 
 
 
Source: USITC dataweb, author’s calculations 
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Figure 3: U.S. motor vehicle parts imports by high-wage and low-wage countries 
 
 
 
Source: USITC dataweb, authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 4: Largest high-wage and low-wage source countries for US auto parts imports 
 
 
  230
 
Source: USITC Dataweb and authors’ calculations 
Note: Shares are out of all imports 
 
Figure 5: Motor vehicle part imports from Mexico by major subsystems 
 
 
 
Source: USITC Dataweb and authors’ calculations 
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Figure 6: U.S. Imports of automotive seats and seat parts 
 
 
 
Source: USITC Dataweb, and authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 7: U.S. Imports of seatparts by largest source country 
 
 
 
Source: USITC Dataweb and authors’ calculations 
  232
  233
References 
 
 
Carillo, Jorge, and Oscar Contreras. 2007. “The Historical Evolution of American Auto Firms in 
Mexico. Two Models of Local Development: From Local Supplier Networks to Firm 
Upgrading.” Paper presented at GERPISA International Colloquium, held in Paris, June 
20–22. 
Data Monitor. 2008.Aluminum in China. Reference Code 0099-2004. Data Monitor, New York. 
Gilmer, Bill, and Jesus Canas. 2008. “The Geography of Cyclical and Structural Change in 
Mexico’s Maquiladora Sector: 1990–2006.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, photocopy.  
Huber, Thomas, Hans-Werner Kaas, Asutosh Padhi, and Jose Maria Rancano. “ ‘Offshoring’ 
Onshore: Exploring Mexico’s Manufacturing Advantages.”  McKinsey Automotive & 
Assembly Extranet. 
http://forummexique2009.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/exploringmexicosmanufacturingad
vantages.pdf (accessed January 14, 2009). 
Herzenberg, Stephen A. 1991. “The North American Auto Industry at the Onset of Continental 
Free Trade Negotiations.” U.S. Department of Labor Economic Discussion paper No. 38. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor. 
Ito, Keiko, Masaru Umemoto. 2004. “Intra-Industry Trade in the ASEAN Region: The Case of 
the Automotive Industry.” ASEAN-Auto Project No.04-8, Working Paper Series Vol. 
2004-23. Kitakyushu, Japan: International Centre or the Study of East Asian Development.  
Klier, Thomas, and James Rubenstein. 2008. Who Really Made Your Car? Restructuring and 
Geographic Change in the Auto Industry. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.  
Montout, Sylvie, Jean Louis Mucchielli, and Soledad Zignago. 2007. “Horizontal and Vertical 
Intra-Industry Trade of NAFTA and MERCOSUR: The Case of the Automobile 
Industry.” Photocopy, University of Paris.  
Research in China. 2008. Global and China Automotive Aluminum Wheel Industry Report, 
2008—2009. Report 1082. Beijing: Research in China.  
Sturgeon, Timothy, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, and Gary Gereffi. 2007. “Prospects for Canada 
in the NAFTA Automotive Industry: A Global Value Chain Analysis.” Paper prepared 
for Industry Canada. 
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1992. “U.S.-Mexico Trade: Pulling Together 
or Pulling Apart?” ITE-545. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Watkins, Ralph. 2006. “The China Challenge to Manufacturing in Mexico.” Washington, DC: 
U.S. International Trade Commission 
  234
http://www.offshoregroup.com/newsfiles/chinachallenge.pdf (accessed October, 20, 
2009). 
Weintraub, Sidney, and Chris Sands. 1998. The North American Auto Industry under NAFTA. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.  
 
  235
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SESSION 5:  MEASUREMENT OF IMPORT PRICES 
 
 
 
 
CHAIR:  Michael Horrigan (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
 
 
Bias Due to Input Source Substitutions: Can It Be Measured? Erwin Diewert (University of 
British Columbia) and Alice Nakamura (University of Alberta) 
 
 
Are there Unmeasured Declines in Prices of Imported Final Consumption Goods?, Marshall 
Reinsdorf and Robert Yuskavage (Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
 
 
DISCUSSANT:  Barry Bosworth (Brookings Institution) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  236
  237
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias Due to Input Source Substitutions: Can It Be 
Measured? 
 
May 2, 2010 
 
W. Erwin Diewert and Alice O. Nakamura117 
 
Discussion Paper 10-07 
Department of Economics 
University of British Columbia 
Vancouver, Canada, V6T 1Z1 
Email addresses: diewert@econ.ubc.ca ; alice.nakamura@ualberta.ca 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Once a business opts to purchase rather than produce an input, it can also change the source from 
which the product is procured.  Producer price index programs face problems in dealing with 
price changes associated with sourcing changes.  We present measures for price index bias due to 
sourcing substitutions.  We begin with highly simplified cases to convey the rationale for our 
approach, and then show how the measures could be generalized.  We also explain related 
aspects of the industry accounts.  This material makes it clear that the growth of outsourcing and 
the related increases in domestic and foreign sourcing substitutions pose important challenges for 
statistics agencies.  
 
                                                 
117 Department of Economics, University of British Columbia and the University of Alberta School of Business. 
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of 
Globalization,” sponsored by the W.E. Upjohn Institute and the National Academy of Public Administration and 
held in Washington, DC, November 6–7, 2009. The authors thank William Alterman, Robert Feenstra, Mike 
Horrigan, Susan Houseman, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson for helpful comments on various drafts, and the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for partial funding. All errors and opinions 
are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
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Producers utilize and make many thousands of products in a year.  Index numbers help reduce 
and summarize this abundance of microeconomic information.  Hence, index numbers intrude 
themselves on virtually every aspect of empirical research about firms and the business sector.  
 
The price index programs of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) were put in place back 
when firms produced on an in-house basis more of the intermediate goods and services required 
as inputs.  When a firm switches from producing to procuring an input, this is called outsourcing.  
Of course, once a firm has found one external source for an intermediate input, it could switch to 
another source.  Thus, sourcing substitutions should rise in the wake of increased outsourcing.  
Unfortunately though, the main producer side measures of inflation, which feed into productivity 
and other national economic performance measures, miss much of the price change associated 
with sourcing substitutions, and this can cause sourcing substitution bias in the producer price 
indexes.  This has become an important problem because finding cheaper input sources is a 
prevalent modern day business strategy for lowering production costs.  
 
Intermediate input price competition is also believed to play a key role in the survival and growth 
of new firms. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) make this point in an important 
empirical study.  For firms that produce physically homogenous products, they are able to 
evaluate and compare a measure of physical productivity with the more conventional 
productivity measure computed using revenue, cost, and price index information.  Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Syverson find a strong inverse correlation between physical productivity and 
prices that is consistent with newer entrants having lower marginal costs, and with this allowing 
those businesses to charge lower prices.118  More generally, they and others document examples 
of physically identical producer inputs being available from different sources for different prices 
at the same point in time.119 
 
The derivations of our bias formulas in the main body of the paper are easy to understand 
because they are for a highly simplified economy.  In an appendix, we show that these formulas 
can be extended to a more realistic case.  Fortunately, the same main parameters emerge as the 
determinants of the bias size, though the derivations are more involved.120 
 
We also explain how price index bias problems undermine the validity of the industry accounts 
produced by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA): accounts that support national 
productivity measurement and economic policy analysis.  We explain how these bias problems 
are obscured by and impede efforts to understand the workings of the economy. 
                                                 
118 In another recent AER paper, Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson (forthcoming) develop a model in which the timing 
of when firms begin to offshore a variable-cost activity to foreign firms is endogenously determined in response to 
economic conditions, including unit cost price differences for input factors. 
119 For example, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2009) report that shifts in the location of production to lower-cost 
countries can deliver cost declines of up to 0.8 percent per year. Also, Klier and Rubenstein (2009) report that “The 
mass-produced aluminum wheel is a commodity that is sourced by carmakers on the basis of price.” Of course, 
firms sometimes purposely buy inputs from sources charging premium prices because of perceived benefits offered 
by the higher priced suppliers. In a later section in the paper, “Recommended Data Gap Fixes,” a potential 
procedural solution is proposed for dealing with quality differences that might be associated with price changes that 
occur together with sourcing substitutions. 
120 Houseman et al. (2009) demonstrate the value of this formulation for empirical studies. 
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SETTING THE STAGE 
 
We begin by considering an economy with just enough in it so that we can show how input 
source substitution bias arises and can be measured.  We consider an economy with four firms, 
one truly homogeneous product, and no taxes or transport costs.  To explore the importance of 
certain price index compilation protocols, we take a case where firms 1 and 2 are suppliers and 
firms 3 and 4 are purchasers of the homogeneous product, and where firms 1 and 3 are large and 
firms 2 and 4 are initially small, but grow substantially from period 0 to 1.  In other words, we 
allow for the situation that Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) document where firms 
enter that have found ways of producing at lower cost and then gain market share by selling their 
products for less than the incumbent firms. 
 
The activities of the four firms can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Firm 1 is a higher-cost producer that sells exclusively to firm 3 in periods 0 and 1. 
• Firm 2 is a lower-cost producer that is small and only sells to small firm 4 in 0t = . 
However, in 1t = , firm 2 moves out of the small firm category by selling to firm 4, 
which has grown, and by also winning a contract to supply part of the intermediate 
product needs of large firm 3. 
• Firm 3 only purchases the output of the higher-cost supplier, firm 1, in period 0, but shifts 
some of its purchases to firm 2 in period 1: a sourcing substitution.  
• Firm 4, which is small in 0t = , only uses the output of the lower cost firm 2 in 1,0t = . 
 
We let tjkp  and 
t
jkq  denote the price and quantity for sales of the one product from firm j to firm 
k in period 1,0t = .121  The firm value flows in Table 1 have a positive sign for outputs and a 
negative sign for inputs. Firm 1 is always the higher-cost supplier.  Thus we always have 
 
(1) 0pp 024
0
13 >> ; 0pp
1
24
1
13 >> ; and 0pp
1
23
1
13 >> . 
 
Table 1.  Value Flows between the Four Firms 
 
Output flows Input flows 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 
Period 0 Value Flows 
0
13
0
13qp  
0
24
0
24qp  
0
13
0
13qp−  
0
24
0
24qp−  
Period 1 Value Flows 
1
13
1
13qp  
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23 qpqp +  
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13 qpqp −−  
1
24
1
24qp−  
 
                                                 
121 Normally we would expect 123p  to be close to 
1
24p , but we allow for possible price discrimination by firm 2. 
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It is important to understand some specifics of the price collection and index compilation 
practices of the BLS. The Producer Price Index (PPI) measures inflation in the prices of the 
outputs of domestic producers: products sold to other domestic businesses as intermediate inputs 
as well as final demand outputs.  The Import Price Index (MPI) measures inflation for the 
products imported by U.S. businesses and residents.  The Export Price Index (XPI) measures 
inflation for U.S. export products.122  When a producer changes from buying an intermediate 
input from a domestic source to buying that same input from a foreign producer, the product 
price will drop out of the domain of definition for the PPI and will become part of the domain of 
definition for the MPI, and any price change associated with that sourcing substitution will not 
be included in either the PPI or the MPI.  
 
For the PPI and XPI, price collection is on the sellers’ side, whereas for the MPI, price collection 
is on the buyers’ side.  
 
As the first step in the procedures for collecting prices from producers, the BLS first selects 
establishments. Products are then chosen and prices are collected at the chosen establishments.  
The BLS collects price data from establishments roughly in proportion to their transaction 
volumes.  Prices are collected from some small establishments for both the PPI and the 
International Prices Program (responsible for the MPI and the XPI).  However, the proportion of 
establishments selected for price collection falls steeply with establishment size below a 
threshold value for each program.  
 
BLS protocols specify that price collection from businesses should focus on the price forming 
units.  Firms often centrally determine the selling prices for all of their establishments.  Some 
price collection is now carried out in a “head office” format, but most still involves interactions 
with the establishments where the productive activities are carried out.  Of course, it is only for 
single establishment firms that the establishment and the firm are the same.  Nevertheless, for 
convenience, hereafter we will usually refer to the production units as firms. 
 
Abstracting from some of the finer points, the current BLS price index compilation practices for 
the PPI and MPI have the consequence that the prices used for index compilation are only for 
ongoing supply contracts (see Nakamura and Steinsson [2008, 2009]).  The objective of these 
BLS practices is to ensure that only identical products, of identical quality, are priced period to 
period.  This is how the BLS has been implementing the matched model methodology for 
comparing price change over time.  However, one important reason why firms make sourcing 
substitutions is to benefit from lower prices.  When firms change the input suppliers they are 
using, this inevitably results in the initiation of new supply contracts that, we would think, 
usually involve lower prices.  Hence, a statistical agency practice of using only the prices from 
ongoing supply contracts in index compilation will miss a substantial and systematic source of 
price change.  
 
Summarizing the key points from the above discussion, BLS procedures miss price changes that 
accompany producer sourcing switches for three main reasons: 
 
                                                 
122 See Chapter 14 on the PPI Chapter 15 on the MPI and the XPI in the BLS Handbook of Methods, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homtoc.htm . See also Diewert (2007a,b). 
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When a producer switches from a domestic to a foreign supplier (or vice versa), any price change 
for the input falls into a price collection gap between the PPI and MPI programs. 
 
In an effort to control for quality differences in products and possible bundled services and 
amenities, the BLS typically only uses prices from ongoing contracts for index number 
compilation purposes.  This practice was instituted to avoid treating quality-related price 
differences as true price change.  
 
The lower-cost suppliers that producers switch to are often new, small suppliers trying to gain 
market share by undercutting the prices of established firms.  Existing BLS price collection 
practices mean there is relatively little price collection from small firms, which will tend to result 
in missing the lower-price transactions for purchases from newer firms. 
 
We want to focus attention on the above problems that are believed to be the biggest causes of 
sourcing substitution bias in the PPI and MPI.  Thus, for now, we do not bother with specifying 
the relevant BLS program or with whether the price collection is from sellers or purchasers for 
the relevant BLS price index program: issues we return to briefly later in the section titled “Price 
Collection from Sellers versus Buyers.” 
 
Table 2 shows unit values, given the value flows in Table 1.  The unit value for a homogeneous 
product is the total cost of all purchases, or the total revenue from all sales, of the product 
divided by the number of items transacted.123  Table 3 shows inflation measures for specificed 
cases.  These inflation measures are ratios of the period 1 to the period 0 unit values for the 
different cases in Table 2.  
 
For panel 1 in Tables 2 and 3, only the prices from the sales or purchases of large firms are 
included.  In contrast, for panel 2, transactions for firms of all sizes are included.  Now there are 
no blank cells.  However, firm 2 sales to firm 3 and firm 3 purchases from firm 2 are still 
ignored. In the rest of this paper, we focus on this panel 2 case.  (Actual BLS practice falls 
between the panel 1 and panel 2 cases in the sense that the BLS does collect prices from some 
small firms.)  
 
For panels 3 and 4, all transactions for all firms are included.  In panel 3, firm-specific 
expressions are shown whereas panel 4 gives the corresponding economy wide aggregate 
expressions.  We refer subsequently to the expressions in these panels 3 and 4 as true targets.  
The “true” or “target” firm indexes in panel 3 of Table 3 can be compared with the incorrectly 
measured price indexes given in panels 1 and 2 of Table 3.  The entries in Tables 2 and 3 are 
used in the following section for showing how the sourcing substitution bias could be measured 
                                                 
123 Since the product being traded between firms is assumed to be homogeneous in all of the following scenarios, the 
methodological advice given in the Producer Price Index Manual applies, and unit value prices are the appropriate 
prices to insert into index number formulas in deriving the true target price index measures. See IMF et al. (2004, 
pp. 509–510), Reinsdorf (1993), and Diewert (1995). The idea that a unit value for homogeneous items is the 
appropriate price to use in a bilateral index number formula can be traced back to Walsh (1901, p. 96) (1921, p. 88), 
and Davies (1924, 1932). Other index formulas are used in the appendix. 
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when all four firms in the hypothetical economy are domestic.  Then in the next two sections, we 
extend the analysis to cover cases where some of the firms are foreign.124  
                                                 
124 The “optimal” procedures may simply be too expensive for the agency to implement. But it is good to have our 
analysis so that rough estimates of bias could be made. 
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Table 2.  Unit Values for Domestic Firms under Alternative Measurement Conditions 
 
 Output flows Input flows 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 
Period Large in 1t =  Small in 1t =  Large in 1t =  Small in 1t =  
1.  Firm unit values; based on prices for continiuing contracts at large firms only. 
0 0
13
0
13
0
13
q
qp  
no price 
collection 013
0
13
0
13
q
qp
−  
no price 
collection 
1 1
13
1
13
1
13
q
qp  
no price 
collection 113
1
13
1
13
q
qp
−  
no price 
collection 
2.  Firm unit values; based on prices for continiuing contracts at all firms. 
0 0
13
0
13
0
13
q
qp  
0
24
0
24
0
24
q
qp  
1
13
1
13
1
13
q
qp
−  
0
24
0
24
0
24
q
qp
−  
1 1
13
1
13
1
13
q
qp  
1
24
1
24
1
24
q
qp  
1
13
1
13
1
13
q
qp
−  
0
24
0
24
0
24
q
qp
−  
3.  Firm unit values; based on all prices at all firms. 
0 0
13
0
13
0
13
q
qp  
0
24
0
24
0
24
q
qp  
0
13
0
13
0
13
q
qp
−  
0
24
0
24
0
24
q
qp
−  
1 1
13
1
13
1
13
q
qp  
1
24
1
23
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
qq
qpqp
+
+  1
23
1
13
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
qq
qpqp
+
−−  
1
24
1
24
1
24
q
qp
−  
4.  Economy wide unit values; based on all prices at all firms. 
0 0
24
0
13
0
24
0
24
0
13
0
13
qq
qpqp
+
+  
???
?
???
?
+
+
−
0
24
0
13
0
24
0
24
0
13
0
13
qq
qpqp  
1 1
24
1
23
1
13
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
qqq
qpqpqp
++
++  
???
?
???
?
++
++
−
1
24
1
23
1
13
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
qqq
qpqpqp  
Note: The unit value expressions shown above are only observable for domestic firms. 
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Table 3.  Price Indexes for Domestic Firms under Alternative Measurement Conditions 
Output flows Input flows 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 
Large in 0t =  Small in 0t =  Large in 0t =  Small in 0t =  
1.  Firm unit values; based on prices for continiuing contracts at large firms only. 
0
13
1
13
p
p  
no price 
collection 013
1
13
p
p  
no price 
collection 
2.  Firm unit values; based on prices for continiuing contracts at all firms. 
0
13
1
13
p
p  
0
24
1
24
p
p  
0
13
1
13
p
p  
0
24
1
24
p
p  
3.  Firm unit values; based on all prices at all firms. 
0
13
1
13
p
p  
0
24
0
24
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
qp
qpqp +  
0
13
0
13
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
qp
qpqp +  
0
24
1
24
p
p  
4.  Economy wide unit values; based on all prices at all firms. 
0
24
0
24
0
13
0
13
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
qpqp
qpqpqp
+
++  
0
24
0
24
0
13
0
13
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
qpqp
qpqpqp
+
++  
Note: The inflation measures shown are only observable for domestic firms. 
 
 
DOMESTIC SOURCING SUBSTITUTION BIAS 
 
We first take up sourcing substitutions among domestic sources: the most prevalent case.  For the 
Table 1 value flows, we consider the case for which results are given in panel 2 of Tables 2 and 
3.125  We consider the situation in which the only reason some changes in price for the 
homogeneous product are missed is because only prices for continuing contracts are used in 
index compilation.  For reasons expalined later, we focus on the measures for the purchasing 
firms 3 and 4 rather than the corresponding measures for the selling firms 1 and 2. 
The firm 4 price index that would be computed, denoted here by )(4IP  and shown in panel 2 of 
Table 3, is compared with the true target index for firm 4, )(4TP , shown in panel 3 of Table 3. 
                                                 
125 In Appendix A, we extend the analysis in this section to the case where we are dealing with the simultaneous 
outsourcing of N products instead of just a single product. The methods we use to measure sourcing substitution bias 
are similar to, but not the same as, the method used by Diewert (1998) to measure outlet substitution bias in the CPI.  
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Both are simply the ratio of the firm 4 purchase price for the homogeneous product in period 1, 
1
24p , to its price in period 0, 
0
24p .  Thus, for firm 4, we have126 
 
(2) )()( / 4I
0
24
1
24
4
T PppP =≡ .  
 
The sourcing substitution bias is defined as the measured index minus the true target index.  This 
difference is zero for firm 4, so there is no sourcing substitution bias problem for this firm.  
 
The analysis for firm 3 is more complex.  There are two transactions in period 1 for this firm at 
potentially different prices.  Since the product being traded is assumed to be homogeneous, as 
already noted, the unit value is the appropriate price to use for price (and also quantity) index 
compilation.  The true firm 3 unit value, 13u , for period 1 is 
 
(3) ]/[][ 123
1
13
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
1
3 qqqpqpu ++≡ , 
 
as also shown in panel 3 in Table 2.  We find it convenient to define share parameters for the 
proportions of firm 1 and firm 2 output sold to firm 3 in period 1; i.e., 
 
(4) ]/[ 123
1
13
1
13
1
13 qqqS +≡  and 
 
(5) ]/[ 123
1
13
1
23
1
23 qqqS +≡ , 
 
with 1SS 123
1
13 =+ . The unit value expression in Equation (3) can now be rewritten as 
 
(6) 123
1
23
1
13
1
13
1
3 SpSpu += . 
 
Using Eqs. (3)–(6), the target firm 3 price index, shown in panel 3 of Table 3, is 
 
(7) 123
0
13
1
23
1
13
0
13
1
13
0
13
1
3
3
T SppSpppuP )/()/(/
)( +=≡ . 
 
However, the formula given in Equation (7) is not what would be evaluated for firm 3 if the 
period 1 sales of firm 2 to firm 3 are ignored because this is the first period for a new contract. 
As given in panel 2, the measured price change component for firm 3 would be 
 
(8) 013
1
13
3
I ppP /
)(
≡ . 
                                                 
126 We assume that the corresponding true quantity index is obtained by deflating the value ratio by the true price 
index. Thus 013
1
13
1
T
0
13
0
13
1
13
1
13
1
T qqPqpqpQ //]/[
)()(
=≡  and 024
1
24
4
T
0
24
0
24
1
24
1
24
4
T qqPqpqpQ //]/[
)()(
=≡ . 
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The numerator in this incorrect index is the period 1 price from the high-cost supplier, 113p , 
rather than the unit value price, 13u , which is an average price for firm 3 input purchases in 
period 1 from both the high- and low-cost suppliers.  
 
Before specifying a formula for the bias for the firm 3 price index, it is helpful, for interpretive 
purposes, to introduce a bit more notation.  We will let i be the rate of price inflation for 
deliveries from the high-cost supplier, firm 1, to firm 3.  
 
(9) )(/)( 3I
0
13
1
13 Pppi1 =≡+ ,   using Equation (8). 
 
Also, we let 1d0 <≤  be a discount factor reflecting the proportional price discount for firm 3 
purchases from firm 1 versus firm 2.  Thus, we have 
 
(10) 013
1
23 ppd1i1 /))(( =−+ , 
 
where 1ppd1 113
1
23 ≤=− /)( . From Equation (9), Equation (10), and Equation (7), we now have 
 
(11) 123
0
13
1
23
1
13
0
13
1
13
3
T SppSppP )/()/(
)( +=  
 
         123
1
13 Sd1i1Si1 ))(()( −+++=  
 
         123
3
I dSi1P )(
)( +−=   also using Equation (8) and the property 
1SS 123
1
13 =+ . 
 
Therefore, for the case of a purchasing substituion from one domestic producer to another, the 
sourcing substitution bias for firm 3 is defined as the index that is computed, given in Equation 
(8), less the true target index given in Equation (7): 
 
(12) 0dSi1PPB 123
3
T
3
I
3 >+=−≡ )()()()( .  
 
From Equation (12) we see that the sourcing bias is positive since 0d > , and the product of 
three factors: 
 
1) The rate of price inflation for the high-cost supplier; i.e., 013
1
13 ppi1 /)( ≡+ ; 
 
2) The proportional cost advantage of the low-cost supplier over the high-cost supplier; i.e., 
1pppp1d 013
1
13
0
13
1
23 >−= )]//()/[( ; and 
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3) The share of deliveries to sector 3 in period 1 that are from the new low-cost supplier; i.e., 
]/[ 123
1
13
1
23
1
23 qqqS +≡ . 
 
If rough guesses can be made for the cost advantage of the low-cost supplier and the input shares 
displaced, then a rough approximation of the bias in the intermediate input price index could be 
made using Equation (12).127 
 
We conclude this section with some observations regarding two extensions of the above results 
for domestic sourcing substitutions: 1) an extension to the whole economy level, and 2) an 
extension to the case where the higher cost supplier, firm 1, shuts down in period 1 because of 
the competition from firm 2, so 113p  and 
1
13q  are not available.  
 
Regarding the whole economy extension, since the firms 1 and 2 are selling a homogeneous 
commodity, the true period 1 unit value for the combined economy-wide inputs of firms 3 and 4 
is ]/[][ 124
1
23
1
13
1
24
1
24
1
23
1
23
1
13
1
13
1 qqqqpqpqpu ++++−≡ , and the corresponding period 0 whole 
economy unit value is ]/[][ 024
0
13
0
24
0
24
0
13
0
13
0 qqqpqpu ++−≡ , as in panel 4, Table 2. Thus the 
target price index is 0143T uuP /
)(
≡
+ , which equals the expression in panel 4 of Table 3. 
 
If the statistical agency fails to include the price information for the new period 1 contract that 
firm 2 has to supply firm 3, then the computed economy-wide index would be 
]/[][ 024
0
24
0
13
0
13
1
24
1
24
1
13
1
13 qpqpqpqp ++ , which will yield a higher value than the target index. 
Thus the computed index for the combined firms will have an upward bias. 
 
Moving on to the second extension, suppose firm 1 shuts down in period 1 because of the 
competition from firm 2, so that 113p  and 
1
13q  are not available.  Now it is not possible to define 
an observable true output price index for firm 1 in period 1.  However, the true input price index 
for firm 3 can still be defined by Equation (7) with 0S113 =  and 1S
1
23 = , so 
)(3
TP  could be 
specified to be the (unmatched) price ratio 013
1
23 pp / , and the rest of the algebra above goes 
through.  
 
However, although the true input price index for firm 3, 013
1
23 pp / , could be evaluated, note that 
the period 0 and period 1 price observations come from different suppliers. Given currently 
accepted practices, a statistical agency would be more likely to measure the price change by 
0
24
1
24 pp / . With low inflation for the prices charged by any one firm, this price ratio would be 
close to one and hence generally larger than the mixed price ratio, 013
1
23 pp / .  Thus, in general, 
                                                 
127 In Appendix A, we show that the bias formula becomes more complex when we generalize the above one 
commodity case to the case of many commodities, but Equation (12) is valuable as a rough approximation to the 
bias. 
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the incorrect index will again have an upward bias, though this bias is not given by Equation 
(12).128 
 
 
OFFSHORE SOURCING SUBSTITUTION BIAS  
 
The extension of the analysis in the previous section to cover the case of a domestic firm 
switching among foreign suppliers is straightforward. We simply reinterpret firms 1 and 2 as 
foreign suppliers. Now none of the column 1 and 2 expressions can be evaluated in Table 2, so 
we focus on the prices that can be observed for firms 3 and 4. Inflation measurement for imports 
must be carried out using prices collected from purchasers. (Comparability with the results here 
is one reason we chose to focus on price indexes for firms 3 and 4 in the previous section too.) 
 
All of the algebra in the previous section can be applied. There are no sourcing substitution bias 
problems for firm 4. However, the statistical agency will be likely to compute the incorrect price 
index for firm 3 given by Equation (8) instead of the true target index given by Equation (7), for 
the same reasons explained above. Thus, the bias Equation (12) is again operative.  
 
Now imports are in the picture, for each firm in the domestic economy, input purchases should 
be distinguished by their point of origin so it can be determined whether a purchase should be 
classified as a domestic or an imported input. We further discuss this issue in the next to last 
section which is on the BEA Industry Accounts.  
 
 
DOMESTIC TO FOREIGN SOURCING SUBSTITUTIONS 
 
Finally, we take up the case where firm 1 is a domestic supplier and firm 2 is a lower-cost 
foreign supplier of the same homogeneous product. Now it is just the column 2 expressions in 
Tables 2 and 3 that cannot be evaluated. However, since firms 3 and 4 are domestic, the column 
3 and 4 expressions can still be evaluated. The sourcing substitution for firm 3 is now the switch 
from exclusively using a domestic supplier (firm 1) in period 0 to importing some of the firm’s 
requirements for the homogeneous input from the foreign firm 2 in period 1.  
 
All of the algebra in section 3 for firm 3 remains valid. Thus the bias analysis in the third section 
carries over to the present context in a straightforward manner. 
 
 
PRICE COLLECTION FROM SELLERS VERSUS BUYERS 
 
With the producer price indexes currently produced by the BLS, the price collection is on the 
purchasers’ side for the MPI since it is only the purchasers that are domestic, but it is on the 
sellers’ side for the PPI. We ignored this institutional information in the previous sections and 
proceeded as though all price collection were on the buyers’ side. We did this partly for 
expositional convenience, but also because doing this allowed us to demonstrate that the 
                                                 
128 The new bias formula will be )/()/()()( 013
1
23
0
24
1
24
3
T
3
I ppppPPB −=−≡ . 
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sourcing substitution bias problem cannot be corrected solely by creating a comprehensive input 
price index with price collection on the purchasers’ side.129  
 
As of now, the United States does not have a comprehensive input price index.  Rather, the 
components of the PPI program that are for intermediate products sold to other businesses and 
the price index components of the MPI for purchases by businesses are combined to form a 
pseudo input price index.  The BLS hopes to begin producing a true Input Price Index (IPI) in the 
future, as explained in Alterman (2009), but has not yet been given the funding to do so. We 
view this as an important step forward.  However, to deal with the sourcing substitution bias 
problem, the BLS also needs to utilize the initial observation when a new procurement contract is 
started, relating this price to the price paid under the previous contract, and to collect prices from 
all firms rather than mostly from large ones.  The purchaser knows, presumably, whether the 
product is truly the same despite a price change.130  On the other hand, a seller typically has no 
information about the prior purchasing choices of their customers or their reasons for making 
sourcing changes.  So, new sources of supply should be flagged and the statistical agency must 
decide, case by case, on whether the product from a new source of supply is closely comparable 
to the product from the old source of supply.  This is the information that would make the BLS 
feel comfortable about including prices for first time purchases under new procurement contracts 
in producer price index calculations.  Making these changes will not be easy, but our bias 
Equation (12) makes it clear the changes are important! 
 
 
THE BEA INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS 
 
One important use of producer price indexes is for use by the BEA for producing industry 
accounts that are corrected for pure price change over time. The BEA industry accounts, which 
include the benchmark input-output (I-O) accounts and annual GDP-by-industry accounts, are 
heavily used for economic policy analyses.131 Benchmark I-O accounts are produced every five 
years using data from the quinquennial economic census of businesses. These include make, use, 
and requirements tables. A make table shows the value of each product produced by each 
industry in a given year.132 A use table shows the uses of products by intermediate and final 
users.133 
 
Starting with the initial benchmark make and use tables, the BEA produces balanced make and 
use tables using a procedure that sequentially changes row and column figures until the recorded 
                                                 
129 Almost 50 years ago, the 1961 report of the NBER Price Statistics Review Committee (the Stigler Report) also 
recommended that the BLS should rely on purchasers’ prices rather than the sellers’ prices. 
130 If the purchaser is acting on behalf of another party, then the question might need to be referred to that other 
party. 
131 See, for example, Streitwieser (2009) on the ongoing sorts of public policy uses of the BEA industry accounts. 
132 Each industry gets a row in a make table, and each product gets a column. The values in a row sum to the current 
value of output for the stated industry. Each column total equals the total output for the given product. 
133 Each product gets a row, and each row sum is the gross output for the given product. There are columns for the 
industry intermediate uses and columns for final uses. The value added for an industry is the sum of the values of 
total industry sales (gross output) minus the value of purchases from other industries (aggregate intermediate 
industry input). Industry value added summed over industries equals the business sector GDP for the nation. 
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total use of each product equals its recorded total supply, and the recorded final demands equal 
the values given in the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPAs).134  
 
Requirements tables are derived from the balanced make and use tables. The coefficients in the 
requirements tables represent interindustry linkages that, in turn, link output and final demand. 
For example, the entries in the employment requirements table show the estimated direct and 
indirect impacts of a change in final demand on employment in the different industries. 
Requirements tables are used for policy impact analyses.  
 
For the purpose of producing constant price real I-O accounts from nominal I-O accounts, price 
indexes are needed for deflating the outputs and also the inputs. Unfortunately, as explained 
above, we believe the input price indexes for producers are distorted by sourcing substitution 
biases.  In addition, there are gaps in intermediate product price collection. Imputed rather than 
direct pricing is used for numerous products.  Moreover, the same economy-wide producer price 
deflator is generally used to deflate the value flows between and from each of the industries. 
Diewert (2007c) notes that this procedure is correct only if each industry produces the same mix 
of micro commodities within each of the broad commodity classes and micro commodity prices 
move together across industries: conditions unlikely to be satisfied for a nation! 
 
Moving to the annual industry accounts (AIAs), these consist of the annual GDP-by-industry 
accounts and the annual I-O accounts.  The annual GDP-by-industry estimates are based on 
annual survey and administrative data from several sources. In contrast, the annual I-O accounts 
are produced by updating the benchmark I-O accounts utilizing the assumption that the real 
(constant-price) use of intermediate inputs relative to each industry’s real gross output does not 
change year-to-year; see Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2009).  The estimates of an industry’s 
real intermediate inputs are first updated based on projected changes in the industry’s real gross 
output from the GDP-by-industry accounts and using the observed ratios of intermediate input 
use to gross output. The AIAs are then “integrated” internally and with the NIPAs. The 
integration achieved is referred to as partial integration.  
 
The balancing process can be viewed, Parker (2004) suggests, as using the relative strengths of 
the available data to produce the best possible data for users.  However, an initial imbalance, say, 
in the initial use table in the form of too little, or too much, supply of a product after the 
estimated intermediate input and final uses have been accounted for represents either an 
inconsistency in the data or in the framework for the accounts.  The balancing process renders 
less visible the initial imbalances; see Meade (2006). 
 
Filling the intermediate products value and price data gaps would help the BEA to move toward 
full rather than just partial integration of the industry accounts. Lawson, Moyer, and Okubo 
(2006) note that the methods developed by the BEA to achieve partial integration were never 
seen as an adequate substitute for the needed improvements to the source data.  They explain 
that, with full integration, the measures of value added by industry would be independent of the 
NIPAs and could provide a useful “feedback” loop that would improve the estimates of the 
product composition of GDP.  
                                                 
134 The techniques used for this balancing are explained in Appendix B of Lawson, Moyer, and Okubo (2006). See 
also Horowitz and Planting (2006) and Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008). 
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Also, policymakers would like to know what factors account for current U.S. offshoring. They 
would like to understand and be able to foresee and perhaps influence the major effects of 
offshoring on U.S. workers and the economy.135  The I-O tables serve as the framework for 
combining the available data for estimated GDP, and are essential to empirical studies of how 
outsourcing and offshoring and inshoring are affecting the U.S. economy.  However, to properly 
allow for foreign engagement, the commodity classification that is used in the I-O tables must be 
expanded.  A gross output that is being produced by a particular industry in a particular 
commodity category must be further distinguished as being supplied to the domestic market or as 
an export while an intermediate input that is being used by a particular industry in a particular 
commodity category must be further distinguished as being purchased from a domestic or a 
foreign supplier.  Making these changes would not be a dramatic methodological leap since the 
1993 System of National Accounts (SNA93) guidelines already suggested this treatment of 
intermediate inputs as a supplementary table.136 However, this change would be expensive.  
 
If it is deemed important to have information on the exports produced and the imports demanded 
by each industrial sector, it will be necessary to construct unit value output prices for both 
exports and deliveries to domestic demanders and to construct unit value input prices for both 
imports and deliveries to the sector from domestic suppliers. If we take this approach as the 
ideal, the dimensionality of the supply and use tables would be expanded beyond what could 
conceivably be implemented in terms of needed data collection, given present survey data 
collection methods and business concerns about confidentiality. However, the suggested 
approach could be partially implemented at least, as suggested by Diewert (2001).137  
 
If our purpose is to measure industry productivity, or to measure industry level product or labor 
demand impacts, then the answer is reasonably straightforward. When calculating the constant 
dollar I-O matrices, each value cell for outputs and each value cell for inputs needs to be deflated 
by a price index that matches up with the value flows in that cell. At present, however, there 
simply are no adequate surveys on the interindustry flows of services. Even in manufacturing, 
where information on commodity flows is relatively complete thanks to explicit surveys of 
manufacturing industries, relatively little information on the flows of purchased services is 
collected. More attention also needs to be given to the development of basic prices by industry 
and by commodity—i.e., we need accurate information on the exact location of indirect taxes 
(and commodity subsidies) by commodity and industry on both outputs and inputs. 
 
                                                 
135 See Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006); Freenstra and Bradford (2009); Jarmin, Krizan and Tang (2009); 
Kletzer (2009); and Norwood et al. (2006).  
136 See Table 15.5 in Eurostat et al. (1993). For a more detailed discussion of how exports and imports could be 
introduced into the production accounts, see Diewert (2007a,b) and IMF et al. (2009). 
137 See Diewert (2005, 2007c) for a treatment of these problems in a closed economy context, and Diewert (2007a,b) 
for an open economy treatment.  
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RECOMMENDED DATA GAP FIXES 
 
As explained following Table 1, the present BLS price collection procedures miss price changes 
of three sorts that accompany producer sourcing switches: 1) price changes associated with 
domestic to foreign sourcing substitutions (or vice versa), 2) price changes associated with the 
start of new procurement contracts, and 3) price changes involving sales of or purchases from 
small firms for one of the two time periods involved for the price change. The resulting price 
data gaps lead to sourcing substitution bias problems.  
 
Changes in statistical agency practices could fix these data-based problems, though these are 
changes that a statistical agency like the BLS would need additional funding to implement. A 
comprehensive Input Price Index (IPI) is needed of the sort the BLS would like to have the funds 
to produce. Price collection should be from purchasers rather than sellers whenever possible, 
since it is only the purchasers who are in a position to state whether there were quality changes 
as well as price changes associated with sourcing changes. Also, it is important for data to be 
collected from all firms, or at least from higher proportions of small firms. 
 
We believe that an important step toward achieving the needed expansion of data collection from 
firms is for the present survey data collection methods to progressively be replaced with full 
electronic price and value data capture for all transactions of all businesses large enough to have 
electronic information systems.138 Many firms have taken advantage of the low cost of computing 
and now have detailed data on all their financial transactions (e.g., they have the value of each 
sale and the quantity sold by commodity).139 This information could enable industry and firm 
research like the scanner data studies that have proven to be so useful in the context of the 
Consumer Price Index.140 This information would permit the construction of true microeconomic 
price and quantity indexes at the firm level and the evaluation of more accurate firm and industry 
productivity indexes. The 2008 American Economic Review study of Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Syverson makes it clear that having this sort of information could result in a revolutionary 
rewrite of our understanding of how productivity growth takes place in the U.S. economy. 
Some additional tentative conclusions also follow from our analysis: 
 
• Basic index number theory and statistical agency practice has not paid enough attention 
to the problems that arise when new firms enter and some grow, and some established 
firms shrink and then exit.  
• It seems likely that statistical agency operating procedures have led to upward sourcing 
substitution biases in the intermediate product components of the PPI and MPI. Upward 
biases in input price indexes lead to downward biases in the corresponding quantity 
indexes and have the effect of overstating total factor productivity improvements. 
                                                 
138 Abraham and Spletzer argue convincingly that economies of scale would be realized if data were collected, when 
possible, for entire firms from their head offices. The context in which Abraham and Spletzer (2009) present these 
options is different, but the options they outline seem relevant for our context too. 
139 For more on new ways of collecting price data, see also Gudmundsdottir, Gudnason, and Jonsdottir (2008) and 
Grimm, Moulton, and Wasshausen (2002). 
140 See, for example, Reinsdorf (1994a,b); Nakamura (2008), Ivancic, Diewert, and K.J. Fox (forthcoming); and 
Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura (forthcoming). 
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• Since the value of international trade as a proportion of GDP has mostly increased over 
time, it seems likely that sourcing substitution bias has also increased over time. 
• There are other data gaps in the U.S. economic statistics that compound the problems 
resulting from sourcing substitution bias. In particular, currently in the United States, 
value information for intermediate products is only collected every five years, and there 
is no direct price collection for large numbers of intermediate products of economic 
importance.  
 
N. Gregory Mankiw (2006, p. 44) quotes John Maynard Keynes as stating: 
 
“If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people 
on a level with dentists, that would be splendid.” 
 
Mankiw explains that Keynes was expressing a hope that macroeconomics would evolve into a 
useful sort of engineering and that “avoiding a recession would be as straightforward as filling a 
cavity.” He goes on to lament a paucity of those in our profession who are willing to commit 
their time and energies to helping to achieve the objectives that Keynes enunciated. However, 
dentists work on the teeth of their patients with the aid of lights, special mirrors, patients who 
willingly open their mouths, and dental X rays. In our view, for economists to make greater 
progress on understanding the economy and for economists and government policymakers to be 
able to do better on managing the economy, we need better “equipment” for seeing the economy. 
The data improvements recommended in this article would help in this regard. 
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Appendix A: Outsourcing Bias when there are N Commodities Being Outsourced 
 
The analysis in the main text associated with Table 1 deals only with the case of a single 
homogeneous product. In this appendix, we define indexes as aggregates over N products instead 
of a single product. The overall message remains the same but the details are more complex. 
 
In this more general setup, there are four groups of firms. We will assume that group 3 
simultaneously switches their sourcing arrangements for N homogeneous commodities. In 
particular, group 3 switches some of its input procurement contracts for N commodities group 3 
firms need as inputs from group 1 (the higher-cost supplier) to group 2 (the lower-cost supplier) 
for N commodities. Thus, the flows shown in Table 1 are still applicable except that now each 
price and quantity shown in the table is interpreted as a vector and the old ordinary price and 
quantity products must now be interpreted as inner products of the corresponding price and 
quantity vectors. Thus, the old value flow of supplies from group i to group j in period t, tij
t
ijqp , 
is replaced by ?
=
≡⋅
N
1n
t
ijn
t
ijn
t
ij
t
ij qpqp  for 10t ,=  where now 
t
ijp = ],,,[
t
ijN
t
2ij
t
1ij ppp ?  is a price 
vector and tijq = ],,,[
t
ijN
t
2ij
t
1ij qqq ?  is a quantity vector.  
Let tp  and tq  be generic price and quantity vectors pertaining to a group for periods 10t ,= . 
Then the Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes, LP  and PP , are defined as follows: 
 
(A1) 00011010L qpqpqqppP ⋅⋅≡ /),,,(  and 
10111010
P qpqpqqppP ⋅⋅≡ /),,,( . 
The Fisher (1922) ideal price index, FP , is defined as the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and 
Paasche price indexes: 
 
(A2) 211010P
1010
L
1010
F qqppPqqppPqqppP
/)],,,(),,,([),,,( ≡ . 
 
The Fisher price index can be justified as a “best” index from multiple perspectives141 and will be 
used for forming the “true” target index in what follows.  
 
Looking at Table 1, it is straightforward to define the true output price index for group 1, )(1TP , 
as the Fisher index ),,,( 113
0
13
1
13
0
13F qqppP  and the true input price index for group 4, 
)(4
TP , as the 
usual Fisher index ),,,( 124
0
24
1
24
0
24F qqppP . There are no sourcing substitution complications here. 
However, in period 1, group 2 firms began selling the same product to group 3 as well as group 4 
firms, possibly at different prices. Thus, proper measurement of inflation for group 2 and group 3 
transactions is more complicated. 
 
For groups 2 and 3, the unit value prices for the N commodities ( N1n ,,?= ) in period 1 are 
 
                                                 
141 See Diewert (1976, 1992) and the Producer Price Index Manual. 
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where the group 2 and 3 (physical) quantity shares for product n in period 1 are given by 
 
(A5) ]/[ 1 n24
1
n23
1
n23
1
n23 qqqS +≡ ; ]/[
1
n24
1
n23
1
n24
1
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1
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1
n13 qqqS +≡ ; ]/[
1
n23
1
n13
1
n23
1
n23 qqqS +≡ ; 1SS
1
n23
1
n13 =+ . 
 
Let the vector of group 2 unit value prices for period 1 be u21 ≡ [u211,u221,...,u2N1] where the u2n1 
are defined by (A3) and let the vector of group 3 unit value prices for period 1 be u31 ≡ 
[u311,u321,...,u3N1] where the u3n1 are defined by (A4). The period 1 quantity vectors that 
correspond to these unit value vectors in period 1 are q231+q241 for group 2 and q131+q231 for 
group 3. Thus our true output index for group 2 and our true input index for group 3 are defined 
to be the following Fisher ideal price indexes, respectively,  
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In principle, a statistical agency could compute the true output price index )(2TP  defined by (A7) 
and the true input price index, )(3TP  defined by (A8). In practice, there are likely to be problems. 
Of particular relevance here, group 3 has switched to a new supplier in period 1 for the N 
commodities under consideration, so there will be no matching price for these supplies in period 
0. Given current BLS practices, it is likely that the statistical agency will use the following 
“matched model” incorrect intermediate input price index for group 3:  
 
(A9) .)],,,(),,,([ /)( 21113
0
13
1
3
0
13P
1
13
0
13
1
3
0
13L
3
I qqppPqqppPP ≡  
 
The incorrect index )(3IP  is the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes, 
).,,,( 113
0
13
1
3
0
13L qqppP  and ),,,(
1
13
0
13
1
3
0
13P qqppP , that use only the price and quantity data for the 
incumbent supply source (group 1 firms) for both periods. Since group 1 is a high-cost supplier, 
we can expect )(3IP  to be higher than the true index, 
)(3
TP . Here we will develop formulae that 
will enable us to determine the magnitude of this upward bias. 
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It is cumbersome to develop a bias formula for the difference of )(3IP  less 
)(3
TP  but it is fairly 
easy to develop bias formulas for the differences between the Laspeyres and Paasche 
components of these indexes. Thus, we start our analysis by expressing the high-cost supplier 
price relatives, 0 n13
1
n13 pp / , as the following high-cost supplier product specific inflation rates: 
 
(A10) )(/ n
0
n13
1
n13 i1pp +≡ ;    N1n ,,?= ; 
 
Next, the lower-cost supplier prices in period 1 relative to the corresponding high-cost supplier 
prices in period 0 are expressed as: 
 
(A11) ))((/ nn
0
n13
1
n23 i1d1pp +−≡ ,   N1n ,,?=  
 
where nd  is a proportional discount factor for the low- versus the higher-cost supplier for 
product n that satisfies 
 
(A12) 1d0 n << ;      N1n ,,?= . 
 
We start our analysis by looking at the Laspeyres component )(3TLP  of the true input price index 
defined by (A8) 
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          using (A10) and 
(A11) 
 
        0 n13
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        0 n13
1
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0
n13n
N
1n sSi1dsi1 )()([ +−+= ?? ==   using (A6) 
where the period 0 expenditure shares on the N commodities in group 3 are defined as follows: 
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It is straightforward to show that ?
=
+N 1n
0
n13n si1 )(  is the incorrect Laspeyres component, 
),,,( 113
0
13
1
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0
13L qqppP , in the incorrect Fisher price index for group 3 defined by (A9) above; so, 
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Thus if we define the bias LB  in the incorrect Laspeyres index as the difference between 
)(3
ILP  
and )(3TLP , using (A13) and (A15), we have the following expression for this bias: 
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where the inequality follows from the nonnegativity of the physical shares 1 n23S  (with at least 
one of these shares being positive), the positivity of the base period expenditure shares 0 n13s  and 
the positivity of the discount factors nd . The bias formula (A16) has the same general structure 
as the bias formula (12) in the main text except that now it is the base period expenditure shares 
0
n13s  of the group making the N-product sourcing switch that enter the formula. 
 
We now need to repeat the above analysis for the Paasche component of the true index )(3TP  
defined by (A8) and the Paasche component of the incorrect index )(3IP  defined by (A9). Define 
these Paasche components as follows: 
 
(A17) )(/)(),,,()( 123
1
13
0
13
1
23
1
13
1
3
1
23
1
13
0
13
1
3
0
13P
3
TP qqpqquqqqupPP ++≡+≡ ; 
 
(A18) 113
0
13
1
13
1
13
1
13
0
13
1
3
0
13P
3
IP qpqp          qqupPP /),,,(
)(
≡≡ . 
 
In place of the base period expenditure shares 0 n13s , for our Paasche analysis, we require two sets 
of expenditure weights that use the prices of period 0 but quantities that pertain to period 1. 
These hybrid expenditure shares are given by:  
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(A20) )qq(p/)qq(ps 123
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*01
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The expenditure shares 01ns  use the base period prices for group 3, 
01
np , and the deliveries of the 
high cost group to group 3 in period 1, 113q , whereas the expenditure shares 
*01
ns  use the base 
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period prices for group 3, 013p , as the price vector and the sum of all deliveries to group 3 in 
period 1, 123
1
13 qq + , as the quantity vector.           
 
We must now look at the Paasche component )(3TPP  of the true input price index defined by (A8). 
Using definition (A17), we have  
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 Moreover, for the Paasche component )(3IPP  of the incorrect input price index defined by 
(A9), using definition (A18), we have 
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Define the bias BP in the incorrect Paasche index as the difference between )(3IPP  and 
)(3
TPP . 
Using (A21) and (A22), we have the following expression for this bias: 
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Under normal conditions, the first term in the last line of (A23) will be close to zero142 so the 
second term, *01n13
1
n23n
N
1n n
sS)i1(d +?
=
, will dominate. Since this second term is positive under our 
assumptions, the Paasche component of the bias, PB , will usually be positive. This second term 
has the same general form as the Laspeyres bias component LB  defined above by (A16).  
 
We can approximate the true Fisher index )(3TP  defined by (A8) by the arithmetic mean of its 
Laspeyres and Paasche components. Also, we can approximate the incorrect Fisher index )(3IP  
defined by (A9) by the arithmetic mean of its Laspeyres and Paasche components. Expressions 
(A16) and (A23) can be used to form an overall bias estimate for the incorrect Fisher index.  
  
 
                                                 
142 If all of the commodity specific inflation rates for the high cost producer are equal (i.e., the in are all equal), then 
it can be seen that the first term on the right hand side of (A23) will vanish since the two sets of shares sum to one. 
This term will also be zero if the correlation between the vector of commodity specific inflation rates in and the 
vector of differences in the shares is zero. 
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One of the ways in which the U.S. economy has been transformed since the 1970s is the growth 
of its engagement in international trade.  Imports of nonpetroleum goods have risen particularly 
rapidly.  They amounted to about 10 percent of final domestic uses of goods in personal 
consumption expenditures and gross investment in 1975, about 20 percent in 1991–1992, and 
about 30 percent in 2008 (Figure 1).   
 
Many factors have been found to contribute to growth of imports, including lower transport 
costs, lower communications costs, advances in managing the logistics of fragmented supply 
chains, multilateral trade liberalizations, scale economies, growth in varieties, rising productivity 
and capital stocks of emerging Asian economies, and undervalued foreign currencies.  These 
factors can be expected to act to lower prices of imports to domestic buyers.  Substitution to 
lower-priced sources of supply therefore seems to be an important driver of the growth of 
nonpetroleum goods imports.   
 
Yet the U.S. import price indexes generally give no indication that prices have been a significant 
factor in the displacement by imports of domestic sources of supply.  Goods prices at the 
consumer level should be an average of prices from domestic and imported sources of supply 
adjusted for trade and transportation margins, so if import prices are falling relative to domestic 
prices, we might expect to see the price index for imports of nonpetroleum goods rising more 
slowly (or falling faster) than a price index for nonenergy goods in personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE) in the national income and product accounts (NIPAs).  Although this pattern 
did occur between 1996 and 2001, in most years since 1990 the imports index has risen faster 
than an index of PCE nonenergy goods prices (Figure 2).  On a cumulative basis over the time 
span from 1990 to 2008, prices for imports of nonpetroleum consumer goods rose about 4 
percent more than the PCE prices.      
 
Figure 2 suggests that the import indexes might be missing some price declines, but comparisons 
of aggregate indexes like those shown in Figure 2 can be affected by differences in commodity 
composition or weights.  If commodities with above-average rates of price growth are more 
heavily represented in the mix of items included in the nonpetroleum goods import index, 
declines in relative prices of imports might have occurred at the level of detailed items but have 
been masked in the more aggregated indexes by the mix effects.   
 
 
TWO HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE IMPORT PRICE 
INDEX 
 
Newly Imported Products 
 
Imports could gain market share through lower prices in two ways that would be difficult for the 
import price indexes to measure.  First, when substitution from a domestic supplier to a foreign 
supplier involves a product that was not previously imported, that product constitutes a new good 
for purposes of the import price index.  This means that it will be linked into the import price 
index in a way that avoids an effect on the index’s level.  If the newly imported product starts out 
priced on a par with competing domestic products (perhaps subsequently picking up market 
share by falling in relative price), and it is brought into the import index promptly, the index will 
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not suffer any bias.  (Of course, bringing the new import into the index promptly may not be 
easy, particularly if it does not fit into the preexisting product classification system used for the 
imports index.)  Yet a more likely scenario for a newly imported product that succeeds in 
capturing a significant market share is that it already has a substantially lower quality-adjusted 
price than the domestic incumbents at the time of entry.  If an imported product enters at a low 
price, a temporary state of disequilibrium may ensue as information about the price and quality 
of the newly available import diffuses and preexisting contracts with incumbent suppliers expire.   
 
When entry occurs at a substantially lower price level than that prevailing in the marketplace, 
prompt linking of the new import into the buyers’ price index is not sufficient to capture all the 
gains to buyers.  A theoretical measure all of the gains would bring the newly imported product 
into the index by creating a hypothetical observation for the time period before the one in which 
actual purchases of the product begin with a quantity of zero and a price equal to the Hicksian 
virtual price (which is defined as the price that is just high enough to drive demand to zero).  The 
consumer surplus from the drop from the Hicksian virtual price to the price at which purchases 
are first occur can then be measured by integrating the area under a compensated demand curve.   
 
A practical approximation to this theoretical concept would use a Törnqvist, Fisher, or Fisher-
like index formula and an estimated value of the virtual price at which quantity demanded would 
be zero.  For example, if the entrant offers a quality level that is identical to that of the incumbent 
supplier, the Hicksian virtual price equals the price of the incumbent supplier.  This principle 
was used by Griliches and Cockburn (1995) to argue that when a branded pharmaceutical goes 
off patent, the low-priced generic should not be linked into the CPI.  Instead, the prices of the 
generic and its branded counterpart should be directly compared, with a quality adjustment for 
the generic that attributes half of the savings enjoyed by those consumers who substitute to the 
generic to a quality decline and counts the other half as a pure price reduction.  Similarly, 
Reinsdorf (1993) argues that when consumers change their purchasing patterns to lower-priced 
discount outlets, linking the lower-priced outlets into the CPI would result in outlet substitution 
bias.  As in the case of generic pharmaceuticals, the Hicksian virtual price for those consumers 
who substitute the discount outlet for the full-service outlet can be estimated by the price of the 
full-service outlet. 
 
A buyers’ price index that combined imported and domestic sources of supply could also 
properly account for the gains from the entry of a new product into the imports basket if the 
newly imported product matched the characteristics of a domestically supplied product.  In the 
case of matching characteristics, the import could be brought into the buyers’ price index as a 
directly comparable substitute, meaning that its price would be directly compared with the price 
of the domestically supplied item that it replaced.  In addition, if the characteristics are not 
exactly identical, a direct quality adjustment could be made to the price of the imported item to 
allow it to be compared to its domestically supplied counterpart.  In many cases, imported 
sources of supply will involve extra delivery lags, communications problems, and warehousing 
costs, so that even if the physical characteristics are identical to those of the domestic product 
that it replaces, some downward quality adjustment is warranted.  In a buyers’ price index, it 
might therefore be reasonable to treat a physically identical import the same way that a generic 
drug is treated in the CPI index for pharmaceuticals of Griliches and Cockburn (1995).   
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New Product Varieties 
 
The second hard-to-measure way that imports could gain market share is through the entry of 
new varieties (or source countries) of products that are already present in the imports index’s 
basket.  A difficult challenge in the construction of import (and export) price indexes is that price 
changes tend to coincide with changes in product specifications.  (This may be because foreign 
trade occurs under contracts that fix the price for the lifespan of the variety, and the signing of a 
new contract presents an opportunity to revise both the price and the item characteristics.)  The 
effect on the price of a change in an item’s characteristics is difficult to measure directly, so new 
varieties are usually linked in a way that avoids any effect on the index’s level.  This practice 
tends to result in an index that is artificially flat if the market is one in which price changes tend 
to be delayed until the item’s characteristics are updated.   
 
In contrast to the “new goods” hypothesis, which always implies an upward bias, the new 
varieties hypothesis implies that an upward bias in the import prices indexes arises only for items 
whose true price trend (including correctly measured quality change effects) is downward.  Many 
electronic and technology-intensive goods do, in fact, have falling price trends, so a bias toward 
zero in the measured rate of price change could plausibly have a positive effect on the rate of 
growth of the aggregate import index for nonpetroleum goods.   
 
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find that in the samples used to construct the imports indexes, 
prices frequently remain constant for the life of a quote (that is, for the length of time that the 
specific version of an item remains in the sample).  Respondents tend to report a price change 
only at the time of a change in the version of the item that they import.  When price and 
characteristics change simultaneously, separating the reported change in price into a quality 
change component and a pure price change component is difficult.  Consequently, the new 
version of the product is typically linked into the index, which is equivalent to attributing all of 
the reported price change to quality change.  The fraction of the observed price changes that are 
effectively treated as price changes of zero is high for some products in the import and export 
indexes.  This is not the case of the CPI, because most products in the CPI do not behave in this 
way, and because the CPI uses hedonics or other methods to value characteristics changes for 
those products where price changes tend to coincide with characteristics changes.      
 
 
USE OF CPIs FOR COMPARISONS 
 
Construction of Suppliers’ Price Indexes and Purchasers’ Price Index 
 
Although no buyers’ index that allows price comparisons of imported and domestic-sourced 
products exists at the wholesale level or for intermediate inputs, buyers’ indexes for final 
consumer goods do exist.  In particular, CPIs for individual goods or classes of goods are buyers’ 
indexes that can include both imported and domestically produced items.   
 
Although the CPI does bring in some foreign-sourced items by linking, it appears to be less 
vulnerable to linking bias than the import price index. In the CPI, a foreign-sourced item would 
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be directly compared to a domestic-sourced item if the consumer is thought to perceive their 
quality levels as the same.  Furthermore, the CPI makes more use of direct quality adjustment 
techniques, such as hedonic regressions and suppliers’ cost estimates, than do the import and 
export indexes.    
 
On the assumption that some declines in prices paid by buyers from substitutions from domestic 
to imported versions of products and from substitutions between imported versions of products 
are reflected in the CPI but not in the imports price indexes, CPIs should tend to show lower 
inflation rates than import price indexes covering similar detailed items.  In Figure 3, for 
example, the average rate of growth of tire prices is 4.1 percent in the import price indexes, but 
only 3.2 percent in the CPI.  Moreover, if the growth rate of the CPI for tires is an average of true 
import price growth rate and the correctly measured growth rate of the PPI, the lower rate of 
growth of the CPI than of the PPI implies that true growth rate of the import prices must be 
below that of the CPI.   
 
To take a more systematic approach to comparing import prices and CPIs for detailed items, we 
used BEA’s industry accounts data to identify commodities included in PCE that are at least 
partly supplied by imports.  The industry accounts also show the proportion of total domestic 
supply of each commodity that come from imports.  Using this weighting information we  
constructed Fisher indexes that combine prices received by domestic producers (which BEA 
measures based on PPIs from BLS) and prices received by suppliers of imports (which BEA 
measures based on import price indexes from BLS).  Even “producer prices” can include imports 
in BEA’s industry accounts, at BLS “producer price indexes” do not include imports, so we term 
these indexes suppliers’ price indexes.  
 
Prices at the retail level include transportation margins, wholesale and retail distribution margins, 
and commodity taxes.  Therefore, in addition to our indexes of suppliers’ prices, we constructed 
purchasers’ price indexes that combine the suppliers prices with price indexes for transportation 
and distribution margins and adjust for changes in commodity taxes.  Our purchasers’ price 
indexes represent predicted CPIs based on prices and weights from BEA’s industry accounts.  
However, we are not entirely confident of the quality of some of the price indexes for 
distribution margins, so we will compare both our suppliers’ price index and our purchasers’ 
price index with a CPI at the most detailed level of aggregation that is available. 
 
If we take the CPI and the supplier price index as given, the equation that expresses the log-
change in the CPI as a weighted average of log-changes in the supplier price index and the price 
index for transportation and distribution margins and taxes contains only one unknown value, 
that of the price index for distribution margins and taxes.  We can therefore solve this equation 
for the implied price index for the margin industry services and taxes.  Assuming that the CPI is 
correct and that the quality of the match between the CPI and the suppliers’ price index is good, 
an implausible value for this implied index would imply that the suppliers’ index is biased.  If we 
also assume that PPI is correct, then the bias in the suppliers’ price index would have to come 
from its imports component.   
 
Under the assumption that the prices of inputs into transportation and distribution are not 
changing and that tax rates are not changing, the rate of decline in the implied price index for the 
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margin industries will equal their rate of productivity growth.  If the implied productivity growth 
rate in transportation and distribution is implausibly high, that is evidence of either upward bias 
in the suppliers price index, downward bias in the CPI, or mismatch between the microlevel 
composition of the detailed CPI that we used and the microlevel composition of our suppliers 
index. 
 
Aggregation as a Solution to the Problem of Poor Match Quality 
 
At the level of detailed comparisons, the quality of the matches between CPIs and suppliers’ 
price indexes is often dubious.  However, if poor match quality is a source of random noise in the 
comparisons that is as likely to be positive as negative, a consistent pattern of implausibly high 
implied estimates of productivity growth in transportation and distributions would still suggest a 
systematic downward bias in the import indexes.  In addition, the industry accounts data show 
the importance of each commodity in final uses in personal consumption expenditures (PCE), 
allowing us to use appropriate weights to aggregate commodities.  Problems of misclassification 
become much less important at aggregate levels such as all durable goods, all nondurable goods, 
and all goods that have imported sources of supply.  Therefore, comparisons made at aggregate 
levels are likely to be robust problems with matches between CPI items and our detailed 
suppliers’ price indexes.   
 
The main impediment to constructing good matches between CPIs and our suppliers’ price index 
is that the most detailed CPIs available are generally broader in coverage than the commodity 
categories in the industry accounts.  For example, fur coats are a commodity in our industry 
accounts data, but BLS does not publish a CPI for fur coats.  We therefore had to match fur coats 
to a CPI for women’s coats in general. To give another example, we matched boat building in the 
industry accounts to a CPI for recreational vehicles including bicycles.  The unavailability of 
sufficiently detailed CPIs means that at the level of individual items, many of the comparisons of 
CPIs to our suppliers and purchasers indexes do not hold the commodity mix constant.  This 
problem becomes less severe when detailed items in the industry accounts are aggregated.   
 
Two other caveats are also worth noting. First, the indexes that we use have positive variances, 
which we have not attempted to estimate.  Second, the import price indexes exclude tariffs, but 
tariffs undoubtedly influence the retail prices for imported items that are measured by the CPI.  
Tariff rates have trended down in recent decades, so declines in tariffs have probably acted to 
reduce the growth rate of the CPIs compared to those of the import price indexes.  Nevertheless, 
for most items with significant volumes of imports, average effective tariff rates started out at 
low levels, so most of the reductions during the period covered by our sample were modest. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Suppliers’ Price Index Comparisons 
 
Differences in average annual growth rates of suppliers’ indexes from matched CPIs between 
1997 and 2007 are shown in the first column of Table 1.  For most nondurables types of goods, 
  274
the indexes of suppliers’ prices do not differ significantly from their CPI counterparts.  Indeed, in 
the cases of food and alcoholic beverages, the difference in growth rates is zero after rounding.    
 
For the other categories of goods, however, the suppliers’ indexes rise more than their CPI 
counterparts.  In the case of apparel and textiles, the growth rate of the suppliers’ price index 
exceeds that of the CPI by 1.5 percent per year.  At the retail level, seasonal apparel items tend to 
enter at a high price at the beginning of the selling season, then go on sale later in the selling 
season before they exit the marketplace.  This pattern of falling prices during the life of a quote 
would cause downward bias in the CPI if at the beginning of a selling season quotes tend to enter 
the index via linking rather than via a comparison with the final price of the previous selling 
season.  However this problem appeared to have been largely resolved in 1991 when hedonic 
methods were introduced into the CPI for apparel.   
 
Another factor that likely contributes to the gap between the apparel indexes’ growth rates is the 
use of different index formulas to construct elementary aggregates.  A geometric mean index 
formula is used to construct most of the elementary aggregates in the CPI, including apparel, but 
a Laspyeres-like formula is used in the IPP and the PPI.  Geometric mean indexes have a number 
of desirable axiomatic properties that Laspyeres-like indexes lack, and under certain assumptions 
they do a better job of accounting for substitution behavior.  The dataset used in Feenstra et al. 
(2009) shows that the effect of changing to a Törnqvist formula (which resembles a geometric 
mean formula) on the import price indexes would reduce the growth rate of the apparel indexes 
by about 0.3 percent per year.  On the other hand, comparisons of the CPI-Uto the CPI-RS from 
1991 to 1998—years when the CPI-U did not use geometric means—imply that the effect of 
adopting the geometric mean formula on the CPI for apparel is about 1.3 percent per year.  Such 
a large effect is troubling, as it suggests that quotes linked out of the index at sale prices may 
have a disproportionate effect on the geometric mean formula.   Thus, downward bias in the CPI 
for apparel could account for some of the gap between its growth rate and that of the suppliers’ 
index.  The gap between the suppliers’ index and the matched CPI for apparel is not large 
enough to constitute evidence of the existence of an upward bias in the imports price index 
considering the possible presence of downward bias in the CPI and the noisiness in the index 
comparisons arising from differences in index composition. 
 
On the other hand, for durable goods other than motor vehicles, the growth rate gaps are larger 
than for apparel.  The most troubling growth rate discrepancies are for computers and related 
equipment, where the suppliers’ price index grows 6.4 percent per year faster than the CPI, and 
other electronic equipment, where it grows 4.2 percent per year faster.  However, even for 
durables in general, the growth rate gap is pretty high, at almost 2 percent per year. 
 
Purchaser Price Index Comparisons 
 
Adding in distribution and transportation margins to obtain purchasers’ price indexes makes the 
growth rate gaps smaller for nondurable and apparel, reducing the overall average gap from 1 
percent per year to 0.6 percent per year, or from 1.1 to 0.7 percent per year if tobacco is 
excluded. (Note however, that to be in our sample, an item in the industry accounts needed to 
have positive imports, few or no missing values, and a CPI counterpart, so “all items” in our 
sample covers only about 20 percent of personal consumption expenditures on nonenergy 
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goods.)  Indeed, a number of nondurable goods have negative growth rate differences between 
their purchasers’ price index and the corresponding CPI.  
 
On the other hand, the growth rate differentials for most apparel items still remain above 1 
percent per year.  What is more, the product categories with large gaps between their CPIs and 
their suppliers’ indexes have even larger growth rate gaps using a purchasers’ index.  In 
particular, the growth rate gap for electrical equipment excluding computers rises to 4.7 percent 
per year, while the growth rate gap for computers and related equipment rises to 11.6 percent per 
year.   
 
The electronic and computer items have falling CPIs, so the upward bias in their import indexes  
is consistent with Nakamura and Steinsson’s (2009) theory that a pattern of price changes 
coinciding with linking causes excessive flatness in the import indexes.143  Furthermore, in the 
case of tobacco products, the negative gaps of the suppliers’, purchasers’, and import price 
indexes compared with the CPI are also consistent with the hypothesis of artificial flatness in the 
imports index, as these products have high rates of price growth in the CPI. 
 
Similarity of PPIs and Import Price Indexes for Certain Items 
 
Simple comparisons of import price indexes with corresponding aggregates of domestic prices as 
measured by producer price indexes can also shed light on relative growth rates of the import 
indexes.  In constructing the aggregates used for these comparisons, we weight the indexes for 
detailed commodities in proportion to the importance of these commodities in final goods uses as 
measured in the industry accounts.   
 
These comparisons also suggest the presence of an upward bias in the import index for durable 
goods, but not in other categories of goods.  In the case of nondurable goods, domestic prices at 
the producer level rise faster than prices at the consumer level, while import prices rise more 
slowly than consumer prices.  Thus, the closeness of the suppliers’ indexes to the CPIs is a result 
of offsetting effects of slow growth in import prices and fast growth in producer prices.  For 
apparel and textile items, import and domestic producer prices both differ from CPI growth rates 
by about +1.5 per cent per year.  However, for durable goods, the growth rate of import indexes 
is 2.3 percentage points above that of the corresponding CPI and 0.7 (= 2.3 – 1.6) percentage 
points above that of domestic producer prices.  For computers and peripherals, domestic 
producer prices fall nearly as fast as the CPI, but the growth rate of import index is about 11.8 
percent per year above that of the rapidly falling CPI.  
 
Implied Productivity Growth in Transportation and Wholesale and Retail Distribution 
 
Under neoclassical assumptions, the difference between the growth rate of the price index for the 
output of an industry and the price index for the inputs that it uses is an estimate of its 
productivity growth.  Price indexes for labor and other inputs are unlikely to have growth rates 
                                                 
143 From January 1998 to September 2003, CPI computer price indexes used hedonic regressions for quality 
adjustment, and since then these indexes have used direct methods to estimate attribute values.  These techniques 
allow measurement of price changes that are time to coincide with changes in attributes.   
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below zero, so reversing the sign of the growth rate of the implied price index for transportation 
and distribution services gives a lower bound estimate of productivity growth in these services.   
 
Solving for the price index for transportation and distribution services that would explain the  
difference between our suppliers price index and the matched CPI, we find a plausible positive 
rate of growth for nondurables other than apparel of 1.3 percent per year and a not inconceivable 
growth rate for apparel and textile products of -2.5 percent per year (Table 2).  On the other 
hand, for durable goods the implied price change for transportation and distribution is about -8 
percent per year, which is too low to be believed.  For computers and peripherals, the implied 
growth rate is almost -30 percent per year.  Although strong productivity growth in distribution 
services is plausible, rates as high as 8 percent per year or more are not plausible.  They therefore 
suggest that the difference between the growth rates of the import and domestic producer price 
indexes and the growth rate of the CPI is too large to be correct. 
 
 
RELATION BETWEEN IMPORTS AND WHOLESALE AND RETAIL DISTRIBUTION 
MARGINS  
 
Price reductions that are realized by substituting foreign sources of supply for final consumption 
items for domestic ones are unlikely to be completely passed on to consumers. Instead, some of 
these price reductions are likely to result in expansions of margins received by the wholesale and 
retail distribution sectors.  One reason for this is that more distribution services are required to 
set up and manage international supply chains.  In addition, distributors are likely to have higher 
inventory costs and greater risks of being stuck with unwanted inventory when suppliers are 
distant and turnaround times for restocking are long.  In addition, while the process of switching 
to foreign sources of supply is under way, markets are likely to be in a temporary disequilibrium 
that allows early switchers to earn economic rents. 
 
To test whether higher proportions of imports in the overall domestic supply of a commodity are 
associated with higher distribution margins, we regress trade margin levels and growth rates on 
import share levels and growth rates.  The regression in Table 3 implies that a 10 percent 
increase in the share of domestic supply sourced from imports is associated with a 1.3 percentage 
point expansion in the distribution margin.   
 
Commodities that are heavily imported—such as apparel—might also have characteristics that 
require lots of distribution services.  If so, import share could be a proxy for the types of 
characteristics that make a commodity require more distribution services, resulting in upward 
bias in the regression coefficient in Table 3.  We therefore also test for a relationship between the 
growth of imports as a share of total commodity supply and the growth of distribution margins.  
The growth rate regression also shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
imports and distribution margins (Table 4).  The regression coefficient implies that a commodity 
with a 10 percentage point increase in its import share would have 0.93 percentage points more 
growth in its margin rate than a commodity with no change in its import share.  Thus, the 
theoretical prediction of a link between imports and margins received by the distribution 
industries finds some empirical support.   
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CONCLUSION  
 
The increased international engagement of the U.S. economy has enhanced the roles of the 
import and export price indexes in the measurement of real output growth.  For imported final 
goods that enter personal consumption expenditures in the NIPAs, an upward bias in the import 
index would result in upward bias in the measure of GDP; these items are deflated by an import 
index in the M component of the formula GDP = C + I + G + X – M but then deflated by a 
consumer price index when they reach the C component.   
 
In the case of nondurable goods, comparisons of import indexes and of suppliers’ and 
purchasers’ price indexes with CPIs at the most detailed level possible given the available data 
indicate no systematic differences in behavior of these indexes.   But for apparel and textile 
items, the import prices seem to grow faster than CPIs by about 1.5 percent per year, and for 
durable goods they seem to grow faster by more than 2 percent year.  A very large discrepancy 
of over 11 percent per year for computers contributes significantly to this discrepancy for durable 
goods.  Furthermore, the implied rates of change in prices for transportation and distribution 
services for durable goods are implausibly negative.  The index comparisons therefore suggest 
the presence of a significant upward bias in the import price indexes for some types of durable 
goods, especially computers, as well as the possible presence of a modest upward bias in the 
import indexes for apparel.  Nevertheless, these comparisons are not definitive evidence of the 
existence of a problem because the CPIs used in the comparisons often differ in their detailed 
item composition from the indexes with which they are compared. 
 
The results in this paper are consistent with Nakamura and Steinsson’s finding of a bias toward 
zero in the rate of growth of the import price indexes caused by linking out of a large fraction of 
the price changes that occur.   The substantial positive discrepancies between the growth of the 
import index and the growth of the CPIs occur for the apparel and durable goods items that have 
falling CPIs, and the largest negative discrepancy occurs for an item with a very high growth rate 
in the CPI, tobacco products. Further research on solutions to the linking problem identified by 
Nakamura and Steinsson could yield important benefits for our measures of import and export 
prices, and improve our measures of the growth of output and productivity, especially at the 
industry level. 
 
Finally, we note that if any bias that is present in the import indexes is matched by a similar bias 
in the export indexes if exports and imports had the same nominal value, the net effect of the two 
biases on our estimates of real GDP growth would be zero.  However, complete cancellation is 
unlikely to occur in practice because exports of goods are less than imports of nonpetroleum 
goods (the difference is between 2 and 4 percent of GDP in most of the years in our sample) and 
because some sources of upward bias in the import indexes are either not present or less 
important on the export side.  In particular, imported versions of many products are likely to 
have entered the U.S. market at a significantly lower price level than the incumbent domestic 
version of the product.  This results in a gain to consumers that should theoretically be accounted 
for by use of a high Hicksian virtual price in period before entry was observed to bring the 
imported version into the import index.  Yet on the export side, when new opportunities to export 
a particular product arise, the Hicksian virtual price would be lower than the first observed 
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selling price, implying the presence of a downward bias in the export index.  Alternatively, we 
could model new exports as having been caused by positive technology shocks to exporters and 
ask how much lower the first observed price is than the virtual price at which exports would first 
become profitable with technology held constant at the new level.  This would yield a correction 
of the same sign as the one that is applicable to the import index.  Yet growth of exports has been 
less than growth of imports, and the value of the export products that could reasonably be 
modeled in this way is undoubtedly less than the value of the new types of imports.   
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Figure 1: Nonpetroleum Goods Imports as Percent of GDP, PCE 
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Figure 2: Price Indexes for Consumer Good Imports and for 
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Table 1: Growth Rate Differences from Matched CPIs of Suppliers and Purchasers Price Industry,1997-2007 
Difference from Matched CPI  
Suppliers’ prices Purchasers’ prices Import Prices 
Domestic 
Prices 
MEMO: 
Index of 
Matched 
CPIs 
Nondurables ex apparel  0.3  -0.6  -0.6   0.6  2.2  
  Food  0.0  -0.7   0.1   0.0  2.1  
  Alcohol  0.0  -0.6  -0.5   0.0  1.9  
  Misc. household supplies  0.6  -0.1  -0.2   1.3  1.5  
  Paper products, books and  magazines  1.1   0.2  -0.4   1.1  1.4  
  Tobacco products        -0.6  -3.3  -6.6  -0.5  8.1  
Durables  1.9  2.0  2.3   1.6  -2.2  
  Motor vehicles and parts  0.2  0.2  0.7  -0.1  -0.1  
    New cars and trucks  0.4  0.5  1.2  -0.2  -0.6  
  Electrical equipment ex. computers  4.2  4.8  3.5   4.3  -5.6  
  Computers, peripherals and software  6.4    11.7    11.8   3.8    -20.8  
  Furniture and wood products  2.3  1.4  1.5   2.5  -0.6  
  Clocks and watches  1.8  1.7  1.8   1.9  -1.4  
  Tools, hardware and supplies  1.8  0.9  1.7   1.7  -0.2  
  Other durables  3.0  1.9  3.1   2.4  -0.8  
Apparel and textiles  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.5  -1.2  
  Women's and girls' apparel  1.9  1.7  1.9  1.8  -1.5  
  Men's and boy's apparel  1.3  1.4  1.4  0.7  -1.5  
  Other apparel  2.4  1.7  2.4  2.4  -1.2  
  Footwear  0.6  0.5  0.6  1.2  -0.4  
  Textile and sewing products  1.5  1.1  1.4  1.6  -0.8  
      
All products  1.0  0.6  0.7  1.1   0.2  
All products ex tobacco  1.1  0.7  1.0  1.1  -0.1  
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Table 2: Growth Rates of Price Index for Transportation and Distribution Services implied by Difference between Suppliers Price 
Index and Matched CPI, 1997-2007 
 
 Implied price index for Transport & 
Distribution  
Actual price index for Transport & 
Distribution 
Nondurables ex. apparel    1.3  0.5  
  Food    2.2   0.2 
  Alcohol    1.9   0.9 
  Misc. household supplies    1.1  0.3 
  Paper products, books and  magazines    0.3  0.4 
  Tobacco products    8.7   2.4 
Durables   -7.9  0.1 
  Motor vehicles and parts   -1.3  0.3 
    New cars and trucks   -1.8  0.4 
  Electrical and electronic equipment ex. 
Computers  
-11.0  0.2 
 Computers, peripherals and software                     -29.7  0.1 
  Furniture and wood products   -2.7  0.0 
  Clocks and watches   -1.7  0.1 
  Tools, hardware and supplies   -1.8  0.0 
  Other durables   -3.3  0.1 
Apparel and textiles   -2.5 -0.0 
  Women's and girls' apparel   -3.0 -0.0 
  Men's and boy's apparel   -2.6 -0.0 
  Other apparel   -3.0  0.0 
  Footwear   -0.9  0.0 
  Textile and sewing products   -2.2  0.0 
All products   -0.8  0.3 
All products ex tobacco   -1.2  0.2 
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Table 3:  Regression of Average Level of Distribution Margin on Share of Domestic Supply from Imports 
 
 Coefficient t statistic 
Intercept 0.3663 29.8 
Share supplied by imports 0.1290   4.3 
Growth of share of imports  0.0985   1.4 
 
 
Table 4:  Regression of Growth of Distribution Margin from 1997 to 2006 on Share of Domestic Supply from Imports 
 
 Coefficient t statistic 
Intercept 0.0067 1.2 
Share supplied by imports 0.0272 1.9 
Growth of share of imports  0.0934 2.8 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The rapid growth of offshoring has sparked a contentious debate over its impact on the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, which has recorded steep employment declines yet strong output growth—
a fact reconciled by the notable gains in manufacturing productivity. We maintain, however, that 
the dramatic acceleration of imports from developing countries has imparted a significant bias to 
the official statistics. In particular, the price declines associated with the shift to low-cost foreign 
suppliers generally are not captured in input cost and import price indexes. To assess the 
implications of offshoring bias for manufacturing productivity and value added, we implement 
the bias correction developed by Diewert and Nakamura (2009) to the input price index in a 
growth accounting framework, using a variety of assumptions about the magnitude of the 
discounts from offshoring. We find that from 1997 to 2007 average annual multifactor 
productivity growth in manufacturing was overstated by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point and real 
value added growth by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage point. Furthermore, although the bias from 
offshoring represents a relatively small share of real value added growth in the computer and 
electronic products industry, it may have accounted for a fifth to a half of the growth in real 
value added in the rest of manufacturing. 
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Offshoring and the State of American Manufacturing 
 
 
Developing economies have become the new, low-cost suppliers of a wide range of products 
purchased by consumers and used as intermediate inputs by producers, with China—now the 
largest exporter to the United States—accounting for about a third of the growth in commodity 
imports over the last decade. The rapid growth of offshoring—defined as the substitution of 
imported for domestically produced goods and services—contributed to a ballooning trade 
deficit and sparked a contentious debate over its impact on the U.S. manufacturing sector, which 
shed 20 percent of its employment, or roughly 3.5 million jobs, from 1997 to 2007. Concerns 
over employment losses and the trade deficit have prompted a recent spate of government and 
private sector proposals to revitalize manufacturing.144 
 
Our paper highlights the dramatic growth of offshoring and the structural changes occurring in 
manufacturing in the decade prior to the current recession. During this time, more than 40 
percent of imported manufactured goods were used as intermediate inputs, primarily by domestic 
manufacturers. Using a growth accounting framework, we examine the contributions to the 
growth in real (constant price) domestic shipments in manufacturing from the inputs to 
production and from multifactor productivity (MFP). A novel feature of our analysis is that we 
distinguish between imported and domestic materials inputs, which enables us to more closely 
examine offshoring by manufacturers. We find substantial evidence of offshoring. The 
contribution from imported materials to the growth in real manufacturing shipments was larger 
than that of any other factor input and was more than twice the contribution from capital. At the 
same time, contributions from domestic materials and, reflecting declining employment, labor 
were negative.  
 
In spite of the steep employment declines in manufacturing, official statistics indicate that real 
value-added growth in U.S. manufacturing was robust, increasing almost as quickly as that for 
all nonfarm business. What happened in manufacturing? As put by former Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich (2009), “In two words, productivity growth.” Indeed, the disparate trends in 
manufacturing—steep employment declines and strong output growth—are reconciled in the 
data by high productivity growth. While Reich and others have cited the strong output and 
productivity figures as evidence of the strength of the American manufacturing, we discuss 
reasons to qualify this conclusion. 
 
First, the robust output and productivity growth in manufacturing is largely attributable to one 
industry: computer and electronic products manufacturing. The average annual growth rate of 
value added in manufacturing excluding computers—which accounted for about 90 percent of 
manufacturing value added throughout the period—was less than a third of the published growth 
rate for all manufacturing. As a result, the aggregate numbers do not accurately characterize 
trends in most of manufacturing.  
 
Second, the price declines associated with the shift to low-cost foreign suppliers generally are 
not captured in price indexes. The problem is analogous to the widely discussed problem of 
                                                 
144 See, for example, Executive Office of the President (2009), Helper (2008), New America Foundation (2010), 
Pisano and Shih (2009), Pollin and Baker (2010), and Surdna Foundation (2010).   
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outlet substitution bias in the literature on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Just as the CPI fails 
to capture lower prices for consumers due to the entry and expansion of big-box retailers like 
Wal-Mart, import price indexes and the intermediate input price indexes based on them do not 
capture the price drops associated with a shift to new low-cost suppliers in China and other 
developing countries. A bias to the input price index from offshoring implies that the real growth 
of imported inputs has been understated. And if input growth is understated, it follows that the 
growth in MFP and real value added have been overstated.  
 
Building upon Diewert’s (1998) characterization of the bias from outlet substitution to the CPI, 
Diewert and Nakamura (2010) demonstrate that the bias to the input price index is proportional 
to the growth in share captured by the low-cost supplier and the percentage discount offered by 
the low-cost supplier. Although the actual input price changes from offshoring are not 
systematically observed, evidence from import price microdata from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), industry case studies, and the business press indicate that there are sizable 
discounts from offshoring to low-wage countries.  
 
If this evidence is representative of the actual discounts manufacturers realized from offshoring, 
then the biases to MFP and value-added growth may well be significant. We estimate that 
average annual MFP growth in manufacturing was overstated by 0.1–0.2 percentage points and 
real value-added growth by 0.2–0.5 percentage points from 1997 to 2007. And, although the bias 
from offshoring represents a relatively small share of real value-added growth in the computer 
industry, it may have accounted for one-fifth to one-half of the growth in real value added in the 
rest of manufacturing. Moreover, our work only examines biases to manufacturing statistics from 
the offshoring of material inputs. Additional biases may have arisen from the substitution of 
imported for domestically produced capital equipment and from the offshoring of services.  
 
These biases have implications not only for the industry statistics, but also for the analyses based 
on them. Because the growth of these imports will be understated in real terms, offshoring will, 
at least to some degree, manifest itself as mismeasured productivity gains. As a result, studies 
that endeavor to assess the impact of low-cost imports on the American economy and its workers 
may well understate the true effects.  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE STATE OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING  
 
One of the most important developments in the U.S. economy in recent years has been the rapid 
growth of trade. After being little changed in the early 1990s, the total value of imports and 
exports of goods and services jumped from roughly 20 percent of U.S. GDP to 28 percent prior 
to the recent downturn. About 80 percent of the increase was attributable to a run up in the value 
of imports. The growth of nonoil imports was the most important contributor to the increase in 
imports during this period, and nonoil goods imports—largely manufactured goods—accounted 
for almost half of total import growth, while oil accounted for about a third and services for the 
remainder.145 
 
                                                 
145 BEA data on the trade in services in 2008 indicate that 59 percent was travel, transport, royalties, and education 
related, while the remaining 41 percent was business services. 
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The surge in the imports of manufactured goods—more than 100 percent from 1997 to 2007—
reflects both an increase in the import share of goods for final consumption as well as the import 
share of intermediate inputs. According to the BEA, the import share of intermediate material 
inputs used by manufacturers increased from under 17 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2007. 146 
Figure 1 plots this substantial shift in the sourcing of intermediates from domestic to foreign 
suppliers.  
 
Also in Figure 1 the imported intermediate materials are classified by type of source country—
developing, intermediate, and advanced. We classify countries with less than 20 percent of U.S. 
per capita GDP in 2008 as developing, and with a few exceptions, countries with per capita GDP 
equal to or exceeding two-thirds that of that in the United States as advanced. The remaining 
countries are classified as intermediate. 147 Developing countries accounted for half of the growth 
in foreign materials inputs, with much of that growth coming from China. Intermediate countries, 
such as Mexico, accounted for about a third of the growth. 
 
How has the manufacturing sector performed given the growth of imports from low-wage 
countries? In particular, has the substantial shift in sourcing “hollowed out” manufacturing or 
instead contributed to the emergence of a leaner, more efficient industrial sector? On the one 
hand, dramatic drops in employment are often taken to portray a sector in decline. The 
precipitous decline in manufacturing employment since the late 1990s is evident in Figure 2 and 
is coincident with the rise in foreign sourcing. Employment never rebounded after the 2001–
2002 recession as it had following previous downturns. Indeed, in the decade leading up to the 
current recession, manufacturing employment declined by 20 percent, while manufacturing’s 
share of employment in the economy fell from 14 percent in 1997 to 10 percent in 2007 (Figure 
3). Reflecting plant closures that accompanied the employment declines, the net number of 
manufacturing establishments fell by 10 percent from 1998 to 2007. At the same time, the 
nominal share of manufacturing value added in GDP fell from 15.4 percent in 1997 to 11.7 
percent in 2007. 
 
Statistics on manufacturing production, however, paint a much more favorable picture of the 
sector. From 1960 to 2009, the average annual rate of change in real nonfarm business output 
was 3.5 percent, only slightly higher than the 3.2 percent average annual change for 
manufacturing.148 More recently, from 1997 to 2007, the average annual growth rate of real 
manufacturing production was 3 percent, almost the same as the 3.1 percent growth for all 
                                                 
146 Government surveys do not explicitly track the destination of imports to final and intermediate uses.  In the data 
we employ within this paper, the BEA assumes that an industry’s use of a specific import is in proportion to its 
overall use of that commodity in the economy, i.e., the import comparability or proportionality assumption. 
147 The main exceptions are Middle Eastern oil producers, which we classify as intermediate countries. 
148  Although the average growth of manufacturing has been fairly close to that of the economy as a whole, the 
sector has typically exhibited greater cyclical swings.  As a result, the sector tends to make outsized contributions to 
changes in GDP growth during economic turning points (Corrado and Mattey 1997). In addition, the relatively faster 
gains in manufacturing productivity have resulted in lower relative goods prices, which, in combination with 
inelastic demand for goods (on average), has led to a decline in manufacturing’s share of nominal output.  
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private industry.149 Moreover, cross-country comparisons show larger production gains in U.S. 
manufacturing relative to other advanced industrial countries, according to OECD data.  
 
The divergent trends of employment declines and plant closures, on the one hand, and rapid 
growth in real value added, on the other, are primarily reconciled through the lens of 
productivity. The steadily increasing series displayed in Figure 3 shows the ratio of output per 
hour in manufacturing to output per hour in all nonfarm business since 1960; the series indicates 
that labor productivity grew considerably faster in manufacturing throughout the period. Indeed, 
the average annual growth rate of labor productivity in manufacturing during 1997 to 2007 was 
4.1 percent compared to 2.7 percent for all nonfarm business. Manufacturing labor productivity 
also grew substantially faster in the United States than in most other major industrialized 
countries during that decade (see BLS 2009). The rapid growth in labor productivity has more 
than offset the declines in labor input and has permitted firms to sustain robust growth in real 
value added.  
 
Analysts have pointed to the robust output and productivity growth to argue that the 
manufacturing sector is relatively healthy.150 Our work, however, suggests the story is more 
complex. The aggregate numbers are unrepresentative of the trends in most of manufacturing. 
Moreover, we find that the performance of U.S. manufacturing has been overstated to some 
extent in the official statistics because of offshoring.  
 
 
EVIDENCE OF OFFSHORING BY MANUFACTURERS 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the sources of the growth in manufacturing. Toward this 
end, we utilize a standard growth accounting framework in which output is defined as 
manufacturing shipments adjusted for price changes—termed real gross output. We decompose 
growth into the parts resulting from the growth of inputs to production—capital, labor, services, 
energy, and materials inputs—and MFP growth, which is computed as a residual. In other words, 
MFP growth is the part of output growth that cannot be accounted for by the growth of factor 
inputs, and therefore represents the returns to all factors of production.151  
 
As mentioned, a novel feature of our analysis is that we distinguish between domestically 
sourced and foreign materials inputs. Specifically, we use unpublished BEA data on the value of 
                                                 
149  With the BEA’s May 2010 comprehensive revision to the annual industry accounts, manufacturing output now 
expands at a slightly faster rate during this period.  The analysis throughout this paper is based upon the previous 
vintage of these data published in 2009. 
150 This perspective is illustrated by Executive Office of the President (2009), which emphasizes the strength of 
output and productivity and growth of U.S. manufacturers vis-à-vis the aggregate economy and manufacturers in 
other industrialized countries and which largely attributes employment declines to productivity growth. Recent 
articles in the popular press also have advanced this view (e.g., Economist 2005; Murray 2009).  
151 See Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) and Hulten (2009) for more on the growth accounting methodology, 
its early development, and current applications. The industry-level data for output, materials, energy, and services 
come from the BEA’s GDP-by-industry accounts. Capital services inputs for are derived from the BEA’s fixed asset 
accounts. The labor input is based on industry-level hours worked from the national income and product accounts, 
adjusted for changes in the worker composition effects using wage data from the Census Bureau’s county business 
patterns. 
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imports and imported input prices at a detailed commodity level to distinguish between the 
growth of domestic and imported materials inputs. 
Using these data, we compute MFP growth for manufacturing as the growth in real gross output 
( Q
∧
) less a weighted average of the growth rate of labor ( L
∧
), capital ( K
∧
), energy ( E
∧
), services 
( S
∧
), domestic materials ( DM
∧
), and foreign materials ( FM
∧
) inputs: 
 
(1) D FL K E S m mD Fw w w w w wQ L K E S M MMFP
∧ ∧∧ ∧ ∧ ∧∧∧ ? ?
= − + + + + +? ?? ?? ?
         
 
The weights (w) on each input represent the input’s share of total input costs. Any error in the 
measurement of input growth—including errors that result from biased price indexes used to 
deflate the inputs—will directly result in an error in the measurement of productivity growth. 
 
Equation (1) can be rearranged to obtain an identity in which output growth is decomposed into 
MFP growth and contributions from the growth of factor inputs. Table 1 provides the results of 
this decomposition for manufacturing and selected industry breakouts from 1997 to 2007. Note 
that the figures in column (1), which represent the average annual real output growth rate over 
the period, equal the sum of the figures in columns (2) through (8), which represent the 
contributions to output growth from MFP and from the growth of the indicated inputs.  
 
Several striking findings emerge from this table. One is the strong MFP growth. The contribution 
to real output growth from MFP actually exceeds real gross output growth, indicating that MFP 
can account for all of the growth in real gross output over the decade. Capital, purchased 
services, and materials all play important, albeit more modest, roles, while the contribution of 
labor is negative and large, reflecting the steep employment declines during the period.152  
 
Columns (7) and (8) in Table 1 provide a clear picture of the rapid pace of structural change 
currently under way in U.S. manufacturing. During the period, the contribution of domestically 
supplied materials inputs fell, while that of imported materials inputs greatly expanded, 
reflecting the substitution of foreign for domestic intermediate inputs. The growth of imported 
intermediate inputs, to some degree, will also reflect the direct substitution of imported goods for 
domestic labor and capital. To see this, consider the case in which a firm previously produced an 
intermediate input and final product internally, but now sources that input from a foreign 
supplier. In this instance, gross output will not change, but imported materials inputs will rise 
and the labor and capital previously used to produce the input will fall.  
 
For all manufacturing, the contribution of imported materials inputs to output growth was greater 
than that of any other factor of production and was more than double the contribution from 
capital. For manufacturing excluding the computer industry, imported materials account for 60 
percent of the growth during this period.  
 
                                                 
152 The growth accounting results in Table 1 reflect the authors’ calculations and rely on a different methodology 
than what is used by the BLS. However, these two salient features of the data are also observed in the BLS 
estimates. A full reconciliation of the two approaches appears in Houseman et al. (2010). 
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Another striking result in Table 1 is that computer and electronic products manufacturing—which 
includes computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment—accounts for most of the 
output and productivity growth in manufacturing over the period.153 Output and productivity growth in the 
computer industry averaged 7.4 and 6.8 percent per year, respectively, compared to growth of only about 
0.5 percent for output and 0.7 percent for MFP in the rest of manufacturing. The extraordinary 
productivity and output growth in computers reflects, to a large degree, technological improvements of 
the products produced and output price deflators that, when properly adjusted for product improvements, 
are often falling rapidly.154  
 
Throughout the decade, the computer industry’s share of manufacturing value added remained 
relatively constant at around 10 percent. Because manufacturing output and productivity 
statistics are strongly affected by the computer industry, which represents such a small share of 
the sector, researchers should be cautious in drawing general inferences about manufacturing 
from the aggregate numbers. It also bears note that statistics on industry output and productivity 
growth should be interpreted in relation to growth in demand for the industry’s products. Indeed, 
in spite of rapid value added and productivity growth of computers and electronic products 
manufacturing during the decade, the trade deficit within this product group greatly widened and 
substantial offshoring of components of the industry occurred (Brown and Linden 2005; Linden, 
Dedrick, and Kraemer 2009). 
 
Because statistics on labor productivity, defined as output per hour worked, are widely used in 
research and policy analyses, it is also of interest to consider the relationship between labor 
productivity growth and offshoring. In the official BLS labor productivity release, manufacturing 
output includes imported intermediates but excludes intermediates sourced from within the 
domestic manufacturing sector. As a result, shifts in sourcing from a domestic to a foreign 
supplier do not offset each other, mechanically increasing labor productivity.155 To this point, 
Eldridge and Harper (2009) find that imported intermediate materials explain 20 percent of the 
growth in manufacturing labor productivity from 1997 to 2006. We find that the contribution to 
manufacturing labor productivity from imported materials inputs significantly accelerated over 
the period.  
 
Although Table 1 documents the substantial growth in offshoring during the period, it nevertheless likely 
understates the true magnitude of the phenomenon. Our focus below concerns the systematic upward bias 
in the price indexes used to deflate intermediate materials. We could not account for the measurement of 
two additional factors, which likely also impart an upward bias: 1) imported capital inputs, such as 
computers and machinery, have exhibited substantial gains in import penetration; and 2) imported 
services inputs (i.e., services offshoring) have accelerated in recent years, albeit from a very low level.156  
 
 
                                                 
153 Similar findings have been reported in other studies. See, for example, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) and 
Oliner and Sichel (2000). See also Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007) and Syverson (2010) for more in-depth reviews 
of recent research on U.S. productivity. 
154 The BLS uses hedonic methods to adjust prices in the computer industry. For a review of these, see Wasshausen 
and Moulton (2006). 
155 This could also occur if a firm imports an intermediate input it previously produced internally. In this case, output 
will not change, but the labor input used to produce that intermediate input will fall.  
156 See Cavallo and Landry (2010) for a discussion of imported capital goods, and Eldridge and Harper (2009) and 
Yuskavage, Strassner, and Maderios (2008) and for estimates of services offshoring. 
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BIAS TO PRICE INDEXES FROM OFFSHORING 
 
Understanding why offshoring likely results in biases to the price indexes used to deflate inputs 
requires some background on the relevant price programs. In addition to the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), the BLS constructs separate price indexes for imports, exports, and domestically 
produced goods. Just as the BLS constructs the CPI to measure the rate of price change of goods 
and services purchased by consumers, the BEA constructs input price indexes to measure the rate 
of price change of inputs to production purchased by businesses. The BEA constructs industry-
specific input price indexes using import and domestic price indexes in conjunction with 
information on each industry’s input structure from the input-output tables. The import price data 
come from the BLS’s International Price Program (IPP), which surveys importing establishments 
on the prices paid for imports of a detailed product. For domestic materials prices, the BEA 
primarily uses the Producer Prices Index (PPI) in which BLS surveys domestic producers on the 
prices they receive for a sample of products.157  
 
The BLS takes great care to ensure that it is pricing the same item over time, and thus that price 
indexes are based on “apples-to-apples” comparisons. Each observation used in the construction 
of a particular price index represents the period-to-period price change of an item as defined by 
very specific attributes and reported by a specific establishment. These methods mean, however, 
that price indexes neither capture the price changes associated with the entry of a low-cost 
supplier nor the level differences in prices which drive its subsequent market share expansion. 
As mentioned, this problem has been studied extensively in the CPI literature, where it has been 
dubbed “outlet substitution bias” (Diewert 1998, Hausman 2003, and Reinsdorf 1993).  
 
Figure 4 presents a stylized depiction of the problem in the context of offshoring. The BLS 
measures the price change from period t to t+1 of a specific imported product at a specific 
importer in the IPP, and it measures the price change from period t to t+1 of a specific product 
produced by a specific domestic producer in the PPI. Neither the IPP nor the PPI captures the 
price drop (d) that occurs when businesses shift from a high-cost domestic to a low-cost foreign 
supplier. The input price index is, in essence, a weighted average of period-to-period changes 
measured in the IPP and the PPI, and thus the price drop from offshoring is missed.158  
 
To further illustrate how offshoring can impart a bias into the input price index, Table 2 provides 
a hypothetical numerical example. Suppose that pharmaceutical companies purchase a common 
chemical compound, “obtanium,” from a domestic supplier at $10 per ounce. A Chinese supplier 
enters the market and sells obtanium for $6 per ounce. As the new, lower-cost source becomes 
known, its reliability is established, and contracts with the domestic supplier expire, U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies begin shifting their purchases to the Chinese supplier. For simplicity, 
we assume that the domestic and foreign dollar prices of obtanium remain the same throughout 
the period.159 Even if the BLS picks up the Chinese import of obtanium in its import prices 
                                                 
157 For more information on the BLS price index computations, see Chapters 14 and 15 in BLS (2009). 
158 Although our empirical focus is on the substitution of imported for domestic inputs, a bias would also occur with 
the entry and market share expansion of a new low-cost domestic supplier.  
159 Because prices are often contractually set for periods of time, this simplifying assumption of price stickiness is 
not unrealistic. Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) document that 40 percent of prices on imported items never change 
for the entire duration they are in the BLS sample.   
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sample without a lag, it will not capture the input price drop enjoyed by drug manufacturers at 
the time of the switch.  
 
The input price index, as computed by the statistical agencies, is a weighted average of the 
domestic and import index, and, in our example, does not change. The correct index, however, 
would capture the period-to-period change of the average price that U.S. companies pay for 
obtanium and falls by 12 percent. More rapid introduction of new suppliers into the BLS 
sampling frame or more frequent sampling of prices—common suggestions for improving price 
statistics—will not address this particular problem.  
 
The bias to the price index arises because neither the U.S. producer nor the U.S. importer can 
report the price drop that buyers experience when they shift their purchases from domestic to 
foreign suppliers. To address this problem, the BLS has proposed that an input index be 
constructed based on a survey of purchasers (Alterman 2009).160 In theory, the buyers could 
accurately report the period-to-period changes in the price they pay for specific inputs, 
irrespective of source.  
 
Diewert and Nakamura (2010) characterize the bias to the input price index resulting from a shift 
in input suppliers. The upward bias (B) to the rate of inflation in the input price index (1+i) is 
proportional to the share captured by the low-cost supplier over the period (s) and the percentage 
difference in the prices of the low- versus the high-cost supplier—or discount—(d): 
 
 (2)    (1 )B i sd= +  
 
Returning to our obtanium example, over the period there is no measured inflation (i.e., i equals 
zero), the low-cost supplier captures a 30 percent market share, and the discount from the low-
cost supplier is 40 percent. Whereas the measured rate of price change is zero, the true rate of 
price change for that input is -0.12, or negative 12 percent. The characterization of the bias to the 
input price index in Equation (2) is identical to the characterization of the bias to the CPI 
(Diewert 1998). It is the same problem manifested in a different index. 161 
 
As shown in Figure 5, the problem is evident in the input price indexes used by the BEA to 
deflate intermediate materials inputs. If price indexes were accurately capturing the cost savings 
to businesses that presumably underlie the recent share growth of imported intermediates, then 
the growth of the import price index should be slower than the domestic price index, indicating a 
fall in the price of imported relative to domestic inputs. Instead, the foreign price deflator for 
intermediate materials rose faster than the domestic deflator. The differential between foreign 
and domestic materials price deflators is especially apparent beginning in 2002, coincident with 
the rapid rise of imports from China. 
 
                                                 
160 The proposed input cost index is still at the concept and design stage at the BLS.  
161 Although the goods in this model are treated as homogeneous, Diewert (1998) provides a simple extension to 
where the goods are different qualities. In this case, the discount represents the price differential adjusted for quality. 
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EVIDENCE OF COST SAVINGS FROM OFFSHORING 
 
No comprehensive evidence exists on the magnitude of the cost savings from shifts in 
sourcing—i.e., the discount, d, in Equation (2). A few case studies, however, provide some 
evidence for selected products and industries. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2010) find sizable 
cross-country differences in the prices of semiconductor wafers with identical specifications. On 
average, they find that, compared to prices of semiconductor wafers produced in U.S. foundries, 
prices were on average about 40 percent lower in China and about 25 percent lower in 
Singapore. Klier and Rubenstein (2009) find that offshoring aluminum wheel production to 
Mexico lowered overall costs by 19 percent and processing costs by 36 percent.  
 
The different samples in the IPP and PPI do not permit a direct comparison of prices for 
domestic and imported items. However, such a comparison is possible among imported products 
originating in different countries. Products from intermediate and, especially, developing 
countries were gaining market share not only vis-à-vis the United States but also other advanced 
countries. On the grounds that production cost structures are likely to be more similar between 
the United States and other advanced countries, systematic import price differentials between 
products from advanced versus developing and intermediate countries may be informative about 
the size of the discount relative to U.S. goods.  
 
Figure 6 shows the average percentage differences between imported products from advanced 
and developing countries and between advanced and intermediate countries as recorded in the 
BLS microdata underlying the IPP. The position of each bubble represents the size of the 
discount for a single North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 4-digit category in 
manufacturing. The size of each bubble is proportional to the gain in U.S. market share for 
developing and intermediate countries within each category. In almost all cases, the discounts are 
negative, indicating lower prices in developing and intermediate countries compared to advanced 
countries. In many cases, these discounts appear to be quite sizable. Further, the size of a 
discount is negatively correlated with a gain in market share, indicating that the larger the 
developing or intermediate country’s price differential, the greater the U.S. market share 
captured. Products on the left side of the figure (i.e., food, beverages, textiles, and apparel) are 
characterized by smaller discounts and share gains, whereas products to the right (i.e., 
machinery, electronics, semiconductors, and transportation) are characterized by larger discounts 
and share gains.  
 
An important caveat to this figure is that even within very detailed product codes there may be 
considerable heterogeneity that may explain at least some of the price differentials. Returning again to our 
example in the previous section, if obtanium is a differentiated product and the Chinese version is of a 
lower quality than that from Japan, then Chinese obtanium should trade at a discount relative to a variety 
that is not strictly comparable. We adopt various methods to control for possible heterogeneity. In 
particular, one method restricts the import price sample to cases in which there is a newly observed price 
for an incumbent importing firm within the same detailed product code. In this way, we are able to narrow 
the sample to instances in which an importer appears to be switching sources of a specific product from a 
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supplier in an advanced country to one in a developing or intermediate country. The observed price 
differentials are somewhat smaller but still sizable when we limit our sample in this way.162  
 
The evidence from case studies and from comparisons of import prices is consistent with reports 
of large discounts in the business literature. For example, in 2004 Business Week reported that 
prices of imported goods from China typically were 30 to 50 percent lower than the prices for 
comparable products produced in the United States, and that the discounts were sometimes 
higher (Engardio and Roberts 2004). Similarly, a McKinsey & Company (2006) study cited cost 
savings from production of electronic equipment in China of between 20 and 60 percent. 
Estimates of the savings from offshoring auto parts production to Mexico are generally in the 
range of 20 to 30 percent (see discussion in Kinsman 2004). In sum, although no systematic data 
exist, a variety of evidence points to large cost savings from offshoring.  
 
The above-mentioned price differentials could be the result of numerous factors, such as labor 
costs, industrial policy, or disequilibrium in exchange rate markets. For instance, the 
Manufacturers Alliance of the National Association of Manufactures provides estimates of 
manufacturing labor costs, adjusted for productivity, for major U.S. trading partners as compared 
to the United States. Their estimates of large labor cost savings—58–72 percent lower in China 
and 22–62 percent in Mexico from 2002 to 2009—are consistent with the large product discounts 
reported in research and in the business press (Leonard 2008). Also consistent with the evidence 
of cost savings from offshoring are estimates that the Chinese renminbi may be significantly 
undervalued relative to the dollar, perhaps by as much as 40 percent (Bergsten 2010, Cline and 
Williamson 2010).  
 
 
BIAS TO PRODUCTIVITY AND VALUE ADDED FROM OFFSHORING 
 
We implement the bias correction to input prices in Equation (2) and simulate the effects of the 
bias on MFP and value-added growth. Figure 7 illustrates what the bias to industry-level 
materials deflators would be if the true import discounts match those derived from the full 
sample of import price microdata. The vertical distance between each point and the 45 degree 
line represents the size of the bias. For all manufacturing, if the true import discount can be 
approximated by the IPP microdata, then the cumulative price growth of 20 percent between 
1997 and 2007 would overstate the bias-corrected inflation rate by a full 9 percentage points. 
Thus, once we account for offshoring bias, the materials costs faced by U.S. manufacturers 
would only have risen at half the rate reported in official estimates. This, in turn, would imply 
that the real use of materials by U.S. manufacturers was twice as large as reported. With more 
production being generated by purchased materials, both productivity and value added would be 
diminished. Also shown in Figure 7 are the implied industry-level cumulative price changes 
under this set of assumptions about import price discounts.  
 
                                                 
162 Houseman et al. (2010) describe this approach in greater detail. We also attempt to account for unobserved 
differences in product characteristics using an econometric model informed by estimates of product-level quality 
from Mandel (2010). We find that the price dispersion across source countries decreases but remains substantial. In 
short, it is unlikely that product differentiation accounts for the large, persistent price differences across countries. 
  299
By how much might the productivity statistics be overstated from failing to account for 
offshoring? The top panel of Table 3 presents alternative estimates of MFP growth based upon 
different assumptions about the import discount. Column (1) restates our baseline MFP results 
from Table 1, while column (2) presents estimates in which all commodities—both domestic and 
imported—have been deflated with domestic deflators provided to us by the BEA. Since our 
alternative materials deflators are derived by adjusting domestic commodity prices (primarily 
PPIs), the estimates in column (2) should be viewed as the appropriate reference or “jumping-
off” point for gauging the extent of offshoring bias. In other words, they show what MFP would 
be if the rate of price inflation for imported commodities was the same as for their domestic 
counterparts. This assumption in Equation (2) is maintained in order to hone in on the impact of 
the level difference in prices between imported and domestic commodities. 
 
For the entire manufacturing sector, deflating imported materials with domestic prices reduces 
MFP growth by a bit less than 0.1 percentage point, from 1.30 percent in our baseline scenario to 
1.23 percent. Almost all of this change owes to differences in the price deflators used for 
imported and domestic semiconductors. In other words, prices for imported semiconductors—a 
product used heavily by the computer and electronic products industry—fell less rapidly than 
their domestic counterparts. The discrepancies are especially evident in the early years of our 
data and appear to be the result of inconsistent adjustment of imported and domestic 
semiconductor prices for quality improvements. Although not the focus of our paper, the drop in 
MFP between columns (1) and (2) likely represents an additional modest bias.163  
 
Columns (3) and (4) present MFP estimates that have been adjusted for offshoring using our 
micro evidence on the import discount. We report estimates using product-level discounts based 
on the entire microdata sample (“full sample”) and on a sample limited to instances where 
importers appear to shift from suppliers in advanced counties to ones in developing or 
intermediate countries (“switchers”). In columns (5) and (6), we estimate MFP using import 
discounts informed by the business press and available case study evidence, applying these 
discounts uniformly across commodities. The column labeled “50/30” assumes discounts of 50 
percent for developing countries and 30 percent for intermediate countries, whereas the column 
labeled “30/15” assumes discounts of 30 percent for developing countries and 15 percent for 
intermediate countries. These represent discounts on the high and low end, respectively, of those 
found in the case study and business literature.  
 
On balance, for the entire manufacturing sector, we find that adjusting for offshoring lowers 
MFP growth by an additional 0.1–0.2 percentage point, which implies average annual 
productivity growth is reduced between 6 and 14 percent. These numbers are fairly significant, 
as a 0.1 percent average annual growth rate for MFP roughly equals the average annual 
contribution of the capital stock to manufacturing growth during this period.  
 
If we exclude the contribution of the computer and electronic products industry, correcting for 
offshoring results in larger percentage adjustments to MFP, which falls from 0.67 percent in 
                                                 
163 Because of the high import penetration in semiconductors and other high-tech products, consistently adjusting 
domestic and import prices for product improvements is important for the accuracy of industry and national income 
statistics, though difficult owing to lack of product detail, particularly for imports. Addressing this problem has 
resulted in substantial revisions to the national accounts statistics in the past (Grimm 1998).  
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column (2) to between 0.52 percent (column 3) and 0.58 percent (column 4); in other words, the 
reduction in MFP widens to as much as 22 percent. The results for the case study scenarios 
shown in columns (5) and (6) are quite consistent with our results based on IPP microdata. 
 
What about the likely range of bias to value added? Recall that value added nets out intermediate 
inputs from an industry’s shipments, and therefore represents the additional product produced in 
an industry.164 If, as suggested by Figure 7, the actual amount of intermediate materials used by 
U.S. manufacturers has been larger than what is contained in the official statistics, then value 
added has been overstated as well. This implies that a larger share of the sector’s production has 
simply been final assembly, and relatively less of domestic manufacturing shipments are 
contributing value to the overall economy.  
 
The BEA derives indexes for industry-level value added using the double-deflation method in 
which real value added is computed as the difference between real gross output and real 
intermediate inputs. We replicate this double-deflation procedure using our adjusted measures of 
real purchased materials. We therefore derive the implied value of real value added –associated 
with published measures of gross output, energy, and services and our adjusted measures of 
purchased materials inputs. 
 
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents alternative estimates for value added based on our different 
assumptions on the import discount. Of note, the unadjusted average growth rate in value added 
for all manufacturing is about 3 percent, while the annual growth rate for manufacturing, 
excluding the computer sector, is less than one-third of this size—about 0.9 percent. The annual 
growth rate for the computer industry exceeds 20 percent. As shown in columns (3) through (6), 
our simulations indicate that value-added growth for all manufacturing was overstated by 0.2–0.5 
percentage point, or about 7–18 percent of the growth. Excluding computers, real value-added 
growth for manufacturing is biased by 0.2–0.4 percentage point, which accounts for 21–49 
percent of the growth. 165 The annual growth rate of real value added for manufacturing 
excluding computers falls under a half percent per year in some of our adjusted estimates, while 
that for nondurable goods turns negative for all of our adjusted estimates. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA AND RESEARCH 
 
The above analysis focuses on biases to manufacturing productivity and value added from the 
substitution of lower-cost imported for domestic materials inputs. Such biases, however, may 
also arise from the offshoring of other inputs and affect statistics for other sectors and for the 
aggregate economy.166 In the 2000s, sizable import penetration by developing countries occurred 
in computers and machinery products, which largely are treated as capital inputs in the industry 
accounts. Price drops accompanying the substitution of imported for domestic capital equipment 
                                                 
164 Gross domestic product can therefore be derived as the sum of value added across all sectors of the economy. 
165 In addition to the “switchers” estimates, we attempted to adjust for unobserved differences within detailed 
product codes using econometric techniques. These estimates do not alter the qualitative results of our analysis, and 
imply bias adjustments to MFP and value added roughly in line with the “30/15” estimates in Table 3. 
166 Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2009) examine pricing in selected consumer goods and provide preliminary evidence 
of biases to GDP from import growth. Biases to price indexes from offshoring and their implied biases to GDP 
growth also have been covered in the business press (see Mandel 2007, 2009). 
  301
would not be captured in capital price deflators, possibly leading to an understatement of the 
growth of capital services and an overstatement of growth in MFP and real value added.  
 
The same problem arises from services offshoring. Collecting accurate price information on 
services trade is complicated by the fact that the level of detail in services sector data is quite 
limited (Jensen 2009, Norwood et al. 2006,Sturgeon et al. 2006, ), and that the BLS international 
prices program does not cover business services imports and exports. If services offshoring were 
to expand rapidly in the near future, as some predict, the absence of accurate price deflators 
could impart significant biases in official statistics.  
 
More generally, the Shumpetarian dynamic by which low-cost producers enter and capture 
market share from incumbents is an important mechanism by which prices change, but is a 
dynamic largely missed in price indexes. Although we have focused on the substitution of low-
cost foreign for domestic inputs because of the recent empirical importance of offshoring, the 
entrance and market share expansion of low-cost domestic suppliers is an important aspect of 
firm dynamics in the United States and also would impart biases to price indexes.167 As 
mentioned above, a proposal to construct an input price index based on a survey of purchasers, if 
implemented by BLS, would address the biases to the industry statistics from all shifts in 
sourcing (Alterman 2009).168 
The growth of low-cost imports has spurred numerous studies to assess their effects on the U.S. 
economy and its workers. Biases to price indexes that arise from offshoring affect the accuracy 
not only of the industry statistics, but also of analyses based on them. Because such import 
growth will be understated in real terms and, to some degree, will be manifested as false 
productivity gains, studies may underestimate the true effects of import growth.  
 
The pace of globalization is unlikely to abate in the near future, underscoring the need for 
reliable economic statistics to understand its effects and formulate policy responses. The biases 
to price indexes discussed in this paper are emblematic of a broader set of measurement 
problems that arise from the growth of globalization (Feenstra and Lipsey 2010, Houseman and 
Ryder 2010). Understanding the effects of globalization requires better data, including, quite 
critically, better price deflators. 
                                                 
167 See Foster, Haltiwager, and Syverson (2008) for evidence that entrants, on average, have higher physical 
productivity and offer lower prices than incumbent firms.  
168 The proposed index, which would not distinguish source country, would capture price changes from shifts in 
sourcing among domestic suppliers, among domestic and international suppliers, and among international suppliers. 
Although the input price index would address biases in the industry statistics, it would not address biases in 
published statistics on GDP growth, which are based on expenditure, not industry value-added, data.   
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Figure 1: The Import Share of Material Inputs Used by U.S. Manufactures 
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NOTE: Imported intermediates are decomposed into their source country of origin and plotted as 
their portion of the share of imported intermediate in total materials use by the manufacturing 
sector.  
Source: BEA Annual Industry Accounts and Import Microdata 
 
Figure 2: Manufacturing Employment, 1960-2009 
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Figure 3: Manufacturing: Labor Productivity and Employment Relative to Total 
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NOTE: Productivity series is calculated as ratio of manufacturing output per worker as a fraction of total 
nonfarm business labor productivity. Employment share is ratio of manufacturing employment to total 
employment.  
SOURCE: BLS 
  310
Figure 5: Baseline Input Price Indexes for the Manufacturing Sector 
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Imported Materials
Total Materials
Domestic Materials
 
NOTE: The total materials deflator is from the BEA’s Annual Industry Accounts, while the imported 
materials deflator is an aggregate of confidential BEA commodity price data. The implied domestic materials 
price deflator is computed from the total and imported materials price deflators. 
                                                                                 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
NOTE: The import price discount for each NAICS category averages across many underlying detailed 
product groups classified according to the U.S. Harmonized System (HS 10-digit) for the months 
September 1993–May 2007. Within an HS group, the developing (or advanced) country discount is the 
average of individual item prices exported from developing (or advanced) countries relative to a 
geometric mean of advanced country transaction prices.  
SOURCE: BLS 
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Figure 7: Materials Cost Inflation for U.S. Manufacturing Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The figure contrasts the materials cost inflation as published by the BEA with an adjusted measure derived 
from IPP micro data and Census foreign trade shares. For each manufacturing industry, and manufacturing as a 
whole, cost measures are computed as the cumulative percent change between the published and hypothetical 
index values in 2007 and 1997. A cost inflation of 0.2, for example, represents a 20 percent increase in prices over 
the decade. Two industries, petroleum products, and computer and electronic components, were included in the 
overall manufacturing number but excluded from the charts. Petroleum products had cumulative input cost 
inflation of 137 percent and bias-corrected inflation of 134 percent. Computer and peripherals had input costs 
decline by 35 percent, 51 percent adjusted.  
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Table 1: Sources of Growth for U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1997–20071 
 
Gross Purchased Materials
Output MFP2 Capital3 Labor Energy Services Domestic Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Manufacturing 1.18 1.30 0.13 -0.53 -0.05 0.22 -0.19 0.28
2. Manufacturing excl. Computers and electronic products 0.46 0.69 0.11 -0.47 -0.05 0.13 -0.23 0.28
3. Durable goods: 2.00 2.02 0.17 -0.66 -0.05 0.30 -0.15 0.37
4.        Computer and electronic products 7.35 6.82 0.25 -1.11 -0.05 1.05 0.04 0.35
5.        Durable goods excl. Comp. & electr. products 0.77 0.95 0.15 -0.57 -0.05 0.12 -0.22 0.38
6. Nondurable goods: 0.16 0.45 0.07 -0.37 -0.04 0.14 -0.25 0.17
1.  Average annual rate for period shown. Column (1) is percent change. For each row, columns (2) through (8) are percentage points that sum across columns to (1).  
2.  MFP is multifactor productivity. 3. Includes Non-IT equipment, IT Capital, (computers and peripheral equipment, software, and communication equipment), 
structures, and inventories 
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Table 2: Hypothetical Offshoring of "Obtanium" 
t t+1 t+2 t+3
Domestic supplier price $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00
Domestic quantity sold 100 90 80 70
Chinese supplier price $6.00 $6.00 $6.00 $6.00
Chinese quantity sold 0 10 20 30
Average price paid for obtanium $10.00 $9.60 $9.20 $8.80
Domestic input price index 100 100 100 100
Import input price index              ? 100 100 100
Input index, as computed 100 100 100 100
True input price index 100 96 92 88  
 
Full Sample Switching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multifactor Productivity:
1 Manufacturing 1.30 1.23 1.05 1.12 1.08 1.16
2 Manuf.excl. Comp. & electronic products 0.69 0.67 0.52 0.58 0.54 0.61
3 Durable goods: 2.02 1.87 1.64 1.73 1.67 1.77
4        Computer and electronic products 6.82 6.33 5.91 6.13 6.05 6.18
5        Durable goods excl. Comp. & electr. products 0.95 0.89 0.70 0.76 0.71 0.81
6 Nondurable goods: 0.45 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.42
Value Added:
7 Manufacturing 3.04 2.82 2.31 2.50 2.39 2.61
8 Manuf.excl. Comp. & electronic products 0.94 0.86 0.44 0.59 0.48 0.68
9 Durable goods: 5.25 4.86 4.19 4.44 4.27 4.57
10        Computer and electronic products 22.68 21.12 19.73 20.44 20.17 20.61
11        Durable goods excl. Comp. & electr. products 1.74 1.58 1.05 1.22 1.07 1.34
12 Nondurable goods: 0.07 0.08 -0.23 -0.10 -0.15 -0.03
Table 3: Foreign Offshoring and the Bias to U.S. Multifactor Productivity and Value Added,  1997-2007
Simulation: Baseline IPP=PPI
Micro Evidence
Dev50, 
Int30
Dev30, 
Int15
 
 
NOTE: Figures represent average annual percent growth in real value-added. For "IPP=PPI,” imported materials are deflated with domestic 
deflators. For “full sample,” estimates are adjusted with product-level discounts from the entire IPP micro data sample. For “switchers,” the 
import discount is based on a sample where importers appeared to shift from suppliers in advanced counties to ones in developing or 
intermediate countries. “50/30” assumes discounts of 50 percent for developing countries and 30 percent for intermediate countries, while 
“30/15” assumes discounts of 30 percent and 15 percent respectively. 
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This paper is designed to address the need, and especially the feasibility, of producing an input 
price index at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  These price indexes would serve to 
provide more accurate estimates of several key indicators of the state of the U.S. economy, 
including gross domestic product (GDP), productivity, and inflation.  
 
The current interest in these types of price indexes arose over concerns that the BLS does not 
adequately measure shifts in prices resulting from offshoring (or its corollary, onshoring) in its 
industrial price programs.  The BLS has three indexes that cover the production of goods, the 
International Price Program’s (IPP’s) import price index (MPI) and export price index (XPI), and 
the producer price index (PPI).  The MPI only covers goods that are being imported, the XPI 
only covers the export of goods, and the PPI only covers goods and services that are produced 
domestically.  Thus, a good that had been domestically produced and repriced by the PPI, and 
has had its production sent overseas, will no longer be tracked in the PPI.  Correspondingly, the 
MPI index will not begin to price that particular item until after it has become an import.  
Therefore neither program will directly show the price change that occurs when the item goes 
from domestic production to foreign (or vice versa).   
 
An example of how the BLS constructs an import price index and a producer price index will 
help to illuminate the problem. Let us look at how both indexes might reflect price changes in the 
manufacturing of furniture.  Below I’ve constructed a table showing prices for four different 
chairs.  All chairs that are being produced domestically sell for $10, while all imported chairs sell 
for $5.  Chair A is only produced domestically, while Chair D is only imported.  During the year, 
the remaining two chairs shift from domestic production to being imported, Chair B in March 
and Chair C in May.    
 
The PPI only tracks Chair A for the entire period, and Chairs B and C for the months that they 
are domestically produced.  The MPI only tracks chair D for the entire period, and chairs B and 
C only for the months they are imported.  Thus, the PPI and the MPI for chairs would both 
reflect no change during the entire reference period.   
 
One suggested option was to combine the two indexes.  However, since the indexes themselves 
are always unchanged, no amount of recombining or reweighting will produce anything other 
than an unchanged series.  The only way to construct a price index that would show the price 
decline associated from the offshoring of chairs B and C would be to construct a price index that 
would directly track the price changes of items as they move from domestic to foreign and vice 
versa.  This is not possible under the methodology (and concepts) currently in use in the BLS’s 
two industrial price programs.169  The PPI does currently construct output price indexes for 
wholesalers and retailers, which presumably includes data on both imported and domestically 
produced goods.  However, these indexes are only gross margin indexes, and only represent the 
difference between their selling price of a good and the acquisition price for that same item.  The 
data collected does not lend itself to delineating import goods from domestic goods. 
 
                                                 
169 Note that the consumer price index is designed to pick up these price changes, and is reflected in prices paid by 
domestic consumers.   In addition, the bureau has conducted a preliminary analysis of PPI data that provides some 
evidence that prices from domestic producers are influenced by the degree of import penetration in their industry.  
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  Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 
Chair A Domestic $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 
Chair B Domestic $10 $10     
Chair B Imported   $5 $5 $5 $5 
Chair C Domestic $10 $10 $10 $10   
Chair C Imported     $5 $5 
Chair D Imported $5 $5 $5 $5 $5 $5 
        
        
PPI  100 100 100 100 100 100 
MPI  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Combined index 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Input index 100 100 85.7 85.7 71.4 71.4 
 
Although the BLS was aware of the potential data gaps between XPI, MPI, and PPI, it appeared 
that shifts over time between domestic and foreign production have been gradual enough that it 
was not evident that the limitation of the indexes was seriously biasing estimates of productivity 
as well as GDP figures and other components of the National Accounts.  The potential 
shortcomings in the BLS indexes, however, were highlighted in an article in the summer of 2007 
in Business Week, and by a study funded by the Sloan Foundation (Mandel 2007; Houseman 
2009a).  Presumably this potential gap in BLS data becomes more serious as the proportion of 
the U.S. economy tied into the global economy has grown, especially in conjunction with the 
perception that U.S. jobs are being lost to foreign competition.  
 
In order to address this limitation, the BLS needs to develop an entirely new set of “input” price 
indexes, which would price goods and services that are inputs into a domestic company’s 
production function.  Indeed, the BLS itself recognized the need for this type of series over 30 
years ago when the old “wholesale price index” was transformed into the more comprehensive 
and systematic output-based producer price indexes.  
 
This paper will review both the concepts and uses of an input price index, as well as assess 
additional evidence centering on the need for these data.  In addition, the paper will also focus on 
the practical aspects and limitations of attempting to produce such an index.  This will include 
surveying the data sources necessary for drawing a sample of establishments and items to 
reprice, evaluating possible sources for appropriate weights in an input price index, determining 
a proper index estimation formula, and verifying the publication structure necessary to support 
the different uses of these series.  
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WHY AN INPUT PRICE INDEX IS IMPORTANT 
 
As mentioned, an accurate estimate of the prices paid for inputs of both goods and services is 
crucial to a number of broad and critical measures of the economy.  This includes estimates of 
GDP, inflation, and productivity.  For example, in order to properly estimate GDP by industry, 
(constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA]) and industry productivity estimates 
(constructed by the BLS), these agencies must properly account for input costs.  Although these 
data are available on a current dollar basis (though sometimes with a considerable lag), in order 
to estimate their “real” (that is, inflation-adjusted) values, they need to be deflated by changes in 
price levels.  However, the appropriate price measures paralleling these input values are not 
currently being produced by the BLS.  Consequently, the BEA and the BLS must make use of 
whatever price data are available.  Generally this has required the agencies to make use of the 
PPI output price indexes and/or the IPP import price indexes.  It has been speculated that using 
these next best sources may lead to significant mismeasurements in the economy.  For example, 
the Business Week article (Mandel 2007) estimates that the increase in real GDP from 2003 to 
mid-2007 may have been overestimated by $66 billion.  This article focuses on import prices not 
picking up price changes when a good goes from being domestically produced to being 
imported.  It summarizes the example of the furniture industry and highlights the apparent 
contradictory behavior of consumer prices for furniture; those prices have been decreasing while 
the indexes for both domestic producer prices and import prices for this category have both been 
increasing.  
 
Equally important, the article also infers that the lack of an input price index may lead to a 
significant overestimate of productivity in U.S. industry.  A rise in a nation’s productivity is 
considered the key factor in an economy’s ability to improve its standard of living.  It is further 
assumed that increases in real hourly earnings are often tied to gains in productivity.  If, in fact, 
GDP and productivity are being overestimated, this implies that the gains from trade (that is, the 
terms of trade) are being underestimated, and that in real terms the value of imports is greater 
than currently measured.  
 
 
RECENT WORK 
 
A growing body of literature has now examined the increasing role of imports in intermediate 
inputs in the U.S. economy, as well as concerns associated with the methodology in constructing 
U.S. estimates of GDP and productivity.  Kurz and Lengermann (2008) note that foreign inputs 
accounted for one-third of growth in the manufacturing sector between 1997 and 2005, while 
Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008) estimate that from 1997 to 2006 the import share of 
intermediate inputs increased from 13.5 to 20.0 percent.  Feenstra, Reinsdorf, and Slaughter 
(2008) attribute a substantial portion of the apparent acceleration in productivity gains after 1995 
to gains in the terms of trade and tariff reductions. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find 
limitation in the import and export price indexes associated with “product replacement bias.”  
Finally, Houseman (2009b) states, “The measurement problem has broad implications not only 
for various aggregate and industry statistics, but also for the research that relies on them. 
Although the growth of imports from developing countries has spurred great interest in academic 
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and policy circles about their effects on the U.S. economy and its workers, credible research into 
these issues cannot be conducted without accurate data on real import values.” 
 
Additional Evidence 
 
In order to prove the need for a set of input price indexes that incorporates both domestic and 
foreign sourcing, I analyzed the most recent available data on the role of imports in domestic 
supply.  In analyzing the data from the BEA, I estimate that not only has the contribution of 
imports to intermediate inputs in the United States increased, but that it increased at a faster rate 
during the past decade.  In 1975, imports represented less than 7 percent of inputs into 
manufacturing.  By 2007 that figure had climbed to almost 28 percent (see Figure 1). Equally 
important, between 1997 and 2007, the percent of imports in inputs increased by an average of 
over 0.4 percent a year, while in the prior decade, the percent had increased by less than 0.25 
percent a year.  This point is critical because it infers that there is an acceleration in companies 
shifting their products from domestic sourcing to foreign sourcing, making the need for 
additional data more critical.  In addition, if the rate of change was consistent over time, it might 
have been easier to model a “discount” factor to apply to import prices in order to adjust for this 
shift. 
 
Indeed, the speed of globalization is perhaps happening so quickly that the ability of traditional 
measures to capture these shifts has become increasingly problematic.  For example, the  
household wood furniture manufacturing industry—the industry highlighted in the Business 
Week article—recorded a dramatic increase in the value of imports during the past decade, 
jumping from $13.2 billion in 1999 to $27.0 billion in 2007.  Despite this increase, in 2006 the 
preliminary estimate from the Annual Survey of Manufactures for the household wood furniture 
sector recorded an increase in value of domestic production, up to $13.5 billion.  However, when 
the final figures were revised the following year, the number was adjusted substantially 
downward to only $8.6 billion.  This may be due in part to the difficulty of properly (and in a 
timely manner) coding companies to the correct NAICS (North American Industry Classification 
System) number when they shift from being a manufacturer to being essentially a wholesaler.  
 
Limitations 
 
It is important to point out that the construction of an input price index will not alleviate directly 
the potential mismeasurement issues associated with an import price index.  This is important to 
note because GDP can be estimated using two different methods:  It can be constructed by 
calculating the total of final sales in the U.S. economy and subtracting imports (the familiar Y = 
C + I + G + X – M), as well as by the value-added approach, where the total value added of each 
industry is aggregated (Y = VAj,   where VAj = Sales for industry j – Purchases of materials and 
supplies by industry j.  The current methodology in the United States focuses on the former.   
 
In order to understand why the BLS cannot construct an import price index that directly registers 
these price changes, it helps to review the current methodology.  The procedure for producing 
import price indexes starts out with a very robust frame from which to draw a sample.  It 
includes nearly the entire set of transactions of all merchandise brought through U.S. Customs 
and into the United States.  It categorizes it by individual shipments, product categories, and of 
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course, companies.  A sample of specific companies and the items they imported is then drawn 
from this frame, and the BLS attempts to collect prices on a monthly basis for these items.  Note, 
however, that the sample only consists of goods that are already being imported.  It is not 
practical to ascertain from an importer (who in many cases may only be an intermediary) if in the 
past he sourced an item domestically.  It would also be hard to get the reverse, asking an 
importer who no longer imports if the sampled good is now produced domestically, and if so, 
what is the price.  Presumably, constructing an input price index may potentially provide some 
indication of the magnitude of any differences in price trends being missed by import prices or 
producer prices as sourcing shifts from one to the other.  This might be possible if, as the pricing 
data was being collected, the respondent was able to take note of whether the item was bought 
domestically or from a foreign source.  From a practical standpoint, however, it is not clear if this 
information could be successfully incorporated into the index production process.  
  
It should also be noted that an input price index will not alleviate problems arising from 
previously in-house-produced goods and services that are now being outsourced (either 
domestically or to a foreign source).  This, too, is considered a growing phenomenon, but unless 
data on prices associated with the in-house cost of producing an item can be directly compared 
with the outsourced price, it is not clear how the BLS could evaluate shifts in prices associated 
with this phenomenon. 
 
 
BLS AND INPUT PRICE INDEXES 
 
The seminal 1961 report of the National Bureau of Economic Research Price Statistics Review 
Committee, the so-called Stigler Report, made a number of recommendations surrounding the 
wholesale price indexes, which was the name of the industrial price series then being produced 
by the BLS.  One of the recommendations was that the BLS should rely on buyers’ prices rather 
than sellers’.  A second recommendation was for the creation of a set of conceptually rigorous 
input and output price indexes.  The report also included an empirical study, which concluded 
that buyers’ prices were more likely than list prices to accurately reflect prices of actual 
transactions.    
 
Buyers’ Prices 
 
Prior to the Stigler Report, the PPI had evaluated the use of buyers’ prices.  In 1942, the PPI 
conducted a study of buyers’ prices for eight selected items of steel mill products for six time 
periods and compared them to list prices.  The results of the study showed that the buyers’ prices 
moved differently than list prices for short periods of time, but longer-term list and invoice prices 
were comparable.  Experiences with the study showed that purchases of an item by an individual 
company included many different transaction terms and detailed specifications.  
 
In response to the Stigler Report and subsequent reports, the BLS commissioner as well as others 
expressed concerns that the cost of collecting buyers’ prices would outweigh the likely benefits 
due to potential problems such as buyers’ prices from an invoice sometimes not reflecting real 
transaction prices, difficulties capturing retroactive price adjustments based on cumulative 
volume, and financial assistance given by sellers to buyers for advertising and other expenses.  
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The BLS did agree that the project had merit on a selective basis to allow analysis of price trends 
in industries where transaction pricing was difficult. 
 
A more detailed study looking into the advantages of buyers’ prices was published in Stigler and 
Kindahl (1969), which pointed out the differences in price trends between buyers’ and sellers’ 
prices.  As much of the concern with the then BLS wholesale price index focused on the use (or 
potential misuse) of so-called list prices, the BLS economists worked with the sellers who were 
participating in the price survey to encourage the reporting of actual transaction prices and made 
substantial progress in some industries in improving the quality of the received prices.  In 
addition, the PPI also began the process of evaluating specific products where buyers’ prices 
should be collected due to the unavailability of transaction prices from sellers. As a result of this 
study, in January 1972 the PPI began publishing a commodity index for aluminum ingot using 
buyers’ prices from a judgmentally selected sample of reporters.   
 
Building on this work, in 1974 the PPI attempted a systematic sampling approach to obtaining 
buyers’ prices.  This project was undertaken with the goal of determining the feasibility and cost 
of collecting prices directly from buyers in order to either calculate price indexes or evaluate the 
quality of the transaction prices being reported by sellers.  The project identified  highly 
weighted  products where either sellers refused to provide transaction data or the quality of 
current transaction data was questionable, and where there were homogeneous products 
frequently purchased by buyers in consistent quantities. The project focused on titanium forgings 
because the PPI was able to create an unrefined frame and document the typical transaction 
characteristics of buyers in this product area.  After significant resources were spent on this 
project, pricing issues remained, and a process had not been defined to refine and systematically 
sample from the frame.  As a result, the project was dropped and the program reverted to 
obtaining good transaction prices from sellers even in these more difficult cases.  No further 
work was done on buyers’ prices, and in 1980, when indexes calculated using sellers’ transaction 
prices were introduced from the systematic sample for the primary aluminum industry output 
index, the buyers’ price commodity index for aluminum ingot was dropped. 
 
Input/Output Indexes 
 
In response to the Stigler Report, the PPI also began examining approaches to creating input and 
output (price) indexes for industries.  For example, in the early 1960s the PPI built output 
Industry-Sector Price Indexes (ISPI) for some industries by combining the judgmentally sampled 
data collected for the commodity indexes using different classification structures and weighting.  
In the mid 1970s, however, the PPI began a comprehensive revision in order to plan and 
implement many improvements that had been recommended over the years, including those in 
the Stigler Report. The long-term goal of the revision was to expand the PPI’s coverage to every 
industry in the private economy and to publish a system of price indexes that included  
 
• industry output indexes, 
• industry input indexes,  
• detailed commodity indexes, and  
• industry based stage of processing indexes. 
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In the late 1970s the PPI began systematically sampling industries, and in 1980 began 
introducing industry output indexes on a regular basis.170  Throughout the years, the PPI 
continued to expand the number of industry output indexes and now covers 82 percent of all in-
scope production.   
 
As an attempt to fulfill the recommendations of the Stigler report, and as a component of its 
stage of processing indexes, the BLS did publish a set of input price indexes from 1988 to 2003.  
These indexes were calculated by reweighting output prices using input weights, which allowed 
the use of output price indexes at a great level of detail.  However, these indexes did not include 
imports, nor did they directly account for substitution from a buyer’s perspective. Thus, they 
assumed that sellers’ prices are a good proxy for buyers’ prices, and that prices for imports and 
domestic production move similarly.  These series were discontinued in 2003, but the BEA and 
the BLS still used them as a method for constructing input price indexes where necessary  (see 
Table 1).   
 
Note that the BLS does have extensive experience with constructing an input price index, 
because both the import price and consumer price indexes are constructed from buyers’ prices. 
 
 
CURRENT USES AND USERS OF THE DATA 
 
The fundamental question facing the BLS, of course, is, can the BLS produce an input price 
series that will meet the needs of its primary users?  To answer this question, one must first delve 
into the intricacies of the construction of the outputs of the two primary potential users of these 
data, the Office of Productivity and Technology (OPT) at the BLS, and the Industry Sector 
Division of the BEA.   
 
The BLS 
 
We will start with the OPT, which publishes two types of productivity measures: 1) labor 
productivity, or output per hour of labor; and 2) multifactor productivity, or output per unit of 
combined inputs.  Labor productivity indexes and multifactor productivity indexes are produced 
in two different divisions in the BLS. 
 
Labor productivity 
Measures of labor productivity are produced in two divisions of the OPT: the Division of Major 
Sector Productivity (DMSP) and the Division of Industry Productivity Studies (DIPS).  The 
estimates of labor productivity (and unit labor costs) for major sectors are published quarterly, 
while estimates for industries are published annually.  Labor productivity estimates do not 
explicitly measure shifts in the quantity (or constant dollar value) of material inputs, and 
therefore do not require estimates of the changes in the prices of those inputs, be they 
domestically sourced or imported.  Note that outputs are adjusted for inflation.   
 
                                                 
170 While the practical work focused on an output price index, work did proceed on the theory of an input price 
index, culminating in a BLS working paper by Robert Archibald in 1975.   
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Multifactor productivity 
Multifactor productivity measures are also produced in both the DMSP and DIPS. The DMSP 
publishes, albeit with little detail, multifactor productivity estimates for the private business and 
private nonfarm business sectors of the economy.  These series represent 77 percent of U.S. 
GDP.  In calculating these series, outputs are measured on a value-added basis, which are then 
compared to just two inputs, capital and labor. The value of material inputs is excluded from 
these calculations.  However, staff uses detailed price indexes to deflate capital expenditures.  
Physical capital, as measured by the DMSP, consists of 42 types of equipment and software, 21 
types of nonresidential structures, 9 types of residential capital, inventories (manufacturing available 
for 3 stages of fabrication), and land. Deflation of each capital expenditure category is actually 
done at the detailed 5- or 6-digit input-output (I-O) level.  (The actual derivation of value-added 
by sector entails adjusting the value of inputs to account for changes in prices.  This work, 
however, is done at the BEA.)   
 
The DMSP also publishes annual multifactor productivity measures for total manufacturing and 
18 broad 3-digit NAICS manufacturing industries, comparing sectoral output (total output 
excluding intraindustry or intrasector transactions) to a broad set of inputs, including capital, 
labor, energy, materials and business services (KLEMS) inputs.  (Note that on a value-added 
basis, manufacturing represented 12 percent of GDP in 2007.)  In the manufacturing sector of the 
economy and in individual industries, intermediate purchases constitute the largest component of 
inputs.  The nominal dollar and constant dollar values of energy, materials, and services used by 
the DMSP are derived by the BEA.   
 
DIPS publishes more detailed annual multifactor productivity measures for 86 4-digit NAICS 
manufacturing industries, plus air transportation and line-haul railroads.  These productivity 
measures also compare industry sectoral output to a broad set of combined inputs.  DIPS 
publishes estimates of intermediate purchases, capital, and labor for each of the detailed 
manufacturing industries.  The index of intermediate purchases for each industry is constructed 
by combining separate quantities (or constant dollar costs) of electricity, fuels, materials, and 
purchased services.  In order to deflate nominal dollar cost inputs for each industry, weighted 
deflators for materials and services are calculated by combining detailed price indexes using 
weights derived from the cost of commodities consumed by each industry, as shown in the 
detailed benchmark I-O tables produced by the BEA.  I-O commodities from the benchmark I-O 
tables generally relate to the primary products of 6-digit NAICS industries, or occasionally a 
combination of industries.  For materials commodities that are heavily imported, DIPS combines 
PPIs and import price indexes using weights from the BEA’s import matrix.  DIPS also uses 
PPIs to create weighted deflators to deflate annual fuels purchases of each industry and capital 
expenditures.  Price deflators for each equipment asset category are constructed by combining 
detailed PPIs with weights from the BEA capital flow tables at the roughly 6-digit level.  For the 
DIPS detailed manufacturing industry measures, physical capital consists of 25 categories of 
equipment, two categories of structures, three categories of inventories, and land.    
 
Note that the BLS makes use of product-specific data in constructing deflators for a set of input 
price indexes for a given industry’s material costs.  Ideally, an input price index would be 
industry-specific, but that may prove cost-prohibitive.   
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Since industry MFP calculations are based on annual data, the nominal input values are adjusted 
by annual PPIs (average of 12 monthly price indexes).  
 
The BEA 
 
The Industry Sector Division at the BEA is responsible for producing the annual industry 
accounts and the benchmark input-output accounts.  These accounts, which shed critical light on 
the relationships between U.S. industries, take a value-added approach to and are consistent with 
the BEA’s flagship GDP estimates.  Although the BEA does not publish detailed annual real 
input-output estimates, they do publish annual price and quantity indexes for 65 detailed 
industries, including 19 manufacturing industries, which do require data on the real value of 
inputs.   
 
As in the work at the BLS, the BEA attempts to make its adjustments at the most detailed level 
possible.  For example, at the BEA, the effort to construct updated values for intermediate inputs 
of goods and services entails making adjustment to approximately 3,500 different items, of 
which roughly 2,300 represent categories of goods.  Ideally, and like the BLS, the BEA would 
like input price indexes by industry for each of the 1,179 6-digit NAICS level of detail. In 
practice, since the cost of producing that many separate price indexes could be prohibitive, the 
BEA, like the BLS, would accept a set of product-based input price indexes.  In addition, at a 
minimum, category definitions should be consistent with the 12 expense categories recently 
added to the Census Bureau’s ASM forms (most of which are services inputs).  While the BEA 
currently only produces annual estimates of GDP-by-industry, there has been growing interest in 
providing these estimates on a quarterly basis.  
 
In sum, although superficially the level of publication required to produce the currently 
published set of economic data is comparatively high, in actuality the detail necessary to 
properly support these estimates may be considerably more disaggregated.  
 
 
STEPS TO PRODUCE AN INPUT PRICE INDEX 
 
While there is little dispute over the potential advantages of adding an input price index to the 
family of price indexes produced by BLS, there is the fundamental  question of both feasibility 
and cost of producing a usable and comprehensive set of indexes.    
 
Developing a Sample 
 
From a practical standpoint, the first and perhaps the biggest hurdle in developing an input price 
index is developing a frame from which to draw a sample of establishments; the bureau does not 
currently have access to data on the expenses and purchases of individual companies necessary 
to produce a representative sample.  Without these data, a BLS field agent attempting to initiate a 
respondent into a survey would have no information on what that establishment buys in order to 
produce its outputs.  While, in theory, the establishment might be able to supply these data, in 
practice it is expected that this type of data collection would be very problematic given the 
voluntary nature of BLS programs.   
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All is not lost, however, as the Census Bureau does collect detailed data on purchases by 
individual establishment.  In particular, in the Economic Census, which the agency conducts 
every five years, all manufacturing firms are asked to include detailed data (by 10-digit NAICS 
code) on their cost of materials, parts, and supplies consumed in the reference year.  The most 
recent data available cover the calendar 2007 Economic Census and became available in mid-
2009.  The dataset includes information for 340,000 manufacturing establishments in the United 
States, and the Census Bureau records the total cost of materials purchased by these 
establishments as approximately $2.5 billion in calendar 2007.  Table 2 is part of the collection 
form for the MC-33702 Manufacturing, Household Furniture and Wood Housings sector, where 
establishments report on their material costs.  In addition, Table 3 has an example of the type of 
data that is publically available from the census.  For NAICS 333111, one can find data on the 
number of companies and their total purchases and expenses, as well as an indication of their 
relative size.  Table 4 shows data on cost of materials by type of material for that same industry, 
while Table 5 reflects the total purchases for all manufacturing industries of a given commodity.   
 
In addition, the less comprehensive but timelier Annual Survey of Manufacturing, which is based 
on a sample of 50,000 manufacturing establishments, includes a limited amount of data on 
purchases, providing one category for total cost of materials, parts, containers, packaging, etc. 
 
One shortcoming of these surveys is that, while data on capital expenditures is also collected, it 
is only split three ways: 1) motor vehicles, 2) computers, and 3) other.  Another potential 
shortcoming of this source of data is its timeliness, or lack thereof.  Since the detailed data is 
only collected once every five years, it may be that by the time the BLS is able to draw a sample 
and initiate these establishments into a market basket, the establishments and/or the products that 
they buy may be out of date and no longer reflective of their current market.   
 
Although much of the focus has been on the manufacturing sector, it should be recalled that the 
manufacturing component only accounts for a small and shrinking sector of the economy; 
services represent nearly two-thirds of GDP.  The amount of detailed cost data collected by the 
census for the service industry surveys is more limited.  In general the collection forms include 
some detailed data on purchased services, but only limited data on purchased equipment and 
materials.171  Interestingly, while the census collects very little detailed data on material costs in 
the noncensus years for manufacturing industries, the level of detailed data collected for the cost 
of business services, though limited, is roughly the same, whether it is for an annual survey or 
the every five-year census.  In general, the surveys break out the purchases of business services 
into five categories:  computer services, communication services, advertising and related 
services, professional and technical services, and repair and maintenance services.  
 
Due to the more detailed cost of materials data available for the manufacturing sector, much of 
the current assessment of a potential sampling frame has focused on this sector.  Unfortunately, 
because many of the datasets at the Census Bureau have data that has been commingled with 
                                                 
171 For example, in contrast to the forms for the furniture manufacturing industries, the collection form for the 
parallel furniture wholesale (Table 6: WH-42305) sector does not provide the same level of detail on material costs, 
while the collection form for the retail furniture industry (Table 7: RE-44201) does not collect any information on 
the cost of materials. 
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federal tax return information data from the Internal Revenue Service, getting access to the 
necessary data has been somewhat problematic.  Work has continued for several years on what is 
referred to as companion legislation.172 Regardless, BLS staff have recently been able to access 
these data at the Census Research Data Center in Suitland, Maryland, and have begun the 
process of assessing the utility of using these data to draw samples that would permit the 
publication of input price indexes for the 471 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries.  One 
concern is that a large percentage of the cost of materials purchased is in a miscellaneous 
purchase category.  
 
Assuming BLS is able to use the census data, this would allow the BLS, using establishment 
sampling methodologies with which the bureau is already quite familiar, to construct a sample of 
establishments, and detailed product areas within the given establishment, that the bureau would 
need to collect the necessary pricing data. The selection of the actual item that the bureau would 
need to reprice on a periodic basis would normally be done by a BLS field economist during a 
so-called initiation visit to the establishment. This procedure is one that is already done by 
staffers when collecting data for the bureau’s PPI and IPP industrial price programs, and 
involves a number of trade-offs.  Ideally the selection would be based on a probability 
proportionate to how much of a given item a company purchases within the selected category.  
Thus, if a company buys a certain amount of varying types of steel, the field economist, using 
data hopefully supplied by the respondent, would be able to select a specific steel product on 
which the BLS would attempt to collect data. In practice, however, these procedures would 
likely have to take into account the fact that the selected item may not be purchased on a regular 
basis, or the respondent may not have any data available on how much of each different type of 
steel the company purchased in a given period.  Since the BLS already has experience with these 
types of issues in its current programs, developing an appropriate fallback procedure does not 
necessarily present a problem.  However, it does lead in to what is perhaps the key issue, which 
is the ability of the program to reprice the same item month after month, quarter after quarter or 
year after year, from the same source.   
 
Pricing 
 
Maintaining a constant set of items to reprice over time may prove to be the most intractable 
barrier to constructing a comprehensive set of input price indexes.  While on the output side, 
companies tend to ship their goods (or offer their services) every month, it is not clear if they buy 
the same item on a regular basis, especially for capital equipment such as computers.  This may 
place a heavier burden on the imputation method chosen for valuing prices in missing periods.173  
Alternatively, the BLS may have to use an altogether different approach, such as combining 
prices from different respondents (in cases where the item specifications are identical).  A related 
question is how to handle changes in the pricing specifications.  For example, if the product is 
the same but the supplier is different, do we continue to price it as the same item? What is our 
                                                 
172 Legislation to modify the IRS tax code was proposed by the last Administration, with interagency support from 
the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, in 2002–2003 and in 2008.  Conversations have begun on the 
development of an official Obama Administration proposal, with the Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Economic Affairs taking the lead on this effort.   
173 In constructing a sample for the import price index, the International Price Program has the advantage of 
accessing the universe of import transactions from the Customs Service, which allows for drawing a sample only of 
those items and importers who trade consistently over the course of a year.  
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general approach toward quality adjustment when a buyer switches products and/or suppliers?  
That is, in an ideal situation where we can get the exact information that we desire, what would 
we ask for?  What are the acceptable fallbacks if we can’t obtain the desired information?  What 
if, in fact, the buyer uses multiple suppliers?  Do we select a specific supplier or use some sort of 
average?  If we select one, how and when do we switch to a price from a different supplier?  
Should the price include or exclude transportation costs?  If other services are bundled with the 
product (e.g., installation), how do we handle those situations?  Do we want to include 
government purchases?  If so, how would we sample for them since they wouldn’t be included in 
data at census?  How do we coordinate requests for buyers prices with requests for sellers prices 
within the same firm? 
 
In order to answer these and similar questions, the BLS will most likely need to make some 
effort to collect information from a sample of representative companies.  A final decision on 
some of these issues will probably entail balancing the requirements of a price index with the 
reality of the agency’s sometimes limited ability to collect data voluntarily from private industry.  
 
Estimation Formula  
 
With one exception, compared to the questions associated with sampling and repricing, the 
issues surrounding the estimation formula are comparatively easy.  Weights can either be derived 
from the sampling frame, from the respondents themselves, or from some combination thereof.  
One concern with using the weights derived from the sampling frame is the age of the data.  
Since the detailed data are collected only once every five years, the data may be out of date by 
the time they are actually used in the calculation of the indexes.  A comparison of these values 
from one census to the next may shed light on the volatility of these figures.  
 
There are various questions associated with the actual formula to use, such as using an arithmetic 
formula versus a geomeans formula, but they do not present intractable barriers. One interesting 
aspect of the formula relates to theoretical differences between the price index formula for the 
output from a production function versus the index formula for the price index for inputs into a 
production function.  The theory assumes that a firm will attempt to maximize profits by 
minimizing costs while maximizing revenue. On the output side, theory tells us that an 
establishment will attempt to shift sales to its goods or services that over time are becoming 
relatively more expensive compared to its other outputs.  In contrast, the firm would attempt to 
shift costs toward its expense categories that are becoming relatively cheaper.  Consequently, a 
price index of firms’ outputs would tend to show at least no decline in the relative quantity of the 
more expensive goods being sold, while on the cost side, the index should in theory reflect at 
least no increase in the goods or services that are more expensive.  Interestingly, these 
assumptions are based on partial equilibrium models where the model is only looking at one side 
of the equation.  But, of course, one establishment’s sales are another establishment’s purchases, 
and in a general equilibrium model, there is no a priori theory of exactly what constitutes the 
correct direction of substitution.174  
 
The one notable difficulty in estimating these indexes relates to how one goes about constructing 
industry-specific price indexes.  While a product-based input price index would use every 
                                                 
174 For further elucidation, see Kim and To (2009) 
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establishment’s purchases of a specific good (or service), an industry-specific input price index 
would only use goods or services purchased by establishments in that specific industry.  For 
example, presumably all establishments must purchase energy, be it electricity, gas, petroleum 
products, etc.  Would the BLS attempt to calculate a separate energy index for each industry, or 
would it combine all energy data into one generic input energy index?  The answer may 
ultimately be decided on practical grounds, (i.e., do we have enough data for separate energy 
series, or do each of the different energy series trend nearly the same?)  Of course, a proxy for an 
industry-specific input price index could be constructed using individual product-level price 
indexes, but aggregating them using the proportions appropriate for a particular industry’s 
purchasing patterns.   
 
Next Step: Reality Check 
 
As previously mentioned, the preliminary step in this effort to produce an input price index is to 
develop a set of questions for a limited set of respondents who in the past have proven 
cooperative to the BLS industrial price programs.  The questions would be designed not to 
collect specific pricing data from the establishments, but to provide the BLS with some insight 
into how respondents are likely to react to any such data collection requests.  For example, some 
companies have refused to provide BLS with data, citing confidentiality concerns.  Thus, one 
question might be designed to ascertain whether companies would be more likely, less likely, or 
equally as likely to supply data on costs as they are willing to supply output or import or export 
price data.  Another basic question to ask respondents would be to ascertain if they even keep 
good data on the cost of their purchases, and if so, what the periodicity of their purchasing is.   
 
Developing a Pilot 
 
A longer-term effort to produce input price indexes can be broken down into four phases, based 
on availability of data.  This effort will require additional approvals and funding as well.  The 
four phases include input indexes covering 1) manufacturers material costs, 2) manufacturers 
capital equipment costs, 3) manufacturers business services costs, and 4) service industries 
material, capital equipment, and business services costs. 
 
Ideally, each phase would start with a pilot prior to going into production.  For each pilot, BLS 
will conduct research and develop the methodology, procedures, and systems associated with 
each of the following activities: 
 
• Obtain permission from the OMB. 
• Select a set of industries for the pilot. 
• Evaluate the data sources that are available for a sampling frame.  Due to the potential for 
detailed cost data from the Census of Manufactures, the first phase would focus on input 
indexes of cost of materials for manufacturing industries. 
• Develop the collection materials and procedures and train staff. 
• Select a sample of establishments for the pilot. 
• Conduct the pilot test and evaluate the results. 
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• Evaluate the feasibility of producing an input price index for the given phase and develop 
the requirements for producing an input price index, including publication goals, required 
sample size, expected burden, and estimated resources and timeframe for publication. 
• Based on available resources, develop and maintain a production set of indexes for that 
particular set of input indexes.  
 
Cost 
 
Assuming the methodological and data collection issues can be resolved, and assuming the BLS 
is able to collect the necessary data from respondents, there remains the question of the cost of 
developing and maintaining these new indexes.  On the one hand, the collection, review, and 
verification of data for inclusion in price indexes still has a significant labor-intensive 
component, usually requiring a substantial level of expertise in economics and/or statistics.  On 
the other hand, a significant (but unknown) amount of the necessary resources, both in human 
capital as well as data processing applications, may be shared with the bureau’s other industrial 
price programs, the IPP and the PPI.  Any bureau effort to produce an input price index past the 
research phase would require resources sufficient to cover collecting approximately 15,000 items 
and publishing approximately 600 6-digit material codes (which are similar to NAICS codes).  
The process for developing these series would extend over several years. Extending the set of 
indexes to cover the three additional phases would entail an additional annual cost.  
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Table 1 
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Table 2 
2007 Economic Census: MC-33702 Manufacturing, 
Household Furniture and Wood Housings 
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Table 3 
NAICS 333111 
Farm Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
 
Companies Establishments 
with 100 
employees or 
More 
Total Value of 
Shipments 
($1,000) 
Total Capital 
expenditures 
($1,000) 
Total Cost of, 
Purchased 
materials 
($1,000) 
1,079 104 $21,181,238 $348,399 $9,903,172 
 
Table 4 
NAICS 333111 
Farm Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing  
(Cost of Materials) 
 
226,547Engine electrical equip. (incl. spark plugs/magnetos/etc.)33632200
268,893Iron and steel castings (rough and semifinished)33151001
280,209All other steel shapes/forms (exc. castings/forgings/etc.)33120092
281,122Mechanical speed changers, gears, & ind. high-speed drives33361200
286,917Steel struct shapes & sheet piling (excl castings/forgings/etc.)33100025
288,496Transmissions and parts33635003
389,781Pneumatic tires and inner tubes32621103
504,553Other fabricated metal products (excl. Forgings/castings etc.)33200046
586,586Steel sheet and strip (including tinplate)33100022
607,834Fluid power products, hydraulic and pneumatic33000067
680,000
Engines (diesel/semidiesel/gasoline/carburetor-type/etc.) & 
parts33000019
967,152All other materials/components/parts/containers/supplies970099
2,718,394Materials, ingredients, containers, and supplies, nsk971000
Delivered cost 
($1,000)DescriptionMaterial Code
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Table 5 
Expenditures on Fluid Power 
products (Material Code 33000067) by Industry 
405,854All other motor vehicle parts manufacturing336399
237,914Motor vehicle transmission and power train parts manufacturing336350
47,397Motor vehicle brake system manufacturing336340
89,222Motor vehicle steering and suspension parts336330
268,662Gasoline engine and engine parts manufacturing336312
284,283Other engine equipment manufacturing333618
4,687Turbine and turbine generator set units manufacturing333611
29,007Other metalworking machinery manufacturing333518
12,355Rolling mill machinery and equipment manufacturing333516
43,371Machine tool (metal forming types) manufacturing333513
66,118Machine tool (metal cutting types) manufacturing333512
422,091Other commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing333319
218,356Lawn and garden equipment manufacturing333112
607,834Farm machinery and equipment manufacturing333111
Delivered 
cost 
($1,000)Description
NAICS 
Code
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Table 6 
2007 Economic Census: WH-42305 Wholesale, Furniture and Home Furnishings 
 
Table 7 
2007 Economic Census: RT-44201, Retail Furniture Stores 
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Figure 1  
Imports as a Percent of Domestic Supply
Manufacturing Sector
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Imported Inputs and Industry Contributions to Economic Growth: 
An Assessment of Alternative Approaches 
 
 
Over the past decade imports have become an increasingly important source of supply for both 
U.S consumers and producers, partly due to changes in the relative prices of imported and 
domestic goods.  From 1997 to 2007, imports as a share of all goods and services consumed in 
the United States increased from 18 percent to 23 percent.  This aspect of globalization has 
affected the size and structure of the U.S. economy, especially the manufacturing sector, but it 
has also complicated the task of measuring economic growth and industry performance.  
Policymakers and researchers are concerned that increased outsourcing to lower-cost offshore 
suppliers has affected key economic measures such as output, value added, and labor input.  
Difficulties in measuring price change for imported goods can affect measured growth in real 
gross domestic product (GDP).  Similarly, problems identifying outsourcing-related activities 
could affect measures of industry contributions to economic growth and productivity in 
manufacturing and other sectors.   
 
For several decades, imports have been the major source of U.S. supply for final consumer goods 
such as apparel, toys, shoes, motor vehicles, and consumer electronics, and for certain kinds of 
business investment goods.  More recently, the import share has increased for final goods such as 
furniture and other household products, with important implications for the measurement of 
domestic consumption prices.  Another recent trend has been strong growth in the use of 
imported intermediate materials by U.S. manufacturing industries, partly at the expense of 
domestic goods.  A significant portion of this trade occurs among affiliated parties within U.S. 
multinational companies.  This form of offshore outsourcing—substitution of imported for 
domestic materials—has raised questions about the measurement of real value added by industry 
and its impact on real GDP growth. 
 
Limitations in the measurement of imports have somewhat different implications for the various 
approaches typically used by statistical agencies to measure GDP.175  Only the final expenditures 
approach and the production approach provide measures of both nominal and real GDP.  
Because imports are subtracted using either approach, import growth has important measurement 
implications.  In the final expenditures approach, which is featured in the United States, real 
GDP is an aggregate of personal consumption expenditures, private equipment and structures, 
government consumption and investment, and exports less all imports, both final and 
intermediate.  In the production approach, which is the featured approach in many other 
countries, real GDP is an aggregate of the real value added originating in all industries, including 
government.  Value added equals gross output less intermediate inputs, which include imported 
inputs.  As a result, under the production approach, only the imports consumed in intermediate 
uses are subtracted.  In recent years, intermediate goods and services have accounted for slightly 
more than 50 percent of all imports. 
 
                                                 
175 The three major approaches are the final expenditures approach, the income approach, and the production 
approach. 
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Economists have expressed concern that substitution by U.S. consumers and producers toward 
lower-priced imported goods from developing countries may not be fully reflected in the official 
import-price indexes used for calculating real GDP based on the final expenditures approach, and 
that as a consequence, growth in real GDP and productivity may be overstated (Mandel).  This 
potential bias can be explored using both the expenditure and production approaches to 
measuring real GDP.  To the extent that the recent growth in lower-priced imported goods has 
affected intermediate and final uses assessing the impact using the production approach may be 
revealing.   
 
Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) annual industry accounts can be used to 
identify not only the uses of imported goods (intermediate vs. final) but also the overall 
importance of imported products by measuring their value relative to the value of comparable 
domestically produced goods.  For this paper, we use data from the BEA’s annual industry 
accounts and from the BEA’s surveys of multinational companies (MNCs) to determine how 
growth in imported intermediate inputs has affected growth in real value added by industry (real 
GDP growth), and to assess the impact of alternative assumptions about the use of imports and 
the behavior of import prices. 
 
In this paper, we calculate real value added by industry and real value added for all industries 
(real GDP) using alternative assumptions about industry use of imports and the behavior of 
imported input prices.  In the current (baseline) methodology, the allocation of imports to 
industries is based on an “import comparability” assumption.  This assumes that the portion of 
intermediate inputs attributable to imports is calculated as a percentage of the total purchase 
value, using the economy-wide ratio of commodity imports to the total domestic supply of the 
commodity.  Alternative assumptions about the use of imports by selected industries are based 
on the BEA’s data on imports by the U.S. parents of foreign affiliates and unaffiliated parties.  
For the deflation of imported intermediate inputs, the current methodology relies primarily on 
import-price indexes compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Alternative assumptions 
about import-price change are made to determine a threshold required for import price biases to 
impact real GDP, the manufacturing sector, and selected manufacturing industries.   
 
The remainder of this paper is presented in four sections.  The next section provides background 
on how the industry accounts can be used to measure outsourcing and the role of imported inputs 
at the industry level, how the BEA’s import-use tables are compiled, and how imported inputs 
are used in constructing real value added by industry.  After that we briefly describe the BEA’s 
International Economic Accounts, including the MNC data, and explain how the MNC-based 
import-use tables are compiled.  The following section presents empirical results that compare 
the current (baseline) estimates from the annual industry accounts with results from the MNC-
based import-use tables.  This section also describes results based on different assumptions about 
the behavior of import prices.  We conclude with a brief summary and recommendations for 
improving data on imported inputs by industry and import-price indexes. 
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ANNUAL INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS 
 
The annual industry accounts are a useful analytical framework for simulating the impact of 
alternative assumptions about imports for several reasons.  These accounts provide an annual 
time series of nominal and real gross output, intermediate inputs, and value added for 65 
industries defined according to the 1997 NAICS) (Moyer et al. 2004).  They provide an 
internally consistent set of industry production accounts that are integrated conceptually and 
statistically with final expenditures and GDP from the national income and product accounts 
(NIPAs).   
 
The annual industry accounts are estimated within the framework of balanced make and use 
tables, which allows for integrated analysis of industry output, inputs, employment, final 
demand, and imports.  The annual input-output (I-O) accounts provide a time series of detailed, 
consistent information on the flows of goods and services that both comprise industry production 
processes and that are included in final expenditures.  Estimates of the supply of commodities are 
prepared at nearly the same level of detail as in the benchmark I-O accounts and are then 
aggregated to the higher publication level used for the annual industry accounts.  The GDP by 
industry accounts feature estimates of nominal and real value added by industry.  Value added is 
defined as an industry’s gross output (sales or receipts and other operating income) minus its 
intermediate inputs (energy, materials, and purchased services).  Intermediate inputs are acquired 
from either domestic or foreign sources (imports).  Price and quantity indexes of gross output, 
intermediate inputs, and value added are published for industries, industry groups, and broad 
sectors in the GDP by industry accounts.  
 
Significant improvements in the measurement of intermediate purchases in the 1997 benchmark 
made the annual industry accounts more suitable for identifying and measuring outsourcing and 
the role of imported inputs than in the past.176  A broader set of purchased services was collected 
for establishments in the manufacturing, mining, and construction sectors, and more detailed data 
on purchased services for more industries in the trade and services sector were collected from an 
expanded Business Expenses Survey.177  Estimates of materials and energy inputs by industry 
were also based on detailed economic census data for manufacturing and on broader input 
category data for nonmanufacturing industries.  
 
The expansion of the annual industry accounts in 2005 to provide additional information on the 
composition of intermediate inputs by industry made these accounts more analytically useful to 
study trends in the use of energy, materials, and purchased services inputs (Strassner, Medeiros, 
and Smith 2005).  The balanced I-O use table provides the product detail needed to aggregate 
estimates of intermediate inputs into cost categories useful for economic analysis.178  Each cost 
category includes both imported and domestically produced goods and services, and each 
                                                 
176 The 1997 benchmark I-O accounts were based almost entirely on detailed data on outputs and inputs collected by 
the Census Bureau in the 1997 Economic Census.  For more information, see Lawson et al. (2002). 
177 As a result of the expansion in source data, a much larger share of total intermediate purchased services was 
based on economic census data than in past benchmarks.   
178 These estimates are prepared by applying a KLEMS production framework to the BEA’s estimates of industry 
production. 
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category is valued in purchasers’ prices, which include domestic transport costs, wholesale trade 
margins, and sales and excise taxes.   
 
On an annual basis, a wide array of source data is used to update the benchmark estimates for the 
annual time series.  Nominal value added by industry estimates are available annually for the 
compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and the gross 
operating surplus.  Annual survey data are available from the Census Bureau for updating 
industry gross output for all of the manufacturing industries and for most of the services 
industries, including the industries that provide outsourcing-related services.  Annual data are 
also available from the NIPAs for updating estimates of final expenditures.   
 
Data, however, are not available annually to update estimates of intermediate inputs by industry.  
Instead, the BEA’s procedures for annual updates of intermediate inputs rely partly on the 
assumption that the real (constant-price) use of intermediate inputs relative to the industry’s real 
gross output has not changed from the prior year.179  An industry’s real intermediate inputs are 
initially updated based on changes in its real gross output.  The nominal value of its intermediate 
inputs for the current year is further adjusted based on price changes for the detailed commodity 
inputs.  Balancing constraints are imposed to ensure that the use of commodities by all industries 
equals the supply of commodities, after accounting for final uses from the NIPAs.180  These 
procedures are used for each year’s set of accounts.  Updated KLEMS estimates by industry are 
likewise based on the updated commodity input estimates.  
 
An important step in updating the annual industry accounts is the development of import-use 
tables to allow for the separate deflation of domestic and imported inputs in the calculation of 
real value added.181  Intermediate inputs at a detailed product level are disaggregated to obtain the 
domestic and imported portions of intermediate inputs included in each KLEMS input cost 
category.  For each detailed commodity used by an industry, the portion attributable to imports is 
calculated as a percentage of the total purchase value, using the economy-wide ratio of 
commodity imports to the total domestic supply of the commodity.182  Although this assumption 
is necessary, the import content of specific types of goods and services could vary by industry as 
a result of factors such as affiliation status, location, product mix, relative prices, or technology.  
The BEA uses this approach because of the lack of actual data on the use of imports by 
industry183   
 
This distinction between domestic and imported inputs allows for differences in the behavior of 
prices for imported and domestic products to be accounted for when separate price indexes are 
                                                 
179 This is often described as the “constant industry technology” assumption. 
180 The annual I-O accounts use final expenditure categories from the NIPAs as controls during the biproportional 
balancing of the use tables.  An additional balancing constraint is that the sum of nominal value added across all 
industries must equal GDP.     
181 Fisher-ideal index number formulas are used to prepare chain-type indexes for gross output, intermediate inputs, 
and value added by industry, and for higher-levels of aggregation.  For more information, see the technical appendix 
in Moyer et al. (2004). 
182 For example, if imports represent 35 percent of the domestic supply of semiconductors, then the estimates in the 
import-use table assume that imports comprise 35 percent of the value of semiconductors in each industry that uses 
semiconductors.   
183 This “import comparability assumption” is often used in studies of the impact of imports on intermediate inputs.   
  347
available.184  For domestic materials and for energy, the price indexes are mostly BLS producer 
price indexes (PPIs), Department of Energy implicit price deflators, and price indexes from other 
sources that are considered reliable.  Many of the services input-price indexes are also obtained 
from BLS PPIs, but some are based on other sources that are not as reliable, either because of 
quality change or due to assumptions about labor productivity.185  Price indexes for imported 
materials are largely based on the BLS International Price Index program.  Price indexes for 
imported services are much more limited in their coverage. 
 
International Accounts 
 
The BEA’s international transactions accounts (ITAs) provide monthly, quarterly, and annual 
estimates of transactions between the United States and foreign residents.186  ITAs include a 
current account, a capital account, and a financial account.  The two major components of the 
current account are 1) exports of goods and services and factor income receipts, and 2) imports 
of goods and services and factor income payments.  The difference between these two 
components, plus net unilateral current transfers, equals the balance on the current account.  The 
capital account includes capital transfers such as debt forgiveness.  The two major components 
of the financial account are 1) changes in net U.S.-owned assets abroad, and 2) changes in net 
foreign-owned assets in the United States.  These components are the major source of change in 
the United States’net international investment position. 
 
The BEA also produces comprehensive statistics on U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign 
direct investment in the United States that are required for compiling ITAs and for analysis of 
MNCs.  The BEA’s data on MNCs are potentially very useful for assessing assumptions about 
the use of imported goods by industries because these companies account for about 60 percent of 
U.S. imports of total intermediate inputs.  While imports of goods in ITAs are based primarily on 
data compiled by the Census Bureau from import shipping documents, the data on imports of 
goods reported to BEA on the MNC surveys conform well to Census Bureau concepts and 
definitions.  Imports of services in ITAs are estimated from a variety of sources, primarily the 
BEA’s surveys of U.S. and foreign MNCs and the BEA’s surveys of U.S. international services 
transactions between unaffiliated parties.  For this study, we used annual data on U.S. imports of 
goods and services shipped to the U.S. parents by both their foreign affiliates and other 
unaffiliated parties.   
 
The BEA’s surveys are mandatory and collect selected data for transactions between the U.S. 
parents of MNCs and both their foreign affiliates and unaffiliated parties and transactions 
between the U.S. affiliates of foreign MNCs and both their foreign parent companies and certain 
other affiliated foreign firms.  These data play an important role in compiling ITAs and in 
providing additional detail on cross-border trade in services and on services provided by the 
affiliates of MNCs. Because U.S. MNCs are typically very large firms, the combined data for 
U.S. parents and U.S. affiliates of foreign MNCs account for a significant share of domestic 
                                                 
184 Domestic prices are used to deflate imported inputs in cases where import prices are unavailable. 
185 Expansion of the BLS PPI program in the services sector during the 1990s has resulted in better coverage and 
improved quality, but gaps and limitations remain. 
186  Transactions between the United States and its territories, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands are not 
treated as foreign transactions in ITAs. 
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economic activity, especially in the goods-producing sector of the economy.  These combined 
company data, when classified by industry, provide valuable insights into the industry 
distribution of imports. 
 
For this paper, alternative import-use tables were constructed using data from the BEA’s surveys 
of MNCs. 187  Companies in these surveys are classified according to the International Survey 
Industry (ISI) classification system, a system developed by the BEA that is based on the NAICS.  
The MNC surveys provide information on total imports by U.S. parent firms (from both 
affiliated and unaffiliated parties) classified by the U.S. parents industry, and imports by U.S. 
parent firms from foreign affiliates classified by the foreign affiliate’s industry.  For the 
“benchmark” survey years, additional product information on imports is provided.  These broad 
product categories are listed below: 
 
• Food, live animals, beverages, and tobacco 
• Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
• Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials 
• Chemicals and related products 
• Industrial machinery and equipment 
• Office machines and automatic data processing machines 
• Telecommunications, sound equipment, and other electrical machinery and parts 
• Road vehicles and parts 
• Other transportation equipment 
• Other products 
 
Linking the foreign affiliate to its U.S. parent provides the basis for a commodity and industry 
classification for the import-use framework.  Industry classification is based on the ISI industry 
of the U.S. parent and commodity classification is based on the ISI industry of the foreign 
affiliate.  To develop this mapping, imported products from the foreign affiliate were compared 
to the ISI industry of the foreign affiliate.  In most cases, the ISI industry of the foreign affiliate 
aligns well with the product imported.  For example, a foreign affiliate classified in 
pharmaceuticals and medicines manufacturing (ISI 3254) ships products categorized in 
chemicals and related products (NAICS 325).  Because industry classifications are not available 
for unaffiliated parties, imports from unaffiliated firms are assumed to resemble those of 
affiliated firms.  The import-use tables based on ISI industry categories were converted to the 
1997 NAICS-based structure used for the Annual Industry Accounts.  Import shares for 
commodities purchased by each industry were calculated as the ratio of the commodity import 
value for that industry and the total import value for that industry.  In total, the MNC-based 
                                                 
187 The estimates are based on special tabulations prepared by the BEA’s Direct Investment Division (DID).  The 
DID provided access to databases that allowed the authors to identify and tabulate imported goods and services 
directly. 
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imports accounted for about 60–65 percent of all imported intermediate inputs presented in the 
annual industry accounts. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The existing framework and methodology for the annual industry accounts was used to prepare a 
set of baseline estimates that can be compared with the results of simulation exercises that 
incorporate alternative assumptions about import use and prices.  These results focus on 
industries that are the largest users of imported goods, such as computers and electronic products 
and chemicals manufacturing.  Assumptions about both the use of imports and the behavior of 
import prices are important because an industry’s real value added is calculated as the difference 
between real gross output and real intermediate inputs.188   
 
Table 1 shows that, in the aggregate, the import comparability assumption provides results that 
are largely consistent with actual data on the use of imports by industry from the BEA’s MNC 
surveys.  These results indicate that the assumptions underlying the industry distributions of 
imported inputs in the annual industry accounts give reasonable results at aggregate levels, but 
that improvements are possible at more detailed industry levels.  Some differences in the results 
at detailed levels are attributable to the fact that the data from the International Accounts are 
classified by industry on an enterprise basis, whereas data from the annual industry accounts are 
classified by industry on an establishment basis.  Within both the goods- and services-producing 
sectors, some large share differences for industry groups are offset at higher levels of 
aggregation, suggesting the possibility that the differences are attributable largely to differences 
in classification.   
 
                                                 
188 Estimates of real value added by industry are affected by both the source of the inputs and the import price 
indexes used for deflation.  For example, if the computer manufacturing industry uses more imported 
semiconductors than assumed and if import prices are falling faster than domestic prices, or if the actual price of 
imported semiconductors is falling faster than the official import price index, then real intermediate input is 
understated and real value added is overstated in the computer manufacturing industry. 
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Over the period 1999–2006, import shares of materials for manufacturing based on the MNC 
data are consistently higher than those constructed for the industry accounts using the import 
comparability assumption; however, the pattern of growth between the two series is similar 
(Chart 1).  On average, the MNC data suggest that the annual industry accounts understate 
import shares of materials inputs by about 4 percentage points per year for manufacturing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within manufacturing, the composition of imported inputs for materials shows some variation.  
Table 2 presents import shares for manufacturing at the commodity level constructed for the 
Chart 1.  Imported Materials Inputs as a Share of Total Intermediate 
Inputs for Manufacturing, 1999-2006
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Industry Group
International 
Accounts
Annual Industry 
Accounts
Manufacturing 20.7 16.8
Distributive services/1/ 3.3 7.0
Information 4.2 5.3
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 0.9 5.0
Professional and business services 2.3 3.9
Other industries/2/ 6.5 6.4
Addenda
Private goods-producing industries/3/ 17.7 14.9
Private services-producing industries/4/ 3.5 5.4
/1/ Consists of w holesale trade; retail trade; transportation and w arehousing
/2/ Consists of agriculture, forestry, f ishing, and hunting; mining; construction; educational services; health 
     care and social assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation; accommodation and food services; 
     and other services, except  government
/3/ Consists of agriculture, forestry, f ishing, and hunting; mining; construction; and manufacturing.
/4/ Consists of utilities; w holesale trade; retail trade; transportation and w arehousing; information; f inance 
     and insurance; real estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientif ic and technical services; 
     management of companies and enterprises; administrative and w aste management services; 
     educational services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation;
     accommodation and food services; and other services, except  government.
(Percent)
Table 1.  Import Shares by Industry, 2002
(Comparison of International Accounts and Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Tables)
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annual industry accounts compared with those constructed using MNC data.  There are notable 
differences in import shares across the board.  For 10 of the largest annual industry accounts’ 
publication-level commodities within manufacturing, the largest differences are shown for oil 
and gas extraction and computers and electronic products.  Most other commodities show much 
smaller differences.   
 
Commodity
 International 
Accounts
Annual Industry  
Accounts
Oil and gas extraction 36.9 63.6
Computer and electronic product manufacturing 70.6 42.9
Primary metal manufacturing 8.5 20.7
Chemical manufacturing 26.4 13.4
Machinery manufacturing 26.2 29.0
Fabricated metal product manufacturing 3.8 10.2
Paper manufacturing 2.6 13.8
Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 24.7 35.2
Food manufacturing 9.9 12.2
Wood product manufacturing 16.2 24.0
(Percent)
Table 2.  Imported Input Shares for Manufacturing Commodities, 2002
(Comparison of International Accounts and Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Tables)
 
 
 
One would expect that changing the mix of intermediate inputs sourced from domestic versus 
foreign production could lead to important differences in price growth for imported intermediate 
inputs.  Charts 2 and 3 show chain-type price indexes for economy-wide energy, materials, and 
purchased services inputs based on import shares developed for the annual industry accounts and 
those based on the MNC data.  Price growth for imported energy inputs and purchased services 
inputs increases at a slower pace using data from the annual industry accounts; price growth for 
materials inputs increases at a faster rate. 
 
Chart 2.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for Imported Intermediate Inputs, 1999-2006
(Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Table)
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Chart 3.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for Imported Intermediate Inputs, 1999-2006
(International Accounts Import-Use Table)
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Within manufacturing, the trend for materials inputs is more focused.  Over 1999–2006, price 
growth for imported materials inputs for manufacturing increases at a faster pace using data 
constructed for the annual industry accounts than that based on the MNC data (Chart 4).  The 
slower materials price growth resulting from higher overall import shares for materials 
constructed with MNC data, coupled with BEA’s existing import prices, suggest real 
intermediate inputs in the annual industry accounts may be understated and, therefore, that real 
value added for manufacturing is overstated.189 
 
Chart 4.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for Imported Materials for Manufacturing
(Comparison of International Accounts to Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Table)
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However, because existing import price data is incomplete, changing the sourcing mix for 
intermediate inputs does not impact the price indexes for intermediate inputs for all industries or, 
even, the manufacturing sector (Charts 5 and 6).  Some differences do exist for high-import 
                                                 
189 In addition to materials inputs, real intermediate inputs growth is a function of the source and price mix for 
energy and purchased services inputs.  Therefore, compositional effects within intermediate inputs would have to be 
examined to determine how real intermediate inputs have changed.  Nevertheless, manufacturing is a high importer 
of materials inputs relative to imports of energy and purchased services inputs.   
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industries, such as computer and electronic products, where existing good-quality import-price 
data is used to deflate the import content of intermediate inputs.   
 
Chart 5.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for All Industries' Total Intermediate Inputs
(Comparison of International Accounts to 
Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Table)
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Chart 6.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for Total Intermediate Inputs for Manufacturing
(Comparison of International Accounts to 
Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Table)
80
90
100
110
120
130
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
In
de
xe
s 
(2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
Annual Industry Accounts International Accounts
 
 
The limited availability of import-price data, overall, is the primary reason that changing the mix 
of import shares does not impact the aggregate growth rates.  There are 1,028 item-level building 
blocks used to deflate imported intermediate inputs in the annual industry accounts, but only 57 
percent have import prices available for use in the separate deflation of intermediate inputs.  The 
remaining item-level goods and services are deflated with domestic price indexes.  The mix of 
import-price coverage also differs by sector, with about 58 percent coverage for the Goods sector 
and 50 percent for the Services sector.  Finally, import-price coverage does not necessarily imply 
a good match, as many of the item-level building blocks covered are deflated with an aggregate 
import-price index. 
 
Given data limitations for import-price indexes available from the U.S. statistical system, we 
conducted several simulations to determine the threshold of import price biases that are required 
to affect real value added growth across all industries (real GDP), manufacturing, and a selected 
number of manufacturing industries.  As a first step, we adjusted the domestic prices used to 
deflate the import content of intermediate inputs by applying the average price differential that 
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exists for item-level detail when both domestic and import-price indexes are available.  This 
difference averaged about 0.4 percent per year. 
 
This bias adjustment translates into notable differences in price growth for imported intermediate 
inputs for All industries and manufacturing.  Over the period 1999–2006, price growth for 
economy-wide imported intermediate inputs increases at an average annual rate that is about 1.5 
percentage points slower when import shares are based on MNC data instead of the annual 
industry accounts.  Price growth is about 3 percentage points slower for manufacturing (Charts 7 
and 8).  The impact, however, on real GDP growth and real value added for manufacturing is 
negligible: real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent using MNC-based import 
data, compared to 2.6 percent for the annual industry accounts, and real value added growth for 
manufacturing grew 1.9 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively.   
 
Chart 7.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for All Industries' Imported Intermediate Inputs 
with 0.4 Percent Import Price Bias Adjustment
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Chart 8.  Chain-Type Price Indexes for Manufacturing's Imported Intermediate 
Inputs with 0.4 Percent Import Price Bias Adjustment
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Finally, we applied a series of bias adjustments, ranging from a 1 percent to 5 percent 
overstatement of import prices, to determine the thresholds required to affect real GDP growth, 
and real value added growth for manufacturing, computer and electronic products, chemical 
manufacturing, and machinery manufacturing.  The 1–5 percent bias adjustments were applied to 
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all existing import prices and to the domestic prices that are used to deflate the import content of 
imported intermediate inputs for goods and services that do not have import price coverage.190  
The results in Table 3 show average annual growth rates for real value added based on the 
various bias adjustments applied to the existing annual industry accounts import-use tables and 
those constructed using MNC data.   
 
Overall, each 1percent bias adjustment to import prices led to an average annual decrease of 0.08 
percentage points for all industries, 0.33 for manufacturing, 0.46 for computer and electronic 
products, 0.22 for chemicals, and 0.24 for machinery manufacturing, when using import shares 
based on the annual industry accounts.  One percent bias adjustments, when using import shares 
based on MNC data, led to an average annual decrease of 0.08 percentage points for all 
industries, 0.39 for manufacturing, 0.60 for computer and electronic products, 0.27 for 
chemicals, and 0.18 for machinery manufacturing. 
 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In the annual industry accounts, imports of intermediate inputs are constructed using the import 
comparability assumption for purposes of separately deflating domestic and imported 
intermediate inputs in the calculation of real value added.  An analysis of import shares for the 
                                                 
190 Each bias adjustment decreased import prices used in the deflation by 1–5 percent.   
Industry Baseline 0.04% 1% 3% 5%
All Industries
Annual Industry Accounts 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2
International Accounts 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2
Manufacturing
Annual Industry Accounts 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.2 0.5
International Accounts 2.0 1.9 1.6 0.9 0.1
Computer and electronic products manufacturing
Annual Industry Accounts 17.2 17.1 16.8 15.8 14.9
International Accounts 17.2 17.1 16.8 15.6 14.4
Machinery manufacturing
Annual Industry Accounts 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.2
International Accounts 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.5
Chemical manufacturing
Annual Industry Accounts 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.5
International Accounts 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.1
Oil and gas extraction
Annual Industry Accounts -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.7 -3.8
International Accounts -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.6
Table 3.  Average Annual Growth Rate for Real Value Added by Industry with Price Adjustments, 1999 - 2006
(Percent)
(Comparison of International Accounts and Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Tables)
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annual industry accounts compared to import shares constructed using actual source data from 
the International Accounts shows that the import comparability assumption provides a good 
approximation of imported intermediate use.  Differences at detailed levels, however, may be the 
result of using MNC company data rather than establishment-based data.  In addition, while 
MNC imports account for about 60–65 percent of total imported intermediate inputs in the 
annual industry accounts, it is possible that import usage differs among the smaller firms that 
account for the remaining 35–40 percent.  The possible impact of this coverage difference may 
be worth examining more closely.   
 
Most notably, data from the international accounts suggest that growth in real imported materials 
inputs is likely understated in the annual industry accounts.  However, this understatement does 
not currently lead to large differences in real value added growth for all industries (real GDP) or 
for manufacturing because of the limited availability of import-price data used to deflate the 
import-content of intermediate inputs.  A simulation of a range of bias adjustments for import 
prices used in deflation suggests that better import-price measurement will improve the accuracy 
of real value added by industry; however, the overall magnitude of the bias adjustments would 
need to be about 6.5 percent to affect real GDP growth by at least one-half of a percentage point, 
irrespective of whether import shares are from the annual industry accounts or based on data 
from the international accounts.  
 
Further study is required to develop a better understanding of how imported inputs affect 
industry output, employment, real value added, and contributions to GDP.  More research is also 
needed to determine the sensitivity of these results to the assumptions used by the BEA for the 
annual industry accounts with respect to the classification of imported goods and services, the 
distribution of goods and services by using industry, and the behavior of import prices.  The 
BEA will continue to review these assumptions and will further investigate company-based data 
from the international accounts that could help evaluate the assumptions underlying the industry 
distributions.  The BEA is also interested in working with the BLS International Price Program 
to try to develop improved price indexes for the deflation of imported intermediate inputs in both 
the NIPAs and annual industry accounts.  The BEA is also interested in the idea of input-price 
indexes that are proposed by the BLS.  These input-price indexes could be used to deflate total 
intermediate inputs without concern for the sourcing mix.  Input-price indexes, in conjunction 
with domestic price indexes, could be used to calculate import price indexes, allowing for the 
continued study of imported intermediate inputs.   
 
The BEA plans to investigate these differences in more detail with the goal of obtaining 
improved industry distributions of imported intermediate inputs in the annual industry accounts. 
Better grounding of these assumptions is important not only for understanding the role of 
imported inputs in the U.S. economy, but also for developing more reliable quantity and price 
indexes for intermediate inputs and value added by industry.   
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When materials offshoring is measured by estimating imported intermediate inputs, a common 
assumption used is that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand, is the 
same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand: this is the so-called “import 
comparability assumption” (Houseman 2008, p. 9), or the “proportionality assumption ” (OECD 
STAN database). That assumption was made by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), for example, and 
was critiqued by the National Research Council ([NRC] 2006) as being a significant limitation of 
current data collection and analysis. Recent work by Winkler and Milberg (2009) for Germany 
shows that this assumption does not hold up well when compared to the actual imports by 
industries. For the United States, too, it is highly desirable to move beyond this assumption to 
obtain a direct measure of imported materials by industry. 
 
The goal of this project is to obtain such an industry-level measure of offshoring for the United 
States. We begin, however, with a smaller first step. In the first step, we explore alternatives to 
the Feenstra-Hanson (1999) measure of offshoring that still make use of the import 
comparability assumption. While that measure of offshoring was intended to reflect imported 
intermediate inputs, in practice it also included imported final goods. So in this first step, we 
recalculate the Feenstra-Hanson (1999) measure of offshoring while focusing on only imported 
intermediate inputs as defined by end-use classifications. This approach has been taken by 
several other recent authors, including Bergstrand and Egger (2008), Sitchinava (2007, 2008), 
and Wright (2009). 
 
In the second step, we explore a different methodology for allocating imported inputs across 
industries using firm-level data on imports and production. We use information on imports from 
the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which links individual U.S. 
trade transactions to firms and information on materials used and products produced from the 
census of manufactures. We use the linked production and import data to construct firm-level 
input-output (I-O) tables and then aggregate these to the industry level to derive imported input 
intensity by industry and compare our results with those obtained by the BEA using the “import 
comparability” assumption. Our focus is on imports of intermediate inputs, so we again use the 
end-use classification to exclude from the analysis products identified at “final goods” by Wright 
(2009). We confront a number of technical and data issues and make several compromises as a 
result, all of which we describe in the paper. We describe differences between the import matrix 
constructed using firm-level import data and BEA’s import matrix.   
 
 
THE IMPORT COMPARABILITY ASSUMPTION 
 
Our goal is to update the offshoring measure described in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), 
which is defined for any industry k purchasing inputs j as 
Industry  share of intermediate inputs that are importedk  
 
(1)
imports of good (industry  purchases of good )
total domestic consumption of 
(industry  purchases of good )
?? ??? ?
=
?
?
j
j
jk j
j
k j
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The primary shortcoming of this measure is the use of good j’s share of imports in total domestic 
consumption, in the numerator, which is computed for the entire U.S. economy. Obviously, it 
would be preferable to measure this share by just using data for purchasing industry k, as we 
shall attempt to do in the second step of this project. As it is stated, Equation (1) essentially 
assumes that the economy-wide import share for good j is the same as the industry k import share 
for good j, which is the “import comparability” assumption. 
 
Given this limitation of Equation (1), there are still some improvements that can be considered 
before using firm-level data. Specifically, we consider recalculating the measure of offshoring in 
Equation (1) while focusing more carefully on only imported intermediate inputs. Specifically, 
the inputs j that are used in Equation (1) are defined by the classifications used in I-O tables of 
the United States: either 4-digit SIC before 1996 or 6-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) after 1996. For each of classifications, there will be multiple 10-
digit Harmonized System (HS) imported products. Let us denote by jIi ∈ the set of 10-digit HS 
products within each 4-digit SIC before 1996 or 6-digit NAICS good i. Then a more accurate 
definition of the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) measure of materials offshoring is: 
 
 
imported are that inputs teintermedia of sharek Industry  
 
(1') 
sum over imports 
(industry  purchases of good )
total domestic consumption 
(industry  purchases of good )
?? ∈ ??? ?∈? ?
=
?
?
j
j
j
j
i I
k j
i I
k j
 
 
A problem with this definition of offshoring is that some of the imported products i can be final 
goods rather than intermediate inputs. Imports of such final goods are often not what we have in 
mind with materials offshoring. To correct this problem we can restrict attention to HS goods 
with corresponding “end-use codes” that are indeed intermediate inputs. The end-use codes are 
used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to allocate goods to their final use, within the 
National Income and Product Accounts. Accordingly, U.S. imports and exports by Harmonized 
System are also allocated to end-use codes. As described by the Census Bureau, Guide to 
Foreign Trade Statistics:191 
 
The 1-digit level end-use categories provide data for the following broad aggregates: (0) 
Foods, feeds, and beverages; (1) Industrial supplies and materials; (2) Capital goods, 
except automotives; (3) Automotive vehicles, parts and engines; (4) Consumer goods 
(nonfood), except auto; and (5) Other merchandise.  
 
…The HTSUSA and Schedule B classifications are summarized into six principal "end-
use" categories and further subdivided into about 140 broad commodity groupings. These 
categories are used in developing seasonally adjusted and constant dollar totals. The 
concept of end-use demand was developed for balance of payments purposes by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
                                                 
191 Slightly amended from http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/guide/sec2.html. 
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Based on the numbering system defined in the above quotation, food and other items begin with 
the digit 0, which include both final goods and intermediate inputs; raw materials and 
intermediate goods begin with 1; investment goods begin with the digit 2; automotive goods 
begin with 3, which include both final goods (finished autos) and intermediate inputs (parts); 
final consumer goods (nonfood) begin with the digit 4; and 5 is a miscellaneous category. In 
Appendix A we list the precise 5-digit end-use codes that are included within final goods (i.e., 
consumption and investment), while all other end-use codes are treated here as intermediate 
inputs or raw materials.192 
 
Using this end-use classification, we consider a restricted set of HS codes within each SIC or 
NAICS industry j 
 
  {HS goods  within the industry  that are also intermediate inputs}≡jI i j . 
 
Then the revised measure of materials offshoring is 
 
(2)
sum over imports 
(industry  purchases of good )
total domestic consumption 
(industry  purchases of good )
?? ∈ ??? ?∈? ?
?
?
j
j
j
j
i I
k j
i I
k j
.  
 
Note that the import share used in the numerator of Equation (2) restricts the set of goods used in 
both the numerator and the denominator, so we cannot tell how it compares with the import share 
used in Equation (1'). Specifically, the denominator of this import share is constructed as 
 
 total domestic consumption ∈ ji I   
 = domestic shipments for ∈ ji I + sum over imports ∈ ji I  – sum over exports ∈ ji I . 
 
The import and export terms in this expression do not need any explanation: they are simply the 
sum over HS imports or exports within the SIC or NAICS industry j, that are also intermediate 
inputs (as defined by their end-use classification). But the domestic shipments term does require 
an explanation. Rather than use the total domestic shipments of industry j, we instead 
apportioned those domestic shipments into various HS products i, by assuming that the share of 
domestic shipments for each HS product i within industry j equals the share of U.S. exports in 
that HS product and industry. We then sum domestic shipments over just those HS products that 
are also intermediate inputs (as defined by their end-use classification).  
 
Empirical Implementation 
 
We construct the offshoring measure Equation (2) for all years between 1980 and 2006 within 
the manufacturing sector. We begin with measures of intermediates purchases by U.S. industries, 
                                                 
192  We thank Marshall Reinsdorf, BEA, for providing the end-use classifications in Appendix A. As noted in the 
appendix, certain raw materials such as oil and minerals are always excluded from the offshoring calculation. 
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which are obtained from the economic census for benchmark years (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 
2002). Prior to 1997, values are by 4-digit SIC codes and post-1996 values are by 6-digit 
NAICS.  Each observation in the economic census benchmark dataset contains a purchasing 
industry, a corresponding intermediate industry which provides inputs, and a total value of 
purchases (inputs).  To obtain purchases for all years for an industry from a particular 
intermediate industry, we simply interpolate and extrapolate the benchmark values linearly 
throughout the period 1980—2006.193   
 
The next step is to construct the import share of intermediates in domestic consumption of 
intermediates. This industry share will be merged with the input-providing industries from the 
purchases data described above. First, we merge data on imports and exports from Feenstra 
(1996) and Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) with yearly data on total industry shipments, 
obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Again, prior to 1997 these data are by 4-digit 
SIC and post-1996 by 6-digit NAICS, so the merge is straightforward.   
 
Now, in order to restrict the imports, exports, and shipments to intermediates only, we use the 
end-use categories that are matched to SIC and NAICS industries in the import/export datasets.  
The end-use categories that we excluded because they are “final goods” come from a list 
provided by the BEA, as shown in the appendix. We separate investment goods and most 
automobile categories from the list because these include many things that we think of as 
vulnerable to offshoring, such as automobile parts and machinery and equipment, and therefore 
we ultimately would like to include these items. For personal consumption expenditure (PCE) 
goods, a portion of the list is more subjective, with some categories split between intermediate 
and final goods.  Here we simply remove all end-use categories that encompass some final 
goods, and since the categories that are problematic are primarily food items, which we don’t 
generally associate with offshoring activities, this approach seems reasonable. In addition, we 
remove certain raw materials detailed in the appendix, such as petroleum products and various 
metals, whose value and import volumes are likely unrelated to offshoring activities. 
 
Table 1 shows trends in the offshoring measure using the original method of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1990, equations [1] or [1']). We report both a broad and a narrow offshoring measure as 
in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), where the narrow measure restricts the final and 
intermediate industries to be within the same 3-digit NAICS categories. In comparison, Table 2 
details trends in the revised offshoring measure, Equation (2), with and without inclusion of 
investment goods.   
 
We have compared the original and revised offshoring measures to determine which industries 
show the greatest differences (averaged over years) and to obtain the results: 
 
NAICS 339931: Dolls and stuffed toys, difference ≈ 0.85 
NAICS 315991: Hats and caps, difference ≈  0.35 
NAICS 331316: Aluminum extruded products, difference ≈ 0.35 
NAICS 311320: Chocolate and confectionary products, difference ≈ 0.29 
                                                 
193 The 2007 benchmark will be available beginning in June, and we will be able to reduce error caused by the 
extrapolation of the 2002 benchmark. 
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NAICS 339941: Pens and mechanical pencils, difference ≈ 0.28 
NAICS 339992: Musical instruments, difference ≈ 0.25 
 
The industries with the greatest difference are simply consumer items that are imported directly 
to retail outlets, so these imports are clearly final goods and therefore are omitted from the 
revised offshoring measure.  
 
 
ASSIGNING IMPORTED INPUTS TO INDUSTRIES USING FIRM-LEVEL DATA 
 
In this section, we explore an alternative methodology to the “import comparability assumption” 
for allocating imported inputs across industries. This alternative methodology uses transaction 
data on firms’ imports linked to production data at the firm and plant level to construct 
something analogous to firm-level I-O tables and then aggregates the firm-level I-O tables to 
produce an aggregate import matrix that allocates imported intermediate inputs (I-O 
commodities) across industries. This approach offers promise in that it provides a different 
perspective on the allocation of imported intermediate inputs across industries. Our objective in 
the remainder of the paper is to explain the alternative methodology, describe some of the 
challenges we faced in trying to produce this, and then attempt to characterize (within the limits 
of disclosure) how our alternative import matrix differs from the import matrix provided by the 
BEA.  
 
Data Used and Assignment Methodology 
 
We use information on imports from 1997 from the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction 
Database (LFTTD), which links individual U.S. trade transactions to firms (see Bernard, Jensen, 
and Schott [2009] for more details on the LFTTD). We use information on materials used and 
products produced from the 1997 census of manufactures. Because both datasets contain a firm-
level identifier, it is possible to link imported inputs to production data (materials used and 
products produced) of the firms that import the intermediates. We will use this information to 
construct a firm-level I-O table that allocates imported inputs across the products (I-O industries) 
the firm produces.  
 
The first limitation we confront is that the LFTTD contains firm-level identifiers for 80–85 
percent of import value (roughly 10 percent of value is associated with transactions that have no 
Employer Identification Number). As a result, our estimates of total import value across 
commodities are systematically lower than the BEA’s, and this difference varies across 
commodities. When we compare our allocation of imports across industries to BEA’s import 
matrix, we will compare the shares of imports by industry (instead of levels) between the two 
methodologies to try to mitigate the impact of this problem.    
 
The LFTTD contains information on products at the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) 
classification level. We use publicly available concordances between 10-digit HS products and 
6-digit BEA I-O commodities and assign 6-digit I-O commodity codes to all firm-level imports. 
We then have firm imports on an I-O commodity basis.  
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The next step is to allocate the firm’s imports to the industries that use the imports in production. 
Our intention was to use information collected in the census of manufactures regarding materials 
used by manufacturing establishments as a way of allocating the use of imported intermediate 
inputs to industries. The information on materials used is contained in “material trailers” in the 
census of manufactures files and is classified using internal Census Bureau material codes. To 
use this information to allocate imported commodities, we needed a bridge between internal 
Census Bureau materials codes and I-O commodity codes. We obtained internal BEA 
concordances between census material codes and BEA I-O codes.194 Using these codes, we were 
able to allocate materials used to I-O industries.195 The assignment of materials used to industries 
identified another limitation of our methodology—the value reported in the material trailers 
accounts for only about 75 percent of the total materials used in the BEA I-O  
tables.196  
 
Another complication we confronted in allocating imported inputs to industries is that the vast 
majority of trade value is mediated by large, multiunit, multiactivity firms (see Bernard, Jensen, 
and Schott [2009]). Many of these firms have establishments classified in a range of sectors, e.g., 
the manufacturing sector, the wholesale sector, and the retail sector. Allocating imports across 
industries within these firms proved difficult. One source of the difficulty is that the materials-
used information is not collected in the same way for sectors outside of manufacturing, so we 
needed some way to allocate commodity imports across industries. We tried allocating based on 
the share of a firm’s total sales each establishment accounted for but found we were allocating 
significant value for end-use commodities to manufacturing establishments owned by multisector 
firms. To mitigate this problem, we excluded from our analysis 10-digit HS products classified 
as “end use” by Wright (2009) and restricted our analysis to the manufacturing establishments of 
importing firms. 
 
After excluding end-use products and nonmanufacturing establishments/firms, we were able to 
allocate 50 percent of total imported intermediate input value to manufacturing establishments 
using the material codes (i.e., imported intermediate inputs were assigned to an establishment’s 
I-O industry if the establishment reported using the material); the remainder of imported 
intermediate value was allocated based on establishments’ share of a firm’s manufacturing 
output. Because we exclude establishments within a firm that are outside of manufacturing, it is 
possible that we overallocate imports to firms that have both manufacturing operations and 
import for wholesale or retail operations. This highlights another potential compromise in our 
methodology—that a significant share of imported intermediate value is imported by firms 
whose manufacturing establishments do not report using the material.197 
 
 
                                                 
194 We thank Belinda Bonds of the BEA for providing the internal version of the concordance.  
195 We used a concordance between NAICS industry classifications and BEA I-O industry classifications.  
196 The BEA uses other sources and methodologies for constructing the materials used in the I-O tables. 
Conversations with BEA staff suggested that our finding that the material trailers accounted for 75 percent of the I-
O value was in the right ballpark. There is a high correlation across commodity-industry cells between our materials 
used values and the BEA I-O tables materials used.  
197 It is difficult to know how to interpret this fact. One possibility is that establishments under-report the materials 
that they use. An alternative explanation is that firms import a significant share of intermediate inputs that they do 
not use for production.  
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With the assignment of imported intermediate inputs (I-O commodities) to establishments  
that are classified by industry (I-O industry), we have essentially created firm-level I-O tables 
with I-O commodity by I-O industry cells. The final step is to aggregate these firm-level cells to 
obtain an import matrix for the manufacturing sector.  
 
Comparison of BEA’s Import Matrix to Our Alternative Import Matrix 
 
In this section, we attempt to characterize whether the allocation of imported intermediate inputs 
differs between BEA’s import matrix, which uses the import comparability assumption, and our 
alternative matrix, which uses firm-level data to assign commodities to industries—and, if so, 
where it differs.198 Assessing whether the matrices differ in a meaningful way is obviously a bit 
subjective and would depend to some extent on the purpose for which the matrix would be used. 
We present descriptive statistics that attempt to quantify and characterize the differences between 
the matrices from the two methodologies. 
 
We focus on the share of a commodity’s import value assigned to a particular industry instead of 
the level of import value to mitigate the issue posed by the systematic underallocation of 
imported inputs in our data. To make the comparison, we exclude from BEA’s import matrix 
industries that are outside of manufacturing and exclude products classified as end use (the same 
products we excluded from the import data).199 For the manufacturing sector, we calculate the 
share of an I-O commodity’s total imports that is allocated to each I-O industry within 
manufacturing. We compare the shares in these I-O-commodity I-O-industry cells.   
 
We begin by examining the simple correlation between the share of each 3-digit commodity 
group’s total import value assigned to a 3-digit I-O-industry cell in the two matrices. The simple 
correlation and BEA-value-weighted correlation are reported in Table 3. There is a high 
correlation between the share in both the simple correlation and the weighted correlation; the 
correlation is actually higher for the value-weighted correlation.  
 
We also examine the distribution of the differences between the shares in the two matrices at the 
3-digit I-O-commodity/I-O industry-cell level. Figure 1 exhibits the distribution of share 
differences for 3-digit cells. Most of the cells have very small differences in the share of the 
imported intermediate input (I-O commodity) across industries. This suggests that for most cells, 
the share of the commodity imports allocated to a particular industry is fairly close in many cells. 
The high correspondence may be due to the large number of cells for which both methods 
allocate zero imports.  
 
We also examine the BEA import-value-weighted distribution of share differences to see 
whether we match the allocated shares as closely for I-O-commodity/I-O-industry cells with 
relatively large import values. Figure 2 shows the BEA-import-value-weighted distribution. The 
value-weighted distribution is obviously more dispersed. For I-O-commodity/I-O-industry cells 
with relatively high import values, the import matrices derived from the “import comparability 
assumption” method and our alternative method are more different. In contrast to the unweighted 
                                                 
198 Characterizing the differences at a detailed level is difficult because of the constraint of confidentiality. 
199 This excludes I-O commodities that the BEA allocates to I-O industries outside of manufacturing. I-O industries 
outside of manufacturing can account for a significant share of value of some I-O commodities.   
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distribution, significantly less mass is at zero or small share differences. While most value-
weighted cells have differences below 50 percentage points, there is significant mass of the 
distribution that differs by 10 percentage points or more.  
 
We also thought it would be useful to show the I-O-commodity/I-O-industry cells where the two 
methodologies have the largest share differences. We were constrained a bit by the disclosure 
prevention protocols but were able to release 15 cells from the 10 largest positive and 10 largest 
negative differences. The cells are listed in Table 4.  
 
The results highlight some of the limitations and conceptual differences inherent in our 
alternative approach. For example, the I-O-commodity/I-O-industry cell in the first row of the 
top panel of Table 4 shows that our methodology allocated a significant share of I-O-commodity 
337, Furniture imports, to I-O-industry 337, Furniture. The BEA had a much smaller share of 
furniture imports allocated to this I-O industry. The first row of the negative panel shows that the 
BEA allocated a large share of furniture imports to I-O-industry 321, Wood products. In fact, the 
BEA allocated very little in terms of import value to I-O-industry wood products, but instead 
allocated most of the value of furniture imports outside of the manufacturing sector. Our 
allocation methodology allocated furniture imports by furniture manufactures to I-O-industry 
337, Furniture. In contrast, the BEA allocated the furniture imports to the Construction sector. It 
would require additional research, and in the end it might be infeasible, to determine whether the 
furniture importers that are furniture manufactures are adding value to the furniture imports or 
are merely acting as wholesalers. Yet, to determine which allocation method is more appropriate 
would require this type of investigation.  
 
The 3-digit I-O-commodity/I-O-industry cells are a bit unsatisfactory because of the relatively 
high level of aggregation (but are necessitated by the disclosure prevention protocols). To 
provide some sense of how the matrices compare at a more detailed level, we report descriptive 
statistics for weighted and unweighted share differences at the 6-digit I-O-commodity/I-O-
industry level. Table 5 reports the mean share difference (weighted and unweighted) for the I-O-
commodity/I-O-industry cells in the 90–100th percentile and the 0–10th percentile. The 
unweighted share differences are relatively small—only about 2 percentage points—at both the 
high end and the low end. The BEA-import-value-weighted means tell a somewhat different 
story. The weighted-average at the low end is more than 50 percentage points different. There 
are some 6-digit cells with relatively large import values where the BEA allocates significantly 
more import value to the industry than the alternative measure does. At the other end of the 
distribution, the differences are smaller, about 16 percentage points different. While it would be 
desirable to provide more information on the share differences at a very detailed level, 
fortunately the aggregation to the 3-digit level does not seem to distort the overall story much.    
 
In summary, this alternative methodology seems to offer promise and probably warrants 
additional investigation. The comparison of the import matrices derived from the alternative 
methodology to BEA’s matrix highlight some of the data limitations confronted by the firm-level 
methodology and possibly point out some conceptual differences between the two 
methodologies. To resolve which allocation is more appropriate would require additional 
information. As such, the exercise points out some potential shortcomings in current data 
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collection systems; of particular interest is additional work to resolve the issue of firms importing 
intermediate inputs that are not reported as being used in production.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the first part of this paper, we explored alternatives to the Feenstra-Hanson (1999) measure of 
offshoring that still make use of the import comparability assumption. While that measure of 
offshoring was intended to reflect imported intermediate inputs, in practice it also included 
imported final goods. So in this first step, we recalculated the Feenstra-Hanson (1999) measure 
of offshoring while focusing on only imported intermediate inputs as defined by end-use 
classifications.  
 
In the second step, we explored a different methodology for allocating imported inputs across 
industries using firm-level data on imports and production. We used linked production and 
import data to construct firm-level I-O tables and then aggregate these to the industry level to 
derive imported input intensity by industry. We compared the results of this alternative allocation 
methodology with those obtained by the BEA using the “import comparability” assumption. The 
comparison of the import matrices derived from the alternative methodology to the BEA’s 
matrix highlight some of the data limitations confronted by the firm-level methodology, and 
possibly point out some conceptual differences between the two methodologies. 
 
Table 1 
Offshoring Trends with original Feenstra-Hanson calculation (Equation 1) 
 
Year Narrow Measure Broad Measure 
Broad minus 
Narrow Measure 
1980 0.047 0.071 0.024 
1990 0.067 0.123 0.055 
2000 0.103 0.228 0.124 
2006 0.129 0.282 0.152 
 
 
Table 2 
Revised Offshoring Trends (Equation 2) 
 
 With Investment Goods Included Without Investment Goods 
Year Narrow Measure Broad Measure Narrow Measure Broad Measure 
1980 0.032 0.066 0.032 0.065 
1990 0.054 0.121 0.049 0.122 
2000 0.091 0.197 0.083 0.204 
2006 0.119 0.270 0.105 0.274 
 
 
  370
Table 3 
Unweighted 0.6803
Weighted (by BEA import value) 0.8717
Correlation between Import Value Share across 3-digit IO-Commodity IO-Industry Cells
 
 
Table 4 
3-digit IO Commodity Group 3-digit IO Industry Group Alt. Share BEA Share Share Difference
337 Furniture and Related Products 337 Furniture and Related Products 0.50 0.01 0.50
324 Petroleum and Coal Products 324 Petroleum and Coal Products 0.82 0.34 0.48
315 Apparel 316 Leather and Allied Products 0.46 0.00 0.46
326 Plastics and Rubber Products 326 Plastics and Rubber Products 0.56 0.18 0.38
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 334 Computer and Electronic Products 0.38 0.01 0.37
316 Leather and Allied Products 316 Leather and Allied Products 0.61 0.26 0.35
325 Chemicals 325 Chemicals 0.73 0.46 0.28
335 Electrical Equipment and Components 335 Electrical Equipment and Components 0.40 0.20 0.20
3-digit IO Commodity Group 3-digit IO Industry Group Alt. Share BEA Share Share Difference
337 Furniture and Related Products 321 Wood Products 0.06 0.98 -0.92
114 Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping 311 Food 0.18 1.00 -0.82
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 323 Printing and Related Support Activities 0.12 0.73 -0.62
311 Food 312 Beverage and Tobacco Products 0.00 0.36 -0.36
324 Petroleum and Coal Products 325 Chemicals 0.13 0.46 -0.32
316 Leather and Allied Products 314 Textile Products 0.00 0.22 -0.22
316 Leather and Allied Products 323 Printing and Related Support Activities 0.00 0.22 -0.22
Note: This table lists the 3-digit IO Commodity IO Industry cells with the largest share differences (both positive and negative). The table lists 8 of 
the top 10 positive differences and 7 of the top 10 negative differences. The remaining cells were suppressed to prevent disclosure. 
IO Commodity IO Industry Cells with Largest Share Differences
 
 
Table 5 
0 to 10th Percentile 90 to 100th Percentile
Unweighted -0.021 0.020
Weighted (by BEA import value) -0.543 0.165
Mean Differences in Shares for 6-digit level IO-Commodity IO_Industry Cells
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Figure 1 
Histogram of Difference in Commodity-Industry Cell Import Share 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Histogram of Difference in Commodity-Industry Cell Import Share  
(Weighted by BEA Import Value) 
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Appendix A: End-Use Final Goods 
Personal Consumption Expenditure: 
 
The following include both final and intermediate goods: 
 
00020    Cane and beet sugar 
00100    Meat products & poultry 
00110    Dairy products & poultry 
00120    Fruits & preparations including juices 
00130    Vegetables & preparations 
00140    Nuts & preparations 
00150    Food oils & oilseeds 
00160    Bakery products & confectionery 
00170    Tea, spices, & preparations 
00180    Agricultural foods, n.e.c. 
00190    Wine & related products 
01000    Fish and shellfish 
01010    Whiskey and other alcoholic beverages 
01020    Other nonagricultural foods & food additives 
15200    Fabricated metal products 
16110    Blank audio and visual tapes and other media 
 
The following are final goods only: 
 
40000   Apparel, & household goods--cotton 
40010   Apparel, & household goods--wool 
40020   Apparel, & household goods--other textiles 
40030   Non-textile apparel & household goods 
40040   Footwear of leather, rubber & other materials 
40050   Sporting & camping apparel, footwear & gear 
40100   Medicinal, dental, & pharmaceutical preparations includ. vitamins 
40110   Books, magazines, & other printed matter 
40120   Toiletries & cosmetics 
40140   Consumer nondurables, n.e.c. 
41000   Furniture, household items & baskets 
41010   Glassware, porcelain, & chinaware 
41020   Cookware, cutlery, house & garden ware & tools 
41030   Household and kitchen appliances 
41040   Rugs & other textile floor coverings 
41050   Other household goods 
41100   Motorcycles & parts 
41110   Pleasure boats & motors 
41120   Toys, shooting & sporting goods, including bicycles 
41130   Photographic & optical equipment 
41140   Musical instruments & other recreational equipment 
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41200   Television receivers, video receivers, & other video equipment 
41210   Radios, phonographs, tape decks, & other stereo equipment & parts 
41220   Records, tapes, & disks 
413       Coins, gems, jewelry, & collectibles 
42000  Unmanufactured goods 
421     Unmanufactured diamonds 
 
Investment (final goods): 
 
20000   Generators, transformers, and accessories 
20005   Electrical equipment and parts n.e.c. 
21000   Oil-drilling, mining, and construction machinery 
21100   Industrial engines, pumps, compressors, and generators 
21110   Food- and tobacco-processing machinery 
21120   Machine tools & metal-working machinery, molding and rolling 
21130   Textile, sewing and leather working machinery 
21140   Woodworking, glass-working & plastic- and rubber-molding mach. 
21150   Pulp & paper machinery, bookbinding, printing & packaging mach. 
21160   Measuring, testing, and control instruments 
21170   Materials-handling equipment 
21180   Other industrial machinery 
21190   Photo- & service-industry machinery and trade tools 
21200   Agricultural machinery and equipment 
21400   Telecommunications equipment 
21500   Other business machines 
21600   Scientific, hospital, and medical equipment and parts 
22000   Civilian aircraft, complete* 
22010   Civilian aircraft, parts 
22020   Civilian aircraft, engines 
22100   Railway & other commercial transportation equipment 
22200   Vessels (except military & pleasure craft) & misc. vehicles 
22300   Spacecraft, engines & parts, except military 
 
Automotive Vehicles, Parts, and Engines (final and intermediate goods):** 
 
30000   Passenger cars, new and used 
30100   Complete and assembled 
 
Raw Materials (not final goods nor intermediate inputs):* 
 
14200  Bauxite and aluminum 
14220  Copper 
14240  Nickel 
14250  Tin 
14260  Zinc 
14270  Nonmonetary gold 
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14280  Other precious metals 
14290  Misc. non-ferrous metals 
10         Crude, Fuel oil, Other petroleum products, Coal, Gas, Nuclear fuel, Electric energy 
 
_____________ 
* These classifications are always excluded from the offshoring calculation. 
** This broad category include both final and intermediate goods. Those listed here are final goods and are excluded 
from the offshoring calculation. 
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Errors from the “Proportionality Assumption” in the 
Measurement of Offshoring: Application to German Labor Demand 
 
Deborah Winkler and William Milberg 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Offshoring—the importing of intermediate materials and services—has expanded rapidly in most 
industrialized countries, and its impact on the labor markets in these countries has been the 
source of enormous debate in both scholarly and popular circles. Since data on imported inputs at 
the sectoral level are not available for the United States and the United Kingdom, empirical 
research has relied entirely on a proxy-based measure offshoring, using what the OECD refers to 
as the “proportionality assumption.” That is, every sector is assumed to import inputs of each 
material and service in the same proportion as its economy-wide use of that input. 
 
German input-output data differentiate between domestically purchased inputs and imported 
inputs, which permits us to calculate a direct measure of sectoral imported input use. In this 
paper, we compare this measure to the proxy-based measure based on the standard 
proportionality assumption. We find that the direct measure differs significantly from the proxy-
based measure for both services and materials offshoring. To assess the significance of using 
different measures, we substitute them for each other in standard labor demand equations 
focusing on German manufacturing between 1995 and 2004. We find that using the direct 
measure of offshoring gives very different results for labor demand—sometimes of opposite sign 
—compared to estimates using the proxy-based measure.  
 
We perform a simple decomposition of the proxy-based measure and find that it fails to 
accurately capture the cross-sectoral variation in offshoring intensity because—as a result of the 
proportionality assumption—it is heavily influenced by the cross-sectoral variation in domestic 
input demand. The implications of our findings go beyond the case of Germany. They indicate 
that researchers must be cautious about drawing policy conclusions from estimates using the 
proxy-based measure of offshoring.  
 
 
 
JEL No. F1, F2 
 
Key Words: Services Offshoring, Offshoring Intensity, Labor Demand 
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Offshoring—the importing of intermediate materials and services—has expanded rapidly in most 
industrialized countries, and its impact on the labor markets in these countries has been the 
source of enormous debate in both scholarly and popular circles.200 Since data on imported inputs 
at the sectoral level are not available for the United States and the United Kingdom, empirical 
research has relied entirely on a proxy-based measure offshoring, using what the OECD refers to 
as the “proportionality assumption” (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006). The U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, for example, collects data on input use, but does not break out imported from 
domestically produced inputs. Lacking information on a sector’s imports of each input, 
researchers have instead applied the economy-wide import penetration ratio for a material or 
service input to approximate the imported input share of that material or service by all sectors. 
That is, every sector is assumed to import inputs of each material and service in the same 
proportion as its economy-wide use of that input. Without the information on imported input use, 
the proportionality assumption has been accepted in most major studies of the level and impact of 
offshoring.201  
 
To date, there has been no way to assess the extent of error in measurement introduced by the use 
of the proportionality assumption, but recent data for Germany provide a test. German input-
output data differentiate between domestically purchased inputs and imported inputs, which 
permits us to calculate a direct measure of sectoral imported input use. In this paper, we compare 
this measure to the proxy-based measure based on the standard proportionality assumption. We 
find that the direct measure differs significantly from the proxy-based measure for both services 
and materials offshoring. To assess the significance of using different measures, we substitute 
them for each other in standard labor demand equations. We find that using the direct measure of 
offshoring gives very different results for labor demand—sometimes of opposite sign— 
compared to estimates using the proxy-based measure. For example, using the proxy-based 
measure, services offshoring is found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
German employment. Using the direct measure, the estimated employment effect is significantly 
negative. This result is robust to a number of specifications and estimation techniques.  
 
We perform a simple decomposition of the proxy-based measure and find that it fails to 
accurately capture the cross-sectoral variation in offshoring intensity because—as a result of the 
proportionality assumption—it is heavily influenced by the cross-sectoral variation in domestic 
input demand. The implications of our findings go beyond the case of Germany. They indicate 
that researchers must be cautious about drawing policy conclusions from estimates using the 
proxy-based measure of offshoring when we know, at least in the case of Germany for 1995–
2004, that the direct measure gives a very different result.  
 
This paper has five sections. First we discuss the alternative measures of offshoring—the direct 
measure and the proxy-based measure—differentiating between services and materials offshoring 
intensities, and present our calculations on these two measures for Germany in 1995 and 2004. 
We then look at the source of the apparent error in the proxy-based measure, followed by an 
                                                 
200 For a concise survey of the scholarly literature on employment and wage effects of offshoring, see Milberg and 
Schöller (2008). For a discussion of the parallels between the scholarly and popular debates, see Milberg (2008). 
201 The assumption was first used by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) and has been adopted in all major studies, 
for example, Hummels, Ishi, and  Yi (2001), Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006). Further discussion of the proportionality assumption can be found in National Research Council (2006).  
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econometric analysis of offshoring and labor demand that uses the two measures and confirms 
the error of the proxy measure. In the final section we conclude with a discussion of the 
implications for future research and data collection. 
 
 
OFFSHORING INTENSITY 
 
In this section, we calculate the direct and proxy measures of services and materials 
offshoring intensity for Germany from 1995 to 2004. The analysis uses annual input-output 
data from the German Federal Statistical Office (FSO). Input-output tables focus “on the 
interrelationships between industries in an economy with respect to the production and uses of 
their products and the products imported from abroad. In a table form […] the economy is viewed 
with each industry listed across the top as a consuming sector and down the side as a supplying 
sector” (United Nations 1999, p. 3). We extract a symmetric 43-sector matrix from the 
original input-output tables containing 71 sectors, including all 36 manufacturing sectors in 
the original tables and seven of the 27 services sectors. We drop the primary sector (sectors 
1–3) and the sectors Mining and Quarrying of the secondary sector (sectors 4–8), as they 
generally have little or no offshoring activity. Total nonenergy inputs in Equations. (1) and 
(5) contain all 36 material inputs plus the 7 service inputs selected above. For a list of the 43 
sectors covered, see Appendix A.  
 
In the following section, we use the term “inputs” when we refer to the supplying sectors. The 
selection of the 7 service inputs out of 27 follows the aggregation of Kalmbach et al. (2005) 
and includes tradable business activities. Business activities comprise Other business activities 
(sector 62), as well as the following 6 sectors: 1) Post and telecommunications; 2) Financial 
mediation (except insurance and pension funding); 3) Activities related to financial mediation; 4) 
Rental of machinery and equipment; 5) Computer and related activities; and 6) Research and 
development (sectors 54, 55, 57, 59–61). We exclude Wholesale, trade, and commission excl. 
motor vehicles services from the original definition, since in our view they do not represent 
typical offshoring services. Abramovsky, Griffith, and Sako (2004), for instance, classify them as 
nonbusiness services. Consumer-related202 and social services203 are also not considered, since 
the former in general do not represent typical offshoring services and the latter are not tradable. 
 
Direct and Proxy Offshoring Intensity Measures 
 
In this section we present the two measures of offshoring intensity: a direct offshoring 
intensity measure that uses direct information on imported input use and a proxy 
offshoring intensity measure that adopts the proportionality assumption that all sectors 
import an input at the economy wide rate. We explain the two different concepts by using 
the example of services offshoring intensity. These definitions can be applied analogously to 
materials offshoring intensity.  
 
The direct services offshoring intensity (DOS) measures the share of imported service inputs s in 
total nonenergy inputs used by sector i at time t and is calculated as follows: 
                                                 
202 Sectors within the classification of the FSO: 45, 47-53, 56, 58, 69–71. 
203 Sectors within the classification of the FSO: 63–68. 
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(1)  
(     )
( - )
t
ist
t
imported input purchases of service s by sector iDOS
total non energy inputs used by sector i
=
   
         
 
The direct services offshoring intensity across all service inputs s for sector i at time t is 
calculated by taking the sum over all DOSist: 
 
(2) s istit
DOS DOS= ?
   
 
The sectoral services offshoring intensity DOSit should not be confused with DOSst, which 
represents the average offshoring intensity of a certain service input s across all sectors i. This is 
calculated by aggregating the respective DOSist, weighted by total sectoral nonenergy inputs 
INP , which is204 
 
(3)  
* ( / )
i
st ist it tDOS DOS INP INP= ? , where
i
t itINP INP=? .         
 
Summing DOSst over all service inputs s yields the average services offshoring intensity DOSt 
across all sectors i and all inputs s at time t 
 
(4)  st st
DOS DOS= ?
.  
 
The second measure is the proxy services offshoring intensity (POS), which uses a proxy for the 
proportion of the imported service input s used in home production, defined as follows (see e.g., 
Feenstra and Hanson [1996]: 
 
(5)
   
( ) ( )
( - ) + 
t t
ist
t st st st
input purchases of service s by sector i imports of service sPOS
total non energy inputs used by sector i production imports - exports
? ? ? ?
= ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
          
       
 
The first bracket gives the share of the purchased service input s in total nonenergy inputs for 
sector i at time t, which we call the sectoral input share. However, the first ratio does not 
distinguish between domestically and foreign purchased inputs. Offshoring focuses solely on 
inputs purchased from abroad. Therefore, the second bracket gives an adjustment based on the 
share of total imported inputs s (the numerator) in the entire domestic disposability of this input s 
(the denominator), where the latter is composed of home production plus imports minus exports 
at time t. We call the second bracket of Equation (3) the overall import share.  
 
The proxy services offshoring intensity POSist of service input s in sector i is equal to the product 
of the two ratios. The proxy measure is based on the assumption of the same import share of 
                                                 
204 Other authors, e.g., Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006), use sectoral outputs as weights. Using total nonenergy inputs 
instead of output results in a more accurate overall offshoring intensity, as it directly refers to the denominator of the 
offshoring measure. 
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service input s for all sectors, irrespective of actual sectoral differences. In Germany, for instance, 
the overall import share of other business activities was 4.5 percent in 2004. Hence, an import 
share of 4.5 percent is assumed for each sector i in the calculation of the sectoral import 
intensities for 2004. POSit, POSst and POSt are defined analogously to Equations (2), (3), and (4). 
We calculate direct and proxy materials offshoring intensities (DOM and POM) analogously to 
the services offshoring intensities. 
 
The definition of offshoring intensity suffers from three related shortcomings; the first two 
concern both offshoring intensity measures, whereas the last one only holds for the proxy 
offshoring measure. First, the numerator underestimates the actual offshoring values, since 
import prices—used here for the calculation of the offshoring measure—are generally lower than 
the actual purchase prices of these inputs. Second, total nonenergy inputs only include purchased 
inputs, but not self-produced inputs used by sector i, which underestimates the denominator. 
Third, the application of the same import share of across all sectors in the proxy offshoring 
intensity is not accurate, since not every sector uses imports to the same extent. Thus, the 
offshoring intensity cannot be exactly measured (Amiti and Wei 2005).  
 
The first two shortcomings are mutually offsetting and the direct offshoring intensities presents a 
good measure for the proportion of imported inputs being used by sector i at time t. However, the 
third shortcoming—the proportionality assumption that applies the same import share to all 
sectors i in the proxy offshoring intensity measures—could constitute a major problem, since 
much of the import-induced cross-sectoral variation gets lost.  Because of lack of data on the 
direct import of intermediates, the proxy measured is used in all major studies of offshoring.205 
 
German Offshoring Intensity Using Direct and Proxy Measures 
 
Table 1 presents the direct and proxy measures of average services offshoring intensity (weighted 
by total nonenergy inputs) for each of the 7 selected service inputs s over all 43 sectors i in 1995 
and 2004 as defined in Equation (3). For each service input we also show the (unweighted) mean 
and the standard deviation across the 43 sectors. The average services offshoring intensity 
measured directly, DOSst, more than doubled from 1.37 percent in 1995 to 2.90 percent in 2004. 
At the service level, Computer and related activities grew on average from the third smallest 
share of 0.08 percent in 1995 to the fourth largest share of 0.39 percent in 2004. Average 
offshoring intensities of Research and development services increased from 0.13 percent in 1995 
to 0.35 percent in 2004. Other business activities almost doubled their intensities from 0.53 
percent in 1995 to 0.95 percent in 2004. These three service inputs are those that are typically 
associated with services offshoring and account for 58 percent of the total tDOS  in 2004. 
 
The proxy measures of services offshoring intensity, POSst, are shown at the bottom of Table 1. 
They are smaller than the direct measures. Applying the overall import share of a services 
category s to all sectors i thus seems to underestimate the real amount of imported service inputs. 
Average POSt more than doubled from 0.88 percent in 1995 to 1.80 percent in 2004. Table 1 also 
shows that cross-sectoral standard deviations are generally much lower using the proxy measures 
compared to the direct measures. The corresponding measures of materials offshoring intensity 
                                                 
205 For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999); Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006); Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006); and OECD (2007). 
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by type of materials input can be found in Appendix B. Note that analogously to subscript s in 
Equations (1) to (5), subscript m stands for material inputs. In the case of materials offshoring, 
we find the reverse: the proxy measures tend to be higher than the direct measures. Cross-sectoral 
standard variations, on the other hand, are higher for the proxy measure than for the direct 
measure which we will explain in section. 
 
Table 6: Direct and Proxy Measures of Services Offshoring Intensity by Type of Service Input in Germany, 
1995 and 2004 
 
Service input s Rank DOS s 19 9 5   
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std 
Dev
Rank DOS s 2 0 0 4   
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std 
Dev
Post and telecommunications 3 0.25% 0.25% 1.49% 2 0.52% 0.49% 3.04%
Financial intermediation 6 0.08% 0.06% 0.08% 6 0.19% 0.18% 0.10%
Activities related to financial intermediation 2 0.31% 0.19% 1.24% 3 0.51% 0.80% 4.71%
Renting of machinery and equipment 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Computer and related activities 5 0.08% 0.13% 0.62% 4 0.39% 0.64% 2.07%
Research and development 4 0.13% 0.24% 1.00% 5 0.35% 0.64% 2.91%
Other business activities 1 0.53% 0.35% 1.03% 1 0.95% 0.73% 2.06%
Total DOS t 1.37% 1.23% 2.53% 2.90% 3.48% 6.98%
Service input s Rank POS s 19 9 5   
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std 
Dev
Rank POS s 2 0 0 4   
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std 
Dev
Post and telecommunications 3 0.09% 0.10% 0.11% 4 0.22% 0.21% 0.64%
Financial intermediation 5 0.05% 0.05% 0.10% 6 0.09% 0.09% 0.16%
Activities related to financial intermediation 2 0.22% 0.26% 1.19% 2 0.31% 0.38% 1.78%
Renting of machinery and equipment 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Computer and related activities 6 0.04% 0.06% 0.20% 3 0.27% 0.40% 1.42%
Research and development 4 0.05% 0.10% 0.44% 5 0.16% 0.27% 1.06%
Other business activities 1 0.42% 0.45% 0.41% 1 0.75% 0.74% 0.63%
Total POSt 0.88% 1.03% 1.44% 1.80% 2.09% 2.78%
 
Source: Own calculations, Data: FSO, revised input-output tables (1995 and 2004). 
 
 
Figure 1 presents a plot of the development of the average services and materials offshoring 
intensities over all sectors in Germany as defined in Equation (4). The continuous lines represent 
the direct measures. Average direct services offshoring intensities DOSt have grown considerably 
by on average 8.6 percent per year from 1.4 percent in 1995 to 2.9 percent in 2004, possibly due 
to the increased use of ICT. Direct materials offshoring intensities have risen by 8.0 percent per 
year from 13.2 percent in 1995 to 23.8 percent in 2004. The relatively strong annual growth rate 
of materials offshoring compared to services offshoring is somewhat surprising, as the process of 
materials offshoring started earlier and perhaps should have reached its limit. One explanation 
would be the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, which was followed by significant 
German foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe, and subsequent wave of re-
imports back to Germany. Another explanation is the growing reliance on East Asian contract 
manufacturers. 
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Figure 5: Offshoring Intensities of Intermediate Inputs in Germany (1995-2004) 
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Source: Own calculations. FSO, revised input-output tables (1995-2004). Weighted average across all sectors i 
by total nonenergy inputs at time t.  
 
The dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the average proxy measures POSt and POMt. Average 
services offshoring intensities POSt are lower than the corresponding DOSt measures. 
Nevertheless, the average annual growth rate is still 8.3 percent over the 1995–2004 period. On 
the other hand, the proxy measures of materials offshoring intensity POMt are mostly higher than 
the corresponding direct measure DOMt. The POMt variable tracks the constant growth trend of 
the DOMt measures with a lower CAGR of 6.8 percent. In sum, there is a clear difference in the 
average level and variation between the direct and proxy measures. 
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ERROR IN CAPTURING CROSS-SECTORAL VARIATION USING THE PROXY 
MEASURE 
 
Loss of Cross-Sectoral Variation 
 
In this section, we are interested how the proxy measure influences the cross-sectoral variation 
of offshoring, i.e., the variation across all sectors considered. In Equation (5), we distinguished 
between the “sectoral input share” (first bracket) and the “overall import share” (second bracket). 
Accordingly, we can attribute the cross-sectoral variation of the proxy measure in Equation (5) to 
the “input-induced variation,” i.e., the variation in the first bracket across all sectors, and the 
“import-induced variation,” i.e., the variation in the second bracket across all sectors.  
 
Let us study the import-induced variation of the proxy measure compared to the direct measure 
in a first step. Applying the same overall import share for a service input s over all sectors i 
constitutes a major loss of cross-sectoral variation, which we will show in the following equation. 
Let us assume that a sector i only purchases two service inputs, s1 and s2. Then, the calculation of 
POSit for a sector i at time t is given by 
 
(6)
2
1
1 1 1
1 1
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(   ) (   )
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(  )
( -
s
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it s t s t s t
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Now imagine the calculation of POSit for a sector j (with j i≠ ), which uses the same kinds of 
inputs as sector i at time t. We can see from Equation (6) that only the first bracket of each 
summand— i.e., the input-induced variation—differs from sector i, while the second bracket of 
each summand remains as in sector i— i.e. there is no import-induced variation across sectors. As 
a consequence, the cross-sectoral variation in offshoring intensities is solely determined by the 
input-induced variation. The application of the proportionality assumption thus lowers the 
import-induced cross-sectoral variation. 
 
Influence of Domestically Purchased Inputs 
 
We now analyze the input-induced variation of the proxy measure. As we have shown in the 
previous section, the cross-sectoral variation of POSit is only determined by the input-induced 
variation because of the proportionality assumption. Note that the term input-induced variation in 
opposition to import-induced variation could be misleading, as it includes both the variation of 
domestically purchased inputs and the variation of imported inputs of s. In the following section 
we show that this can lead to a biased sectoral input share (first bracket in Equation 5), because 
the cross-sectoral variation is mainly determined by domestically purchased inputs. 
 
The sectoral services offshoring intensities for the 36 manufacturing sectors using direct and 
proxy measures are plotted in Appendix C. One can see that the two measures differ for each 
sector. The cross-sectoral standard deviations per year (on bottom) are stronger for the DOSit 
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measures. Consequently, the standard deviation of the DOSst measures is also higher compared to 
that for POSst, as already shown in Table 1. The category Other business services, for instance, 
shows a standard deviation of 1.03 percent in 1995 using the DOSt measures, while the standard 
deviation is only 0.41 percent for the POSt measures.  
 
Similar differences between the direct and the proxy measure can be detected for materials 
offshoring intensity. Appendix D shows the sectoral materials offshoring intensities in 
manufacturing using both measures. Despite the loss in import-induced variation explained in the 
previous section, the cross-sectoral standard deviations of POMit are higher than those for DOMit. 
Likewise, the cross-sectoral standard deviations for the POMmt measures are also higher 
compared to the DOMmt measures (see Appendix B).  
 
Why are there such differences in the standard deviation across sectors between the direct and 
proxy measures? In the following equation, we show the extent to which domestically purchased 
inputs as opposed to imported inputs influence the input-induced variation. To do this, we 
introduce two domestic outsourcing variables to reflect the amount of home-purchased service 
inputs and home-purchased material inputs. The domestic services outsourcing intensity HPS is 
calculated as follows: 
 
(7) 
(     )
( - )
t
ist
t
domestic input purchases of service s by sector iHPS
total non energy inputs used by sector i
=
   
       
 
The domestic services outsourcing intensity HPSit for sector i at time t is calculated by taking the 
sum over all HPSist: 
s
istitHPS HPS= ? . The domestic materials outsourcing intensity HPM is 
calculated analogously.  
 
According to this definition, summing up Equations (7) and (1) yields the left bracket of Equation 
(5), i.e., the sectoral input share. Such domestic outsourcing is fully captured in the proxy 
measures, and is plotted in Figure 2 for the period 1995–2004. The average domestic outsourcing 
intensities are much higher than the offshoring intensities shown in Figure 2.206 We thus expect 
domestic outsourcing to exert a stronger influence on the cross-sectoral input-induced variation. 
Between 1995 and 2004, domestic services outsourcing grew at an average rate of 5.3 percent per 
annum, (from 16.6 percent to 26.3 percent), while the overall domestic materials outsourcing 
intensity grew from 39.7 percent in 1995 to 50.7 percent in 2004, a compound annual growth rate 
of 2.8 percent. 
 
The cross-sectoral correlations presented in Appendix E show that the sectoral POSit measures 
have a very high correlation with the corresponding domestic services outsourcing intensities 
HPSit, which is reflected in an average correlation of 0.9. This means that most of the cross-
sectoral variation in POSit is in fact determined by the domestic services outsourcing intensity 
and not by imported service inputs. Despite the fact that the POMit measure shows an overall 
correlation with the domestic materials outsourcing intensity HPMit of almost zero, the sectoral 
                                                 
206 Note that the offshoring and domestic outsourcing measures for materials or services do not sum to 100 percent. 
The denominator in both measures is ‘total nonenergy inputs,’ which includes both material and service inputs, while 
the numerator includes only services or materials, depending on the measure. 
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data reveal that 22 sectors have a pairwise correlation of more than 50 percent. This is due to the 
fact that some sector pairs show positive and others have a negative correlation. We explain these 
differences by the fact that the ratio of domestic to imported inputs is much higher in services 
than in materials (see Figures 1 and 2). The influence of domestic outsourcing, and thus the error, 
would seem to be less severe for materials compared to services. 
 
Figure 6: Domestic Outsourcing Intensity of Intermediate Inputs in Germany 
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Source: Own calculations. Data: FSO, revised input-output tables (1995–2004). Weighted average across all 
sectors i by total nonenergy inputs at time t.  
We conclude that the input-induced variation is mostly determined by domestically purchased 
inputs, which is stronger in the case of service inputs. A high standard deviation of the domestic 
outsourcing variables thus influences the variation in the proxy measure. To support our 
hypothesis, we present the sectoral domestic outsourcing intensities and their standard deviations 
in Appendix E. The standard deviations of HPSit. and HPMit are much higher than the respective 
standard deviations of DOSit and DOMit, which implies a strong influence of domestically 
purchased inputs on the variation of POSit and POMit. Moreover, the standard deviations of 
HPMit (with 36 material inputs) across all sectors are higher than the standard deviations of HPSit 
(with 7 service inputs). 
 
To sum up: the use of proxy measures significantly influences the degree of cross-sectoral 
variation. First of all, the cross-sectoral variation of the proxy measure is only determined by the 
input-induced variation due to the proportionality assumption, since there is by assumption no 
cross-sectoral variation in the overall import shares.  In general this implies less cross-sectoral 
variation in the proxy measure of offshoring. Second, the input-induced variation is to a large 
extent determined by domestically purchased inputs, which can have an upward or downward 
effect on the cross-sectoral variation, depending on the cross-sectoral variation in domestic input 
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demand compared to that for imported inputs. In our specific case, we detected a lower cross-
sectoral variation in the proxy measure for services, but a higher cross-sectoral variation for 
materials. This indicates a strong upward effect of the input-induced variation for materials on the 
cross-sectoral variation.  
 
These two effects lead in general to erroneous measurement, and this error may be particularly 
important when the proxy measure is used in cross-sectoral analysis of offshoring. We test this 
hypothesis in the next section, where we measure the impact of services offshoring on labor 
demand in German manufacturing using both the direct and the proxy offshoring measures. 
 
 
OFFSHORING AND LABOR DEMAND IN GERMANY 
 
Empirical Model 
 
We use a standard model of labor demand, following the labor demand specification of 
Hamermesh (1993). A firm’s linearly homogenous production function F with constant returns to 
scale is described as follows: 
 
(8) Y = F(L, K, S, M, T)       
2 2
2
1 1 21
0, 0, 0F FF
x x xx
∂ ∂ ∂
> < >∂ ∂ ∂∂              with x1, x2 = L, K, S, M, T               
 
where labor L, capital K, intermediate services S, intermediate materials M, and technology T are 
the input factors. The technology shifter, T=T(OS, OM), is a function of services and materials 
offshoring OS and OM.207 T represents a change of the production function due to offshoring. 
 
The corresponding linearly homogeneous cost function, conditional on the level of output Y, is 
the following:  
 
(9) C = C(Y, w, r, 
Sp ,
Mp ,
Tp )     
1 1 2
0, 0C C
c c c
∂ ∂
> >∂ ∂ ∂          with  c1,cx2 = w, r,  
Sp ,
Mp ,
Tp  
 
where w designates wages, r the rental rate on capital, Sp , Mp , and Tp  the prices for service, 
material, and technology inputs, and Y the constant output.  
 
Using Shephard’s Lemma,208 the conditional labor demand function dL  is derived as follows: 
 
(10) ,  ,* ( , , ,  )
S M TdL L Y w r p p p=    
                                                 
207 We use OS and OM in the following, when the variables can represent the direct or the proxy measure. 
208 According to Shephard’s Lemma (1953), factor demand is determined by the first partial derivative of the cost 
function with respect to the corresponding factor price, regardless of the kind of production function. 
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In log-linear form, we can write 
 
(11) 0
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
it it itit it it it
S M T
Y L K S G TL Y w r p p pα η η η η η η= + + + + + +  
 
In this form, the equation results in the employment-output elasticity Yη , the price elasticity of 
demand for labor Lη , the cross-elasticity of demand for labor due to a change in the rental rate on 
capital Kη , the cross-elasticities of demand for labor due to a change in input prices for services, 
goods, and technology ,  ,S Mη η  and Tη . 
 
Wages are observed directly, but some choices must be made on the specification of the input 
prices. The rental rate on capital, r, is assumed to be the same for all companies and to be a 
function of time r=f(t). r is not directly included in the estimation model, but will be captured by 
adding fixed-year dummies. The input prices for service and material inputs Sp and Mp  can be 
subdivided into foreign input prices and domestic input prices (see Winkler [2009]). Following 
Amiti and Wei (2005), we use offshoring intensities as an inverse proxy for import prices of 
services as well as of materials. The lower the prices of imported services or material inputs, the 
higher the offshoring intensities should be. Therefore, we use the offshoring variables as inverse 
proxies for imported input prices. 
 
Winkler (2009) uses the previously calculated domestic outsourcing intensities HPS and HPM as 
an inverse proxy for the prices of home-purchased service and material inputs. However, these 
variables can only be calculated using the domestic input matrices of the input-output tables. 
Unlike the offshoring intensity measures, we do not know an alternative proxy measure for 
domestic outsourcing intensities. Therefore, we do not include HPS and HPM in the regressions. 
This also makes our study more comparable with other studies that do not include domestic 
outsourcing intensities (e.g., Amiti and Wei [2005, 2006]). Finally, the input prices Tp  of the 
technology shifter T need to be determined. Since adequate measures for Tp  are not available 
and T=T(OS, OM), we use OS and OM as inverse proxies for the prices of technology Tp , 
because falling prices of technology inputs Tp  are expected to be reflected in higher offshoring 
intensities. 
 
Equation (11) thus reduces to 
 
lnLit = ?0 + ?Y lnYit + ?L lnwit + ?OS lnOSit + ?OM lnOMit + ?tDt +  ?it 
 
Note that OS and OM have two functions in Equation (12). First, they are used as (inverse) 
proxies for other foreign input prices, and second, they are used as (inverse) proxies for the  
prices of the technology shifter T. Higher output is expected to be associated positively with labor 
demand, that is, 0Yη > . Increasing wages are expected to be associated negatively, that is, 
0Lη < . Concerning OS and OM, their net effects are not unambiguous as noted by Amiti and 
Wei (2006). Offshoring can influence employment in at least three ways. First, if input prices Sp  
and Mp  fall, i.e., if OS and OM increase, labor is likely to be substituted for imported inputs. We 
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call this the input substitution effect. Analogously, if input prices Tp  decrease, i.e., if OS and OM 
rise, labor is likely to be substituted for technology in what we call the technology substitution 
effect. Second, offshoring could augment productivity via T, so that less labor is needed for the 
same amount of output (productivity effect). The substitution effect influences labor demand in a 
direct manner, whereas the productivity effect is indirect.  
 
Besides these two negative effects, scale effects could influence labor demand positively. If 
productivity effects lead to lower prices, this would be expected to be associated with a greater 
quantity demanded, in turn increasing the demand for labor. Thus, the net effect of offshoring is 
not clear. If the negative substitution or productivity effects are larger than the positive scale 
effects, then ?OS < 0 and ?OM < 0. If the scale effects dominate the other effects for all variables, 
we would expect ?OS > 0 and ?OM > 0 
 
Estimation Results 
 
We estimate the effect of offshoring on labor demand using the consistent fixed effects estimator, 
which allows unobserved time-constant sector-specific effects ic  to be correlated with some 
explanatory variables itx . All estimations produce standard errors robust to both 
heteroscedasticity (Huber-White sandwich estimators) and any form of intracluster correlation. 
Table 2 shows the results using the fixed effects estimator including all sectors, Table 3 shows 
the results excluding outliers ‘pharmaceuticals’ and ‘recycling,’ and Table 4 applies the 
instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) estimator to control for potential 
endogeneity of the offshoring variables. The correlation matrix, summary statistics and data 
description can be found in Appendices G–I.. 
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Table 7: Fixed Effects Estimations (1995–2004) 
 
Dependent variable: lnLt 
 Fixed effects using DOS and DOM measures Fixed effects using POS and POM measures 
 (1)                    (2)                (3)                 (4)              (5)                   (6) (7) (8) 
lnYt  
 
lnYt-1 
 
lnwt  
 
lnwt-1 
 
lnOSt 
 
lnOSt-1 
 
lnOMt 
 
lnOMt-1 
 
ln(IM/Y)t 
 
ln(IM/Y)t-1 
 
0.3418*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.5369*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.0403* 
(0.059) 
 
 
0.0095 
(0.672) 
0.1216** 
(0.020) 
0.2484*** 
(0.010) 
-0.4414*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1250** 
(0.037) 
-0.0092 
(0.653) 
-0.0406** 
(0.013) 
-0.0051 
(0.769) 
0.0109 
(0.665) 
0.2271** 
(0.050) 
 
 
-0.4701*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.0133 
(0.313) 
 
 
0.0258 
(0.367) 
 
 
0.0209 
(0.602) 
 
0.1401** 
(0.032) 
0.0613 
(0.470) 
-0.3499*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1560*** 
(0.005) 
0.0121 
(0.549) 
-0.0243** 
(0.020) 
0.0116 
(0.596) 
0.0376 
(0.137) 
0.0429 
(0.127) 
-0.0396 
(0.295) 
0.3398*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.5357*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.0910* 
(0.064) 
 
 
-0.0128 
(0.844) 
0.1291** 
(0.028) 
0.2277** 
(0.014) 
-0.4395*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1300* 
(0.053) 
0.0569 
(0.133) 
-0.0068 
(0.825) 
-0.0026 
(0.955) 
0.0160 
(0.737) 
 
0.1771** 
(0.036) 
 
 
-0.4623*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.0860** 
(0.030) 
 
 
0.0524 
(0.253) 
 
 
0.0195 
(0.449) 
 
0.0973 
(0.203) 
0.0503 
(0.402) 
-0.3621*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1490*** 
(0.008) 
0.0577 
(0.132) 
0.0075 
(0.770) 
0.0444 
(0.327) 
0.0616 
(0.108) 
0.0357 
(0.194) 
-0.0368 
(0.235) 
Year fixed effects 
Joint significance tests: 
lnYt + lnYt-1 = 0 
lnwt + lnwt-1 = 0 
lnOSt + lnOSt-1 = 0 
lnOGt + lnOGt-1 = 0 
ln(IM/Y)t+ln(IM/Y)t-1 = 0 
AIC 
Observations 
R-squared 
Yes             Yes           
 
 p>F=0.0062 
 p>F=0.0000 
 p>F=0.0415 
 p>F=0.8727 
 
-855.8 -821.6 
347 312 
0.64 0.65 
Yes Yes 
 
 p>F=0.0970 
 p>F=0.0000 
 p>F=0.0641 
 p>F=0.3239 
 p>F=0.1973 
-849.8 -809.7 
319 287 
0.66 0.66 
Yes Yes 
 
 p>F=0.0181 
 p>F=0.0000 
 p>F=0.2827 
 p>F=0.9273 
 
-834.9 -813.5 
360 324
0.62 0.63 
Yes Yes 
 
 p>F=0.1650
 p>F=0.0000
 p>F=0.2751
 p>F=0.1763
 p>F=0.3325
-879.3 -836.6 
330 297 
0.68 0.68 
Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses).  
 
In each case we consider instantaneous effects and additional one-period lags of the independent 
variables.  Employment is associated with income and wages in the predicted fashion under all 
estimation techniques, whether the estimation includes proxy or direct measures of offshoring.  In 
all cases the income variable (contemporaneous and one-year lag) is positive and in most cases 
statistically significant. Similarly, the wage variable (contemporaneous and one-year lag) is 
always negative and in most cases significant. When lagged values of these variables were 
included, they were in all cases jointly significant with the contemporaneous value (see joint 
significance tests at the bottom of each table). 
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There are different results, however, for the offshoring variables depending on if they are 
measured in a direct or proxy fashion.  In the fixed effects models (both with and without 
outliers), materials offshoring varies from positive to negative but is statistically insignificant in 
all models. In the IV 2SLS estimated with year fixed effects without outliers (Table 4), the direct 
measure of materials offshoring is negative and significant in columns (1) and (3) and 
insignificant in (2) and (4).  The proxy measure of offshoring has a negative sign in all cases, and 
the effect is larger and statistically significant at a higher level in columns (5) and (7). 
 
Table 8: Fixed Effects Estimations without Outliers (1995–2004) 
 
Dependent variable: lnLt  
 Fixed effects w/o outliers1) using DOS and DOM 
measures 
Fixed effects w/o outliers2) using POS and POM 
measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnYt  
 
lnYt-1 
 
lnwt  
 
lnwt-1 
 
lnOSt 
 
lnOSt-1 
 
lnOMt 
 
lnOMt-1 
 
ln(IM/Y)t 
 
ln(IM/Y)t-1 
 
0.3547*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.5627*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.0397* 
(0.056) 
 
 
0.0065 
(0.788) 
0.1297** 
(0.018) 
0.2530*** 
(0.009) 
-0.4770*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1090* 
(0.067) 
-0.0097 
(0.641) 
-0.0398** 
(0.013) 
-0.0040 
(0.825) 
0.0039 
(0.882) 
0.2578** 
(0.037) 
 
 
-0.5007*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.0139 
(0.292) 
 
 
0.0160 
(0.629) 
 
 
0.0388 
(0.398) 
0.1508** 
(0.039) 
0.0873 
(0.334) 
-0.3831*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1477*** 
(0.008) 
0.0112 
(0.589) 
-0.0245** 
(0.023) 
0.0071 
(0.780) 
0.0263 
(0.343) 
0.0488 
(0.136) 
-0.0231 
(0.560) 
0.2717*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
-0.4770*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.0591 
(0.114) 
 
 
-0.0036 
(0.957) 
 
0.1210** 
(0.046) 
0.1628** 
(0.029) 
-0.4238*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0704 
(0.266) 
0.0381 
(0.206) 
-0.0106 
(0.728) 
0.0060 
(0.902) 
0.0133 
(0.775) 
0.1716** 
(0.041) 
 
 
-0.4959*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.1102** 
(0.020) 
 
 
0.0726 
(0.109) 
 
 
0.0368 
(0.112) 
 
0.0983 
(0.213) 
0.0406 
(0.503) 
-0.3992*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1399** 
(0.017) 
0.0744* 
(0.056) 
0.0247 
(0.297) 
0.0708 
(0.112) 
0.0558 
(0.128) 
0.0470* 
(0.054) 
-0.0281 
(0.385) 
Year fixed effects 
Joint significance tests: 
lnYt + lnYt-1 = 0 
lnwt + lnwt-1 = 0 
lnOSt + lnOSt-1 = 0 
lnOMt + lnOMt-1 = 0 
ln(IM/Y)t+ln(IM/Y)t-1 = 0 
AIC 
Observations 
R-squared 
Yes             
 
 
 
 
 
 
-836.8 
337 
0.65 
Yes 
 
p>F=0.0047 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0398 
p>F=0.9643 
 
-803.3 
303 
0.66 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-828.5 
309 
0.67 
Yes 
 
p>F=0.1121
p>F=0.0000
p>F=0.0708
p>F=0.6074
p>F=0.2608
-786.3 
278 
0.66 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-897.0 
340 
0.68 
Yes 
 
p>F=0.0316
p>F=0.0000
p>F=0.3666
p>F=0.9588
 
-845.5 
306 
0.67 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-868.7 
320 
0.70 
Yes 
 
p>F=0.1960 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.1098 
p>F=0.0902 
p>F=0.1069 
-828.5 
288 
0.70 
Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses).  
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1) Columns 1–4 exclude the outlier ‘pharmaceuticals’. 
2) Columns 5–8 exclude the outliers ‘pharmaceuticals’ and ‘recycling.’ 
Table 4: IV 2SLS Fixed Effects Estimations without Outliers (1995-2004) 
Dependent variable: lnLt 
 Instrumental Variables 2SLS: Fixed effects  
w/o outlier1) using DOS and DOM measures 
Instrumental Variables 2SLS: Fixed effects  
w/o outliers2) using POS and POM measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnYt  
 
lnYt-1 
 
lnwt  
 
lnwt-1 
 
lnOSt 
 
lnOMt 
 
0.3537*** 0.2368** 
(0.001) (0.048) 
 
 
-0.5509*** -0.5124*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0511** -0.0298 
(0.021) (0.365) 
-0.0815* 0.0376 
(0.063) (0.430) 
0.2549*** 0.1439* 
(0.002) (0.059) 
0.2424*** 0.2361*** 
(0.001) (0.006) 
-0.4750*** -0.4573*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.1405** -0.1078* 
(0.029) (0.073) 
-0.0625*** -0.0402 
(0.008) (0.161) 
-0.1181** -0.0238 
(0.019) (0.627) 
0.2825*** 0.1893* 
(0.003) (0.082) 
 
 
-0.5419*** -0.4597*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
0.0911 0.1872 
(0.106) (0.186) 
-0.2426*** -0.0216 
(0.001) (0.884) 
0.2545*** 0.1083 
(0.001) (0.161) 
0.0676 0.1395** 
(0.276) (0.023) 
-0.4760*** -0.4261*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.1336* -0.0722 
(0.070) (0.267) 
0.0439 0.1176 
(0.494) (0.468) 
-0.2201*** -0.0185 
(0.005) (0.901) 
Year fixed effects 
Joint significance tests: 
lnYt + lnYt-1 = 0 
lnwt + lnwt-1 = 0 
First stage results: 
Shea Partial R-squared: 
lnOSt  
lnOMt  
Hanson J statistic3) P-val. 
AIC 
Observations 
R-squared 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5297 
0.4320 
?2(4)=0.05 
-603.5 
235 
0.48 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5092 
0.3142 
?2(4)=0.49 
-649.6 
235 
0.59 
No 
 
p>F=0.0002 
p>F=0.0000 
 
 
0.5274 
0.4144 
?2(4)=0.05 
-610.7 
235 
0.50 
Yes  
 
p>F=0.0128 
p>F=0.0000 
 
 
0.5066 
0.3173 
?2(4)=0.42 
-666.8 
235 
0.63 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3297 
0.4501 
?2(4)=0.04 
-648.1 
238 
0.51 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1923 
0.3247 
?2(4)=0.09 
-692.8 
238 
0.61 
No 
 
p>F=0.0040 
p>F=0.0000 
 
 
0.3111 
0.4405 
?2(4)=0.03 
-653.2 
238 
0.53 
Yes 
 
p>F=0.0483
p>F=0.0000
 
 
0.1802 
0.3274 
?2(4)=0.13 
-711.2 
238 
0.65 
Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses).  
 
1) Columns 1–4 exclude the outlier ‘pharmaceuticals.’ 
2) Columns 5–8 exclude the outliers ‘pharmaceuticals’ and ‘recycling.’ 
3) Overidentification test of all instruments. 
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The dramatic differences in the results between proxy and direct measures occur with services 
offshoring. In the fixed effect estimations (Table 2), the proxy variable has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient in columns (5) and (7).  The direct services offshoring measure 
has a negative sign in all cases and is significant in contemporaneous form in model (1) and in 
lagged form in models (2) and (4). A very similar result occurs when outliers are removed (Table 
3). In the IV 2SLS fixed effects estimations (Table 4), the direct services offshoring variable is 
negative and significant when year fixed effects are not included (columns 1 and 3). By 
comparison, the coefficient on the proxy measure of services offshoring (models 5-8) is always 
positive and statistically insignificant. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The proportionality assumption in the measurement of offshoring has been adopted in all the 
major empirical, input-output-based studies of offshoring. In this paper we provide a first 
assessment of the merits of that assumption. Since Germany collects imported inputs directly, we 
were able to construct a direct measure of offshoring to compare to the proxy measure, where the 
proxy measure was constructed with the proportionality assumption. We estimated the effect of 
offshoring on German labor demand for a sample of 36 sectors over the period 1995–2004 and 
found that the direct and proxy measures of offshoring give very different results, especially in 
the case of services offshoring. In many cases where the proxy measure gives a positive and 
insignificant coefficient, the direct measure has a negative and significant coefficient. This 
finding is robust to different estimation techniques.  
 
We also performed a simple decomposition of the proxy-based measure. We find that the proxy 
measure fails to accurately capture the cross-sectoral variation in offshoring intensity because—
as a result of the proportionality assumption—it is heavily influenced by the cross-sectoral 
variation in domestic input demand. More precisely, the cross-sectoral variation of the proxy 
measure is only determined by the input-induced variation, and the input-induced variation is to a 
large extent determined by domestically purchased inputs. 
 
The implications of our findings go beyond the case of Germany. Researchers must be cautious 
about drawing policy conclusions from estimates using the proxy-based measure of offshoring 
when we know, at least in the case of Germany for 1995–2004, that using a direct measure 
sometimes gives the opposite result. Whereas the proxy measure would support the view that 
workers should have no “fear of offshoring,” the direct measure indicates that offshoring has a 
negative effect on labor demand. The two results would support very different policy 
prescriptions. Researchers relying (because of a lack of data) on the proxy measure should be 
very cautious when interpreting the results of their analysis. 
 
Given our results, we would urge that industrialized countries seek to improve data on imported 
intermediates along the lines suggested by Sturgeon (2006).  This would be especially important 
for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, where offshoring levels and their labor 
market effects are known to be significant and the subject of considerable policy debate. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Sectoral Classification 
Manufacturing Sectors (36 Sectors)
1 Food products
2 Beverages
3 Tobacco products
4 Textiles
5 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur
6 Leather, leather products and footwear
7 Wood and products of wood and cork
8 Pulp and paper
9 Paper products
10 Publishing
11 Printing
12 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
13 Pharmaceuticals
14 Chemicals exluding pharmaceuticals
15 Rubber products
16 Plastic products
17 Glass and glass products
18 Ceramic goods and other non-metallic mineral products
19 Iron and steel
20 Non-ferrous metals
21 Metal castings
22 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
23 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
24 Office, accounting and computing machinery 
25 Electrical machinery and apparaturs, n.e.c. 
26 Radio, television and communication equipment 
27 Medical, precision and optical instruments
28 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
29 Other transport equipment
30 Manufacturing n.e.c.
31 Recycling
32 Electricity, steam and hot water supply 
33 Gas and gas supply
34 Collection, purification and distribution of water
35 Construction site and civil engineering
36 Construction installation and other construction
Service Sectors (7 Sectors)
37 Post and telecommunications
38 Financial intermediation except insurance and pension funding
39 Activities related to financial intermediation 
40 Renting of machinery and equipment
41 Computer and related activities
42 Research and development
43 Other business activities  
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Appendix B: Materials Offshoring Intensities per Input Category in Germany 
Material input m DOMm 1995     
(weighted average)
Mean Std Dev DOMm 2004      
(weighted average)
Mean Std Dev POMm 1995      
(weighted average)
Mean Std Dev POMm 2004      
(weighted average)
Mean Std Dev
Food products 0.51% 0.35% 1.75% 0.68% 0.60% 2.73% 0.42% 0.30% 1.52% 0.63% 0.43% 2.17%
Beverages 0.02% 0.04% 0.24% 0.03% 0.04% 0.22% 0.02% 0.06% 0.36% 0.04% 0.09% 0.57%
Tobacco products 0.01% 0.14% 0.93% 0.00% 0.05% 0.32% 0.00% 0.06% 0.36% 0.00% 0.05% 0.34%
Textiles 0.46% 1.14% 4.18% 0.44% 1.11% 3.69% 0.68% 1.92% 7.36% 0.70% 2.05% 7.44%
Wearing apparel, dressing, and dying of fur 0.17% 0.58% 3.78% 0.17% 0.58% 3.76% 0.14% 0.54% 3.53% 0.16% 0.68% 4.43%
Leather, leather products, and footwear 0.10% 0.86% 5.46% 0.10% 0.73% 4.52% 0.12% 0.91% 5.61% 0.15% 1.12% 6.80%
Wood and products of wood and cork 0.37% 0.46% 1.60% 0.38% 0.48% 1.55% 0.38% 0.52% 2.03% 0.37% 0.53% 1.96%
Pulp and paper 0.67% 1.41% 4.94% 0.83% 1.90% 6.83% 0.76% 1.67% 5.72% 0.91% 1.99% 6.72%
Paper products 0.08% 0.14% 0.29% 0.16% 0.26% 0.43% 0.12% 0.25% 0.66% 0.30% 0.54% 1.35%
Publishing 0.03% 0.06% 0.28% 0.11% 0.16% 0.75% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.11% 0.11% 0.34%
Printing 0.04% 0.04% 0.10% 0.06% 0.06% 0.12% 0.08% 0.13% 0.38% 0.07% 0.12% 0.34%
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 0.38% 0.60% 2.19% 0.78% 1.17% 3.94% 0.31% 0.60% 2.47% 0.75% 1.41% 6.26%
Pharmaceuticals 0.11% 0.21% 1.29% 0.18% 0.35% 2.25% 0.11% 0.13% 0.77% 0.52% 0.88% 5.75%
Chemicals exluding pharmaceuticals 1.93% 1.76% 3.60% 3.39% 3.58% 6.63% 2.22% 2.03% 3.18% 3.88% 3.27% 5.46%
Rubber products 0.21% 0.15% 0.48% 0.40% 0.32% 1.16% 0.21% 0.17% 0.49% 0.50% 0.39% 1.31%
Plastic products 0.44% 0.36% 0.46% 0.77% 0.67% 0.91% 0.56% 0.45% 0.80% 0.94% 0.74% 1.31%
Glass and glass products 0.15% 0.36% 1.75% 0.23% 0.50% 2.55% 0.16% 0.33% 1.31% 0.25% 0.50% 2.04%
Ceramic goods & other non-metallic mineral 
products
0.35% 0.27% 0.75% 0.34% 0.31% 0.73% 0.47% 0.41% 1.52% 0.38% 0.36% 1.27%
Iron and steel 1.02% 0.57% 1.48% 1.68% 1.27% 4.32% 1.17% 0.73% 3.03% 1.83% 1.12% 4.52%
Non-ferrous metals 1.10% 1.19% 4.98% 1.69% 2.63% 9.80% 1.11% 1.37% 5.02% 1.78% 2.64% 9.88%
Metal castings 0.07% 0.03% 0.12% 0.26% 0.23% 1.25% 0.10% 0.05% 0.11% 0.29% 0.13% 0.34%
Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery & equip. 0.52% 0.38% 0.51% 1.00% 0.71% 0.99% 0.67% 0.44% 0.76% 1.24% 0.78% 1.41%
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 0.78% 0.46% 1.08% 1.84% 1.05% 2.47% 0.96% 0.62% 1.15% 1.93% 1.20% 2.39%
Office, accounting, and computing machinery 0.30% 0.52% 2.56% 0.59% 1.05% 4.16% 0.39% 0.71% 2.85% 1.06% 1.94% 7.60%
Electrical machinery and apparaturs, n.e.c. 0.70% 0.37% 1.04% 1.52% 0.80% 2.48% 1.02% 0.57% 1.63% 2.14% 1.20% 3.65%
Radio, television, and communication equipment 0.61% 0.59% 2.46% 1.67% 1.53% 5.98% 0.60% 0.61% 2.14% 2.20% 2.36% 8.93%
Medical, precision, and optical instruments 0.14% 0.20% 0.65% 0.33% 0.48% 1.59% 0.16% 0.27% 0.75% 0.37% 0.64% 2.12%
Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 1.52% 0.26% 1.57% 2.83% 0.56% 2.98% 1.12% 0.19% 1.08% 3.86% 0.64% 3.45%
Other transport equipment 0.11% 0.15% 1.01% 0.41% 0.55% 3.60% 0.11% 0.14% 0.90% 0.70% 0.95% 6.21%
Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.09% 0.12% 0.63% 0.30% 0.40% 2.52% 0.07% 0.09% 0.49% 0.24% 0.26% 1.49%
Recycling 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Electricity, steam, and hot water supply 0.03% 0.06% 0.15% 0.48% 0.91% 5.31% 0.03% 0.06% 0.08% 0.24% 0.42% 0.83%
Gas and gas supply 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Collection, purification, and distribution of water 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Construction site and civil engineering 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Construction installation & other construction 0.14% 0.08% 0.32% 0.21% 0.12% 0.55% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.04%
Total Materials O ffshoring Intensity in  t 13.17% 13.91% 10.86% 23.84% 25.19% 16.90% 14.31% 16.36% 12.69% 28.57% 29.57% 19.68%
 
Source: Source: Own illustration. Data: FSO, revised input-output tables (1995 and 2004). 
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Appendix C: Sectoral DOS vs. POS Measures 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Food products 0.0011 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0020 0.0025 0.0029 0.0031 0.0032 0.0010 0.0059 0.0062 0.0070 0.0077 0.0085 0.0100 0.0118 0.0113 0.0101 0.0103 0.0021
Beverages 0.0023 0.0038 0.0041 0.0045 0.0042 0.0051 0.0070 0.0070 0.0052 0.0050 0.0014 0.0134 0.0146 0.0154 0.0164 0.0180 0.0206 0.0216 0.0202 0.0172 0.0165 0.0027
Tobacco products 0.0081 0.0134 0.0150 0.0172 0.0193 0.0226 0.0331 0.0351 0.0376 0.0391 0.0112 0.0170 0.0072 0.0197 0.0220 0.0126 0.0303 0.0323 0.0293 0.0246 0.0269 0.0081
Textiles 0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0013 0.0016 0.0024 0.0014 0.0015 0.0008 0.0030 0.0030 0.0033 0.0037 0.0038 0.0043 0.0047 0.0050 0.0039 0.0041 0.0007
Wearing apparel, dressing, and dying of fur 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0009 0.0009 0.0005 0.0027 0.0028 0.0031 0.0031 0.0033 0.0034 0.0039 0.0040 0.0029 0.0032 0.0004
Leather, leather products, and footwear 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0017 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0023 0.0029 0.0027 0.0020 0.0021 0.0004
Wood and products of wood and cork 0.0006 0.0051 0.0051 0.0049 0.0054 0.0015 0.0020 0.0019 0.0013 0.0013 0.0019 0.0034 0.0034 0.0036 0.0040 0.0049 0.0053 0.0052 0.0047 0.0037 0.0039 0.0008
Pulp and paper 0.0020 0.0014 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0039 0.0045 0.0047 0.0043 0.0043 0.0016 0.0024 0.0023 0.0027 0.0031 0.0036 0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0040 0.0042 0.0010
Paper products 0.0040 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0066 0.0060 0.0061 0.0078 0.0077 0.0029 0.0025 0.0024 0.0028 0.0031 0.0034 0.0044 0.0046 0.0046 0.0040 0.0044 0.0009
Publishing 0.0064 0.0105 0.0124 0.0119 0.0118 0.0229 0.0283 0.0271 0.0287 0.0302 0.0092 0.0165 0.0187 0.0211 0.0250 0.0277 0.0302 0.0322 0.0312 0.0278 0.0294 0.0055
Printing 0.0025 0.0026 0.0027 0.0032 0.0033 0.0050 0.0058 0.0066 0.0053 0.0055 0.0015 0.0029 0.0031 0.0034 0.0042 0.0048 0.0053 0.0059 0.0062 0.0050 0.0054 0.0012
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 0.0035 0.0024 0.0024 0.0020 0.0030 0.0037 0.0050 0.0062 0.0068 0.0068 0.0019 0.0147 0.0151 0.0159 0.0126 0.0148 0.0100 0.0097 0.0118 0.0136 0.0140 0.0021
Pharmaceuticals 0.0691 0.0714 0.0916 0.0704 0.0923 0.1477 0.1499 0.1666 0.2091 0.1965 0.0540 0.0146 0.0182 0.0232 0.0318 0.0357 0.0450 0.0526 0.0576 0.0613 0.0577 0.0175
Chemicals exluding pharmaceuticals 0.0037 0.0030 0.0038 0.0041 0.0046 0.0093 0.0120 0.0126 0.0158 0.0164 0.0053 0.0047 0.0051 0.0058 0.0065 0.0074 0.0093 0.0095 0.0095 0.0081 0.0088 0.0018
Rubber products 0.0027 0.0041 0.0043 0.0063 0.0065 0.0078 0.0089 0.0091 0.0068 0.0070 0.0021 0.0046 0.0049 0.0058 0.0072 0.0077 0.0097 0.0097 0.0085 0.0075 0.0080 0.0018
Plastic products 0.0095 0.0054 0.0060 0.0062 0.0066 0.0153 0.0167 0.0183 0.0122 0.0129 0.0048 0.0053 0.0059 0.0070 0.0079 0.0095 0.0116 0.0126 0.0129 0.0096 0.0105 0.0027
Glass and glass products 0.0016 0.0040 0.0049 0.0052 0.0059 0.0052 0.0056 0.0068 0.0053 0.0060 0.0014 0.0088 0.0088 0.0101 0.0108 0.0120 0.0143 0.0149 0.0142 0.0125 0.0131 0.0023
Ceramic goods & other non-metallic mineral products 0.0087 0.0063 0.0062 0.0062 0.0063 0.0102 0.0126 0.0128 0.0099 0.0096 0.0026 0.0102 0.0103 0.0111 0.0119 0.0138 0.0150 0.0148 0.0141 0.0119 0.0122 0.0018
Iron and steel 0.0012 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0027 0.0032 0.0028 0.0063 0.0068 0.0023 0.0015 0.0016 0.0019 0.0022 0.0022 0.0028 0.0032 0.0028 0.0027 0.0031 0.0006
Non-ferrous metals 0.0014 0.0004 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0068 0.0080 0.0082 0.0070 0.0070 0.0035 0.0014 0.0015 0.0018 0.0022 0.0025 0.0036 0.0038 0.0036 0.0030 0.0033 0.0009
Metal castings 0.0002 0.0016 0.0015 0.0030 0.0028 0.0026 0.0034 0.0039 0.0057 0.0063 0.0019 0.0026 0.0026 0.0033 0.0042 0.0046 0.0055 0.0056 0.0060 0.0060 0.0070 0.0015
Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery & equip. 0.0014 0.0024 0.0027 0.0026 0.0028 0.0036 0.0048 0.0052 0.0043 0.0044 0.0012 0.0037 0.0041 0.0045 0.0054 0.0061 0.0069 0.0076 0.0073 0.0068 0.0071 0.0014
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 0.0032 0.0027 0.0031 0.0030 0.0031 0.0054 0.0062 0.0066 0.0057 0.0059 0.0016 0.0044 0.0051 0.0056 0.0066 0.0073 0.0087 0.0101 0.0099 0.0094 0.0098 0.0022
Office, accounting, and computing machinery 0.0044 0.0196 0.0289 0.0363 0.0303 0.0270 0.0367 0.0362 0.0263 0.0224 0.0098 0.0064 0.0072 0.0096 0.0117 0.0112 0.0174 0.0202 0.0183 0.0155 0.0136 0.0047
Electrical machinery and apparaturs, n.e.c. 0.0052 0.0049 0.0054 0.0059 0.0053 0.0085 0.0091 0.0112 0.0091 0.0098 0.0023 0.0050 0.0057 0.0064 0.0078 0.0084 0.0085 0.0116 0.0123 0.0110 0.0119 0.0027
Radio, television, and communication equipment 0.0060 0.0025 0.0027 0.0025 0.0037 0.0128 0.0162 0.0174 0.0120 0.0112 0.0059 0.0056 0.0063 0.0071 0.0072 0.0097 0.0136 0.0161 0.0159 0.0139 0.0133 0.0041
Medical, precision, and optical instruments 0.0043 0.0044 0.0050 0.0052 0.0050 0.0079 0.0090 0.0094 0.0079 0.0076 0.0020 0.0055 0.0061 0.0070 0.0087 0.0097 0.0121 0.0133 0.0133 0.0121 0.0117 0.0030
Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 0.0027 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 0.0061 0.0067 0.0065 0.0061 0.0065 0.0027 0.0019 0.0025 0.0027 0.0037 0.0047 0.0062 0.0066 0.0061 0.0045 0.0049 0.0017
Other transport equipment 0.0013 0.0026 0.0032 0.0038 0.0036 0.0036 0.0040 0.0043 0.0039 0.0038 0.0009 0.0038 0.0055 0.0059 0.0069 0.0075 0.0098 0.0124 0.0123 0.0101 0.0098 0.0029
Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0017 0.0022 0.0025 0.0018 0.0018 0.0009 0.0047 0.0049 0.0055 0.0063 0.0069 0.0082 0.0087 0.0080 0.0068 0.0072 0.0014
Recycling 0.0000 0.0049 0.0061 0.0067 0.0049 0.0012 0.0014 0.0011 0.0013 0.0019 0.0024 0.0029 0.0033 0.0049 0.0054 0.0050 0.0092 0.0107 0.0098 0.0088 0.0110 0.0031
Electricity, steam, and hot water supply 0.0037 0.0059 0.0068 0.0075 0.0068 0.0069 0.0076 0.0064 0.0092 0.0100 0.0017 0.0080 0.0090 0.0101 0.0122 0.0134 0.0133 0.0154 0.0121 0.0099 0.0105 0.0023
Gas and gas supply 0.0015 0.0077 0.0092 0.0098 0.0127 0.0071 0.0090 0.0098 0.0093 0.0105 0.0029 0.0073 0.0071 0.0093 0.0110 0.0166 0.0222 0.0240 0.0221 0.0200 0.0224 0.0068
Collection, purification, and distribution of water 0.0000 0.0070 0.0081 0.0086 0.0092 0.0054 0.0061 0.0059 0.0043 0.0049 0.0026 0.0066 0.0074 0.0080 0.0102 0.0118 0.0116 0.0115 0.0111 0.0091 0.0104 0.0019
Construction site and civil engineering 0.0015 0.0031 0.0032 0.0027 0.0026 0.0017 0.0021 0.0024 0.0018 0.0018 0.0006 0.0052 0.0059 0.0065 0.0067 0.0075 0.0082 0.0077 0.0070 0.0064 0.0063 0.0009
Construction installation & other construction 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0014 0.0018 0.0022 0.0017 0.0017 0.0004 0.0033 0.0038 0.0039 0.0046 0.0047 0.0052 0.0055 0.0058 0.0046 0.0049 0.0008
Cross-sectoral Std. Dev. 0.0113 0.0119 0.0155 0.0127 0.0157 0.0243 0.0251 0.0277 0.0345 0.0324 0.0043 0.0044 0.0055 0.0065 0.0070 0.0089 0.0100 0.0103 0.0105 0.0101
DOSit POSit Std. Dev. 
over t
Std. Dev. 
over t
Source: Own illustration. Data: FSO, revised input-output tables (1995–2004). 
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Appendix D: Sectoral DOM vs. POM Measures 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Food products 0.1416 0.1221 0.1442 0.1181 0.1169 0.1479 0.1711 0.1660 0.2191 0.2392 0.0418 0.1317 0.1425 0.1771 0.1428 0.1383 0.1615 0.1725 0.1728 0.1912 0.2016 0.0238
Beverages 0.0931 0.1165 0.1184 0.1329 0.1308 0.1058 0.1114 0.1101 0.1115 0.1058 0.0118 0.1103 0.1087 0.1187 0.1099 0.1114 0.1334 0.1340 0.1326 0.1486 0.1461 0.0154
Tobacco products 0.1208 0.0873 0.0843 0.0720 0.1112 0.0838 0.1087 0.1058 0.0807 0.0872 0.0161 0.0945 0.0755 0.0738 0.0686 0.1343 0.0903 0.1029 0.1042 0.0950 0.1085 0.0195
Textiles 0.3591 0.2665 0.2810 0.3012 0.2924 0.3860 0.4141 0.3915 0.3689 0.3600 0.0521 0.4638 0.4446 0.4863 0.4673 0.4657 0.4923 0.4863 0.4859 0.4875 0.4798 0.0150
Wearing apparel, dressing, and dying of fur 0.4549 0.4785 0.5779 0.6177 0.4514 0.4739 0.5755 0.5617 0.4205 0.4599 0.0686 0.6082 0.5570 0.6823 0.7069 0.5990 0.6789 0.6677 0.6891 0.6452 0.7027 0.0501
Leather, leather products, and footwear 0.4309 0.4911 0.6266 0.4866 0.4541 0.4920 0.5604 0.5667 0.4780 0.4387 0.0628 0.4402 0.4560 0.5621 0.4956 0.5049 0.5624 0.6191 0.6319 0.5410 0.5640 0.0636
Wood and products of wood and cork 0.1178 0.1350 0.1488 0.1612 0.1679 0.1334 0.1298 0.1253 0.1464 0.1614 0.0170 0.2016 0.1824 0.2165 0.2199 0.2340 0.2378 0.2288 0.2192 0.2207 0.2413 0.0177
Pulp and paper 0.2994 0.2363 0.2289 0.3278 0.3155 0.4193 0.4165 0.4075 0.4286 0.4495 0.0819 0.3317 0.2832 0.3423 0.3239 0.3707 0.4537 0.4110 0.3900 0.4139 0.4215 0.0531
Paper products 0.1813 0.1620 0.1713 0.1776 0.1891 0.2285 0.2324 0.2442 0.3228 0.2979 0.0552 0.2822 0.2456 0.2904 0.2659 0.2857 0.3697 0.3753 0.3871 0.3897 0.3848 0.0582
Publishing 0.0365 0.0591 0.0528 0.0461 0.0375 0.0518 0.0562 0.0571 0.0619 0.0676 0.0101 0.0338 0.0347 0.0413 0.0383 0.0443 0.0555 0.0539 0.0580 0.0590 0.0552 0.0100
Printing 0.1611 0.1586 0.1690 0.1880 0.2033 0.2177 0.2309 0.2131 0.1916 0.1955 0.0244 0.1934 0.1612 0.1622 0.1850 0.1971 0.2539 0.2639 0.2671 0.2459 0.2459 0.0419
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 0.1878 0.2481 0.3742 0.2558 0.1912 0.2551 0.2402 0.2239 0.2747 0.2786 0.0526 0.2159 0.2113 0.2617 0.1753 0.2211 0.3726 0.2986 0.2718 0.3786 0.4497 0.0887
Pharmaceuticals 0.1353 0.1833 0.1971 0.1874 0.1864 0.1405 0.1476 0.1815 0.2454 0.2216 0.0349 0.1213 0.1343 0.1887 0.1485 0.1437 0.2216 0.3297 0.3145 0.2850 0.4839 0.1159
Chemicals exluding pharmaceuticals 0.1446 0.0981 0.1313 0.1541 0.1799 0.2451 0.2572 0.2300 0.3556 0.3788 0.0943 0.1692 0.1953 0.2518 0.2356 0.2526 0.2948 0.3160 0.2914 0.3017 0.3314 0.0529
Rubber products 0.1716 0.1831 0.2046 0.2291 0.2240 0.2531 0.2895 0.2944 0.4186 0.4409 0.0930 0.2013 0.1826 0.2123 0.2521 0.2560 0.3237 0.3280 0.3246 0.3742 0.4085 0.0766
Plastic products 0.2024 0.2081 0.2247 0.2396 0.2458 0.2862 0.3306 0.2943 0.3015 0.3319 0.0485 0.1766 0.1466 0.1610 0.1982 0.2103 0.2591 0.2735 0.2583 0.2700 0.3103 0.0552
Glass and glass products 0.1588 0.1201 0.1302 0.1291 0.1319 0.1815 0.2265 0.2134 0.2490 0.2839 0.0579 0.1441 0.1355 0.1631 0.1540 0.1574 0.2055 0.2161 0.2186 0.2083 0.2303 0.0356
Ceramic goods & other non-metallic mineral products 0.0767 0.0879 0.0934 0.0932 0.0907 0.0821 0.0973 0.0932 0.0780 0.0859 0.0070 0.1272 0.1193 0.1272 0.1287 0.1356 0.1503 0.1464 0.1441 0.1351 0.1509 0.0110
Iron and steel 0.0905 0.0789 0.0895 0.0947 0.0780 0.1095 0.1113 0.0956 0.2686 0.4123 0.1100 0.2293 0.2157 0.2650 0.2396 0.1937 0.2594 0.2506 0.2340 0.2467 0.3438 0.0397
Non-ferrous metals 0.3340 0.2914 0.3691 0.3702 0.3207 0.4417 0.4485 0.4817 0.4359 0.5321 0.0773 0.3213 0.2950 0.3981 0.3732 0.3942 0.5408 0.5102 0.5160 0.5013 0.6145 0.1044
Metal castings 0.1121 0.0707 0.1029 0.1297 0.1166 0.2646 0.2947 0.3069 0.5027 0.6695 0.1972 0.2099 0.2225 0.3216 0.2941 0.2921 0.4006 0.4019 0.3969 0.4253 0.5193 0.0971
Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery & equip. 0.1594 0.1351 0.1477 0.1629 0.1478 0.1995 0.2136 0.2127 0.2087 0.2414 0.0364 0.1763 0.1534 0.1631 0.1965 0.1981 0.2415 0.2373 0.2381 0.2537 0.2977 0.0456
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 0.1572 0.1532 0.2139 0.2053 0.2096 0.2580 0.2736 0.2763 0.2877 0.3127 0.0550 0.1644 0.1724 0.1914 0.2113 0.2208 0.2695 0.2812 0.2923 0.3037 0.3430 0.0611
Office, accounting, and computing machinery 0.2247 0.1578 0.2749 0.1553 0.0799 0.4370 0.4849 0.5032 0.4655 0.4069 0.1582 0.2471 0.2131 0.3430 0.3913 0.3738 0.6818 0.6511 0.7143 0.6963 0.6791 0.2030
Electrical machinery and apparaturs, n.e.c. 0.1242 0.1204 0.1500 0.1906 0.2065 0.2065 0.2187 0.2343 0.2511 0.2814 0.0532 0.1527 0.1515 0.1847 0.2183 0.2293 0.2696 0.3044 0.3167 0.3168 0.3706 0.0758
Radio, television, and communication equipment 0.1897 0.2011 0.2403 0.0807 0.1240 0.4120 0.4917 0.5007 0.4276 0.4407 0.1595 0.1672 0.1610 0.2101 0.1834 0.3187 0.5032 0.5141 0.5591 0.5842 0.6480 0.1952
Medical, precision, and optical instruments 0.1305 0.1382 0.1561 0.1936 0.1989 0.2672 0.3039 0.2955 0.2772 0.3101 0.0713 0.1628 0.1622 0.2112 0.2198 0.2591 0.3389 0.3644 0.3761 0.3895 0.4382 0.1010
Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 0.1553 0.1380 0.1512 0.1590 0.1919 0.2274 0.2322 0.2272 0.3083 0.3387 0.0681 0.1183 0.1407 0.1736 0.1921 0.2305 0.2776 0.2943 0.3030 0.3211 0.3546 0.0813
Other transport equipment 0.1463 0.2040 0.1799 0.1648 0.3691 0.3902 0.3821 0.3576 0.3744 0.4032 0.1078 0.1420 0.1996 0.2379 0.2786 0.3765 0.4962 0.5784 0.5920 0.5635 0.5824 0.1783
Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.1829 0.2027 0.2427 0.2956 0.2936 0.3116 0.3778 0.3846 0.3446 0.3636 0.0714 0.1916 0.1883 0.2237 0.2510 0.2663 0.3002 0.2893 0.3031 0.3012 0.3224 0.0484
Recycling 0.0104 0.0146 0.0348 0.0445 0.0415 0.0329 0.0419 0.0442 0.0510 0.0713 0.0174 0.0275 0.0258 0.0400 0.0373 0.0374 0.0686 0.0772 0.0722 0.0721 0.0897 0.0234
Electricity, steam, and hot water supply 0.0955 0.0674 0.0677 0.0734 0.0780 0.1004 0.1890 0.2420 0.4128 0.4571 0.1473 0.0715 0.0708 0.0832 0.0931 0.0953 0.1134 0.1283 0.1260 0.1421 0.1607 0.0306
Gas and gas supply 0.0136 0.0216 0.0231 0.0314 0.0448 0.0433 0.0526 0.0498 0.0531 0.0564 0.0153 0.0266 0.0216 0.0303 0.0341 0.0496 0.0804 0.0915 0.0950 0.0997 0.1285 0.0377
Collection, purification, and distribution of water 0.0540 0.0648 0.0685 0.0971 0.1025 0.0971 0.1139 0.1097 0.1028 0.1147 0.0219 0.0724 0.0742 0.0828 0.1081 0.1157 0.1261 0.1269 0.1314 0.1288 0.1532 0.0272
Construction site and civil engineering 0.0881 0.0704 0.0745 0.0750 0.0890 0.1105 0.1149 0.1042 0.0969 0.0978 0.0155 0.1405 0.1357 0.1476 0.1345 0.1455 0.1441 0.1217 0.1205 0.1278 0.1258 0.0100
Construction installation & other construction 0.1420 0.1501 0.1676 0.1898 0.1773 0.2026 0.2312 0.2211 0.2016 0.1991 0.0290 0.1877 0.1899 0.2070 0.2281 0.2260 0.2494 0.2404 0.2449 0.2503 0.2523 0.0247
Cross-sectoral Std. Dev. 0.1019 0.1036 0.1316 0.1221 0.1055 0.1315 0.1448 0.1460 0.1358 0.1508 0.1211 0.1131 0.1402 0.1366 0.1280 0.1669 0.1667 0.1754 0.1672 0.1791
DOMit POMitStd. Dev. 
over t
Std. Dev. 
over t
 
Source: Own illustration. Data: FSO, revised input-output tables (1995–2004). 
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Appendix E: Correlation per Sector 
Sector lnPOS  with lnHPS lnPOM  with lnHPM
1 0.9316 0.6367
2 0.7974 0.1888
3 0.9743 0.4938
4 0.8660 -0.6270
5 0.3774 -0.2668
6 0.7975 0.5548
7 0.8414 -0.3938
8 0.9555 -0.3943
9 0.9109 0.0625
10 0.8534 0.4093
11 0.9142 0.4707
12 0.9732 0.8299
13 0.8915 0.7139
14 0.8856 0.1969
15 0.8932 0.8416
16 0.9300 0.5367
17 0.8412 -0.2155
18 -0.0699 -0.6444
19 0.8826 0.4941
20 0.9802 0.7943
21 0.9711 -0.1708
22 0.9172 0.9690
23 0.9472 0.7441
24 0.9176 0.6081
25 0.9533 0.9161
26 0.9825 0.6371
27 0.9674 0.9607
28 0.9834 0.9814
29 0.9736 0.7621
30 0.9536 -0.4605
31 0.9789 0.9954
32 0.9203 0.7762
33 0.9869 0.9488
34 0.8916 -0.4489
35 0.5789 0.7683
36 0.8838 -0.9230
overall 0.8933 -0.0145
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Appendix F: Sectoral HPS and HPM Measures 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Food products 0.1453 0.1506 0.1523 0.1608 0.1755 0.1800 0.2023 0.2124 0.2154 0.2165 0.0286 0.4683 0.5322 0.6354 0.4693 0.4377 0.4680 0.5012 0.4993 0.5431 0.5475 0.0570
Beverages 0.3512 0.3712 0.3478 0.3584 0.3900 0.3878 0.3844 0.3947 0.3791 0.3580 0.0173 0.4940 0.4578 0.4708 0.3669 0.3491 0.4217 0.4255 0.4160 0.4576 0.4359 0.0449
Tobacco products 0.4017 0.1554 0.3882 0.4228 0.2349 0.4992 0.4992 0.4984 0.4550 0.4926 0.1195 0.3789 0.3136 0.2710 0.2101 0.4424 0.2411 0.2628 0.2667 0.2249 0.2450 0.0732
Textiles 0.0728 0.0705 0.0702 0.0769 0.0779 0.0777 0.0810 0.0912 0.0819 0.0844 0.0065 0.6177 0.6605 0.6824 0.5484 0.5259 0.4503 0.4566 0.4591 0.4572 0.4424 0.0931
Wearing apparel, dressing, and dying of fur 0.0602 0.0616 0.0615 0.0568 0.0605 0.0546 0.0600 0.0665 0.0542 0.0595 0.0036 0.3897 0.2682 0.2782 0.2250 0.2698 0.3002 0.2890 0.2914 0.2648 0.2746 0.0421
Leather, leather products, and footwear 0.0398 0.0402 0.0461 0.0402 0.0402 0.0406 0.0477 0.0478 0.0401 0.0427 0.0033 0.2574 0.2141 0.1875 0.2198 0.2453 0.2672 0.3203 0.3175 0.2533 0.2900 0.0435
Wood and products of wood and cork 0.1051 0.0993 0.0979 0.1008 0.1175 0.1185 0.1127 0.1108 0.1072 0.1091 0.0072 0.7464 0.6791 0.7560 0.6328 0.6648 0.6588 0.6526 0.6595 0.6011 0.6434 0.0480
Pulp and paper 0.0640 0.0600 0.0647 0.0715 0.0803 0.0922 0.0863 0.0917 0.0918 0.0944 0.0135 0.5230 0.5820 0.7762 0.3977 0.4825 0.4558 0.4526 0.4464 0.4714 0.4816 0.1065
Paper products 0.0788 0.0771 0.0802 0.0826 0.0880 0.0930 0.0954 0.1014 0.1032 0.1083 0.0111 0.6216 0.6300 0.7964 0.5352 0.5625 0.6278 0.6423 0.6220 0.6007 0.6190 0.0686
Publishing 0.3922 0.4220 0.4042 0.4666 0.4900 0.4659 0.4635 0.4783 0.4920 0.5153 0.0402 0.3499 0.3516 0.4092 0.3673 0.4383 0.4579 0.4324 0.4181 0.3616 0.3460 0.0423
Printing 0.1271 0.1328 0.1272 0.1413 0.1521 0.1484 0.1566 0.1735 0.1649 0.1691 0.0170 0.5407 0.5009 0.5105 0.4573 0.4992 0.5304 0.5547 0.5520 0.4906 0.5010 0.0306
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 0.3892 0.3877 0.3622 0.2839 0.3296 0.1969 0.1814 0.2345 0.3102 0.3128 0.0745 0.6908 0.5966 0.5236 0.2464 0.4505 0.7236 0.5670 0.5273 0.8808 1.1540 0.2485
Pharmaceuticals 0.1299 0.1378 0.1458 0.1993 0.2023 0.2021 0.1864 0.1950 0.2697 0.2597 0.0470 0.2981 0.3124 0.4616 0.2221 0.1995 0.3894 0.5055 0.4458 0.2944 0.4941 0.1119
Chemicals exluding pharmaceuticals 0.0993 0.1014 0.1017 0.1081 0.1216 0.1254 0.1212 0.1276 0.1321 0.1423 0.0147 0.4393 0.7112 0.9651 0.5409 0.5297 0.5610 0.5729 0.5928 0.6066 0.6332 0.1418
Rubber products 0.1131 0.1129 0.1209 0.1387 0.1462 0.1595 0.1518 0.1439 0.1605 0.1668 0.0198 0.4133 0.3802 0.4317 0.4080 0.3989 0.4965 0.4898 0.4905 0.4715 0.4783 0.0440
Plastic products 0.1169 0.1241 0.1325 0.1430 0.1612 0.1614 0.1600 0.1682 0.1631 0.1752 0.0200 0.4795 0.4425 0.4995 0.4337 0.4277 0.4937 0.4720 0.4955 0.4918 0.5478 0.0363
Glass and glass products 0.2049 0.1953 0.1974 0.2037 0.2227 0.2320 0.2295 0.2341 0.2416 0.2490 0.0193 0.4367 0.4471 0.5062 0.4184 0.4083 0.4582 0.4446 0.4487 0.3915 0.3982 0.0338
Ceramic goods & other non-metallic mineral products 0.2616 0.2581 0.2484 0.2515 0.2796 0.2588 0.2390 0.2454 0.2415 0.2430 0.0122 0.6800 0.6343 0.6075 0.5442 0.5586 0.5660 0.5266 0.5258 0.4892 0.5180 0.0589
Iron and steel 0.0377 0.0386 0.0404 0.0460 0.0435 0.0461 0.0484 0.0460 0.0517 0.0585 0.0063 0.8068 1.0116 1.3028 0.8240 0.6289 0.7738 0.7859 0.8045 0.7937 0.9882 0.1862
Non-ferrous metals 0.0399 0.0415 0.0449 0.0532 0.0576 0.0667 0.0660 0.0681 0.0658 0.0707 0.0118 0.2854 0.3552 0.4604 0.3181 0.3834 0.4616 0.4500 0.4131 0.4234 0.4778 0.0656
Metal castings 0.0688 0.0664 0.0748 0.0901 0.0941 0.0997 0.0962 0.1037 0.1138 0.1309 0.0202 0.4456 0.6811 1.0178 0.5712 0.5485 0.5419 0.5344 0.4961 0.4807 0.5158 0.1652
Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery & equip. 0.0923 0.0984 0.0931 0.1065 0.1156 0.1153 0.1188 0.1225 0.1301 0.1326 0.0145 0.5358 0.5285 0.5230 0.5531 0.5529 0.5771 0.5824 0.5802 0.6006 0.6474 0.0378
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 0.1036 0.1166 0.1130 0.1304 0.1403 0.1444 0.1576 0.1668 0.1804 0.1856 0.0285 0.4697 0.4922 0.4534 0.4712 0.4646 0.4789 0.5035 0.4927 0.5249 0.5589 0.0317
Office, accounting, and computing machinery 0.1398 0.1300 0.1366 0.1580 0.1417 0.2074 0.2075 0.1927 0.1832 0.1588 0.0298 0.0883 0.1125 0.1228 0.2828 0.3262 0.2798 0.2343 0.2323 0.1937 0.1726 0.0803
Electrical machinery and apparaturs, n.e.c. 0.1016 0.1116 0.1119 0.1316 0.1391 0.1254 0.1630 0.1800 0.1876 0.1973 0.0346 0.4264 0.4279 0.4695 0.4987 0.5117 0.5030 0.5677 0.5301 0.5005 0.5631 0.0485
Radio, television, and communication equipment 0.1201 0.1298 0.1330 0.1328 0.1770 0.2119 0.2318 0.2390 0.2456 0.2317 0.0521 0.1384 0.1141 0.1287 0.2295 0.3654 0.2809 0.2238 0.2059 0.2389 0.2550 0.0767
Medical, precision, and optical instruments 0.1296 0.1398 0.1447 0.1737 0.1893 0.2048 0.2125 0.2295 0.2416 0.2285 0.0407 0.3116 0.2954 0.3513 0.3110 0.3557 0.3999 0.4133 0.4036 0.4501 0.4484 0.0571
Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 0.0447 0.0585 0.0566 0.0734 0.0915 0.1003 0.0989 0.0969 0.0857 0.0920 0.0202 0.2604 0.3612 0.4347 0.4511 0.5183 0.6017 0.6409 0.6484 0.6323 0.6898 0.1429
Other transport equipment 0.0869 0.1118 0.1054 0.1179 0.1231 0.1361 0.1557 0.1581 0.1574 0.1521 0.0252 0.2692 0.3414 0.3733 0.3919 0.2857 0.3711 0.4346 0.4544 0.4914 0.4626 0.0746
Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.1143 0.1177 0.1158 0.1276 0.1385 0.1410 0.1424 0.1411 0.1355 0.1406 0.0115 0.4112 0.3664 0.3858 0.3660 0.3914 0.3976 0.3779 0.3681 0.3214 0.3428 0.0264
Recycling 0.0901 0.0913 0.1205 0.1276 0.1118 0.1867 0.2048 0.2136 0.2131 0.2558 0.0597 0.2083 0.2048 0.3271 0.3049 0.2718 0.5963 0.6238 0.6322 0.5702 0.7330 0.2016
Electricity, steam, and hot water supply 0.2250 0.2436 0.2415 0.2837 0.3021 0.2676 0.2939 0.2630 0.2446 0.2522 0.0251 0.3275 0.3462 0.3580 0.4931 0.4994 0.4286 0.4448 0.4375 0.4628 0.5655 0.0751
Gas and gas supply 0.1866 0.1702 0.1973 0.2259 0.3303 0.3976 0.4083 0.4022 0.4153 0.4566 0.1118 0.3311 0.2990 0.3711 0.3186 0.3610 0.4411 0.4313 0.4388 0.4275 0.4793 0.0616
Collection, purification, and distribution of water 0.1923 0.2011 0.1911 0.2403 0.2679 0.2427 0.2286 0.2287 0.2197 0.2444 0.0250 0.7198 0.7532 0.7351 0.8189 0.8288 0.6846 0.6137 0.6166 0.6127 0.6889 0.0796
Construction site and civil engineering 0.2232 0.2369 0.2373 0.2362 0.2656 0.2643 0.2278 0.2222 0.2271 0.2152 0.0170 0.9358 0.9159 0.8871 0.7365 0.8037 0.6912 0.6036 0.6163 0.6167 0.5801 0.1383
Construction installation & other construction 0.0994 0.1119 0.1070 0.1216 0.1248 0.1254 0.1243 0.1327 0.1305 0.1338 0.0114 0.6372 0.6313 0.6252 0.6097 0.6009 0.5698 0.5539 0.5511 0.5493 0.5416 0.0377
Cross-sectoral Std. Dev. 0.1012 0.0943 0.0973 0.1017 0.1030 0.1112 0.1103 0.1101 0.1109 0.1156 0.1900 0.2073 0.2525 0.1615 0.1409 0.1318 0.1246 0.1276 0.1503 0.1908
HPSit HPMitStd. Dev. 
over t
Std. Dev. 
over t
 Source: Own illustration. Data: FSO, revised input-output tables (1995–2004). 
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Appendix G: Correlation Matrix (without Outliers) 
                     lnYt lnYt-1  lnwt   lnwt  lnDOSt lnDOSt-1 lnPOSt lnPOSt-1 lnDOMt  lnDOMt-1 lnPOMt lnPOMt-1 lnHPSt lnHPSt-1  lnHPMt lnHPMt-1    
lnYt  
 
lnYt-1 
 
lnwt  
 
lnwt-1 
 
lnDOSt 
 
lnDOSt-1 
 
lnPOSt 
 
lnPOSt-1 
 
lnDOMt 
 
lnDOMt-1 
 
lnPOMt 
 
lnPOMt-1 
 
lnHPSt 
 
lnHPSt-1 
 
lnHPMt 
 
lnHPMt-1 
 
1.0000 
 
0.9954  1.0000 
 
0.1384  0.1273  1.0000 
 
0.1376  0.1266  0.9730  1.0000 
 
-0.1061 -0.1076  0.3451  0.3467  1.0000 
 
-0.0989  -0.0931  0.3468  0.3487  0.9022 1.0000 
 
-0.1290  -0.1248  0.1880  0.1873  0.7107  0.6914  1.0000 
 
-0.1218  -0.1091  0.1917  0.1885  0.7012  0.7008  0.9681  1.0000 
 
0.1528  0.1444  0.1527  0.1477 -0.1105 -0.1195 -0.3175 -0.2813  1.0000 
 
0.1321  0.1389  0.1391  0.1312 -0.1526 -0.1286 -0.3393 -0.2856  0.9356  1.0000 
 
0.0944  0.0805  0.1146  0.1046 -0.2068 -0.2092 -0.4373 -0.4053  0.8895  0.8670  1.0000 
 
0.0953  0.0929  0.0968  0.0788 -0.2270 -0.2196 -0.4556 -0.4062  0.8752  0.8935  0.9752  1.0000 
 
-0.1277  -0.1171  0.0596  0.0624  0.5926  0.5976  0.9335  0.9107 -0.4540 -0.4623 -0.5918 -0.5959  1.0000 
 
-0.1245  -0.1087  0.0618  0.0634  0.5851  0.5858  0.9061  0.9316 -0.4344 -0.4308 -0.5717 -0.5678  0.9742  1.0000 
 
0.3065 0.3011 -0.1663 -0.1350 -0.2953 -0.2704 -0.3135 -0.2959 -0.1674 -0.1926 -0.0441 -0.0597 -0.1964 -0.1887  1.0000 
 
0.2916  0.2988 -0.1913 -0.1773 -0.2854 -0.2607 -0.2806 -0.2542 -0.1237 -0.1705 -0.0561 -0.0083 -0.1599 -0.1499  0.8754  1.0000 
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Appendix H: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs   Mean  Std Dev   Min Max 
lnLt 
 
lnYt 
 
lnYt-1 
 
lnwt 
 
lnwt-1 
 
lnDOSt 
 
lnDOSt-1 
 
lnDOMt 
 
lnDOMt-1 
 
lnPOSt 
 
lnPOSt-1 
 
lnPOMt 
 
lnPOMt-1 
 
ln(IM/Y)t 
 
ln(IM/Y)t-1 
360       4.95857      1.193256     2.079442     7.375882 
 
360     10.09768      1.057592     7.352441    12.43005 
 
324     10.08927       1.05493     7.352441    12.37422 
 
360      3.684319      0.3741977     2.885917     4.724108 
 
324      3.677526      0.3706786     2.919391     4.724108 
 
347    -5.451265      1.188521   -9.113486    -1.56484 
 
312    -5.495673      1.196417   -9.113486    -1.56484 
 
360    -1.739417      0.7123115   -4.569239    -0.401197 
 
324    -1.777272       0.708497   -4.569239   -0.4675112 
 
360   -4.923661      0.7191872   -6.545177   -2.792723 
 
324    -4.942728      0.7196687   -6.545177   -2.792723 
 
360    -1.545565      0.6845935   -3.832979   -0.3364642 
 
324    -1.580076      0.6828826   -3.832979   -.3364642 
 
330    -1.291672      1.220144   -4.816542     0.9946187 
 
297    -1.307515      1.223805   -4.814771     0.9946187 
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Appendix I: Data 
The empirical analysis covers 10 observations over time for 36 manufacturing industries, which 
leads to a total number of 360 observations per variable. Input-output data at current prices are 
used to calculate offshoring intensities DOS, DOM, POS and POM, as well as domestic 
outsourcing intensities HPS and HPM. German input-output tables are disaggregated to 71 
sectors following the three-digit and, for some sectors, the four-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 
classification (German Federal Statistical Office: revised input-output tables 1995 to 2004 in 
current prices; Fachserie 18 Reihe 2). Gross output data Y is retrieved from the input-output 
tables. We calculated real output using sectoral producer price indices from the German Federal 
Statistical Office.209 Labor demand is mapped using sectoral employment data from the input-
output tables. The number of employees is preferred to the number of total employment. The 
latter considers all persons that are engaged in domestic production of a country, whereas the 
former excludes self-employed an unpaid family workers and better reflects the workforce of 
companies that is exposed to layoffs due to offshoring.  
Sector-specific labor compensation of employees is used as a measure for disaggregated wages w 
and is retrieved from the OECD STAN Industrial Database based on Federal Statistical Office 
data. Labor compensation consists of annual wages and salaries of employees at a sectoral level 
paid by producers as well as supplements such as contributions to social security, private 
pensions, health insurance, life insurance and similar schemes. Labor compensation instead of 
gross wages and salaries is chosen, since labor demand is rather driven by a firm’s entire labor 
costs. Some sectors only have wage data available at a more aggregated level. Therefore, 
disaggregation is acquired weighting the wage data by its sectoral output share.210 The data is 
divided by the respective sectoral employment to calculate average annual labor compensation 
per employee. As labor demand depends on real wages, an appropriate price index is needed. 
Therefore, sectoral producer price indices from the Federal Statistical Office are used, since 
producer prices rather than consumer prices matter.  
                                                 
209 Producer price indices are available at several aggregation levels (28, 107, and 225 sectors). Since some producer 
prices at the required input-output aggregation level were not available, we used producer prices of more 
disaggregated sectors (within the same industry) as a proxy, because similar price trends can be expected there. This 
procedure was also done in cases where years were missing.  
210 Wage data, for example, are only available for the aggregated sector Food products and beverages. The wages of 
the aggregated sector are weighted with the respective output shares of the single sectors Food products and 
Beverages in order to achieve more disaggregated sectoral wages. This procedure was done eight times in the 
following sectors: 1–2; 8–9; 10–11; 15–16; 17–18; 19–21; 32–33, and 35–36.  
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